JUDGMENT : Nirmaljit Kaur, J. 1. As per the advertisement dated 02.08.2013 an applicant should submit the proof of passing the requisite education qualification before the written examination held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. The petitioner was pursuing the B.Ed. Examination at the time of filing the application form. The first examination for the post of School Lecturer (Commerce) was held on 12.07.2014. The last examination for the said recruitment examination was held on 27.09.2014. The result of the B.Ed examination was declared on 25.09.2014 and the petitioner submitted her certificate of B.Ed examination on 25.09.2014 i.e. before the last date of the recruitment examination. The result of the petitioner was declared and she was found in merit. However, the appointment order was not issued to her on account of the fact that she did not have the requisite qualification on the date of the examination when the examination for the post of School Lecturer (Commerce) commenced. It is contended that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Smt. Manju Chhaba vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 34/2015) decided on 10.09.2015 and said judgment has also been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer vs. Smt. Manju Chhaba and Others (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 127/2016) decided on 04.04.2016. 2. Learned counsel for the respondents, although does not dispute that the matte is covered but opposed the same by submitting that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition almost after two years as the result was declared on 27.03.2015 and even the revised list was declared on 10.07.2015. The petitioner was informed on an application moved by her under the Right to Information Act on 29.07.2015 that her candidature was rejected on the ground of not having requisite qualification as on the date of the examination. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the vacancies for the subsequent year have also been advertised meanwhile. 3. Heard. 4. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the vacancies for the subsequent year have also been advertised meanwhile. 3. Heard. 4. It is not disputed that the case of the petitioner is covered by the ratio of the said judgment in the case of Manju Chaba (supra) but still the petitioner cannot be granted the same relief in view of the delay and latches in the facts of the present case. As per the reply, the petitioner was informed about the cancellation of her candidature on 29.07.2015. She did not approach the Court till 25.05.2016 and that too only after the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Manju Chaba (supra). Thus, the petitioner cannot seek the same treatment as Manju Chaba (supra) as she had come well in time and the protection by way of interim relief was also granted to her. However, the petitioner has come after almost 10 months of the order rejecting his candidature and nor any interim order was passed in her favour. Meanwhile, the selection has been finalized. 5. The Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (Civil Appeal No. 9849 of 2014) decided on 17.10.2014 while dealing with the question of delay and latches held that in such like cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent specially when the claimants lost time and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions by holding that:- "(23) The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: (1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of latches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and latches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim." 6. Similarly, the observations of the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mithi Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal and Others (W.P. No. 14028 of 2013) and other connected petitions decided on 20.01.2014 are most relevant:- "The inviolable conclusion deducible from the above noted decisions are that the stale and dead claims should not be encouraged in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A line of distinction is to be drawn between a vigilant and a non-vigilant litigant and they cannot be equated on the same footing. A litigant who was sitting on a fence and waiting for the result of the litigation initiated by other litigant promptly and after the favourable result approaches the Court to seek equality, should not be encouraged. Delay and latches is one of the important factor to push away the recalcitrant or invoible litigant who was watching the proceeding of the other and ventilated the grievance only after a favourable decision is obtained by the other litigant. The plea of inordinate delay is not applicable in case of an infringement of the fundamental rights. The proceeding may attract dismissal, more so, when a third parties right are created in interregnum. It is not an inflexible rule but depends upon the rational and satisfactory explanation and, therefore, varies from case to case." 7. The plea of inordinate delay is not applicable in case of an infringement of the fundamental rights. The proceeding may attract dismissal, more so, when a third parties right are created in interregnum. It is not an inflexible rule but depends upon the rational and satisfactory explanation and, therefore, varies from case to case." 7. Even, in the case of Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India, 1994 SCC Supl. (2) 195 the Apex Court in para 8 held that: "8. The petitioner sought to contend that because of latches on his part, no third party rights have intervened and that by granting relief to the petitioner no other person's rights are going to be affected. He also cited certain decisions to that effect. This plea ignores the fact that the said consideration is only one of the considerations which the court will take into account while determining whether a writ petition suffers from latches. It is not the only consideration. It is a well-settled policy of law that the parties should pursue their rights and remedies promptly and not sleep over their rights. That is the whole policy behind the Limitation Act and other rules of limitation. If they choose to sleep over their rights and remedies for an inordinately long time, the court may well choose to decline to interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that is what precisely the Delhi High Court has done. We cannot say that the High Court was not entitled to say so in its discretion." 8. In the present case also, the petitioner waited till the decision of Manju Chhaba's case for almost 10 months. The petitioner has not only come after almost 10 months of the cause of action having arisen to her but even the vacancies for the subsequent years has been advertised. 9. This Court has earlier also dismissed the S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6963 of 2016 (Mukesh Meghwal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others) decided on 06.03.2017 almost on similar identical facts. 10. In view of the above discussion, the present writ petition is also dismissed on account of delay and latches.