JUDGMENT : SANJIB BANERJEE, J. 1. The marginal delay in preferring the appeal is condoned in view of the good grounds shown. GA 954 of 2017 is allowed. 2. The railways question the propriety of an order by which their challenge to an arbitral award as to the authority of the arbitrator has been repelled in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The grievance is in respect of the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitrator apparently not possessing the qualifications as required of such adjudicator by the arbitration agreement. 3. However, by the judgment and order impugned dated December 7, 2016 the award was tweaked in the sense that the claim awarded on account of interest on security deposit has been set aside on the ground of there being an express bar in the agreement between the parties in such regard. The respondent-contractor has not challenged such part of the order impugned. 4. Though no facts pertaining to the disputes between the parties may be relevant, it may only be noticed that the respondent was awarded a contract for the purchase of spares required for the manufacture, maintenance and overhauling of cranes at the Jamalpur workshop of Eastern Railway. Upon disputes and differences arising between the parties, the respondent invoked the arbitration clause contained in the agreement and sought the setting up of an arbitral tribunal in accordance therewith. By a letter of May 19, 1998, the appointing authority informed the respondent that the matter had been “very thoroughly examined by the competent authority in consultation with Eastern Railway’s legal advisor as well as Joint Secretary of Ministry of Law and Justice” and that “we regret to inform you that the arbitration as requested by you is not tenable in law.” 5. The respondent carried a request to the Chief Justice of this court or his designate under Section 11 of the said Act of 1996. The respondent carried a request to the Chief Justice of this court or his designate under Section 11 of the said Act of 1996. As was the practice in this court at the relevant point of time, the judge delegated the authority by the Chief Justice to adjudicate on requests under Section 11 of the Act had only the limited jurisdiction to look into the propriety of a request and, if the request was found to be in order, the delegate–usually the arbitration court–could only refer the matter to the Chief Justice for the actual naming of the arbitrator or the setting up of the arbitral tribunal to be completed by the Chief Justice. In accordance with the prevalent practice, the judge then taking arbitration matters found the request to be in order and directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice for naming the arbitrator. In course of the relevant order of January 21, 2000, the following was recorded as submission made on behalf of the railways: “Mr. Samaddar submitted that the respondents may have some claims against the petitioner, and in view of that they may be given leave to file their counter-claim, if any.” 6. Upon the arbitrator being named and a retired judge of this court taking up the reference, an objection was taken by the railways in the counter-statement as to the composition of the arbitral tribunal. In paragraph 3 of the counter-statement, the railways contended that the Chief Justice of this court or his designate did not have any authority to make the appointment, but only “to enforce or compel the appointing authority to make an appointment.” The railways maintain that an arbitrator had to be appointed in terms of clause 2900 of the Indian Railways Standards. The objection was repeated at paragraph 6 of the counter-statement. 7. The arbitral award was rendered by the Chief Justice’s appointee on March 31, 2006. The first ground canvassed by the railways is that in view of what is contained in paragraph 47(x) of the Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2005) 8 SCC 618 (SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Limited), the railways were entitled to take the objection before the award was rendered and it would be evident from the award that the railways urged the same and the arbitrator dwelt thereon in course of the award. 8. v. Patel Engineering Limited), the railways were entitled to take the objection before the award was rendered and it would be evident from the award that the railways urged the same and the arbitrator dwelt thereon in course of the award. 8. Prior to the seven-judge Bench verdict in SBP & Co., decisions rendered by a Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the said Act were considered to be administrative in nature by virtue of the dictum in a previous Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2002) 2 SCC 388 (Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Rani Construction Private Limited). The judgment in SBP & Co. altered such position, held that the authority exercised was judicial in nature and issued, inter alia, the following direction at paragraph 47(x) of the report: “47. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows: … (x) Since all were guided by the decision of this Court in Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd. and orders under Section 11(6) of the Act have been made based on the position adopted in that decision, we clarify that appointments of arbitrators or Arbitral Tribunals thus far made, are to be treated as valid, all objections being left to be decided under Section 16 of the Act. As and from this date, the position as adopted in this judgment will govern even pending applications under Section 11(6) of the Act. …” 9. The railways assert that the usual finality of an order passed by a Chief Justice or his designate on a request under Section 11 of the said Act was robbed in this case by the observation and direction contained at paragraph 47(x) of the judgment in SBP & Co. As such, notwithstanding the railways not having carried a special leave petition from the orders passed under Section 11 of the Act on the respondent’s request (since such order of adjudication was passed prior to the judgment in Rani Construction) or such order being challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution, as could have been done in view of the dictum in Rani Construction, the railways could still object to the composition of the arbitral tribunal before the tribunal itself in accordance with the relevant observation in SBP & Co. 10. 10. The arbitrator dismissed such objection on a somewhat unsatisfactory treatment thereof, by referring to the other parts of paragraph 47 of the report in SBP & Co. and by ignoring the only sub-paragraph of relevance therein. The reasons furnished by the arbitrator cannot be regarded as having appropriately dealt with the objection raised by the railways and it only remains to assess whether the objection that was carried to the arbitrator was otherwise tenable. 11. The railways have referred to several judgments to bring home the point. The railways submit that an arbitration agreement has to be strictly adhered to and even if a party or the appointing authority fails to make the appointment, the Chief Justice or his designate cannot rewrite the arbitration agreement: just as no court may rewrite a contract between the parties to a lis. The railways place a judgment reported at (2008) 10 SCC 240 (Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway v. Patel Engineering Company Limited) for the recognition therein, at paragraph 12 of the report, that even the scheme of Section 11 of the Act shows that the emphasis is on the terms of the arbitration agreement being adhered to and being given effect to as closely as possible. The railways contend that there were two parts to the objection carried by them to the arbitrator: that the Chief Justice of this court had no authority to directly make the appointment without compelling the appointing authority to nominate an arbitrator; and, the arbitrator could, in any event, not have been any person who was not a gazetted railway officer. The railways submit that even if the Chief Justice regarded the refusal by the letter dated May 19, 1998 to be inappropriate, the Chief Justice ought to have either called upon the appointing authority to nominate a gazetted officer to take up the arbitral reference or sought names of gazetted railway officers for the purpose of directly making the appointment. 12. The railways next bring a judgment reported at (2009) 8 SCC 520 (Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Raja Transport Private Limited) which dealt with a similar situation as in clause 2900(c) of the Indian Railways Standards in this case. But before referring to the judgment, sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause 2900 of the standard terms governing the parties may be noticed: “2900. But before referring to the judgment, sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause 2900 of the standard terms governing the parties may be noticed: “2900. Arbitration (a) In the event of any question, dispute or difference arising under these conditions or any special conditions of contract, or in connection with this contract (except as to any matters the decision of which is specially provided for by these or the special conditions) the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a Gazetted Railway Officer appointed to be the arbitrator by the General Manager in the case of contracts entered into by the Zonal Railways and Production Units; by any Member of the Railway Board, in the case of contracts entered into by the Railway Board and by the Head of the Organization in respect of contracts entered into by the other Organizations under the Ministry of Railways. The Gazetted Railway Officer to be appointed as arbitrator however will not be one of those who had an opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of their duties as railway servant have expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute or difference. The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties to this contract. (b) … (c) It is further a term of this contract that no person other than the person appointed by the authority as aforesaid should act as arbitrator and that if for any reason that is not possible, the matter is not to be referred to arbitration at all. …” 13. In Raja Transport the relevant clause in the arbitration agreement provided as follows: “It is also a term of this contract that no person other than the Director, Marketing or a person nominated by such Director, Marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator hereunder.” 14. …” 13. In Raja Transport the relevant clause in the arbitration agreement provided as follows: “It is also a term of this contract that no person other than the Director, Marketing or a person nominated by such Director, Marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator hereunder.” 14. The Supreme Court opined in Raja Transport that if an arbitration agreement provides for arbitration by a named arbitrator, the courts should normally give effect to the provision of the arbitration agreement; but if the named person is not available or cannot be appointed, the “Chief Justice or his designate may, after recording reasons for not following the agreed procedure of referring the dispute to the named arbitrator, appoint an independent arbitrator in accordance with Section 11(8) of the Act.” At paragraph 46 of the Report in Raja Transport, the court specifically held that a clause as in that case as quoted above which is similar to clause 2900(c) here, imposes “a condition (which) interferes with the power of the Chief Justice and his designate under Section 11(8) of the Act to appoint a suitable person as arbitrator in appropriate cases.” The dictum in such judgment is that such portion of an arbitration clause “is liable to be ignored as being contrary to the Act.” 15. In the judgment reported at (2009) 4 SCC 523 (Union of India v. Singh Builders Syndicate) next placed by the railways, the court held that ordinarily the Chief Justice or his designate would not deviate from the agreed procedure and constitute an arbitral tribal in accordance with the composition envisaged in the arbitration agreement; but in exceptional cases, for reasons to be recorded, there may be a deviation. In such reported case, arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with clause 64 of the erstwhile general conditions governing railway contracts did not yield any result for years and decades and a retired judge was thereupon nominated to take up the reference. It is the railway’s submission in the present case that it is only in such extreme situation that the deviation can be made. The railways are quick to point out that there was no extraordinary situation of such kind at the time that the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the Chief Justice in the present matter. 16. It is the railway’s submission in the present case that it is only in such extreme situation that the deviation can be made. The railways are quick to point out that there was no extraordinary situation of such kind at the time that the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the Chief Justice in the present matter. 16. For the same proposition, a judgment reported at (2014) 9 SCC 288 (North Eastern Railway v. Tripple Engineering Works) has been cited. In such case, panels of arbitrators appointed since 1996 could not render an award till 2013, whereupon an arbitrator was nominated by the Chief Justice or his designate which was not in accordance with clause 64 of the then general conditions governing railway contracts. The court held that the power under the Act had to be exercised to effectuate the remedy and facilitate the mechanism contemplated therein. The railways here submit that, again, it was in extraordinary circumstances that the court allowed the deviation from the mechanism as envisaged in the arbitration agreement. 17. The railways also refer to a recent judgment reported at AIR 2017 SC 1628 (Union of India v. BESCO Limited). Clause 2900 of the Indian Railway Standard conditions also fell for consideration in that case and the court observed that “though an arbitrator is specified in the agreement for arbitration, if circumstances so warrant, the Chief Justice or the designated Judge is free to appoint an independent arbitrator, having due regard to the qualification, if any, and other aspects as required under Section 11(8) of the Act.” 18. The appellant is particularly critical of the observation in the judgment and order impugned herein that a gazetted railway officer has more to do with the status of the concerned person rather than his qualification. The railways say that it is not for the court to make such a distinction since the parties unequivocally agreed to carry their disputes to a gazetted railway officer and as the appointing authority had only the power under the arbitration agreement to refer the disputes to a gazetted railway officer. 19. Two other judgments, on the point of waiver, have also been carried by the railways; but in the light of the discussion on such aspect, the reference to the judgments becomes unnecessary. 20. 19. Two other judgments, on the point of waiver, have also been carried by the railways; but in the light of the discussion on such aspect, the reference to the judgments becomes unnecessary. 20. The respondent says that in the light of the submission attributed in the order dated January 21, 2000 to counsel for the railways, the objection as to the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the like had been expressly abandoned by the railways. The respondent argues that if clause 2900(c) of the standard conditions were to be strictly construed, it would imply that unless the appointing authority referred to in the arbitration agreement constituted an arbitral tribunal or nominated an arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between a contractor and the railways, there could be no arbitration at all. According to the respondent, once the railways accepted that an arbitral reference would ensue despite the appointing authority declining the request by the letter dated May 19, 1998, it was no longer open to the railways to urge the objection before the arbitrator or anywhere else. 21. On the issue of waiver, the respondent refers to a judgment reported at (2006) 8 SCC 279 (BSNL v. Subash Chandra Kanchan). The arbitration agreement in such reported case provided that no person other than one appointed by the Chief Engineer or Administrative Head of the Telecommunication or Postal department should act as an arbitrator. In course of the request under Section 11 of the said Act made by the contractor, a list of names was furnished to the court by the contractor for appointing any one of the six indicated as the arbitrator. Counsel for BSNL, upon being asked by the court, indicated that he had no objection to one of the named persons being appointed arbitrator and the appointment was accordingly made. BSNL applied thereafter for recalling the order on the ground that the consent given by lawyer on its behalf was without authority. While considering the propriety of the appointment and the subsequent objection of BSNL, the Supreme Court held that BSNL “must be held to have waived their right as they consented to the appointment …” 22. BSNL applied thereafter for recalling the order on the ground that the consent given by lawyer on its behalf was without authority. While considering the propriety of the appointment and the subsequent objection of BSNL, the Supreme Court held that BSNL “must be held to have waived their right as they consented to the appointment …” 22. A Single Bench judgment of this court reported at (2016) 1 Arb LR 306 (Maa Enterprise v. Union of India) is next placed by the respondent for the recognition therein as to the implication of paragraph 46 of the report in Raja Transport. 23. The respondent also relies on paragraph 20 of the report in SBP & Co. for the observation therein that when jurisdictional issues are decided under Section 8 or 11 of the Act before the reference is made, Section 16 thereof cannot be held to empower the arbitral tribunal to ignore the decision rendered by the judicial authority or the Chief Justice at the pre-reference stage. The respondent places great emphasis on the following sentence from paragraph 20 of the judgment in SBP & Co.: “The competence to decide does not enable the arbitral tribunal to get over the finality conferred on an order passed prior to its entering upon the reference by the very statute that creates it.” 24. The respondent also refers to Section 11(7) of the Act as it stood prior to its 2015 Amendment: “(7). A decision on a matter entrusted by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him is final.” 25. In such context, a judgment reported at (2011) 13 SCC 258 (APS Kushwaha v. Municipal Corporation, Gwalior) has been cited by the respondent for the law as enunciated at paragraphs 7 and 8 of the report that an arbitral tribunal cannot go behind a decision of the Chief Justice or his designate that constituted such tribunal and rule on its jurisdiction or on the existence of the arbitration clause. 26. 26. The respondent finally submits that in the absence of the railways carrying the order under Section 11 of the Act by way of a special leave petition or even challenging the constitution of the arbitral tribunal under Article 226 of the Constitution, the ground could not have been urged before the arbitrator; and no observation in paragraph 47(x) of the judgment in SBP & Co. contemplated that an objection on the ground of the composition of the arbitral tribunal could have been raised several years after the reference had commenced or when the reference was on the verge of the conclusion. 27. It would be best to distinguish the twin objections that have been canvassed by the railways. The primary objection is based on clause 2900(c) of the standard form: that if the appointing authority did not make the appointment of the arbitrator, there would be no arbitration at all. The ancillary contention is that clause 2900(a) required only a gazetted railway officer to make up the arbitral tribunal which the Chief Justice derogated from while making the appointment. 28. The fundamental feature of an arbitration agreement is that there is a consensus between the parties to carry the adjudication in respect of any future dispute between them pertaining to a specified matter to a private forum. There is no standard or statutory form of an arbitration agreement. There is no requirement in law that the entirety of the disputes pertaining to a contract must be referable to arbitration or not at all. It is possible for some disputes to be referred to arbitration and other disputes not. It is equally possible for the disputes raised by one party to be referred to arbitration and the disputes raised by the other parties to be carried to the regular sovereign forum. 29. What is of paramount importance is that the arbitration agreement must show an intention to go, in certain or specified circumstances, to a private forum of adjudication. The primary part of an arbitration agreement is the consensus ad idem to go to a private forum of choice. The incidental part of an arbitration agreement is the choice of the private forum. 30. The primary part of an arbitration agreement is the consensus ad idem to go to a private forum of choice. The incidental part of an arbitration agreement is the choice of the private forum. 30. There could be an arbitration agreement where the consensus to go to a private forum cannot be severed of the choice of the private forum; but the court will not always jump to the conclusion that the two are in-severable. It is only in exceptional cases that the two may be in-severable. For instance, if two friends A and B agreed to carry their disputes pertaining to a particular matter to a common friend C, the court may interpret both the arbitration agreement and the forum of choice to be in-severable, such that upon C not being available to take up the adjudication there may not be any arbitration at all. But if the court can make a reasonable distinction between the primary agreement of carrying the disputes to a private forum and the manner of composition of such forum, the arbitration agreement would not be lost for the unavailability of the specified forum. 31. In Raja Transport, a distinction was made on such lines in arbitration agreements contained in standard forms of contracts of public bodies or public sector undertakings in this country. Ordinarily, a clause such as the one contained in the arbitration agreement pertaining to Raja Transport and the one in clause 2900(c) herein would have to be taken at face value; that is to say, that if the appointment is not made by the named appointing authority there would be no arbitration at all. Such interpretation at face value would not cause any prejudice to the parties since the virtual evaporation of the arbitration agreement would not leave the parties without remedy as they may approach the regular sovereign forum for the same purpose. Herein comes the importance of the Supreme Court dictum in Raja Transport, where it was held that such a clause would interfere with the authority of the Chief Justice or his designate to appoint an arbitrator or constitute the arbitral tribunal upon the person whose obligation it was in the first place, failing to do so. Herein comes the importance of the Supreme Court dictum in Raja Transport, where it was held that such a clause would interfere with the authority of the Chief Justice or his designate to appoint an arbitrator or constitute the arbitral tribunal upon the person whose obligation it was in the first place, failing to do so. In other words, the Supreme Court found that in such a situation the agreement to go to arbitration would be the primary object of the arbitration agreement and the choice of the forum or the manner of the composition of the tribunal would be secondary. In addition, the dictum makes room for the secondary to be severed from the primary. It is true that in several of the cases cited on behalf of the railways, the Supreme Court observed that in the usual course the Chief Justice or his designate should adhere to the choice of the arbitrator or the mechanism for constituting the arbitral tribunal as envisaged by the arbitration agreement. But the dictum in Raja Transport covers a different aspect altogether in it holding that the virtual destruction of the primary object of an arbitration agreement to go to an arbitral reference was not acceptable upon the person obliged to make the appointment failing to abide by his obligation. 32. The objection that was carried by the railways before the arbitrator in this case had more to do with clause 2900(c) of the standard conditions rather than the arbitrator being required to be a gazetted railway officer. The emphasis, both in paragraphs 3 and 6 of the counter-statement filed before the arbitrator, was that the appointment of the arbitrator could not have been directly made by the Chief Justice and the Chief Justice ought to have compelled the appointing authority to make the appointment. Such objection falls squarely within clause 2900(c) of the standard conditions and is now governed by the dictum in Raja Transport as being severable from the principal agreement to carry the disputes to a private forum. There is no doubt that if the railways had insisted before the Chief Justice in this case that the arbitrator had per force to be a gazetted railway officer, the Chief Justice may have been persuaded to make such appointment or the Chief Justice would have given reasons for not doing so. There is no doubt that if the railways had insisted before the Chief Justice in this case that the arbitrator had per force to be a gazetted railway officer, the Chief Justice may have been persuaded to make such appointment or the Chief Justice would have given reasons for not doing so. Once the railways failed to urge the ground in proceedings to which they were a party, the finality of an order on such aspect as recognised by Section 11(7) of the Act precluded them from carrying the objection before the arbitrator. 33. It is true that paragraph 47(x) of the judgment in SBP & Co. permitted such objection as to the composition of the arbitral tribunal to be made or resurrected. But the direction in such regard cannot be seen to have conferred a right to raise an objection that had not been canvassed initially. If the railways had taken the point before the Chief Justice at the time of the appointment, they may have resurrected the same in course of the reference by virtue of the direction contained in paragraph 47(x) of the judgment in SBP & Co.; but not otherwise. As far as the railways were concerned, the matter was closed upon the point not being urged before the Chief justice at the time of the appointment and the order of the Chief Justice not being challenged by way of a special leave petition before the judgment in Rani Construction was pronounced, or within a reasonable time thereafter, by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 34. The point of waiver raised by the respondent based on the submission attributed to the railways in the order dated January 21, 2000 is of no substance. At the highest, such submission on behalf of the railways amounted to the acknowledgement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the refusal by the appointing authority to constitute the arbitral tribunal. But the submission cannot be regarded as one that could have robbed the railways of their right to subsequently object to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, if such arbitral tribunal had been constituted in derogation of the arbitration agreement. But the submission cannot be regarded as one that could have robbed the railways of their right to subsequently object to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, if such arbitral tribunal had been constituted in derogation of the arbitration agreement. The waiver or acquiescence on the part of the railways was in course of the naming of the arbitrator by the Chief Justice and the railways have not demonstrated, whether by citing the relevant order or otherwise, that they had urged before the Chief Justice that the reference could be made only to a gazetted railway officer. 35. Equally, the respondent’s interpretation of paragraph 20 of the judgment in SBP & Co. and the finality of an order passed by a judicial authority or a Chief Justice or his designate under Section 8 or Section 11 of the said Act cannot be accepted. While it is true that the existence of an arbitration agreement cannot be questioned before an arbitral tribunal if such matter has been conclusively decided upon in course of a pre-reference adjudication under Section 8 or under Section 11 of the Act, as to whether a particular matter is arbitrable or not, in the sense as to whether it is governed by the arbitration agreement, is the exclusive domain of the arbitral tribunal in view of Section 16 of the Act and the limited authority conferred to court as emphasised in Section 5 thereof. Moreover, unlike under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, a request under Section 11 of the present statute does not require the enumeration of the disputes to be referred to arbitration for the entire aspect of arbitrability to be finally adjudicated upon. 36. The observation at paragraph 20 of the judgment in SBP & Co. only implies that upon a pre-reference adjudication as to the existence of an arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of the disputes having taken place, the arbitral tribunal would not have authority to annul the entire reference on the ground of lack of authority. There are good reasons for the same. For one, a pre-reference decision on a petition under Section 8 of the Act or on a request under Section 11 thereof would be binding on the parties and equally binding on the arbitrator. There are good reasons for the same. For one, a pre-reference decision on a petition under Section 8 of the Act or on a request under Section 11 thereof would be binding on the parties and equally binding on the arbitrator. Secondly, when a judicial authority in seisin of a civil action arrests the same and refers the subject-matter thereof to arbitration, all possible issues that could have arisen in the civil action would be deemed to be capable of adjudication by the arbitral tribunal. However, an order on a request under Section 11 of the Act would not imply that disputes incapable of falling within the scope of the arbitration agreement would also have to be adjudicated upon by the arbitral tribunal unless the order of the Chief Justice or his designate expressly provide there for. This distinction is because in case of a civil action before a judicial authority which allows a petition under Section 8 of the Act, the contours of the adjudication are spelt out; but it is not necessary that the Chief Justice or his designate must notice the entire gamut of the disputes between the parties while making an order for a reference or constituting an arbitral tribunal. 37. For instance, if a dispute pertaining to one of the matters excepted by the agreement between the parties herein were raised before the arbitrator, the arbitrator had the authority to decline to adjudicate on such aspect. However, once a Chief Justice or his designate had referred the disputes to arbitration and had constituted the arbitral tribunal, the reference could no longer be returned by the arbitral tribunal as being without jurisdiction. The objection taken here is not as to some aspect of the claim being incapable of adjudication by the arbitrator; but of the arbitrator completely lacking in authority to have taken up the reference despite the orders on the request under Section 11 of the Act. 38. The element of finality conferred on the decision of the Chief Justice in the appointment of the arbitral tribunal by Section 11(7) of the Act stares the railways in the face and since the objection subsequently canvassed before the arbitrator does not appear to have been raised before the Chief Justice at time of appointment of the arbitrator, the direction contained in paragraph 47(x) of the judgment in SBP & Co. is of no assistance to the appellant in the present context. 39. The challenge to the arbitral award on the ground of the composition of the arbitral tribunal fails, although for reasons other than those indicated in the judgment and order impugned dated December 7, 2016. 40. APO 71 of 2017 and GA 955 of 2017 stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 41. Urgent certified website copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities. I agree.