Judgment Tashi Rabstan, J.—Petitioner, working as Deputy Commandant in Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), aggrieved of Order no.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 19th August 2013, imposing punishments, by reducing him to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a period of three years; stopping increments of pay during the period of such reduction; on the expiry of such period, postponing future increments of his pay; and accordingly reducing his pay from Rs.28,420/- plus Grade Pay 6600/- to Rs.27,400/- plus Grade Pay Rs.6600/- for a period of three years i.e. from 01.09.2013 to 31.08.2016 in the pay band of 15,600-39,100 (PB-3), filed writ petition, registered as SWP no.2117/2013, which was disposed of vide judgement and order dated 19th March 2015; operative portion whereof is: “For the reasons discussed, Writ Petition is allowed and the order no.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 19.08.2013, is quashed to the extent it imposes major penalty on the petitioner. Resultantly, respondents shall supply copy of UPSC advice to petitioner, enabling him to file his response and make an effort to convince the respondents that penalty suggested by UPSC would be unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. By above judgement, the Orderno.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 19th August 2013, imposing major penalty on petitioner, was quashed and in consequence, respondents directed to supply copy of UPSC advice to petitioner, enabling him to file his Response thereto. After two months of passing of judgement and order dated 19th March 2015 in SWP no.2117/2013, petitioner filed Contempt No.288/2015. However, this Court, vide order dated 14th August 2015, held contempt petition not maintainable, with following observations: “Petition is not maintainable inasmuch as order imposing penalty stands quashed. In any case respondents are not interested in proceeding against the petitioner, petitioner need not seek directions to respondents to proceed against him, and that too in a contempt petition.” 3. Respondents issued Order no.D-IX-17-2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015.After detailing out Articles of Charge and institution of writ petition by petitioner, they decided to hold enquiry against him from the stage of serving a copy of advice tendered by UPSC vide letter no.F.3/105/2012 dated 5th October 2012, as ordered by this Court vide judgement dated 19th March 2015.It is this order, of which petitioner feels aggrieved. Petitioner has filed writ petition on hand, on 3rd October 2015, with following relief that he implored for to be passed in his favour and against respondents: a) Writ of Certiorari, quashing impugned condition to hold further enquiry against the petitioner, as incorporated in concluding para 8 sub clause (ii) of the impugned order no.D.IX/2004-CRC dated 31.08.2015 issued by respondents (as contained in Annexure C) may be quashed; b) Writ of Mandamus, commanding the respondents to implement the judgment dated 19.3.2015 passed in SWP No.2117/13 in letter and spirit that would mean to restore all the service benefits including grant of promotion to the next higher grade and post retrospectively and determine and maintain the seniority of the petitioner at an appropriate place under the mandate of law.” 4. On presentation of instant writ petition, threshold ad interim order dated 5th October 2015 this Court passed, staying impugned Order no.D-IX-17-2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015, to the extent of holding enquiry. However, petitioner was asked to file response within 10 days and respondents, on its receipt, were required to consider the same. 5. Respondents preferred an application (MP no.01/2016), seeking modification of aforesaid Order dated 5th October 2015. Application, with consensus of learned counsel for parties, was allowed, modifying ad interim order dated 5th October 2015, in the following manner: “With the consensus of learned counsel for the parties interim order dated 05.10.2015 is modified. The enquiry shall be held in terms of the order impugned. However, the same shall be subject to outcome of the writ petition. The petitioner shall be heard in accordance with judgment and order dated 19.03.2015 passed in SWP no.2117/2013.” 6. It appears that petitioner submitted his reply/ representation dated 10th October 2015,to UPSC advice served on him on 11th September 2015, and participated in the inquiry. Disciplinary Authority, on examining petitioner’s submissions, made certain recommendations, which was followed by Order no.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016. In view of this development, petitioner amendment in writ petition sought for by petitioner was allowed vide order dated 27th June 2016 and amended writ petition taken on record. Respondents were directed to file Reply to amended writ petition. On 2nd May 2017, writ petition was admitted. Respondents were directed to file counter affidavit that they have filed. In view of this development, petitioner amendment in writ petition sought for by petitioner was allowed vide order dated 27th June 2016 and amended writ petition taken on record. Respondents were directed to file Reply to amended writ petition. On 2nd May 2017, writ petition was admitted. Respondents were directed to file counter affidavit that they have filed. Petitioner, on the edifice of case set up, seeks following relief in amended writ petition: a) Writ of Certiorari, quashing impugned condition to hold further enquiry against petitioner as incorporated in concluding para 8 sub-clause (ii) of the impugned order no.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015 issued by respondents; b) Writ of Certiorari, quashing impugned order no.D.IX-17-2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016; c) Writ of Mandamus, commanding respondents to implement judgement dated 19th March 2015 passed in SWP no.2117/2013 in letter and spirit that would mean to restore all the benefits including grant of promotion to the next higher grade and post retrospectively and determine and maintain the seniority of the petitioner at an appropriate place under the mandate of law. 7. Respondents, in their counter affidavit, insist that petitioner has, in essence, challenged impugned Order dated 18th April 2016 at a time when he was not posted at Srinagar and said order has been passed by competent authority at Delhi. Petitioner is stated to be presently posted in 148 Battalion, which is at present located at Chandauli, U.P. and therefore, no cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in that, the same being new cause of action and petitioner has remedy to challenge above-said order before the court of competent jurisdiction and not before this Court as same does not conform to stipulations of Article 226. Respondents maintain that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. Writ petition (SWP no.2117/2013) against order dated 19th August 2013, as respondents contend, filed by petitioner, was disposed of vide order dated 19th March 2015, quashing order dated 19th August 2013 with liberty to respondents to furnish copy of UPSC opinion to petitioner, so that he could make representation against order of penalty and thereafter respondents issued a well-reasoned Order on 18th April 2016, after following the mandate of law as enumerated in Central Classification Control Appeal Rules as also followed the direction of this Court in letter and spirit. Impugned order, according to respondents, has been passed by competent authority in accordance with law and does not call for interference. Petitioner’s writ petition (SWP no.2117/2013) is claimed to have been allowed to limited extent of directing respondents to furnish UPSC opinion to petitioner so that he could make a representation against order of penalty. It is insisted that except for pleading that the proceedings initiated against petitioner were set aside in SWP no.2117/2013, which assertion is wrong on facts and law, petitioner has not pointed out lawful and valid reasons as to why proceedings, initiated against him, are bad in law and facts. Allegations, levelled against petitioner, as averred by respondents, have been proved in compliance to due process of law and respondents are duty bound in law to act against a delinquent officer in terms of law and right of respondents cannot be scuttled. 8. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 9. By judgment dated 19th March 2015 in SWP no.2117/2015 titled Dhiraj Kumar Singh v. Union of India and others, after quashing impugned order therein, this Court directed respondents to supply copy of UPSC advice to petitioner, enabling him to file his Response and making an effort to convince respondents that penalty suggested by UPSC would be unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. In compliance to aforesaid judgement dated 19th March 2015, the Order bearing no.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015 was passed for conducting further enquiry under the provision of Rule 15 (1) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, against petitioner from the stage of serving a copy of advice tendered by UPSC vide letter no.F.3/105/2012-SI dated 5th October 2012. Petitioner, presently posted in 148 Battalion, which is located at Chandauli, U.P., submitted his representation dated 10th October 2015, against UPSC advice and participated in inquiry. The representation, so submitted by petitioner, was examined by respondents. It was observed that petitioner failed to bring any new fact or cogent reason, warranting reconsideration of UPSC advice. This was followed by Order dated 18th April 2016, imposing penalties mentioned therein, which is impugned in this petition. 10. Main objection of respondents in opposition to writ petition on hand is that no part of cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, this writ petition cannot be entertained by this Court. This was followed by Order dated 18th April 2016, imposing penalties mentioned therein, which is impugned in this petition. 10. Main objection of respondents in opposition to writ petition on hand is that no part of cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, this writ petition cannot be entertained by this Court. In support of the said primary objection, raised by respondents, it was pointed out by learned ASGI that what is challenged in present writ petition is the order, bearing no.D.IX-17-2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016, awarding certain punishment on petitioner, which has been passed after conducting inquiry into the matter at Delhi, in which petitioner partook and more particularly petitioner is not presently posted in Srinagar, but in U.P. According to learned ASGI, petitioner could have filed writ petition or any other appropriate motion against Order no.D.IX-17-2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016, before the court at Delhi, or at the most before the court in U.P. 11. Learned ASGI ingeminates that earlier Order no.D-IX-17-2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015,for holding enquiry against petitioner from the stage of serving a copy of advice tendered by UPSC vide letter no.F.3/105/2012 dated 5th October 2012, as ordered by this Court vide judgement dated 19th March 2015, was passed at Delhi. Thereafter, though petitioner initially, on presentation of writ petition, earned Order dated 5th October 2015, staying order dated 19th March 2015, yet the said ad interim order was, with the consensus of learned counsel for parties, modified and enquiry permitted to be held in terms of impugned order bearing no.D-IX-17-2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015 at Delhi. Petitioner participated in the said inquiry, which was conducted at Delhi and he submitted his reply/ representation on UPSC advice and Disciplinary Authority, on examining petitioner’s submissions, made certain recommendations, which was followed by Order no.D.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016, imposing certain penalties on petitioner. 12. It may not be out of place to mention here that the moment petitioner participated in the inquiry, the relief (a) implored for by him in present writ petition, to quash condition to hold further enquiry against him as incorporated in concluding para 8 sub-clause (ii) of impugned order no.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015, has become redundant. 12. It may not be out of place to mention here that the moment petitioner participated in the inquiry, the relief (a) implored for by him in present writ petition, to quash condition to hold further enquiry against him as incorporated in concluding para 8 sub-clause (ii) of impugned order no.IX-17/2004-CRC dated 31st August 2015, has become redundant. Writ petition, therefore, to that extent (i.e. relief (a) beseeched for by petitioner in writ petition) has become in fructuous the moment enquiry was initiated, in which petitioner, out of his own volition, participated. 13. Now, thereafter, are second and third relief(s)sought for by petitioner in writ petition, which are, Writ of Certiorari, quashing impugned order no.D.IX-17-2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016 and directing respondents to restore all benefits including promotion to next higher grade and post retrospectively and determine his seniority at appropriate place. The said impugned order bearing no.D.IX-17-2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016, has been passed only after holding enquiry, in which petitioner took part. The enquiry was conducted at Delhi. Petitioner participated in it. He is presently posted in U.P. (Uttar Pradesh).Fresh cause of action, that according to petitioner, has arisen for him to throw challenge to Order no.D.IX-17-2004-CRC dated 18th April 2016, imposing certain penalties on him, has, therefore, not arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The plea, that is taken, is that this Court shall have extra territorial jurisdiction to entertain instant petition in view of provisions of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid submission of learned counsel appearing for petitioner is misconceived and is required to be rejected out rightly. 14. It is pertinent to mention here that ‘cause of action’ determines the Court of competent jurisdiction when a party invokes extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In discern contradistinction to the provisions of Section 16 to 20 of Code of Civil Procedure, Article 226 (2) restricts the principle of territorial jurisdiction only to ‘cause of action’. The expression would take in its ambit partial or entire ‘cause of action’. Part of cause of action is again a term of wide magnitude and thus, has to be construed liberally. The expression would take in its ambit partial or entire ‘cause of action’. Part of cause of action is again a term of wide magnitude and thus, has to be construed liberally. However, once element of ‘cause of action’; or any part thereof in its minutest form is absent, the court may not have territorial jurisdiction, only on the basis of the residence/location of the party. The provisions of Section 20 CPC provide that subject to limitation contained in the preceding Sections, a suit could be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, defendant or each of defendants voluntarily reside(s) or where ‘cause of action’ wholly or in part arises. Thus, there are two factors, which independent of each other, can grant jurisdiction for a party to institute a suit in the court of competent jurisdiction. However, these provisions would not be applicable to writ jurisdiction stricto senso. It is a settled principle of law that provisions of Civil Procedure Code would not apply in full vigour or strictly to writ proceedings. They are not applicable of their own force to such proceedings, but nonetheless writ proceedings could be governed by principles analogous to those contained in the Code, particularly when they are not inconsistent with writ rules or the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 226. Unlike provisions of Section 20 CPC, which specifies different grounds for vesting jurisdiction in the court, Article 226 contemplates location of authorities and arising of ‘cause of action’, partly or wholly within territorial jurisdiction of that court. By introduction of Article 226 (2), great emphasis has been laid on the concept of ‘cause of action’. Even this statement is further clarified by use of non-obstante clause that it would be so, notwithstanding the fact that seat of such Government or authority or residence of such person is not within those territories. This manifestly shows that residence of the party is not really a relevant consideration for determining jurisdiction of a court under these provisions. In view of this constitutional mandate, the provisions of the High Court Rules and Orders relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction have to be read ejusdem generis to the Constitutional provisions. 15. To appropriately discuss the rationale of principle of ‘cause of action’, giving jurisdiction to a court, it will be useful to refer to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution, which reads: “226. 15. To appropriately discuss the rationale of principle of ‘cause of action’, giving jurisdiction to a court, it will be useful to refer to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution, which reads: “226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs— (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 31[2], every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under Clause (1), without: (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel for such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32.” 16. The provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution clearly exhibit intent of framers of the Constitution to grant territorial jurisdiction to the court in whose jurisdiction entire or part of ‘cause of action’ has arisen. The purpose of restricting jurisdiction of the court and relating it directly to ‘cause of action’, has also nexus to expeditious disposal of writ petition. An aggrieved person should approach the court of competent jurisdiction, and not file writ petitions in the court in whose jurisdiction no ‘cause of action’ or part thereof has arisen, merely on the ground that respondents or petitioners were residents of an area falling under jurisdiction of that court. Article 226 (3) of the Constitution, while furthering cause of expeditious disposal and prevention of unnecessary prolongation of interim orders in the form of injunction or stay, makes it obligatory for the Courts to dispose of such applications within specified time or within such time as the Courts may consider proper for reasons to be stated. Expeditious disposal has relevancy to the administration of justice and, therefore, is essential to the issue of jurisdiction as well. Normally wherever ‘cause of action’ or part thereof arises, authorities would be in power and possession of relevant documents/record, which can without any delay be produced before the courts to help expeditious disposal. These are procedural provisions, but are mandatory in their form as they alone determine the court of competent jurisdiction. The inquiry, in the present case, had been conducted at Delhi. Petitioner is posted in the State of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.).He partook in the inquiry at Delhi.Thus, it would have been apt for petitioner to, instead of knocking at portals of this Court, approach appropriate Court,in whose jurisdiction enquiry was conducted and petitioner participated therein, more particularly where the relevant documents/record relating to said inquiry can be produced without any delay to help expeditious disposal of the case. This, though being procedural provision, but is mandatory in its form as it alone determines the court of competent jurisdiction and for that reason, this Court is not appropriate forum for petitioner to knock at its portals for remedying his gravamen as groused by him in writ petition on hand. 17. This, though being procedural provision, but is mandatory in its form as it alone determines the court of competent jurisdiction and for that reason, this Court is not appropriate forum for petitioner to knock at its portals for remedying his gravamen as groused by him in writ petition on hand. 17. It may be mentioned here that vesting jurisdiction in a court in whose jurisdiction no ‘cause of action’ has arisen, would amount to defeating the very purpose of the Constitutional provisions. In a vast country like ours, the division of jurisdiction would be necessary, which in turn would link itself to the rationale behind these Constitutional provisions. Normally, provisions relating to jurisdiction, should be construed strictly as they vest or divest jurisdiction in the Court. To vest jurisdiction in a Court where the law does not intend, would be impermissible as jurisdiction in a Court can neither be vested by consent of parties nor by implication. Jurisdiction is conferred by a Statute. It is already pointed out that the expression ‘cause of action’ or any part thereof appearing in Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, is of significant meaning and consequences. The question as to whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. In order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of ‘cause of action’, do constitute a cause, so as to empower the Court to decide the dispute and that the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. The facts pleaded in writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a payer can be granted. Those facts, having nothing to do with the prayer made therein, cannot be said to give rise to a ‘cause of action’, which would confer jurisdiction on the Court. Even if a small fraction of ‘cause of action’, accrues within jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. However, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merits and even in appropriate cases, the Court can refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. 18. However, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merits and even in appropriate cases, the Court can refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. 18. To further analyse this expression in proper concept of law, I may refer to some judgments of the Supreme Court that have explained concept of ‘cause of action’. In the case of Oil Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., 1994 (4) SCC 711 , the Supreme Court has held: “Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the advertisement in Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisements itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of January 15, 1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejections of the offer as that fact occurred on January 27, 1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.... The submission of the learned Counsel for NICCO based on Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of Calcutta had no jurisdiction, this Court should, in the absence of proof of prejudice, refuse to interfere with the decision of the High Court unless it is otherwise found to be erroneous. While the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may support such a submission, we are afraid, the discretion cannot be used in favor of a party which deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a Court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever for ulterior motives. That would only encourage such type of litigation. The object underlying the provisions in Section 21 is not to encourage such litigants but to avoid harassment to litigants who had bonafide and in good faith commenced proceedings in a court which is later found to be wanting in jurisdiction. In the instant case, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that NICCO did not act bona fide in moving the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the submission based on Section 21 must fail.” 19. In the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports 2002(1) SCC 567 , the Supreme Court while explaining the principle laid down by that Court in the case of Union of India & ors v. Oswal Woollen Mills 1984 (2) SCC 646 , explained the scope of territorial jurisdiction and held: “We are unable to accept this finding of the High Court. The view of the High Court that this Court in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra) had held that the existence of the registered office of a Company would ipso facto give a cause of action to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the registered office of such a Company is situated, is not correct. As a matter of fact, in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra), the question of territorial jurisdiction in the sense with which we are concerned now, did not arise at all. In that case, the observations of the Court were as follows: Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The writ petitioners, however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory relief which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port....We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi.” 20. Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, which speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, provides that the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to territories, within which ‘cause of action’, wholly or in part, arises for exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or residence of such person is not within those territories. It is clear from the said Constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise jurisdiction in relation to territories within which ‘cause of action’, wholly or inpart, arises. In this regard, it would be suffice to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Utpal Kumar Basu’s case (supra), wherein it was held: “Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial.” 21. It is seen from above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisfied from entire facts pleaded in support of ‘cause of action’ that those facts do constitute a cause, so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above referred decisions that each and every fact pleaded by the petitioner, in the present case, does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to ‘cause of action’ within territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in that, those facts pleaded are such, which have no nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts, which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action, so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court. If this principle is applied to the given facts and circumstances of the present case, then I see that none of the facts pleaded in the petition fall into the category of bundle of facts, which would constitute a ‘cause of action’, giving rise to a dispute to confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court. 22. As is also clear from Union of India v. Adani Exports case (supra), that the entire facts pleaded would determine ‘cause of action’ and not merely happening of an inconsequential event that would determine ‘cause of action’, and in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisfied from entire facts pleaded in support of ‘cause of action’ that those facts do constitute a cause, so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute, which has, at least, arisen within its jurisdiction. Qua present case: inquiry was conducted not within territorial jurisdiction of this Court; petitioner, at the time of conducting of inquiry, was not posted within jurisdiction of this Court; impugned order, imposing certain punishments on petitioner was passed, giving rise to fresh ‘cause of action’, was not also passed within territorial jurisdiction of this Court; petitioner, when impugned order was passed, was not even posted within territorial jurisdiction of this Court; and petitioner is not even as on today posted within territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In such circumstances, ‘cause of action’ to throw challenge to impugned order dated 18th April 2016, imposing certain punishments on him, has arisen not within territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Apart from this, as already noticed that expeditious disposal is one of the underlining features of provisions of Article 226 and to ensure balancing of convenience between parties to the lis, it may be appropriate that the courts determine the question of jurisdiction at the first instance. Be that as it may, it would have been appropriate for the petitioner to approach competent forum, instead of knocking at portals of this Court. 23. It is well settled that proper exercise of jurisdiction would ex facie take in its ambit remedies which are effective and efficacious. If both or any of these ingredients are not satisfied, it would be a factor which will tilt the view of the court against exercising its jurisdiction. The court is expected to deal with the issue of jurisdiction right at the initial stage and normally while taking the petition as framed to be correct. Article 226 (2) opens with the words: “The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders of writs to any Government, authority or person may also be…”, which clearly indicates amplification of jurisdiction and that the provision is meant to aid the powers vested in the High Court for issuance of writ, order or direction, located within their territorial jurisdiction. The expression ‘may also’ would have to be given their true meaning while ensuring that such connotations are in consonance with the law enunciated by the Supreme Court and also spirit of constitutional territorial jurisdiction of a High Court. 24. It is a paramount principle of law of jurisdiction that the court has to determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a case brought by a litigant before it. 24. It is a paramount principle of law of jurisdiction that the court has to determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a case brought by a litigant before it. Undue hardship is one of the factors which the court would consider while answering such an issue. The doctrines of forum conveniens & forum non conveniens are the legal doctrines used by the court to determine the issue of jurisdiction. Ubi jus ibi remedium, there is no wrong without a remedy, is an effective legal maxim often applied to administration of justice but the question is, which is the proper and convenient legal forum or court, whose jurisdiction a party ought to invoke. The petitioner, being dominus litus, is master or has domain over the case but these rights are subject to law of jurisdiction. The laws and procedure, provided under the Code, are lex fori and wherever in terms of such law, the ingredients of territorial jurisdiction are not satisfied, the court would not assume jurisdiction merely on the ground of residence. The doctrine ‘forum non conveniens’ has a limited application but certainly is not an irrelevant factor, while adjudicating question of jurisdiction under the terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court iexamine whether a claim should or should not be entertained for forum non conveniens for the reason that there is another forum, i.e. clearly more appropriate than the one whose jurisdiction has been invoked. The inquiry, in the present case, was initiated and conducted at Delhi. Petitioner, posted at U.P., participated in the inquiry. The inquiry conducted at Delhi and participated by petitioner, culminated in issuance of order impugned. Having said so, fresh ‘cause of action’ has accrued to petitioner, but not within territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Better it would have been for petitioner to approach the court of his convenience, more particularly having regard to the fact that he being presently posted in U.P. 25. That apart, the Supreme Court in a judgment reported as Ambica Industries Versus Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 769 has examined the jurisdiction of the High Court against an order passed by the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi constituted to exercise the jurisdiction in respect of cases arising within the territorial limits of the State of Uttar Pradesh, National Capital Territory of Delhi and the State of Maharashtra. The Court held that decision of the High Court in an appeal shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. The binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction. It has been further held that though the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the writ proceedings, but since the phraseology used in Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226 is pari materia, therefore, the decision of the Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to the writ proceedings also. The Court held to the following effect: “13. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises jurisdiction over all the three States. In all the three States there are High Courts. In the event, the aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litus, as a result whereof, he elects to file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or courts or tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it and which might suit him and thus he would be able to successfully evade the law laid down by the High Court at Bombay. 38. We have noticed hereinbefore that if the decision of the High Court in the aforementioned question is taken to its logical conclusion, the same would lead to a great anomaly. It would also give rise to the problem of forum shopping. We may notice some examples to show that the determination of the appellate forum based upon the situs of the tribunal would lead to an anomalous result. It would also give rise to the problem of forum shopping. We may notice some examples to show that the determination of the appellate forum based upon the situs of the tribunal would lead to an anomalous result. For example, an assessee affected by an assessment order in Bombay may invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it which may be contrary to judgments of the High Court of Bombay. This cannot be allowed.” 26. Similar view was further iterated by the Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and others Versus Kalyan Banerjee, (2008) 3 SCC 456 wherein three-Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Versus Union of India and another, (2004) 6 SCC 254 was considered. It was held as under: “7. “Cause of action”, for the purpose of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, for all intent and purport, must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It means a bundle of facts which are required to be proved. The entire bundle of facts pleaded, however, need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved is material facts whereupon a writ petition can be allowed. 13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the Patna High Court, we are of the opinion that only because the head office of the appellant Company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.” 27. The three Judge Bench of the Supreme court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd case (supra) has held to the following effect: “27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” 28. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by the Supreme Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of ‘cause of action’. It is, no doubt, true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a ‘part of cause of action’, nothing less than that. 29. Since, in the present case, the situs of respondents, whose order is subject matter of challenge in this writ petition, is beyond territorial limits of this Court; respondents are not within the jurisdiction of this Court; and the subject matter of claim of petitioner, that is, inquiry conducted by respondents materialised and outcome thereof in the shape of impugned order took place beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, besides petitioner as well permanently or temporarily does reside beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, this Court will not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition as no cause of action vis-à-vis impugned order dated 18th April 2016, has arisen within jurisdiction of this Court. 30. Resultantly and in view of above enunciated principles of law, I am of the view that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide present writ petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed with liberty to petitioner to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction. Needless to add, this order will not be read as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Dismissed.