Sandeep Sharma, J. This appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendant No.1 against the judgment and decree dated 30.3.2007, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, H.P., reversing the judgment and decree dated 29.06.2000, passed by the learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, Court No.2, Amb, District Una, H.P., whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the respondents-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiffs’) filed a suit for declaration to the effect that they are owners in possession of land measuring 0-20-16 Hects. comprised in Khewat No.8 min, Khatauni No.41, Khasra No.18 (0-00-57), 20 (0-13-89) and 19 (05-70) as entered in Misal Haquiat Bandobast for the year 1986-87, situated in village Seri, Tehsil Amb, District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’). It is averred that previously the defendants were owners of the suit land but in the year 1952 the they orally mortgaged the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs with possession for a sum of Rs.300/-. Though a mutation No.461 was entered regarding the mortgage, but the same could not be sanctioned because the defendants failed to appear before the Revenue Officer at the time of attestation of the mutation and accordingly the same was rejected. However, the plaintiffs were put in possession of the land in dispute by the defendants at the time of mortgage and they continued in possession and rather still in possession of the suit land. It is averred that the defendants did not redeem the suit land till today and the period of redemption has already been lapsed and now the plaintiffs have become owners of the suit land by afflux of time and the defendants have lost all right, title and interest in the same. It is further averred that defendant No.1 was the Lamberdar of the village and was having influence over the local revenue field staff and revenue officials. It is also averred that defendant No.1 had moved an application for correction of entries and due to his influence, he was able to obtain an order dated 16.2.1990 from the Land Reforms Officer, Amb in his favour for correction of entries of possession of the suit land as ‘Khud Kasht’. It is also averred that defendant No.1 had moved an application for correction of entries and due to his influence, he was able to obtain an order dated 16.2.1990 from the Land Reforms Officer, Amb in his favour for correction of entries of possession of the suit land as ‘Khud Kasht’. This order of Land Reforms Officer was set aside by the Divisional Collector, Amb in appeal vide order dated 7.12.1990, but the same was again revised by Divisional Commissioner, Kangra Division Dharamshala vide order dated 27.11.1991 and the aforesaid order of Land Reforms Officer was restored. It is averred that the orders dated 27.11.1991 and 16.2.1990 passed by Divisional Commissioner Kangra and Land Reforms Officer, Amb, are wrong, illegal, baseless, misconceived and not sustainable in the eyes of law or the same are not binding upon the legal rights of the plaintiffs as owners in possession. It is the claim of the plaintiffs that they are still in possession of the suit land and the defendants have left with no right, title or interest therein. It is averred that on the basis of aforesaid orders of Land Reforms Officer and Divisional Commissioner the defendants are threatening to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs and to take forcible possession of the suit land by raising construction etc., though they have no right to do so. It is also averred that the plaintiffs requested the defendants time and again to admit their claim, but they are not ready to do so. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a suit for a decree for declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land as they have perfected their title as owners by afflux of time being mortgagees with possession and the orders dated 27.11.1991 passed by Divisional Commissioner, Kangra Division Dharamshala and that of Land Reforms Officer, Amb dated 16.2.1990 to the contrary, ordering change of entries of possession in the name of defendants are wrong, illegal baseless and not sustainable nor binding upon the rights of the plaintiffs as owners in possession and for issuance of permanent injunction as a consequential relief restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner or raising any sort of construction etc. and from taking forcible possession of the suit land in any manner, with a prayer for recovery of possession in case the defendants succeed to taking forcible possession of the suit land during the pendency of the suit. 3. Defendant No.1 & 3, by way of filing joint written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiffs on the grounds of maintainability, locus-standi, res-juidicata, constructive res-judicata, limitation and estoppel. On merits, it is alleged that defendants No.1 and 2 never mortgaged the suit land with the plaintiffs. It is averred that in fact there was an oral understanding between them to mortgage the suit land, but the same could not be matured for want of payment of full mortgage amount i.e. Rs.300/- as the plaintiffs had paid only Rs.150/-, which was immediately returned by the defendants to the plaintiffs against a proper receipt dated 15.5.1953 and consequently the mutation was rejected. It is further averred that since there was no mortgage, the plaintiffs never came in possession of the suit land at any point of time in any capacity. It is further averred that defendant No.3 has purchased the entire suit land from defendants No.1 and 2 vide two different sale deeds dated 5.6.1995 and 31.10.1995 for a valuable consideration and now neither the plaintiffs nor defendants No.1 and 2 have any right, title or interest in the suit land and defendant No.3 is exclusive owner in possession of the same. 4. Defendant No.2, by way of filing separate written statement, also refuted the claim of the plaintiffs on the grounds of maintainability, estoppel and jurisdiction. On merits, this defendant has also denied the factum of mortgage and delivery of possession. It is alleged by him that there was no mortgage so the question of delivering the possession to the plaintiffs does not arise and the defendants No.1 and 2 are in possession of the suit land. However, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs at the instance of defendant No.1, who is jealous of defendant No.2 and wants to put defendant No.2 in loss. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether defendants mortgaged suit land with possession in 1952 with the plaintiffs? OPP. 2. Whether plaintiffs became owners by afflux of time? OPP. 3. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether defendants mortgaged suit land with possession in 1952 with the plaintiffs? OPP. 2. Whether plaintiffs became owners by afflux of time? OPP. 3. Whether order dated 27.11.1991 of Divisional Commissioner, Kangra and order dated 16.2.1990 of L.R.O. are illegal and ineffective, if so its effect? OPP. 4. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction ? OPP. 5. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of possession? OPP. 6. Whether mortgage was for Rs.150/- as alleged? OPD. 7. Whether plaintiffs received back Rs.150/- on 15.5.1953 if so its effect? OPD. 8. Whether suit is not maintainable? OPD. 9. Whether defendants are owners in possession of the suit land? OPD. 10. Whether suit is time barred? OPD. 11. Relief.” 6. Subsequently vide judgment and decree dated 29.6.2000 learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, which came to be registered as Civil Appeal No.215/2000 RBT 164/04/2000. Learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed declaring them as owners in possession of the suit land as they have perfected their ownership in the suit land by afflux of time being mortgagees with possession. Hence present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-defendant No.1 praying therein for setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.3.2007 passed by the learned appellate Court below. 7. This Court vide order dated 10.12.2007 admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the learned first appellate court below misread and mis-appreciated oral and documentary evidence particularly documents Ext.D-2 an D-3, thus, the impugned judgment and decree as passed stand vitiated? 2. Whether return of money vide receipt is a compulsory register-able document as per section 17 of the Registration Act, if not, findings returned by learned first appellate court below vitiated the impugned judgment and decree? 3. Whether suit of the plaintiff is hit by article 58 of the Limitation Act and learned first appellate court below have not returned contrary findings, thus, vitiated the impugned judgment and decree?” 8. 3. Whether suit of the plaintiff is hit by article 58 of the Limitation Act and learned first appellate court below have not returned contrary findings, thus, vitiated the impugned judgment and decree?” 8. Mr.Ajay Sharma, learned counsel representing appellant-defendant No.1, vehemently argued that judgment passed by first appellate Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is not based upon proper appreciation of facts as well as law on the point and as such same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr.Sharma further contended that learned first appellate Court misread the provisions of redemption of mortgage and wrongly arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs have become owners of the suit land by afflux of time and suit of plaintiffs is within limitation. While inviting the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by trial Court, Mr.Sharma strenuously argued that learned trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to prove that defendants mortgaged the suit land with possession in the year 1952 with the plaintiffs and they have become owners by afflux of time. 9. Mr.Sharma, while referring to the judgment passed by learned trial Court, contended that though plaintiff was not able to prove on record that defendants mortgaged the suit land for Rs.300/- to one Shri Babu Ram, but even if it is presumed that suit land was mortgaged by the plaintiffs in favour of defendants, defendants were well within their right to get it redeemed at any time. Mr.Sharma further contended that though learned trial Court, taking note of Article 58 of Limitation Act, held that limitation to seek declaration is three years from the date of accrual of cause of action and as such held the suit of respondents-plaintiffs to be barred by limitation. But, learned first appellate Court decreed the suit of plaintiffs on the ground that they have become owners of the land by afflux of time, since the defendants failed to get the mortgage redeemed within prescribed period of limitation. Mr.Sharma invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled: Singh Ram (D) Thr.L.Rs. Mr.Sharma invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled: Singh Ram (D) Thr.L.Rs. vs. Sheo Ram and Others, AIR 2014 SC 3447 and stated that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act to recover possession commences when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly by payment or deposit by the mortgagor. He further contended that until then, limitation does not start for the purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. While placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgment, Mr.Sharma forcefully contended that an usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he has become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. Mr.Sharma further contended that it is own case of the plaintiffs-respondents that the defendants mortgaged the suit land with possession in the year 1952 with the plaintiffs and it was usufructuary mortgage as the possession of the property was delivered to the mortgagee with authority to enjoy all rights of the owner. 10. Lastly, Mr.Sharma strenuously argued that now in view of the latest judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram’s case supra, judgment having been passed by learned first appellate Court is not sustainable because in the judgment referred above it has been specifically held that mere expiry of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish the right of mortgage under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr.Sharma also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court passed in RSA No.428 of 2006, titled: Hem Ram & Another vs. Bhagwan Dass & Others, decided on 29.11.2016, wherein same issue has been decided by this Court. 11. Mr.Tara Singh Chauhan, learned counsel representing the respondents-plaintiffs, while supporting the impugned judgment passed by learned first appellate Court, contended that since plaintiffs had lost their right of redemption in the year 1982, learned first appellate Court rightly decreed the suit of plaintiffs holding that the plaintiffs have become owners of the suit land by afflux of time and the suit of plaintiffs is within limitation. Learned counsel further contended that specific period of limitation for redemption of mortgage is prescribed under Limitation Act and grace period of 7 years has further been provided for old cases and as such learned trial Court below wrongly arrived at the conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have become owners by afflux of time. While inviting the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by learned trial Court, Mr.Tara Singh Chauhan contended that there is total mis-reading, misappreciation and mis-construction of evidence adduced on record by the plaintiffs by learned trial Court while dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs, whereas learned first appellate Court correctly appreciated the evidence in its right perspective and rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have become owners of the suit land by afflux of time. 12. At this stage, it may be noticed that learned counsel representing the plaintiffs was unable to dispute the factum with regard to judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram’s case supra, wherein it has been held that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act to recover possession qua mortgaged property commences when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly by payment or deposit by the mortgagor. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 14. After having carefully perused pleadings adduced on record by respective parties as well as provisions of law applicable in the present case and more particularly judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram’s case supra, this Court deems it fit to take all the substantial questions of law together for adjudication as they are closely linked to each other. 15. This Court, after having carefully perused the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram’s case supra, sees no occasion/reason to go into the correctness of findings returned by both the Courts below with regard to mortgage of suit land, if any, made in favour of plaintiffs by the defendants. 15. This Court, after having carefully perused the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram’s case supra, sees no occasion/reason to go into the correctness of findings returned by both the Courts below with regard to mortgage of suit land, if any, made in favour of plaintiffs by the defendants. It is undisputed before this Court that the suit land was originally owned and possessed by the defendants, which in the year 1952 allegedly mortgaged to the plaintiffs and as such question which requires to be decided by this Court is, “whether defendants could redeem their land mortgaged by them only within a period of 30 years, as provided under Limitation Act, 1963 or beyond that period?”. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that earlier period of redemption of mortgage was 60 years, but after coming into operation of Limitation Act, 1963, it was reduced to 30 years. It is also not in dispute that in cases where old Limitation Act was applicable, period of 7 years was given as a grace period. Shri Tara Singh Chauhan, learned counsel representing the plaintiffs-respondents, contended that as per Limitation Act, only 30 years period is provided for redemption of mortgage and as such defendants could redeem land mortgaged in favour of plaintiffs only within a period of 30 years from the date of mortgage i.e. 1952. Since defendants failed to do so within prescribed period of limitation, plaintiffs become owners qua the suit land by afflux of time. 16. After having carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no force in the contention put forth by learned counsel representing the respondents-plaintiffs. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically held that usufructuary mortgagor right under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act continues till mortgaged money is paid and mere expiry of period of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish right of mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 may not be applicable in the case at hand. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that defendants did not mortgage the suit land in their favour and it was not usufructuary mortgage. Admittedly possession of property was delivered to mortgagee with authority to enjoy all rights of the owners. 17. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that defendants did not mortgage the suit land in their favour and it was not usufructuary mortgage. Admittedly possession of property was delivered to mortgagee with authority to enjoy all rights of the owners. 17. Hon’ble Apex Court in Singh Ram (D) Thr.L.Rs. vs. Sheo Ram and others, AIR 2014 SC 3447 , upheld the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Kishan & Ors. vs. Sheo Ram & Ors., AIR 2008 Punjab & Haryana 77, and over-ruled the judgment passed by Full Bench of this Court in Bhandaru Ram vs. Sukh Ram, AIR 2012 HJP 1, wherein Full Bench of this Court had held that for redemption of usufructuary mortgage, where no time fixed for redemption of mortgage money, limitation period would be 30 years as prescribed under Article 60 of Limitation Act. 18. At this stage, it would be apt to reproduce the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Kishan’s case supra:- “Since the mortgage is essentially and basically a conveyance in law or an assignment of debt or for discharge of some other obligation for which it is given, the security must, therefore, be redeemable on the payment or discharge of such debt or obligation. Fact that at one point of time the mortgagor for one or the other reason mortgaged his property to avail financial assistance on account of necessities of life, the mortgagor’s right cannot be permitted to be defeated only on account of passage of time. The mortgagee remains in possession of the mortgaged property; enjoys the usufruct thereof and, therefore, not to lose anything by returning the security on receipt of mortgage debt. The limitation of 30 years under Article 61(a) beings to run “when the right to redeem or the possession accrues”. The right to redemption or recover possession accrued to the mortgagor on payment of sum secured in case of usufructuary mortgage, where rents and profits are to be set off against interest on the mortgage debt, on payment or tender to the mortgagee, the mortgage money or balance thereof or deposit in the Court. The right to seek foreclosure is coextensive with the right to seek redemption. The right to seek foreclosure is coextensive with the right to seek redemption. Since right to seek redemption accrues only on payment of the mortgage money or the balance thereof after adjustment of rents and profits from the interest thereof, therefore, right of foreclosure will not accrue to the mortgagee till such time the mortgagee remains in possession of the mortgaged security and is appropriating usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on the mortgaged debt. Thus, the period of redemption or possession would not start till such time usufruct of the land and the profits are being adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount. In view of the said interpretation, the principle that once a mortgage, always a mortgage and, therefore, always re-deemable would be applicable. The plea that after the expiry of period of limitation to sue for foreclosure, the mortgagees have a right to seek declaration in respect of their title over the suit property would not be tenable. The mortgage cannot be extinguished by any unilateral act of the mortgagee. Since the mortgage cannot be unilaterally terminated, therefore, the declaration claimed is nothing but a suit for foreclosure. It is equally well settled that it is not title of the suit, which determines the nature of the suit. The nature of suit is required to be determined by reading all averments in plaint. Such declaration cannot be claimed by an usufructuary mortgagee. Therefore, in case of usufructuary mortgage, where no time-limit is fixed to seek redemption, the right to seek redemption would not arise on date of mortgage but will arise on date when mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee or deposits in Court, the mortgage money or the balance thereof. Thus, it was held that once a mortgage always a mortgage and is always redeemable.” 19. Hon’ble Apex Court, in view of conflicting decision on the point having been rendered by Full Benches of two High Courts, referred hereinabove, laid down law in Singh Ram’s case supra, affirmed the view taken by Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court as under:- “10. We have given our anxious consideration to the question of law arising in the cases. 11. We have given our anxious consideration to the question of law arising in the cases. 11. We are in agreement with the view taken in the impugned judgment that in a usufructuary mortgage, right to recover possession continues till the money is paid from the rents and profits or where it is partly paid out of rents and profits when the balance is paid by the mortgagor or deposited in Court as provided under Section 62 of the T.P. Act. 12. It will be appropriate to refer to the statutory provisions of the T.P. Act and the Limitation Act:- “T.P. Act 58. "Mortgage", "mortgagor", "mortgagee", "mortgage-money" and "mortgaged" defined. (a) A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed. (b) Simple mortgage-Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself personally to pay the mortgage-money, and agrees, expressly or impliedly, that, in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a simple mortgage and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee. (c) Mortgage by conditional sale-Where, the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale: PROVIDED that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. (d) Usufructuary mortgage-Where the mortgagor delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorizes him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee a usufructuary mortgagee. (e) English mortgage-Where the mortgagor binds himself to repay the mortgage-money on a certain date, and transfers the mortgaged property absolutely to the mortgagee, but subject to a proviso that he will re- transfer it to the mortgagor upon payment of the mortgage-money as agreed, the transaction is called an English mortgage. (f) Mortgage by deposit of title-deeds- Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and in any other town which the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title- deeds. (g) Anomalous mortgage - A mortgage which is not a simple mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale, a usufructuary mortgage, an English mortgage or a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of this section is called an anomalous mortgage. 60. (g) Anomalous mortgage - A mortgage which is not a simple mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale, a usufructuary mortgage, an English mortgage or a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of this section is called an anomalous mortgage. 60. Right of mortgagor to redeem At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage-money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have registered an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished: Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by the act of the parties or by decree of a court. xxx xxx xxx 62. Right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession In the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor has a right to recover possession of the property together with the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee,- (a) where the mortgagee is authorised to pay himself the mortgage-money from the rents and profits of the property,- when such money is paid; (b) where the mortgagee is authorised to pay himself from such rents and profits or any part thereof a part only of the mortgage-money, when the term (if any) prescribed for the payment of the mortgage-money has expired and the mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee the mortgage money or the balance thereof or deposits it in court hereinafter provided. xxx xxx xxx Limitation Act:- Art. 61 By a mortgagor a) b) To redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged. Xxxxxxxxx Thirty years xxxxxx When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues Xxxxxxxxx (emphasis supplied) A perusal of above provisions shows that Article 61 refers to right to redeem or recover possession. xxx xxx xxx Limitation Act:- Art. 61 By a mortgagor a) b) To redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged. Xxxxxxxxx Thirty years xxxxxx When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues Xxxxxxxxx (emphasis supplied) A perusal of above provisions shows that Article 61 refers to right to redeem or recover possession. While right of mortgagor to redeem is dealt with under Section 60 of the T.P. Act, the right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession is specially dealt with under Section 62. Section 62 is applicable only to usufructuary mortgages and not to any other mortgage. The said right of usufructuary mortgagor though styled as ‘right to recover possession’ is for all purposes, right to redeem and to recover possession. Thus, while in case of any other mortgage, right to redeem is covered under Section 60, in case of usufructuary mortgage, right to recover possession is dealt with under Section 62 and commences on payment of mortgage money out of the usufructs or partly out of the usufructs and partly on payment or deposit by the mortgagor. This distinction in a usufructuary mortgage and any other mortgage is clearly borne out from provisions of Sections 58, 60 and 62 of the T.P. Act read with Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Usufructuary mortgage cannot be treated at par with any other mortgage, as doing so will defeat the scheme of Section 62 of the T.P. Act and the equity. This right of the usufructuary mortgagor is not only an equitable right, it has statutory recognition under Section 62 of the T.P. Act. There is no principle of law on which this right can be defeated. Any contrary view, which does not take into account the special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act, has to be held to be erroneous on this ground or has to be limited to a mortgage other than a usufructuary mortgage. Accordingly, we uphold the view taken by the Full Bench that in case of usufructuary mortgage, mere expiry of a period of 30 years from the date of creation of the mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act.” 20. Hon’ble Apex Court in case supra, taking note of its earlier judgments on the point, held as under:- “13. Hon’ble Apex Court in case supra, taking note of its earlier judgments on the point, held as under:- “13. We may now refer to decisions of this Court. (i) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (iv) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (v) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (vi) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (vii) In Hamzabi & Ors. vs. Syed Karimuddin & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 414 , it was observed:- “2. The right of the mortgagor to redeem had its origin as an equitable principle for giving relief against forfeiture even after the mortgagor defaulted in making payment under the mortgage deed. It is a right which has been jealously guarded over the years by courts. The maxim of “once a mortgage always a mortgage” and the avoidance of provisions obstructing redemption as “clogs on redemption” are expressions of this judicial protection. (See: Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit (1989) 1 SCC 458 in this context.) As far as this country is concerned, the right is statutorily recognised in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section gives [pic]the mortgagor right to redeem the property at any time after the principal money has become due by tendering the mortgage money and claiming possession of the mortgaged property from the mortgagee. The only limit to this right is contained in the proviso to the section which reads: “Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a court.” 3. While the expression “decree of court” is explicit enough, the phrase “act of parties” has given rise to controversy. One such act may be when the mortgagor sells the equity of redemption to the mortgagee. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam, (1977) 3 SCC 247 has said that: (SCC p. 254, para 34)” (viii) Contrary view has been expressed in Sampuran Singh & Ors. vs. Smt. Niranjan Kaur (smt.) & Ors., (1999) 2 SCC 679 as follows:- “14. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam, (1977) 3 SCC 247 has said that: (SCC p. 254, para 34)” (viii) Contrary view has been expressed in Sampuran Singh & Ors. vs. Smt. Niranjan Kaur (smt.) & Ors., (1999) 2 SCC 679 as follows:- “14. Submission was, as aforesaid, that right to redeem only accrues when either the mortgagors tender the amount of mortgage or the mortgagees communicate satisfaction of the mortgage amount through the usufruct from the land. This submission is misconceived, as aforesaid, if this interpretation is accepted, then till this happens the period of limitation never start running and it could go on for an infinite period. We have no hesitation to reject this submission. The language recorded above makes it clear that right of redemption accrues from the very first day unless restricted under the mortgage deed. When there is no restriction the mortgagors have a right to redeem the mortgage from that very date when the mortgage was executed. Right accruing means, right either existing or coming into play thereafter. Where no period in the mortgage is specified, there exists a right to a mortgagor to redeem the mortgage by paying the amount that very day in case he receives the desired money for which he has mortgaged his land or any day thereafter. This right could only be restricted through law or in terms of a valid mortgage deed. There is no such restriction shown or pointed out. Hence, in our considered opinion the period of limitation would start from the very date the valid mortgage is said to have been executed and hence the period of limitation of 60 years would start from the very date of oral mortgage, that would be from March 1893. In [pic]view of this, we do not find any error in the decision of the first appellate court or the High Court holding that the suit of the present appellants is time-barred.” However, facts mentioned in para 3 show that possession remained with mortgagor and it was not a case of usufructuary mortgage. 14. We need not multiply reference to other judgments. Reference to above judgments clearly spell out the reasons for conflicting views. 14. We need not multiply reference to other judgments. Reference to above judgments clearly spell out the reasons for conflicting views. In cases where distinction in usufructuary mortgagor’s right under Section 62 of the T.P. Act has been noted, right to redeem has been held to continue till the mortgage money is paid for which there is no time limit while in other cases right to redeem has been held to accrue on the date of mortgage resulting in extinguishment of right of redemption after 30 years. 15. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly. 16. On this conclusion, the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court will stand affirmed and contrary view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bhandaru Ram (D) Thr. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand over-ruled.” (pp.3452-3464) 21. Since Hon’ble Apex Court has held that mere expiry of period of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, there may not be any application of provisions of Limitation Act, 1963. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand over-ruled.” (pp.3452-3464) 21. Since Hon’ble Apex Court has held that mere expiry of period of 30 years from the date of mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, there may not be any application of provisions of Limitation Act, 1963. Since this Court proceeded to decide instant appeal purely on the basis of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment supra, wherein it has been specifically held that mere expiry of 30 years from the date of mortgage would not extinguish right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act to redeem the mortgage land/property, all the substantial questions of law, referred hereinabove, have become redundant and it is not necessary for this Court to look into that, otherwise also it is case of the plaintiff that defendants mortgaged the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents but since he failed to redeem within prescribed period of limitation, plaintiffs have become owners by afflux of time. Only question which was required to be decided by this Court was, “whether defendants could redeem the suit land after expiry of 30 years or not”. Once Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically answered aforesaid question, finding, if any, returned by Courts below with regard to mortgage allegedly made by defendants in favour of the plaintiffs is of no consequence. 22. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove and law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees valid reasons to interfere with the judgment passed by learned first appellate Court, which is apparently against the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court and as such same deserves to be quashed and set aside. This appeal is allowed, judgment and decree passed by learned first appellate Court is set aside and that of the learned trial Court is upheld and the suit filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed, accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.