JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has filed the present appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Cr.P.C.' for short) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Porbandar in Sessions Case No. 39 of 1995. 2. The prosecution case in short is that the complainant Kumbhar Thakarshi Samjibhai, a resident of Vanthli, Dist. Junagadh has filed the complaint at Ranavav Police Station on 24.04.1995 by alleging that deceased Shilpa had married to Kumbhar Dilip Velji - son of respondent accused No. 1 prior to eight months. It has been asserted that on 24.04.1995, a telephonic call received from original accused No. 3 - Dilip Velji whereby the complainant was immediately asked to reach at house of her daughter's (Gitaben) house at Ranavav at about 6 pm. It has been further alleged in the complaint that one Bavaji Bhikhu Natha came at the place of Kirit Virji and informed the complainant to immediately rush to the house of Dilip Velji - accused No. 3. On reaching at the place, they found large number of persons gathered outside the house of respondents accused as the complainant's daughter Shilpa had been taken to the hospital on account of burnt injuries. Therefore on receipt of such information the complainant along with husband of his daughter Gitaben rushed to Porbandar Hospital where her daughter Shilpa was admitted for treatment. On inquiring with the Doctors and information received by the complainant that deceased Shilpa had sustained 95% burnt injuries over all her body and accused respondents were also present in the hospital. During the course of treatment, later on at about 09:45 p.m., the deceased succumbed to the burnt injures and died as a result of which cremation has taken place. It has been alleged in the complaint that the original accused No. 3 - Dilip Velji who returned from Dubai and came to Ranavav on 21.04.1995 was not supporting deceased Shilpa and as the mental and physical cruelty remained unnoticed by him, out of frustration she poured kerosene on her body and set herself on fire. This is the circumstance in which the complainant has filed the complaint at Ranavav Police Station which is registered as I-C.R. No. 45 of 1995 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306, 304B read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondents accused. This is the circumstance in which the complainant has filed the complaint at Ranavav Police Station which is registered as I-C.R. No. 45 of 1995 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 306, 304B read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondents accused. The said complaint came to be investigated by the Investigating Officer who recorded statements of relevant witnesses, has drawn panchnama of place of scene of offence, has carried out steps which are required to be taken during the course of investigation and procedure for post-mortem has also been carried out and thereafter on having found adequate material against the accused respondents, the Investigating Officer has filed charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate. However, since the offence, which has been alleged, was triable by the Court of sessions, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. case came to be committed to the Court of Sessions which has come up for consideration before the learned Sessions Judge, Porbandar which was registered as Sessions Case No. 39 of 1995. 2.1 After committal of the case to the Sessions Court, learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the respondents accused at Exh. 5 and subsequent thereto after read over the same to the respondents accused, their pleas were recorded at Exhs. 6, 7, 8 and 9 but in the said pleas offence was denied to have been committed. Resultantly the case was put up for further cross. During the course of proceedings, the prosecution has led evidence in the form of ocular as well as documentary evidence. As many as 15 witnesses have been examined to prove the case along with 25 documentary materials adduced in the following form. ORAL EVIDENCE:- Prosecution Witness Number Name of Prosecution Witnesses Exh. 1 Dr. Dineshbhai Madhubhai Thakor 17 2 Complainant, Thakarsibhai Samjibhai Kukadiya 20 3 Prosecution Witness Valjibhai Muljibhai 33 4 Prosecution Witness Mohanbhai Lilabhai 34 5 Prosecution Witness Bhojabhai Bhimabhai 35 6 Prosecution Witness Gitaben Sisorbhai Jadav 40 7 Prosecution Witness Kisorbhai Dahyabhai Dabhi 41 8 Prosecution Witness Asvinbhai Thakarsibhai 43 9 Prosecution Witness Bhikhubhai Jerambhai Chhaya 45 10 Prosecution Witness Dudhiben Thakarsibhai 48 11 Prosecution Witness Kantilal Naranbhai Gadher 53 12 Prosecution Witness Kiritbhai Virjibhai Vara 57 13 Prosecution Witness Mahendrasinh Fatesinh Jethwa 61 14 Prosecution Witness PSI Vikramsinh Dasrathsinh Gohel 76 15 Dr. Nurulamin Abdulkadar Khukhudiya 77 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:- Sr. No. Particulars of Documentary Evidence Exh. Nurulamin Abdulkadar Khukhudiya 77 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:- Sr. No. Particulars of Documentary Evidence Exh. 1 Injury certificate by CHC Ranavav 18 2 Injury certificate of Velji Kara Singdiya issued by CHC Ranavav 19 3 Original complaint 21 4 Post Card and letters Exh.22 to 25 5 Cover of letter received through Air-Mail 26 6 Photograph 27 7 Letter written to Veljibhia Karabhai Singdiya 44 8 Letters and Post Card written to Thakarsi Samjibhai Kukadiya 49 to 52 9 Locan panchnama of place of offence 59 10 Inquest Panchnama 60 11 Yadi written by PSO, Ranavav to PSI Ranavav for keeping safe custody of letters regarding offence 62 12 Special Report of the offence 63 13 VHF Message 64 14 Report to PSO 65 15 Yadi written to on duty Medical Officer Bhavsinhji, Porbandar Hospital 66 16 Report of the PSO 67 17 Yadi written to Executive Magistrate 68 18 Report of the PSO 69 19 Receipt regarding handing over dead body to relatives 70 20 PSO Report 71 21 Copy of Janva Jog No.41/95 to Ranavav Police Station 72 22 VHF Message 73 23 Copy of 7/95 of Ranavav Police Station 74 24 Letter for sending PM Note to Superintendent Office, General Hospital, Porbandar 75 25 Suicidal Note of deceased Shilpaben 78 2.2 The prosecution after leading evidence in the aforesaid form submitted closing pursis at Exh. 79 and some of the witnesses were not to be examined. Resultantly, dropping pursis has also been submitted at Exh. 85 by the prosecution. Further closing pursis have been given, further statements of the respondents accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein the accused respondents reiterated that no offence was committed by them, not only that but they also asserted in their further statements that they were falsely implicated into the offence. With these further statements, the case was put up for final adjudication wherein the issues have been framed by learned sessions judge and after examining materials on record and after going through the testimony of witnesses, the learned sessions judge, in exercise of powers under Section 235 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to pass an order of acquittal from the offences for which the respondents accused were tried and this order dated 31.03.2006 is made the subject matter of present Criminal Appeal. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has vehemently contended that the learned Judge has seriously erred in passing the order of acquittal and despite the fact that prosecution has led evidence cogently and established the case against the respondents accused an error is committed in evaluating the evidence in its proper perspective and therefore Mr. Poojari, learned APP has contended that there is no germane reason to justify the order of acquittal. It has also been contended that looking to the panchnama of scene of offence and testimony of the complainant and the daughter it has been specifically found from the record unequivocally that during the short span of marriage life of eight months, there was some episode which took place, which can be inferred against the respondents accused. It is contended that the learned judge by not appreciating the evidence from that angle has committed serious error in exercise of jurisdiction. Mr. Poojari, learned advocate has vehemently contended that there was no justifiable explanation as to under what circumstance within short span of marriage life of eight months a lady committed suicide and therefore inference could be drawn against the respondents accused on the basis of the testimony of the complainant also about the ill treatment which learned judge ought to have appreciated before passing the order of acquittal and therefore this being a serious error committed by the learned judge the same is required to be corrected. Mr. Poojari, learned APP has further contended that it has been categorically come out from the testimony of sister of the deceased who went to the hospital and who has specifically asserted in her deposition that prior to almost about one month when she met the deceased there was a reference made about the ill-treatment to her and therefore this being the position, presumption as provided under Section 113 of the Evidence Act ought to have been drawn and for that it was obligatory on the part of the respondents accused to discharge the said burden and therefore this fact having not been properly appreciated by the learned judge, the order of acquittal is required to be set at naught. Mr. Mr. Poojari, learned APP has further contended that incident in question has occurred immediately within short span of period of return of her husband from Dubai and therefore by referring to testimony of some of witnesses, Mr. Poojari, learned APP has contended that there are no adequate reason to substantiate the order of acquittal passed by learned judge and therefore when medical opinion as well as ocular evidence are in consistent with each other, the order could not have been passed of such a nature especially when there is specific charge of Section 306 as well as Section 304B read with Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and therefore MR. Poojari, learned APP has contended that there is no justifiable reason which can allow such order to be sustained in eye of law. By referring to some of documentary evidence on record, Mr. Poojari, learned APP has ultimately requested that the order of acquittal requires to be set aside and appeal filed by the State may be allowed by awarding appropriate punishment for offence for which the accused respondents have been charged. 4. Mr. Yogendra Thakur, learned advocate has first of all drawn attention of the Court that original respondent accused No. 4, during the pendency of this appeal, has expired and therefore case against the respondent accused No. 4 gets abated. 4.1 Per contra, to oppose the stand taken by the State in the present appeal Mr. Yogendra Thakur, learned advocate appearing for respondents No. 1 to 3 has submitted that the detailed order has been passed by the learned judge by assigning cogent reasons and the said exercise of jurisdiction may not be interfered with. Mr. Thakur, learned advocate has further contended that from over all evidence on record, it is not coming out cogently that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, Mr. Thakur, learned advocate has submitted initial burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt ought to have been discharged by the prosecution only then to refer presumption as envisaged under Section 113 of the Evidence Act and this is having not been so, it cannot be said that any legal infirmity is reflected in the order passed by the learned judge. It has further been contended by Mr. It has further been contended by Mr. Thakor that material witnesses have been examined and dealt with extensively by learned trial judge and then it has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has not inspired any confidence which led ultimately to an order of acquittal and therefore such exercise of jurisdiction may not be required to be interfered with. Mr. Thakur, learned advocate has submitted that from letters which have been referred to by learned APP to establish the case particularly not revealing any such circumstance by virtue of which an inference about the mental and physical cruelty, as alleged, can be drawn and therefore in absence of such evidence cogently not supporting the prosecution case, the order passed by the learned judge is thoroughly justified. Mr. Thakur, learned advocate referring to the testimony of Doctor, Medical Officer who is examined at P.W. No. 1 viz. Dr. Dineshbhai Madhubhai Thakor (Exh. 17), who has specifically opined that whenever any person is suffering from a disease of mood-disorder, there may be a tendency of such person to commit suicide, has drawn our attention to the testimony, more particularly cross examination of this witness wherein it is clearly indicated that such hypersensitive person can commit such an act. Mr. Thakur, learned advocate has further contended that even from the testimony of witnesses i.e. father of complainant no reference is coming out about any physical or mental ill-treatment and so far demand of dowry is concerned there is no cogent material sufficient enough to establish such allegations and therefore from the testimony of father himself, there appears to be no such circumstance which is visible as alleged by the prosecution. It has also been pointed out that from the cross-examination of father, there is no specific time or date coming to as to when such ill-treatment has been made out to the deceased and therefore by stray observation coming in the version, it cannot be said, in any way, that prosecution has established the charge for committing mental and physical ill-treatment to the deceased. By referring to inquest panchnama as well as postmortem examination, there are no other injuries found on the body of deceased except the burnt injuries. Therefore there could be possibility of circumstance in which the deceased might have, on account of her hypersensitive nature, committed the act for which the respondents accused could not be held responsible. Mr. By referring to inquest panchnama as well as postmortem examination, there are no other injuries found on the body of deceased except the burnt injuries. Therefore there could be possibility of circumstance in which the deceased might have, on account of her hypersensitive nature, committed the act for which the respondents accused could not be held responsible. Mr. Thakur, learned advocate has further contended that there is no cogent material sufficient enough to establish and connect the guilty of the respondents accused in commission of crime and therefore Mr. Thakur, learned advocate contended that order of acquittal suffers from no legal infirmity. In addition thereto, Mr. Thakur has contended that in further statement also the specific explanation has come out that there was no ill-treatment, on the contrary the deceased was suffering from mental disorder of hypersensitive nature which has been not only substantiated by medical evidence but also from the testimony of the father of the deceased himself and therefore when such explanation is very much put forth in further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., it cannot be said, in any way, that learned sessions judge has committed any error in passing the order of acquittal. By referring the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Thakur, learned advocate has submitted that the appeal having no merits deserves to be dismissed. 5. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record in co-relation with reasons which are assigned by learned judge, we are of the opinion that conclusion arrived at by learned judge does not appear to be perverse which could result in any miscarriage of justice and for that purpose we have independently examined and assessed evidence on record being comprehensive analyzed which cannot be overlooked. 5.1 We have gone through and examined the testimony of Dr. Dineshbhai Madhubhai Thakor (Exh. 17). From his cross-examination, it is revealed that on account of hypersensitive nature of a person, a possibility cannot be ruled out that such kind of person can commit suicide at any time. On the contrary, this Medical Officer has opined to the extent that person having such a nature may lead to a situation wherein minor children also can be done away by such person. In addition thereto we have also gone through and examined testimony of P.W. No. 2 viz. Thakarsibhai Samjibhai Kukadiya, Exh. On the contrary, this Medical Officer has opined to the extent that person having such a nature may lead to a situation wherein minor children also can be done away by such person. In addition thereto we have also gone through and examined testimony of P.W. No. 2 viz. Thakarsibhai Samjibhai Kukadiya, Exh. 20 in which it is coming from version admittedly that deceased was of hypersensitive nature and in addition thereto it has also been coming out that there are no specific instances with date and month to the so-called allegations of mental and physical cruelty. It has also not come out from testimony of Gitaben - sister of the deceased on the basis of which it can be said that learned judge has committed any error and therefore conjoint reading of the testimony of witnesses who have been examined by prosecution in addition thereto the witnesses in the form of neighbours have also not been reflected any further contrary circumstance by virtue of which it can safely be said that respondents accused are guilty of offences as alleged. 5.3 The record of the case indicates that from the cross examination of testimony of P.W. No. 5 viz. Bhojabhai Bhimabhai Jadav, Exh. 35, who is happened to be a person intervened when other caste persons assembled with the father of deceased, that father of deceased categorically admitted that deceased was of hyper technical nature and therefore when the evidence on record is not reaching to any specific conclusion about the establishment of guilt of the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt, which has also been appreciated by the learned judge, we are unable to dislodge the finding arrived at by learned judge on appreciation of evidence. Looking to the postmortem examination coupled with inquest panchnama, we find no incriminating circumstance which can suggest any role being played by respondents accused and we have also found from reading of the judgment that each and every material led by the prosecution to establish the guilty of accused has been examined and evaluated by the learned judge and upon appreciation of evidence and material on record the learned judge has arrived at conclusion that prosecution has not been able to establish case against the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. When the learned judge has undertaken such exercise and passed an order of acquittal, we are unable to exercise our appellate jurisdiction to dislodge the findings arrived at that too in absence of any other extra ordinary circumstance contrary to the material and therefore we are of the considered opinion that there seems to be no error committed by learned judge in passing the order of acquittal. 5.4 While coming to this conclusion, we are also mindful of limitations of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with the order of acquittal as normally the appellate jurisdiction is no doubt vide enough to re-examine the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion but at the same time, when the order in question is not suffering from any legal infirmity nor any perversity which can be said to have caused any miscarriage of justice, the substitution of conclusion is not warranted in exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therefore by keeping in view this settled proposition of law, we are unable to exercise our appellate jurisdiction to interfere the findings which has been arrived at by learned judge. Series of decisions few of which are reproduced hereinafter as the Court has taken the assistance of the same, on the issue. "In case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under : 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: 10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld. The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: 21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 5.5 In the aforesaid circumstance prevailing on record and keeping in view the propositions of law laid down, as stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the order suffers from no legal infirmity nor any perversity is reflecting. On the contrary, the conclusion arrived at by learned judge is based upon appreciation of evidence led by the prosecution and therefore in absence of any extra ordinary justifiable circumstance, we are unable to dislodge the conclusion arrived at by learned judge more particularly when there seems to be no other view possible contrary to the view taken by learned judge and therefore the State Appeal having no merits is required to be dismissed. 6. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 31.03.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 39 of 1995 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Porbandar is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.