JUDGMENT : MIR DARA SHEKO, J. 1. Let affidavit-in-opposition filed by the learned Counsel representing the opposite parties/defendants and reply thereto filed by the learned Counsel representing the petitioner/plaintiff be kept on record. Heard Mr. Nitai Chandra Saha, being assisted by Mr. Santanu Barik, learned Advocate representing the petitioner and also heard Mr. Nirmalya Pal, being assisted by Ms. Rina Banerjee, learned Advocate representing the opposite parties. 2. The instant application, being CO 2659 of 2016 has been directed assailing the order No. 100 dated June 20, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 6th Court at Alipore in Title Suit No. 97 of 2013 rejecting on contest the application filed by the petitioner proposing amendment in the plaint with cost of Rs. 14,000/- (fourteen thousand) only in all. 3. By the impugned amendment application the petitioner proposed to incorporate one paragraph bearing the text over one alleged 'Ekrarnama' said to have been executed by the predecessor of the opposite parties and apart from other texts of said proposed amendment it was also contended "that the plaintiff states that the said Kalipada Basu was not owner of the premises No. 4, and/or 4/1A, Sabji Bagan Lane" and also had asserted "it has come within the purview of Thika Tenancy and on that course the defendants are not the owners of the said property". The aforesaid texts are in a gist amongst other elaborated texts of the purported amendment, which was rejected by the learned Trial Court with costs. 4. During course of hearing Mr. Saha tried to impress upon the Court that his client while initially filed the suit for declaration and injunction in respect of the suit premises it was filed as against the immediate predecessor for the present defendants namely, Kalipada. Basu since deceased, and at that time the number of suit was 70 of 1999 subsequently renumbered as 97 of 2013. 5. The instant suit was filed by the client of Mr. Saha for declaration that his client was lawful, bona fide and regular tenant in respect of the suit premises described in that schedule of the plaint and prayed so that, the opposite parties i.e., defendants would not be entitled to evict his client without due process of law and for other reliefs. 6. During course of hearing as also apprised by Mr. 6. During course of hearing as also apprised by Mr. Pal that during pendency of the instant suit his client, Kalipada Basu, since deceased, filed a suit for eviction against the petitioner, being Title Suit No. 25 of 2001, renumbered as 131 of 2005, and, both the suits are now pending before the same Court for trial, though not analogously. 7. Therefore, taking the very lis of both the above suits, it has come as an admitted position that the petitioner has involved himself in the litigation in advance to protect his tenancy right with regard to the property mentioned in his suit which was said to have been initiated during lifetime of Kalipada Basu, since deceased by asserting him as tenant admitting said Kalipada Babu as his landlord. Similarly the subsequent suit has been filed by the predecessor of the opposite parties i.e., Kalipada Babu during his lifetime to get his tenant i.e., the petitioner evicted within due process of law if he can succeed, and, after his demise said suit is now in the hand of the present opposite parties. Therefore, the text of the 'Ekrarnama' so far as the ownership or otherwise or the alleged case of any new story of Thika Tenancy can have no nexus with the lis of either of the two suits under reference. 8. Mr. Saha, however, apart from the text of reply relied upon the case of Santilal Dulichand Shah v. Ramesh Chandra Guzrati, reported in AIR 1981 Cal. 413 , the Division Bench judgment of this Court from where attention was drawn particularly upon two paragraph 14. From the said case of Santilal Dulichand Shah (Supra), some relevant extracts of paragraph 14 are set :- "section 116 of the Evidence Act which deals with the question of estoppel of tenant, does not strictly apply to this case for that section prohibits a tenant from repudiating the title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy.. ....... The plaintiff not being the original landlord but claiming title by inheritance is not entitled to invoke section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act on its terms. But then there may be other kinds of estoppel as between landlord and tenant even though the case may not come within the meaning of section 116. ....... ....... The plaintiff not being the original landlord but claiming title by inheritance is not entitled to invoke section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act on its terms. But then there may be other kinds of estoppel as between landlord and tenant even though the case may not come within the meaning of section 116. ....... The rule that a tenant may not dispute his landlord's title applies only to the title of the original landlord who let him in, and not to that of an assignee of the reversion and such title may be disputed by the tenant. But if the tenant has paid rent to the claiming assignee of a reversion or his agent, such payment is prima facie evidence of the title of the assignee, and the tenant, except in a case of fraud or misrepresentation, can only defeat that title by showing that he paid in ignorance and that some third person is the real assignee of the reversion, it is not enough for him to show that the claiming assignee has no title. ....... Upon a consideration of the authorities it follows, therefore, that where the person receiving the payment was not the person who let the payer into possession, but someone who is claiming this by succession, the mere act of payment as and for rent, without more, is not conclusive and does not estop the payer from afterwards repudiating the payee's title if he can explain away the payment by showing that he made it in mistake, ignorance or incomplete knowledge, of the circumstances of payee's title or of other material facts, (See the Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation by Bower 3rd Edition page 194)." 9. So the above text bearing observation of Their Lordships gave clear indication that mere act of payment of rent would not estop the payer from repudiating afterwards the payee's title if he can explain away that he made such payment by mistake or by ignorance and beyond complete knowledge. Every cited case has its own ratio for its applicability depending upon own fact. In the case on hand there is no such case that the petitioner had made payment of rent ever either by mistake, or, due to ignorance, or, beyond complete knowledge. Every cited case has its own ratio for its applicability depending upon own fact. In the case on hand there is no such case that the petitioner had made payment of rent ever either by mistake, or, due to ignorance, or, beyond complete knowledge. Rather the assertions of his own plaint have substantiated that to his knowledge he had been occupying the premises in question as tenant under his landlord by making regular payment of rent and after demise the present opposite parties who were substituted as his landlords. That apart the case of Santilal Dulichand Shah (supra) was filed by the plaintiff in the capacity as Karta of Hindu undivided family for recovery of possession of the disputed premises held by the tenant as a tenant after determination of the tenancy by service of a combined notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the fact of the suit instituted by the tenant/petitioner admitting Kalipada Basu and subsequently his heirs, as his landlords, have no identicality with the fact of the case of Santilal Dulichand Shah (supra) and that is why also the case of Santilal Dulichand Shah (supra) is distinguished. 10. Principle of amendment has been pronounced on and again through very many judge-made laws apart from having the law itself on it. Amendment in the pleadings is generally allowed provided the same is required for the purpose of adjudication of the real controversy of the suit, and, if by the text of the proposed amendment there is no chance of change in the nature and character in the suit and the plea proposed in the amendment application is not inconsistent or contrary to the assertions already set out in the plaint. 11. As it has been indicated above about the nature of the suit instituted by the petitioner, he is concerned and akin to keep his right of tenancy alive, and he may not be evicted by force or otherwise without due process of law. So he cannot be allowed to bring any record or third case of alleged Thika Tenancy - Bharitia with an attempt to attack ever jurisdiction is the civil court to try the suit if the petitioner would get success in getting his proposed amendment allowed, or, the petitioner save except his own status as already claimed can have no nexus with the text of the 'ekrarnama'. It is not also a civil suit establishing the petitioner's title by denying the same of the other side. That apart, the texts of the amendment application in gist altogether reveal inconsistent pleas to the assertions already set out in the body of the plaint filed in the year 1999 which cannot be allowed under law. This court within the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has examined the impugned order in between the lines and it is observed that learned Civil Judge (St. Division) has well appreciated the law and the reason as to why such an amendment should be rejected and it was rejected rightly with costs, since it could be well captioned as frivolous application for buying time in delaying the proceeding of the suits. 12. To summarise this court observes that the text of the proposed amendment having no necessity for the purpose of adjudication of the lis of the suit filed by the petitioner, rather the same if is allowed would alter the assertions of the plaint filed initially, and, since the text of proposed amendment if allowed cannot be merger with the original plaint due to nature of inconsistency learned trial court rightly rejected and this court accordingly upholds Order No. 100 dated June 20, 2016 with direction to learned trial court to expedite the trial of the suit and if possible simultaneously with other suit being No. 25 of 2001 (re-numbered as 131 of 2005) according to convenience of his diary by refusing unnecessary adjournment if it is approached by either of the parties. The CO is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 15,000 payable by the petitioner before learned Trial Court in favour of the opposite parties within a period of one month from this day for delaying the proceeding of the suit by filing such unnecessary frivolous application failing which the opposite parties may be at liberty to take appropriate steps in due course for realisation of costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis.