JUDGMENT : Anant Bijay Singh, J. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The instant criminal appeal has been filed on behalf of the sole appellant Rajesh Dubey @ Rajesh Kumar Dubey under section 14(2) of the Scheduled Case and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities Act) being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the 16.01.2017 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge-I, Palamau at Daltonganj in B.P. No. 750 of 2016 arising out of Patan P.S. case no. 94/16 under sections 147, 148, 149, 302 I.P.C and section 3/5 of the SC & ST (POA) Act, 1989 whereby and where under, the court below has rejected the regular bail application of the appellant. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is as that the informant Kalawati Devi gave Fardbeyan on 25.10.2016 wherein she has alleged that on 24.10.2016 at about 7:00 p.m. his husband Bhola Paswan had gone to village to collect wages, but at about 9:00 p.m. after hearing “Hulla”, she alongwith her sons Sakendra Paswan, Chhotu Kumar and her daughter-in-law-Uma Devi came out of her house and saw that Rajesh Kumar Dubey ( Appellant), Rakesh Dubey, Ritu Dubey, Santosh Singh, Rajendra Sonar and Sheopujan Lal were assaulting her husband with Lathi-Danda. When she tried to rescue her husband, Rajesh Kumar Dubey (Appellant) abused Chhotu Kumar, son of the informant, with his caste name and threatened them on the gun point and all the accused persons taken her husband towards near the canal and after some time, all the accused persons came by a Scorpio Vehicle of Rajesh Kumar Dubey (appellant) and thrown her husband near her house, when the informant reached near his husband and thought about his treatment in the meanwhile he died. The reason of this occurrence is that her niece, Puja Kumari was adult and these accused persons used to move around her house at night, her husband opposed this and due to this fact accused persons assaulted her husband. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that during the course of investigation, the evidence of Chhotu Kumar, son of the informant has been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C on 27.10.2016 but he has given different version of the occurrence, so the case of prosecution cannot be believed. 5. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that during the course of investigation, the evidence of Chhotu Kumar, son of the informant has been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C on 27.10.2016 but he has given different version of the occurrence, so the case of prosecution cannot be believed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the police after investigation has submitted final form on 19.01.2017 in the court of J.M. Ist Class, Daltonganj (palamau) who under order dated 28.01.2017 took cognizance for the offence under sections 147, 148, 302 of the I.P.C and sections 3(i) (iii) (v) of the SC/ST Act against the appellant and other accused persons. 6. Further, it appears that learned Magistrate has not took note of the provision of amended Act of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 which received the assent of the President on 31.12.2015, published in the Gazette of India dated 01.01.2016. 7. The provision of Section 14 Chapter IV contemplates the Special Court. Section 14(1) provides that for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more districts. It further provides that the courts so established or specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of the offence under this Act. 8. Learned counsel further submitted that in view of the latest amendment, cognizance has to be taken by the Special Court, but in the instant case, cognizance has been taken by J.M. Ist Class. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2015)14 SCC 18 and referred para-15 of the said judgment, which reads as under : In Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy case, the Privy Council was examining whether failure to obtain sanction affected the competence of the court to try the accused. The contention urged was that there was a distinction between a valid institution of a prosecution on the one hand and the competence of the court to hear and determine the prosecution, on the other. The contention urged was that there was a distinction between a valid institution of a prosecution on the one hand and the competence of the court to hear and determine the prosecution, on the other. Rejecting the contention that any such distinction existed, this Court observed: “The next contention was that the failure to obtain a sanction at the most prevented the valid institution of a prosecution, but did not affect the competency of the Court to hear and determine a prosecution which in fact was brought before it. This suggested distinction between the validity of the prosecution and the competence of the Court was pressed strenuously by Mr. Page, but seems to rest on no foundation. A Court cannot be competent to hear and determine a prosecution the institution of which is prohibited by law and Section 14 prohibits the institution of a prosecution in the absence of a proper sanction. The Learned Magistrate was no doubt competent to decide whether he had jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution and for that purpose to determine whether a valid sanction had been given, but as soon as he decided that no valid sanction had been given the Court became incompetent to proceed with the matter. Their Lordships agree with the view expressed by the Federal Court in Agarwalla Case that a prosecution launched without a valid sanction is a nullity.” It was submitted that since cognizance is bad in law, the entire trail is vitiated; hence appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail. 9. Pursuant to issuance of notice, O.P.No.2 appeared and opposed the prayer for bail of the appellant on the ground that there is direct allegation of assault against the appellant and other accused persons and also the witnesses have supported the prosecution case. It was also submitted that the appellant has not challenged the order taking cognizance separately; rather he has taken the point co-laterally, which cannot be permitted. 10. It appears that case diary has been called for and the same has been received. From perusal of para-9, the statement of informant-Kalawati Devi, in para-14, the statement of Uma Devi, in para-15, the statement of witness Lalu Dubey, in para-23, the statement of Sakendra Paswan and in para-24, the statement of Chhotu Paswan have been recorded by the I.O and all the witnesses have supported the prosecution case. 11. From perusal of para-9, the statement of informant-Kalawati Devi, in para-14, the statement of Uma Devi, in para-15, the statement of witness Lalu Dubey, in para-23, the statement of Sakendra Paswan and in para-24, the statement of Chhotu Paswan have been recorded by the I.O and all the witnesses have supported the prosecution case. 11. Taking into consideration all these facts and also taking into consideration that the appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka (Supra) regarding obtaining of sanction for prosecution under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. But it appears that at the time of passing of impugned order this fact has not been challenged by the appellant, rather in the bail application, this point has been taken co-laterally, when the investigation is completed and the trial has been proceeded. 12. In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.