JUDGMENT : Debi Prosad Dey, J. 1. The appellant having been charged with commission of offence punishable under sections 376/323/506-II/504, Indian Penal Code (hereafter IPC), faced trial in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair. The prosecution failed to prove the charges under sections 323/506-II/504, IPC. However, the learned judge convicted the appellant for committing rape of the prosecutrix (hereafter the victim) and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 (ten) years with fine of Rs.4,000/, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for 4 (four) months more. Appalled by the judgment and order dated November 27, 2013, signed by the learned judge on November 28, 2013, this appeal under section 374(2), Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter Cr.P.C.) has been presented by the appellant before this Court imploring that he is innocent and having been falsely implicated and unreasonably convicted, he ought to be set free immediately. 2. The records reveal that on the complaint of the victim, Campbell Bay Police Station registered an F.I.R. on June 12, 2010, bearing no. 37 of 2010, under sections 376/323/504/506, IPC against the appellant. It was alleged in such complaint that the victim, a staff (sales-girl) of a local jewellery shop, was returning home at about 17.30 hours on June 11, 2010 after close of working hours at 17.00 hours; that, the appellant, driving a Maruti Omni bearing registration no. 37 of 2010, under sections 376/323/504/506, IPC against the appellant. It was alleged in such complaint that the victim, a staff (sales-girl) of a local jewellery shop, was returning home at about 17.30 hours on June 11, 2010 after close of working hours at 17.00 hours; that, the appellant, driving a Maruti Omni bearing registration no. AN-01F/0329 (hereafter the Omni), offered a lift to the victim to her residence; that, the victim was familiar with the appellant and hence boarded the Omni and sat on the front seat; that, instead of driving the Omni towards Rajiv Nagar, where the victim’s residence is located, the appellant proceeded towards Gudda Basti; that, the victim protested and asked the appellant to turn the Omni; that, after turning the Omni, the appellant drove it a little far, stopped it where no houses were nearby and started oppressing the victim; that, the victim got scared and wanted to urinate; that, although the appellant allowed the victim to respond to nature’s call, he caught hold of the victim from behind while she was tying the ‘nada’ of her salwar; that, upon lifting her up and throwing her on the front seat of the Omni, the appellant took off her salwar and threw it away; that, in the process one of the bangles worn by the victim broke and while she was trying to save herself, half of her body towards the leg came out and in the same condition the appellant pressed her and raped her; that, the victim thereafter wore her salwar and started crying whereupon the appellant grabbed her by the hair and slapped her vigorously on her cheeks; that, the appellant abused the victim by threatening her to be raped by calling four or five boys, kill her and throw her body away; that, feeling scared, the victim sat silently and near about 00.30 hours the appellant dropped her near her residence at Rajeev Nagar by the Omni and went away; and that, on return she narrated the incident to her family members (except mother, who was not at home) but could not report to the police because of the odd hours of night. 3. Upon registration of the F.I.R., the victim was medically examined by a medical officer posted at Primary Health Centre, Campbell Bay (PW-11) near about 11.30 hours. 3. Upon registration of the F.I.R., the victim was medically examined by a medical officer posted at Primary Health Centre, Campbell Bay (PW-11) near about 11.30 hours. The medical report prepared by PW-11 was exhibited in course of trial (Ext.22). The signature thereon (Ext.22/1) was identified by PW-11 as her signature. The opinion recorded in Ext.22 reveals that the victim, aged 25 years, was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. PW-11 also found “mild injury in the left side of fourchette’s of the vagina and congestion over the vestibule of the vagina”. The hymen was, however, found to be intact and there was no sign of injury. 4. The victim was also produced before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Campbell Bay, Nicobar on June 14, 2010 for recording of her statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. Reading the statement (Ext.4), it appears that there were an alteration and an addition from/in the F.I.R. version. While in the complaint the victim had alleged that she was thrown inside the Omni by the appellant upon application of force, she stated before the judicial magistrate that she had with difficulty escaped from the appellant and sat in the front seat of the Omni. The addition was the victim’s statement that she did not get her knickers and reached her house only wearing salwar. 5. Once the case was committed to sessions, charges were framed with promptitude and trial commenced. In all, 14 (fourteen) witnesses adduced evidence on behalf of the prosecution. From the trend of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the appellant and the answers given to questions posed to him by the learned judge under section 313, Cr.P.C., it is clear as crystal that the appellant was in denial mode. 6. The learned judge while returning the finding of guilt, as aforesaid, analyzed the evidence tendered on behalf of the prosecution, looked into authorities on medical jurisprudence and considered judicial precedents that were cited. 7. Such finding has been attacked by Mr. Krishna Rao, learned advocate for the appellant by submitting that vital pieces of evidence have been overlooked by the learned judge resulting in an erroneous finding being returned that the appellant was guilty of rape. 7. Such finding has been attacked by Mr. Krishna Rao, learned advocate for the appellant by submitting that vital pieces of evidence have been overlooked by the learned judge resulting in an erroneous finding being returned that the appellant was guilty of rape. He urged that the version of the victim that she had been raped by the appellant should not be believed in view of the following circumstances: (i) The appellant had allowed the victim to attend to nature’s call and she had the opportunity to flee; instead thereof, she urinated only 5/6 steps from the Omni. It cannot thus be believed that the appellant had any intention to commit forcible intercourse. (ii) While running towards the Omni after passing urine the victim had another opportunity to flee since, according to her, the appellant was misbehaving with her but despite the same, she entered in the Omni and sat on the front seat. (iii) Although the appellant alleged that half of her body was out of the Omni and she was resisting the appellant from forcing himself upon her, mysteriously no injury was suffered by any of them and hence the plea of the victim is not believable. (iv) Despite alleged assault by the appellant by slapping the victim on her cheeks, getting hold of her by her hair and the bangles being broken in the process, the medical report (Ext.22) does not reveal that the victim sustained any external injury on her body parts. (v) If indeed the victim resisted the appellant from forcing himself upon her, as alleged, there should have been nail marks on the appellant which were not found on his person. (vi) Description of the place of occurrence differs in the F.I.R. version and the version in course of the examination-in-chief. (vii) According to the victim, she was with the appellant from 17.30 hours of June 11, 2010 till 00.30 hours of the following day. Surprisingly, no explanation was proferred by the victim, if not minute by minute, but hour by hour, what happened during the entire course of 7 (seven) hours the victim and the appellant were together. (viii) The version of PW-8, a local man known to the family of the victim, was that he had been called by the victim’s younger brother (PW-4) when the victim did not return home till 22.00 hours. (viii) The version of PW-8, a local man known to the family of the victim, was that he had been called by the victim’s younger brother (PW-4) when the victim did not return home till 22.00 hours. They searched for the victim and when they returned home at 00.30 hours, they found the victim crying. The victim did not disclose on enquiry why she was late or what had happened to her. PW-4 went to sleep but PW-8 stayed back and in course of repeated questioning, the victim told him that the appellant had raped her. The victim had neither stated about the presence of PW-8 at her residence after she returned home nor stated about any disclosure made to PW-8, either in the F.I.R. or in course of deposition in court. This is sufficient to create real doubt about the credit-worthiness of the prosecution witnesses. (ix) The bangles of the victim that were allegedly broken and seized by the investigating officer (PW-12) were not produced in court and hence such seizure was not proved. (x) Lodging of the written complaint at 10.00 hours of June 12, 2010 constitutes delay in registration of F.I.R., which is fatal for the prosecution case. (xi) The charges under sections 323/506-II/504, IPC not having been held to be proved and such finding having attained finality by reason of the State not preferring any appeal there against, the allegation that the appellant only committed rape without threat/assault is hardly believable. (xii) The version of PW-12 leads one to the definite conclusion that the victim has come out with an embellished version before the court, which is at clear variance with her statement recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. (xiii) The C.F.S.L. report did not find any semen in the underwear of the appellant that he allegedly wore on the date of the incident and which was seized. 8. Relying on the decision reported in (1977) 3 SCC 41 (Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa), Mr. Rao submitted that the circumstances proved suggest that the victim and the appellant may have had physical intercourse with the consent of the former and, therefore, the finding of rape is unsustainable in law. 8. Relying on the decision reported in (1977) 3 SCC 41 (Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa), Mr. Rao submitted that the circumstances proved suggest that the victim and the appellant may have had physical intercourse with the consent of the former and, therefore, the finding of rape is unsustainable in law. The decision reported in (1990) 4 SCC 692 (Baldev Singh v. The State of Punjab) was relied on by him for the proposition that a statement recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. could be used for contradicting a witness in the manner prescribed in the proviso to section 162(1) thereof. The decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court reported in 1992 Cr.L.J. 1666 (Biram Soren v. State of West Bengal) was cited where the conviction under section 376, IPC was set aside on the ground of the physical intercourse being found to be a consensual act. 9. Mr. Rao accordingly prayed that the appellant be held not guilty of rape and the conviction and sentence be set aside. 10. Mr. Khan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State advanced a short submission. According to him, there was no reason for the victim to falsely implicate the appellant, for, there is no evidence of any previous enmity. PW-6 saw the victim boarding the Omni driven by the appellant and proceeding further. The evidence of the victim read with the evidence of PW-11 is sufficient to record a finding of guilt against the appellant under section 376, IPC. Relying on the decision reported in (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 240 [Mohd. Imran Khan v. State Government (NCT of Delhi)], he submitted that if on the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case it is disclosed that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence and nailing the accused. He, thus, urged us to maintain the conviction and the sentence upon examination of the evidence on record. 11. The parties have been heard with patience and the materials on record perused with meticulous care so as to obviate any possible slip in appreciation of the evidence tendered at the trial. 12. He, thus, urged us to maintain the conviction and the sentence upon examination of the evidence on record. 11. The parties have been heard with patience and the materials on record perused with meticulous care so as to obviate any possible slip in appreciation of the evidence tendered at the trial. 12. At the outset we have reminded ourselves of the settled law that in a trial for proving an offence punishable under section 376, IPC, the statement of the victim, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, needs no corroboration and the court may convict the accused on the basis of her sole testimony. Should any authority be required, one may refer to Mohd. Imran Khan (supra) cited by Mr. Khan. The decision reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj) also lays down the law that if the prosecutrix is believed to be a truthful witness in her deposition, no further corroboration may be insisted upon; if at all, corroboration from other witnesses could be looked for as a rule of prudence. 13. Also, for our guidance, we have a decision of more or less recent origin reported in (2012) 7 SCC 171 [Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)]. Upon consideration of numerous authorities on the point, the Court ruled as follows: “28. The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses which are not of a substantial character. 29. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witnesses have falsely implicated the accused. The prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witnesses have falsely implicated the accused. The prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143 , and Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 ). 30. The prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. The conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court has reason not to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix’s case becomes liable to be rejected. 31. The court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence in totality of the background of the entire case and not in the isolation. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtues/unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the court is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of.” (italics in original) 14. What has to be borne in mind while dealing with rape cases is that no girl/woman would like to jeopardize her entire future by falsely implicating a person of forcible sexual intercourse. After all, the girl/woman would lose face and compelled to bear it for the rest of her life. What has to be borne in mind while dealing with rape cases is that no girl/woman would like to jeopardize her entire future by falsely implicating a person of forcible sexual intercourse. After all, the girl/woman would lose face and compelled to bear it for the rest of her life. It is difficult to perceive that a young unmarried woman, without there being any enmity factor, will put her reputation in peril by alleging falsely about forcible sexual assault. The caution, therefore, that has to be exercised in regard to a sensitive case like rape, as of necessity, must be of a very high degree. 15. At the same time, it is a cardinal principle of criminal justice that unless proved guilty an accused is presumed to be innocent. It is also fundamental that it is for the prosecution to lead evidence that is cogent, reliable and trustworthy to nail the accused. In a case where the accused is charged with rape and he is convicted and sentenced, and thereby the prosecution version receives a stamp of approval, it is indeed an onerous task for the appellate court (should such conviction and sentence be carried in appeal) to upset the judgment of the trial court and record an acquittal having regard to the authorities noted above. 16. However, the requirement of the court to be cautious does not mean that the appellate court cannot disturb a finding of conviction. Too many lacunae in the prosecution case making the prosecution story inherently improbable backed by compelling rationale may justify the appellate court to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused while upsetting the conviction recorded. 17. In its decision reported in (2008) 15 SCC 133 , the Supreme Court has sounded caution in the following words: “11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication … there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” 18. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication … there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” 18. Thus, to disbelieve the prosecutrix, there must be some evidence on record to create real doubt/disbelief/suspicion in her evidence, which would persuade a prudent person not to reach a conclusion of guilt based thereon. In other words, the version of the prosecutrix must be so patently absurd or inherently improbable or outrageously illogical that it would tilt the scales in favour of the accused warranting interference. 19. Since the statement of a girl/woman who is alleged to have been raped can form the foundation of a conviction without corroboration, it ought to be our endeavour to examine the version of the victim, PW-1 on behalf of the prosecution, and then decide in the light of the other evidence on record and the inferences that can legitimately be drawn as to whether the same can be relied on, without or with corroboration, for upholding the conviction and the sentence, or the appellant’s version that he is innocent should be accepted and his acquittal ordered. 20. We shall now proceed to embark on our journey keeping in mind the aforesaid well-settled principles. 21. In course of examination-in-chief, the version of the victim relatable to the crime in material aspects is found not to be wholly inconsistent with what she said in the F.I.R. as well as what was recorded by the magistrate under section 164, Cr.P.C. She also referred to her medical examination, certain seizures effected by the investigating officer and her statement before the judicial magistrate. She identified the wearing apparels she was wearing on the fateful day (except the knickers which, according to her, the appellant had thrown away and was not found) as well as those (T-shirt and trouser) worn by the appellant, upon the same being shown to her in court as seized articles. In course of cross-examination, the victim more or less stood by her version in chief. Insofar as reaching the Omni after passing urine is concerned, the victim repeated that the front seat was 5/6 steps ahead and that she went to the seat running but before the door could be closed, the appellant caught hold of her. 22. In course of cross-examination, the victim more or less stood by her version in chief. Insofar as reaching the Omni after passing urine is concerned, the victim repeated that the front seat was 5/6 steps ahead and that she went to the seat running but before the door could be closed, the appellant caught hold of her. 22. Scanning the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 (father of the victim), PW- 4 (brother of the victim), PW-7 (owner of the jewellery shop where the victim was a staff), PW-8 (local man and acquaintance of the victim’s family) and PW-12 (the investigating officer) and other evidence on record, the sequence of events right from the time the victim left her workplace at 17.15 hours may be reconstructed bearing in mind the distance between the points that the witnesses referred to in their evidence. For proper appreciation, the same are summarized hereunder: a. The victim left the jewellery shop on the date of occurrence at 17.15 hours (x-exmn. of PW-7); b. Distance between the jewellery shop and the residence of the victim is 3 Km. (x-exmn. of PW-1); c. Distance between the jewellery shop and the residence of the victim is 2 Km. (x-exmn. of PW-7); d. Distance between Coast Guard School and the residence of the victim is about 2/2.5 Km. (x-exmn. of PW-1); e. Distance between Coast Guard School and the jewellery shop is about .5 Km. (x-exmn. of PW-1); f. The victim was offered a lift by the appellant at about 17.30 hours when she reached Coast Guard School (PW-1); g. After the victim boarded the Omni, the appellant drove it towards Gudda Basti, and not Rajiv Nagar, and it was near Hanuman Chowk, which was 10/12 yards away, that the appellant was asked by the victim to stop (PW-1); h. That instead of listening to the cries of the victim and stopping the Omni, the appellant drove further “towards distance of 10/12Km” when bad road conditions stopped him from driving further (PW-1); i. The appellant turned his vehicle and changed direction, and proceeding “2 Kms towards backside”, when it was dark, he stopped on the left side at a place covered by jungle (x-exmn. of PW-1); j. After the victim had urinated and was tying the nada of her salwar, the appellant caught hold of her from behind and applied force on her (PW-1); k. The victim also, applying force, freed herself and “entered inside the vehicle” but at the time she was “closing the door”, the appellant “caught hold of the door”, then “caught hold of” her legs, dragged her out resulting “in half portion of body comprising” her legs coming “out of the vehicle” and upon removing her underwear and salwar and throwing them away, the appellant “started committing rape” upon her (PW-1); l. The victim failed to recollect how long she took to pass urine (xexmn. of PW-1); m. After committing rape, the appellant assaulted the victim and also threatened her [in the manner stated in the F.I.R. (not repeated for brevity)] (PW-1); n. By the time the victim was threatened, “it already became 12.30 pm night” and the appellant kept the victim “seated for long more time” and after that he took the victim near her house “and fled away” (PW-1); o. After the occurrence, the victim once again sat in the vehicle and the appellant proceeded towards her residence and dropped her 40/50 steps away from her house (x-exmn. of PW- 1); p. The victim upon returning home narrated her ordeal to her father (PW-2) but since he was drunk he could not understand (PW-1); q. PW-4 and PW-8 returned at about 00.30 hours at the residence of the victim to find her back (PW-4 and PW-8); r. After PW-4 went to sleep, PW-1 told PW-8 about the incident of rape committed by the appellant, whereupon PW-8 advised the victim to report to the police station but since it was 02.00/02.30 hours, the victim preferred to wait till morning to report (PW-8); s. PW-8 again reached the residence of the victim at 05.30 hours in the morning and narrated her ordeal to PW-2 who then sent PW-4 for calling the victim’s mother (PW-8); t. At 10.00 hours, the written complaint was lodged by the victim, whereafter she was taken for medical examination at about 10.30 hours and PW-11 on medical examination gave her report (Ext.22); u. The victim was also taken to the place of occurrence where photographs were taken; v. At 13.00 hours, the police took the victim to her residence from where her wearing apparels including, inter alia, a ‘sameez’ were seized (PW-1); w. PW-7 was a witness to seizure of the ‘sameez’ (Ext.VIII) which was “stained with mud” (PW-7); x. Distance between Rajiv Nagar and the police station is equal to a distance of a journey on foot for about 10/15 minutes (PW-8); y. Distance between the police station and the place of occurrence is about 3 Km. (PW-8); and z. The place of occurrence was about 2 Km. from police station, Campbell Bay (PW-12). 23. In view of the consistency regarding the distances between one point and another noticed in sl. nos. (a) to (e) above, as testified by the victim and PW-7, it would be reasonable to proceed on the premise that the victim had a clear idea regarding the distance she had to cover on her return journey from the workplace. According to PW-4, the victim used to leave for her workplace at 08.00 hours and return at 18.00 hours. From the place where the appellant gave the victim a lift at 17.30 hours, her residence was at the most 2/2.5 Km away which on foot, by any reasonable estimate, could take no more than an hour. According to PW-4, the victim used to leave for her workplace at 08.00 hours and return at 18.00 hours. From the place where the appellant gave the victim a lift at 17.30 hours, her residence was at the most 2/2.5 Km away which on foot, by any reasonable estimate, could take no more than an hour. Interestingly, as per the version of a private worker (PW-6), the victim was seen by him to board the Omni “in front of Romy Mill” and it would take 10/15 minutes “from the place of Romy Mill” to reach the residence of the victim on foot. Be that as it may, had she not accepted lift, in all probability the victim would have been home not later than 18.30 hours. Till 22.00 hours, none in the victim’s family made any effort to find out why she had not returned. There is no contra evidence that at times the victim returned home late. The time since when the victim’s mother left home is also not available and her father (PW-2) was drunk and went to sleep before the victim reached home. We shall assume that the victim’s parents had good reason not to react. It was the victim’s younger brother (PW-4) who made a call on a mobile phone to PW-8, staying at a distance of 2/3 Km, and he came after 10/15 minutes and both of them started searching for the victim. So far, so good. 24. However, what needs to be closely scrutinized at this stage is the victim’s version. The version of the victim that she entered the Omni driven by the appellant near Coast Guard School is corroborated by PW-6. He, however, said that the Omni, driven by the appellant, “proceeded at high speed towards Rajeev Nagar”. Since the victim spoke of a bifurcation ahead of the spot from where she boarded the Omni, one way leading to Rajeev Nagar and the other to Gudda Basti, it would be unfair for us to hold that PW-6 was right in saying that the Omni proceeded towards Rajeev Nagar. It could have proceeded towards Gudda Basti too. Nothing, therefore, turns on the deposition of PW-6 except that the appellant and the victim were last seen together by PW-6. It could have proceeded towards Gudda Basti too. Nothing, therefore, turns on the deposition of PW-6 except that the appellant and the victim were last seen together by PW-6. The victim deposed that the appellant had driven 10/12 Km from Gudda Basti, found the road in bad condition and turned the Omni, drove 2 Km “backside” and stopped it at the place of occurrence. The dark grey clouds of improbability start gathering from here, rendering the prosecution story doubtful. 25. If indeed the appellant instead of dropping the victim at her residence had deviated therefrom and driven the Omni with the victim on board “up to a long way” [the distance covered being 10/12 Km (x-exmn. of PW-1)], it is rather strange that she did not sound any alarm all the way attracting attention of passers-by to help her. Although the victim stated to have “raised cries” (in x-exam.), that was immediately when the appellant had taken the road towards Gudda Basti from Hanuman Chowk and not during the “long way” that was covered by the appellant while driving 10/12 Km. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that an Omni is not a vehicle fitted with ‘power window’ and ‘central locking system’ and, thus, could not have been locked at the driver’s end. The glass pane could have been brought down manually by the victim and an alarm sounded. There is no such evidence on record. 26. Next, assuming the prosecution version that the appellant dragged the victim by her legs as a result whereof the lower part of her body came out of the vehicle and in that position the appellant forced himself upon her is correct, the inescapable conclusion is that the upper part of the victim’s body was inside the car. It is also the prosecution version that the appellant removed the underwear and the salwar of the victim and threw them away. There is no evidence that the kameez and the sameez worn by the victim had also been removed. If that be so and bearing in mind that a kameez is worn over a sameez, how the sameez that was seized on June 13, 2010 by PW-12 in the presence of PWs 7 and 8 could be “stained with mud” (as stated by PW-7 in evidence in chief) and the kameez not so stained, has not been explained by the prosecution. From the circumstances proved, as discussed in this paragraph, a couple of other seemingly distressing factors have drawn our attention. Should any woman be sought to be ravished by a man against her consent, it is natural that there would be a scuffle and such woman would put up at least some sort of resistance by striking or biting or scratching the body of the man. Here, the injury report (Ext.21) prepared by PW- 9 (the doctor) did not reveal any external injury on the body of the appellant and he was found to be conscious, oriented and cooperative. Similarly, an attempt to escape from the clutches of the man would be the normal reaction of a woman of ordinary prudence. Although one may not always be successful, an attempt to escape would lend credence to the prosecution case. The evidence of the victim in this case sheds no light on these aspects and her version becomes liable to be viewed with some degree of suspicion considering the long hours the two spent together. 27. Further, the medical report of the victim (Ext.22) prepared by PW-11 reveals that the “hymen” of the victim was “intact” with “no sign of injury” although the answer given by PW-11 while replying to question no.2 of the relevant form as to whether the victim was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse was “yes”. Whether rape has been committed or not is a legal conclusion which must be based on the evidence adduced at the trial, cannot be disputed. Now, if the appellant had the mens rea to rape the victim and for accomplishing that had taken the victim to an isolated place near a jungle where, as per the victim’s version, she was at his mercy not only at the time she was ravished but also for hours (either before or after being ravished, the time factor being discussed in the following paragraph), it is difficult to imagine that the appellant behaving like a brute and having the evil intention of satiating his lust would suddenly change his mind and indulge in nothing more than a limited penetration, if at all that may be accepted. These indicators do not rule out the possibility of a consensual act of two adults. 28. These indicators do not rule out the possibility of a consensual act of two adults. 28. Besides the above, the actual time of occurrence of the alleged incident also assumes importance in view of the conflicting versions of the victim in course of examination-in-chief and cross-examination. While the evidence in chief on pages 1 & 2 of the victim’s deposition reveals that she was raped by the appellant immediately after the Omni could not proceed further because of bad road condition, the version in the cross examination is that the Omni had to be turned towards the opposite direction because of bad road condition and it was driven “backside” for about 2 Km to reach the place of occurrence. The story of the Omni being turned and driven backside is conspicuous by its absence in the evidence in chief, although such version is available in the F.I.R. and the 164 statement. We propose to proceed accepting the version that the Omni was driven backside for about 2 Km. However, the evidence in cross would suggest that the incident may have happened within an hour after the victim boarded the vehicle at 17.30 hours (assuming that it took an hour to cover 10/12 Km on the ‘up’ journey and 2 Km on the ‘down’ journey to reach the place of occurrence) whereas the chief version is that while the appellant dragged the lower half of the body of the victim out of the Omni, removed her underwear and salwar and threw them out, committed rape, assaulted her and then threatened her, “by that time it already became 12.30 pm night and then he kept me (her) seated for long more time and after that he took me (her) near my (her) house and fled away”. If the incident occurred within an hour or so of boarding the Omni, i.e. 18.30 hours, the prosecution had to explain what transpired between the victim and the appellant till after midnight since admittedly PWs 4 and 8 found her at her residence at 00.30 hours. On the contrary, if the incident occurred immediately before 00.30 hours or around midnight, as stated by the victim in the evidence in chief, the prosecution was required to explain what was she doing with the appellant for so long a period up to the time of the incident. On the contrary, if the incident occurred immediately before 00.30 hours or around midnight, as stated by the victim in the evidence in chief, the prosecution was required to explain what was she doing with the appellant for so long a period up to the time of the incident. Ordinarily, an unmarried woman would not be expected to spend long hours with a man whom she knows only for a month unless of course some intimacy grew leading to spending time together away from public glare. It is thus difficult to believe which of the two versions is correct. 29. It would now be useful to take a look at the seizures made by the investigating officer (PW-12). On the day the F.I.R. was registered, the wearing apparels of the victim were seized, together with seizure of hair and broken pieces of bangles that were found in the Omni in the presence of the victim and PWs 7 and 8. Thereafter, the police party had been to the residence of the victim and seized the remaining unbroken bangles and had obtained samples of hair from her. The seized bangles were not produced in court. The forensic report (at page 74 of the paper-book) reveals that Items 1 to 5, being the victim’s vaginal swab and pubic hair, the appellant’s pubic hair, “a brown jatti” and “a white petticoat” respectively, were examined for semen but semen was not detected on any of them. The same report also reveals that Item 6 being a paper cover labelled “Two pieces of long black hair … from vehicle” containing two pieces of dark hair and Item 7 being a paper cover labelled “Three pieces of long black hair …” containing three pieces of dark hair were examined and the hair pieces in Items 6 and 7 were found to be human. However, no opinion could be offered regarding their comparison as they were not sufficient. PW-9 who examined the appellant at about 17.45 hours of June 12, 2010 found presence of semen stain in his under-garment but no evidence is available as to whether such under-garment was sent for forensic report or not. Also, there is no evidence worth the name that the under-garment that was found on the person of the appellant at the time of medical examination was the one he wore at the time of committing crime. Also, there is no evidence worth the name that the under-garment that was found on the person of the appellant at the time of medical examination was the one he wore at the time of committing crime. These being the seizures and the forensic report, it is difficult to connect the appellant with the crime, yet, the learned judge allowed himself to be swayed by the report of PW-9 that detection of semen stains in the under-garment of the appellant “goes in favour of the prosecution”. 30. The evidence of the victim also bristles with inconsistencies on certain other aspects, which we propose to notice now. 31. The F.I.R. version reveals that after returning home, the victim disclosed what had happened to her family members (except mother who was not present). In her 164 statement recorded on June 14, 2010, she disclosed having “told all the matter to” her father. It was for the first time in the evidence in chief the victim explained that although she had disclosed everything to her father, he being drunk did not understand her. Her family members definitely included PW-4 (her younger brother) who testified that the victim did not disclose anything to him before he went to sleep. Disclosure made to a family member thus not surface from the evidence on record. That apart, although the victim did not say either in the F.I.R. or before the magistrate or at the trial about the presence of PW-8 at her residence on her return, and that after PW-4 went to sleep she had told PW-8 that the appellant had raped her, it was the version of PW-8 that the victim had confided in him and narrated her ordeal to him. Emergence of PW-8 in the scene as one having derived knowledge of the rape committed on this victim by the appellant has to be swallowed with a grain of slat. 32. Emergence of PW-8 in the scene as one having derived knowledge of the rape committed on this victim by the appellant has to be swallowed with a grain of slat. 32. It is also evident from the deposition of PW-12 (the investigating officer) that: “The victim girl in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. before me did not state me that the accused instead of taking her to her residence proceeded towards gudda or that she requested him to stop and let her get down at that place but he did not do so and took her away from long or that after that she found that the road was not proper and he became compelled to stop and that place was lonely place and then he started catching hold of her. The victim in her statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. before me did not state me that after urination when she was tying the nada the accused caught hold of her from behind and anyhow she came out of his clutch and went to the front seat of the vehicle. The victim girl did not state me the colour of the dress worn by the accused during the occurrence. The victim stated before me regarding her undergarment. The PW-8 … did not state me that after he came to know the occurrence from …(the victim)… he stated her father who then wanted to inform the matter to police.” 33. A statement recorded by the police during investigation under section 161, Cr.P.C. can be used for the purpose of contradiction. What follows from the statement of PW-12 in regard to the statements made by witnesses under section 161, Cr.P.C. after investigation of the F.I.R. was undertaken, belies the prosecution case. 34. Significantly, the learned judge did not convict the appellant under sections 323/506-II/504, IPC for want of proof and recorded a finding of ‘not guilty’. It establishes that the prosecution version was not found to be trustworthy. 35. The findings of the learned Trial Court are also contradictory and has been suffering from lack of cohesion in appreciation of the evidence of the victim. Learned Trial Court acquitted the appellant from the charges under section 323/506-II and 504 of Indian Penal on the ground that Learned Trial Court did not find any corroboration of such allegations from other witnesses as well as from the doctor. Learned Trial Court acquitted the appellant from the charges under section 323/506-II and 504 of Indian Penal on the ground that Learned Trial Court did not find any corroboration of such allegations from other witnesses as well as from the doctor. However, Learned Trial Court has acted on such report of doctor and convicted the appellant. Learned Trial Court has also placed the burden of proof on the appellant by observing that no motive was disclosed from the side of defence as to why the accused has been implicated in this case by the victim girl and there was no enmity between the parties. Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in AIR 2008 SC 572 that in case of rape, false implication of accused is normally improbable. The Apex Court, however, has never stated that any or all cases where rape is alleged, should logically end in conviction. Presumption of innocence is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence in an adversarial system of criminal administration of justice. It is incumbent upon prosecution to prove the charge against the accused beyond all shadow of doubt. Suggestion is not evidence unless accepted by the witness. The accused has had no liability or obligation to prove as to why he has been implicated in this case. Learned Trial Court has appreciated the case on the basis of some incorrect reading of the actual proposition of law and we are constrained to differ with such observation of Learned Trial Court. 36. The observation of Learned Trial Court is based upon his own perception and on the basis of the some decisions as well as some observations made by the author of Modi’s jurisprudence. It is a well settled principle of law that to rely on an isolated observation of any decision in a criminal trial without delving into the fact situation of the case is a dangerous trend in a criminal trial. A single twist in a fact situation may altogether make a decision wholly inapplicable in the context of the given facts and circumstances of the case under reference. Learned Trial Court has observed that ‘rape’ should be a legal conclusion and cannot be decided on the basis of the report of doctor. Paradoxically, the Learned Trial Court has solely relied on such report of doctor. The expert opinion is opinionative in nature and it cannot be equated with that of natural eye witnesses. Learned Trial Court has observed that ‘rape’ should be a legal conclusion and cannot be decided on the basis of the report of doctor. Paradoxically, the Learned Trial Court has solely relied on such report of doctor. The expert opinion is opinionative in nature and it cannot be equated with that of natural eye witnesses. In paragraph 3 of her report (Ext-22), the doctor did not find any sign of injury. In paragraph 4 of such report (Ext-22) the doctor did not find any mark of violence/inflammation of “kadaness” in and around her vagina due to forcible intercourse. Then how could the doctor say that the victim was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. This subjective opinion of the doctor is palpably contradictory with her findings as stated hereinabove. Learned Trial Court, thereafter, went on to rely on such observation of the doctor and authors without delving into the fact situation of the instant case. The evidence of the doctor (Ext-22) appears to be not only contradictory but based on her subjective satisfaction, which ought to have been rejected by the Learned Trial Court. 37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2008 (15) SCC 133 (Raju and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) has enunciated the principle of appreciation of evidence of the prosecutrix. It has been observed that the evidence of the prosecutrix should be evaluated on a par with the injured witness and if the evidence is reliable no corroboration is necessary. But at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time, a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of any false implication. It must further be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants. However, there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statements of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration. 38. However, there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statements of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration. 38. In a recent decision, the Apex Court while relying on the aforesaid decision has acquitted the appellant in a case of gang rape vide Criminal Appeal No.1767 of 2011 (Raja and others vs. State of Karnataka disposed of on 4th October, 2016). 39. In the case under reference, we do find that there is a serious contradiction in the statement made by the prosecutrix and in fact, the medical evidence is also not supporting the case of the prosecutrix. Absence of any injury on the person of the prosecutrix leads to the irresistible conclusion that in fact there was absolutely no resistance on the part of the prosecutrix at the time of alleged occurrence. The prosecution case does not generate unqualified and unreserved satisfaction that is indispensably required to enter into a finding of guilt against the appellant. To record finding of guilt in the context of the given facts and-against the appellant in our considered opinion, amounts to-circumstances of this case travesty of justice and in any view of the case, we cannot uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellant. 40. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus though not applicable in Indian conditions, it is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff while rendering its decision in respect of a criminal trial. The present case, however, poses difficulty in separating the grain from the chaff. There are several loose ends. Whether any relationship, if at all, had developed between the victim and the appellant or whether it is a love story turning sour, is shrouded in mystery. Benefit of doubt, in this case, undoubtedly must be given to the appellant. 41. In the above light and for such reasons as appearing in the preceding discussions, we are of the considered view that the conviction and sentence impugned in this appeal cannot be sustained and that the appellant upon being given the benefit of doubt, ought to have been held not guilty of the offence under section 376, IPC, too. 42. The appeal succeeds. The judgment and order under challenge stands set aside. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith. 43. 42. The appeal succeeds. The judgment and order under challenge stands set aside. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith. 43. The lower court records together with this judgment and order shall be sent to the court of the learned Judge immediately.