ORDER 1. The appellant/tenant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 3.3.2017 passed in First Appeal No.12A/2016 by the First Additional District Judge, Mungawali, District Ashoknagar reversing the judgment and decree dated 2.2.2016 passed in Civil Suit No.8A/2013 by the First Civil Judge, Mungawali. By lower appellate Court the suit filed by the landlord/plaintiff for eviction on the ground mentioned in section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred as to “the Act”) has been decreed. 2. Undisputedly, present appellant/tenant was a tenant in the suit accommodation for non-residential purpose in the disputed shop in a house situated in Kanchan Gali ward No.14 of town Mungawali and landlord Satish Kumar had purchased the house containing suit-accommodation in the year 2007 and, thereafter, appellant was paying rent to the plaintiff. 3. A suit for eviction and recovery of rent was filed by the respondent/plaintiff in respect of the disputed shop on the grounds envisaged under section 12(1) (a) and section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, on pleadings that defendant had not paid rent from 1.8.2010 and, hence, total arrears amount of rent amount of Rs.13,500/- was due towards the tenant. Plaintiff was desirous of opening jewelry shop for his major son Abhishek in the suitaccommodation and for this purpose, plaintiff is having sufficient money and his son Abhishek is having experience of conducting shop. Hence, plaintiff is bona fidely required suit accommodation (shop) for starting business of his major son and he is not having any alternative suitable accommodation of his son in town concerned. Plaintiff orally intimated to the tenant that his tenancy is being terminated from 1.6.2012 and asked for delivering of vacant possession of suit-accommodation, but defendant/tenant did not pay the arrears of rent and also not delivered the possession of the suitaccommodation. The suit for above mentioned reliefs was filed before the trial Court. 4. The defendant/tenant had opposed the prayer by filing a written statement. It was pleaded by the tenant that plaintiff is not having any bona fide need of suit accommodation to start the shop for his major son in suit-accommodation. Defendant was regularly paying rent but the plaintiff to make a ground for eviction stopped taking rent. Thereafter, defendant's son sent rent through money-orders, which returned back as plaintiff refused to received it. Defendant was regularly paying rent but the plaintiff to make a ground for eviction stopped taking rent. Thereafter, defendant's son sent rent through money-orders, which returned back as plaintiff refused to received it. The plaintiff has not terminated the tenancy by legal notice, hence, suit was not maintainable. In the house purchased by the plaintiff, in which suit accommodation is situated, an another shop having two doors (Dar) is situated in which plaintiff is running his shop of shoes from a door (Dar) and from another door (Dar) plaintiff's son Abhishek is conducting jewelry shop. Plaintiff's major son Abhishek is not an unemployed person and plaintiff has also purchased another shop and had given that shop to another tenant. Plaintiff is not having any actual or bona fide necessity for suit accommodation. Thus, dismissal of the suit was prayed. 5. The trial Court framed the issues and after taking evidence of both the parties and hearing recorded its findings that plaintiff is not having bonafide need of suit accommodation, as it was proved that plaintiff's son Abhishek is not unemployed and he is already conducting a jewelry shop in the same house, in which suit accommodation is situated and plaintiff has not sent any written notice regarding demand of arrears of rent before filing of the suit, thus, ground envisaged under section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act was not available to the plaintiff. Consequently, trial Court has dismissed the suit. 6. Plaintiff filed first appeal before the lower appellate Court, which was allowed and his suit for eviction was decreed by lower appellate Court only on the ground envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act holding that plaintiff's son Abhishek was conducting jewelry shop in a portion of his father's shoes shop adjacent to the suit accommodation but he bona fidely required suit accommodation for starting separate shop of son's jewelry shop and he is not having any alternative own suitable shop for this purpose. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant placingreliance on the judgments passed in the cases of Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, reported in 2001(2) JLJ 196 = 2001(4) M.P.H.T. 203 (SC), contended that learned first appellate Court erred in reversing the well reasoned decree passed by the trial Court dismissing plaintiff's eviction suit and lower appellate Court has not properly appreciated and analyzed the evidence produced by the parties, as it was rightly found proved by the learned trial Court that plaintiff's son Abhishek is not unemployed and he is already doing jewelry business in a part of his father's shoes shop, which is adjacent to the suit accommodation. It is submitted that the findings of the Courts below are not concurrent, hence second appeal be admitted for final hearing after formulating substantial questions of law. 8. On the other hand, it is contended by respondent counsel that the findings regarding bona fide need of the landlord for suit accommodation to start the business for his major son is only a finding of fact, against which second appeal is not maintainable, as the findings recorded by the first appellate Court on this point is not perverse in reference to the evidence available on record. 9. The tenant Kishore Singh (DW1) though deposed in examination-in-chief that plaintiff's son Abhishek is not unemployed and he is already conducting jewelry shop from one door (Dar) to the adjacent shop situated in suit house, and from another door (Dar) plaintiff is conducting his shoes shop, but he clearly admitted in para 15 of his cross-examination that adjacent to the disputed shop, 7-8 jewelry shops of gold and silver are situated. 10. On the other hand, plaintiff Satish kumar (PW1) admitted in his cross-examination that he is having a shop in the same purchased house which is having two doors and from first door he is having a shoes shop and in part of the same shop he is having a jewelry shop, which is being jointly conducted by him and his son Abhishek. Hence, it could not be inferred that his son Abhishek is conducting separately a jewelry shop from his father. 11. Abhishek (PW2) has supported his father's evidence. From plaintiff's evidence, it is clear that plaintiff is having an another shoes shop in tenanted premises. 12. Hence, it could not be inferred that his son Abhishek is conducting separately a jewelry shop from his father. 11. Abhishek (PW2) has supported his father's evidence. From plaintiff's evidence, it is clear that plaintiff is having an another shoes shop in tenanted premises. 12. N.K. Jain (PW4) has also deposed that in plaintiff's shoes shop, which is adjacent to the suit accommodation, in some portion of that shoes shop, plaintiff Satish Kumar sales jewelry and plaintiff's son-Abhishek helps his father in conducting jewelry shop. 13. It was further argued by the appellant's counsel that the suit-accommodation is a small shop, where a jewelry shop could not be conducted, but it is common experience that even in many cities, jewelry shops are being conducting in a comparatively small rooms in sarafa market. 14. Much emphasis has been given by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was pleaded by the plaintiff that his major son Abhishek is unemployed, but from evidence of Abhishek (PW2) and other plaintiff witnesses, it was proved that he is not unemployed. It is well settled that it is not necessary for plaintiff's son to remain unemployed till getting vacant possession of the suit accommodation. If after filing of the suit by the plaintiff, his son is helping in his father's jewelry shop, it could not be inferred that plaintiff's son is not having any bonafide need for starting his own separate jewelry shop. It appears that the lower appellate Court has properly and legally appreciated the evidence available on record and there is no any perversity in the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court. It is clear that the trial Court erred in holding that as now plaintiff's son is not unemployed and he is already conducting jewelry shop, hence, suit accommodation is not bonafidely required by the plaintiff. 15. This Court has clearly held in the case of Shakuntala Guha and others v. Jasmit Kaur Naruala and others [ 2017(1) JLJ 420 ], that where the M.P. Accommodation Control Act is applicable, there is no necessity of any notice prior to the suit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, regarding termination of tenancy of the tenant. 16. It has been clearly held by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. 16. It has been clearly held by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. [ 2000(1) JLJ 186 = AIR 2000 SC 534 ] that the bonafide requirement of landlord does not give rise to any substantial question of law and it has to be decided on the appreciation of evidence. It has been held by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Pakeerappa Rai v. Seethamma Hengsu and others [ (2001)9 SCC 521 ] that a findings of fact recorded by Courts below could not be interfered in second appeal even it is grossly erroneous. In the light of case of Babulal and others v.Shankar Lal and others, reported in (2008)17 SCC 638, it is clear that second appeal could not be admitted only on the ground that lower appellate Court has reversed the decree passed by the trial Court. 17. In the light of the above mentioned referred citations, it is clear that there is no any perversity and illegality in appreciation of evidence by the lower appellate Court and hence this second appeal does not involve any question of law rather than substantial question of law. On this point, this Court's judgment passed in the case of Vinod Kumar Goyal v. Avneet Kumar Gupta [ 2016(2) JLJ 439 = I.L.R. (2016) MP 2325] is referable. 18. In the circumstances, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed at the motion stage and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is hereby confirmed. No order as to costs.