JUDGMENT : 1. When these writ petitions came up for admission on 31.05.2017, the learned Assistant Solicitor General took notice for the Union of India and the Ministries under it and the learned Special Government Pleader took notice for the State Government and Directorates under it. Since the learned counsel for the petitioners pressed for an interim order staying the Rule which is impugned in the writ petitions, the counsel on either side where heard on the prayer for interim order. 2. The first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.17803 of 2017 is a cattle trader, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.17829 of 2017 and petitioners 2 and 3 in W.P.(C) No.18064 of 2017 are meat traders and the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.18064 of 2017 is an Association of workers engaged in meat markets. 3. Rule 22 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) Rules, 2017(“the Rules”) framed by the Central Government. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (“the Act”), is under challenge in these matters. 4. 3. Rule 22 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) Rules, 2017(“the Rules”) framed by the Central Government. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 38 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (“the Act”), is under challenge in these matters. 4. Rule 22 of the Rules which deals with restrictions on sale of cattle in animal markets reads thus: “Restrictions on sale on cattle.—The Member Secretary of the Animal Market Committee shall ensure that- (a) no person shall bring to an animal market a young animal; (b) no person shall bring a cattle to an animal market unless upon arrival he has furnished a written declaration signed by the owner of the cattle or his duly authorised agent— (i) stating the name and address of the owner of the cattle, with a copy of the photo identification proof; (ii) giving details of the identification of the cattle; (iii) stating that the cattle has not been brought to market for sale for slaughter; (c) every declaration furnished to the Animal Market Committee shall be retained by it for a period of six months from the date on which it is furnished to them and the Animal Market Committee shall, on demand made by an Inspector at any reasonable time during that period, produce such declaration and allow a copy of it or an extract from it to be taken; (d) where an animal has been sold and before its removal from the animal market, the Animal Market committee shall— (i) obtain the expenses incurred for each animal, as approved by the District Animal Market Monitoring Committee, so as to provide the basic facilities for animal and people; (ii) take an undertaking that the animals are bought for agriculture purposes and not for slaughter. (iii) keep a record of name and address of the purchaser and procure his identity proof; (iv) verify that the purchaser is an agriculturist by seeing the relevant revenue document. (iii) keep a record of name and address of the purchaser and procure his identity proof; (iv) verify that the purchaser is an agriculturist by seeing the relevant revenue document. (v) ensure that the purchaser of the animal gives a declaration that he shall not sell the animal up to six months from the date of purchase and shall abide by the rules relating to transport of animals made under the Act or any other law for the time being in force; (vi) retain such record for a period of six months from the date of sale; (vii) produce such record before an inspector on demand being made by him at any reasonable time during that period and allow a copy of it or an extract from it to be taken; (e) the purchaser of the cattle shall— (i) not sell the animal or purpose of slaughter; (ii) follow the State cattle protection or preservation laws; (iii) not sacrifice the animal for any religious purpose; (iv) not sell the cattle to a person outside the State without the permission, as per the State cattle protection or preservation laws; (f) where a cattle has been sold and before its removal from the animal market, the proof of sale shall be issued in five copies, out of which first copy shall be handed over to purchaser, second copy to seller, third copy to tahsil office of the residence of purchaser, fourth copy to the Chief Veterinary Officer in the district of purchaser and last copy to be kept intact in the record by the Animal Market Committee.” As evident from Rule 22, the same not only prohibits sale of cattle in animal markets for slaughter, but also prohibits purchasers of cattle from animal markets from selling the cattle for the purpose o slaughter. ‘Animal market’ is defined in the Rules thus: “animal market” means a market place or sale-yard or any other premises or place to which animals are brought from other places and exposed for sale or auction and includes any lairage adjoining a market or a slaughterhouse and used in connection with it and any place adjoining a market used as a parking area by visitors to the market for parking vehicles and includes animal fair and cattle pound where animals are offered or displayed for sale or action. Likewise, ‘cattle’ is defined in the Rules thus: “cattle” means a bovine animal including bulls, bullocks, cows, buffalos, steers, heifersand calves and includes camels.” According to the petitioners, the Act does not prohibit slaughter of cattle for food and as such, the impugned Rule in ultra vires the Act. It is also the case of the petitioners that if at all a prohibition on slaughter of cattle has to be imposed as done in the impugned Rule, the same can be done only by the State legislature, invoking Entry 15, List II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Likewise, it is the case of the petitioners that the activities in the markets, if at all to be regulated as done in the impugned Rule, can be done only by the State legislature, invoking Entry 28, List Ii of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. As such, according to the petitioners, the impugned Rule is one issued without legislative competence as well. It is the further case of the petitioners that in so far the impugned Rule prohibits sale of cattle in animal markets for slaughter and in so far as the same prohibits purchasers of cattle from animal markets from selling the cattle for slaughter, the Rule infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners, who are engaged in the trade of cattle as also meat, under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 5. It is settled that a subordinate legislation can be challenged on grounds, viz. failure to conform to the statute under which it is made, exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling statute, lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation, violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution etc. The Act is a Central Legislation brought in, invoking Entry 17 of List III of the 7th Schedule viz. “Prevention of cruelty to a animas”. Section 38 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make Rules to carryout the purposes of the Act. The preamble of the Act indicates that the same was introduced to prevent the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering on animals. Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act makes the various acts of cruelty to animals referred to therein as a punishable offence. The preamble of the Act indicates that the same was introduced to prevent the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering on animals. Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act makes the various acts of cruelty to animals referred to therein as a punishable offence. Clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 11, however, clarifies that the commission or omission of any act in the course of the destruction or the preparation for destruction of any animal as food for mankind, unless such destruction or preparation was accompanied by the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, would not fell within the ambit of the said section. In other words, as contended by the petitioners, the statute does not prohibit slaughter of animal for food. As noted above, the impugned Rule prohibits sale of cattle in animal markets for slaughter. It also prohibits purchasers of cattle from animal market from selling the cattle for the purpose of slaughter. In so far as the Rules do not prohibit slaughter of cattle, it cannot be contended that the Rule is directly in conflict with the provisions of the Act. However, it is also trite that a court will have to consider the nature and object as also the scheme of the enabling statute while considering the issue as to whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. As noted above, the object of the Act is only to prevent infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering on animals. That being the object of the statute, there is for in the contention advanced by the petitioners that the impugned Rule, which prohibits sale of cattle for slaughter in cattle markers and prohibits the purchasers of cattle from cattle markets from selling the same for the purpose of slaughter, is beyond the scope of the Act and thus ultra vires the Act, which neither deals with livestock nor with regulation of the activities in markets. It is all the more so since slaughtering is a permissible activity under the Act. It is all the more so since slaughtering is a permissible activity under the Act. Further, preservation, protection and improvement of livestock and regulation of markets being State subjects falling under Entries 15 and 28 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, there is also force in the contention advanced by the petitioners that the Central Government cannot make a subordinate legislation as in the instant case prohibiting trade of cattle for slaughter in animal markets, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 38 of the Act, which is only a legislation brought in with a view to prevent cruelty to animals with a provision excluding slaughtering of cattle for food from the ambit of the Act. Further, it is seen that even though there is no prohibition as such in the Ruler for slaughter, it is seen that the exhaustive definition given in the Rules for ‘animal market’ has created a situation where only those persons who rear cattle in their houses/farms alone would be able to slaughter them. The specific case of the petitioners is that 90% of the cattle for slaughter are sourced from animal markets and therefore the impugned Rule in effect a ban on slaughter of cattle and hence the same infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to thousands of people who are involved in the trade of cattle and meat. If the said case of the petitioners is correct, the contention of the petitioners that the same infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners and similarly placed persons under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is also a contention to be considered seriously. In the course of the argument, it was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned Rule wood make the agricultural activities unprofitable, as the farmers are able to generate some income by sale of cattle for slaughter which cannot be used for their agricultural activities. Likewise, it is also pointed out that if the cattle which cannot be used for agricultural activities are not permitted to be slaughtered, such cattle would be a social menace after some time. Again, it was pointed out that since meat is one of the main food articles in the States, the impugned Rule would result in scarcity of meat and related issued. Again, it was pointed out that since meat is one of the main food articles in the States, the impugned Rule would result in scarcity of meat and related issued. I am not considering those arguments, as the same are not relevant in the context of the main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. It was held by the apex court in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P.Krishnamurthy and others [ (2006) 4 SCC 517 ] that where a Rule is directly inconsistent with the mandatory provision of the statute, the task of the court is simple and easy, but where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court has to proceed with caution before declaring its invalidity. In the instant case, as found earlier, the impugned rule is not directly inconsistent with any of he provisions contained in the statute. Further, in Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat [ (2008) 5 SCC 33 ], the Apex Court held that the court should exercise judicial restraint while judging the constitutional validity of legislations including delegated legislations as there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of statutes as well as delegated legislation, and it is only when there is a clear violation of a constitutional provision (or of the parent statute, in the case of delegated legislation) beyond reasonable doubt, that the court should declare it to be unconstitutional. Likewise, in Bhavesh D. Parish v. Union of India [ (2000) 5 SCC 471 ], in the context of passing interim orders in matters challenging pieces of legislation, the Apex Court observed that merely because a statute comes up for examination and some arguable point is raised, which persuades the courts to consider the controversy, the legislative will should not normally be put under suspension pending such consideration, for, there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutional validity of any legislation, unless the same is set aside after final hearing. Of course, the said observation was made in the context of a legislation relating to an economic reform. 7. Of course, the said observation was made in the context of a legislation relating to an economic reform. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances, even though this Court finds a strong prima facie case for the petitioners, in the light of the principles referred to in paragraph 6 above, this Court is not inclined to put on hold the impugned Rule pending consideration of the matters. At the same time, this Court is of the view that since it is alleged that 90% of the cattle which are slaughtered for food are sourced from animal markets and that thousands of people are depending for their livelihood, the income from the trade of cattle and meat, these matters need to be heard out of turn, on a priority basis, at the earliest point of time. In the circumstances, the writ petitions are admitted and since notice has been taken for all the respondents by the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India and the learned Special Government Pleader, the registry is directed to list these matters for final disposal on 28.6.2017. Counter affidavits, if any, shall be filled in the meanwhile.