JUDGMENT : DR. B.R. SARANGI, J. 1. Padma Charan Bhuyan, husband of the petitioner, while working as Assistant Manager in Indian Bank, died on 16.06.2006 leaving behind his widow, i.e., the petitioner, two daughters and one son. After his death, the Branch Manager, Indian Bank intimated the petitioner by letter dated 19.07.2006 to apply in proper format for payment of ‘exgratia’ under the scheme in lieu of compassionate appointment to the family of the employee died in harness. The petitioner could not submit her application for payment of ‘ex-gratia’, as because she met with an accident just before the death of her husband and was bed ridden almost two years with multiple fractures and brain injury. Further, she also lost her mental balance due to death of her son-in-law in a road accident. However, she submitted the application on 11.04.2012, but the Branch Manager returned the same vide letter dated 23.10.2012 with a request to resubmit the same after fulfilling required conditions mentioned therein. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted a fresh application on 10.12.2012, which was forwarded to the Zonal Office for payment of ‘ex-gratia’ in lieu of compassionate appointment. However, pursuant to letter dated 22.02.2013 of the Zonal Office, the Branch Manager in its memo dated 27.02.2013 returned the application for payment of ‘ex-gratia’ in lieu of compassionate appointment stating therein that the higher authority declined to entertain the application, as it was not submitted by the eligible dependants within the stipulated period from the date of death of the employee died in harness. Hence, finding no other alternative and efficacious remedy, the petitioner has, by means of this writ application, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. 2. Mr. D.P. Dhalasamanta, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that non-acceptance of the application for grant of ‘ex-gratia’ in lieu of compassionate appointment, on account of death of an employee, taking recourse to a technical ground of delay, frustrates the very purpose of the scheme itself. It is further contended that, when the reason for delay in submitting the application for payment of ‘ex-gratia’ is tale-tell, the action of the authority in returning the same cannot sustain in the eye of law, as it violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended that, when the reason for delay in submitting the application for payment of ‘ex-gratia’ is tale-tell, the action of the authority in returning the same cannot sustain in the eye of law, as it violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that the purported delay caused in submission of the application for grant of ‘ex-gratia’, being neither intentional nor deliberate but due to the reasons beyond the control of the petitioner, the authority concerned should not have rejected the same without appreciating the sufficiency of cause shown and, as such, the action of the authority is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the provisions of law. 3. Mr. S.K. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition and contended that since the petitioner had submitted application after six years of the death of the employee and the same was beyond the prescribed time limit, i.e., six months from the death of the employee, the authority is justified in rejecting the application, which does not warrant any interference at this stage. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the records, since pleadings between the parties have been exchanged, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 5. On the basis of the pleadings available, it is to be considered whether- (i) this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application; and (ii) the authorities are justified in rejecting the application for grant of ex-gratia on the ground that the same was filed beyond the time prescribed under the scheme. 6. So far as question no.1 is concerned, Mr. S.K. Dey, learned counsel for the opposite parties strenuously urged that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application reason being the husband of the petitioner, while working as Asst. Manager in the branch of opposite party no.1 at Vijaynagram in the State of Andhra Pradesh, expired on 16.06.2006. The requisition for submission of the application for ‘ex-gratia’ was handed over to the son of the petitioner at Vijaynagram and all the communications and correspondences were made at Vijayragram branch and, as such, the writ petition is not maintainable before this Court and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability. 6.1. The requisition for submission of the application for ‘ex-gratia’ was handed over to the son of the petitioner at Vijaynagram and all the communications and correspondences were made at Vijayragram branch and, as such, the writ petition is not maintainable before this Court and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability. 6.1. It is no doubt true that the branch office of opposite party no.1 bank, where the deceased husband of the petitioner was working, situates at Vijaynagram in the State of Andhra Pradesh. But at the same time, on careful scrutiny of the records, this Court finds that some of the correspondences in the present context were made with the petitioner at her home address, i.e., Smt. Renubala Bhuyan, W/o-(Late) P.C. Bhuyan, (SR No.8168), C/o-Indian Bank, Chowdwar Branch, Cuttack, Orissa, as would be evident from Annexure-1 dated 23.10.2012. More so, the order of rejection in Annexure-5 dated 27.02.2013 was communicated to the petitioner at her home address, i.e., Chowdwar in the district of Cuttack. The petitioner had submitted her application for payment of ‘ex-gratia’ to the family dying in harness in the prescribed form on 10.12.2012 indicating her address at Kapaleswar, Chowdwar in the district of Cuttack, Orissa. Even the representation of the petitioner dated 08.04.2013 in Annexure-6 was sent from her Chowdwar address. From the communications, referred to above, it can be safely inferred that correspondences have been made by the opposite parties with the petitioner and vice versa at her local address situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 6.2. In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal, (2003) 6 SCC 220 , while considering the scope of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to jurisdiction, the apex Court held that Court would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted. Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in Sahebgouda v. Ogeppa, (2003) 6 SCC 151 and Bhagubhai Dhonabhai v. State of Gujarat, (2007) 4 SCC 244. 6.3. In Raizada v. Gorakhram, AIR 1964 SC 1348 , the apex Court held that the defendant by his defence cannot force the plaintiff to choose a forum different from one chosen by him. 6.4. 6.3. In Raizada v. Gorakhram, AIR 1964 SC 1348 , the apex Court held that the defendant by his defence cannot force the plaintiff to choose a forum different from one chosen by him. 6.4. In Bhagubhai Dhonabhai mentioned supra, the apex Court held that a party having a grievance must have a remedy. Access to justice is a human right. When there exists such a right, a disputant must have a remedy in terms of the doctrine ubi jus ibi remedium. 6.5. So far as territorial jurisdiction of the Court is concerned, it is to be seen whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the State of Orissa. The cause of action has been defined to mean every fact, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. Right to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enforce fundamental rights and other legal rights against the State or authority or its agency is a constitutional right. Such right should not be made illusory or unenforceable upon narrow construction of the concept of cause of action. 6.6. In Chandrama Bhusan Sarangi v. Union of India and others, 2011 (I) ILR-CUT 398, this Court held that High Court can exercise power to issue writ, direction or order for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part-III of Constitution or for any other purpose, if cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court. The expression ‘cause of action’ means bundle of facts which petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore, question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on facts pleaded in petition. Similar view has also been taken by this Court in Girish Mohanty v. Union of India and others (O.J.C. No. 2607 of 2001 disposed of on 03.03.2015). 6.7. In Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), the apex Court categorically held that cause of action partly arose at his native place High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction, he received the letter has jurisdiction to entertain the application. 6.7. In Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), the apex Court categorically held that cause of action partly arose at his native place High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction, he received the letter has jurisdiction to entertain the application. Further it is held that as cause of action for the purpose of Article 226 (2) of Constitution of India must be assigned the same meaning of cause of action as given under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In that view of the matter, since all the correspondences have been made in the local address of the petitioner, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and part of cause of action arose within State of Orissa, this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain this application. Similar view has also been taken in Subhaya Prusty v. Union of India and others, 2016 (I) ILR CUT 738. Therefore, the objection with regard to jurisdiction is answered accordingly. 7. Coming to question no.2, the meaning of ‘ex-gratia’ has been dealt with in various dictionaries, such as: (a) Cambridge Dictionary: “an ex-gratia payment is not legally necessary, but is made to show good intentions.” (b) Oxford Dictionary: “with reference to payment done from a sense of moral obligation rather than because of any legal requirement.” (c) Dictionary.Com: “as a favour rather than as a matter of right”. (d) British Dictionary: “given as a favour or gratuitously where no legal obligation exists”. (e) Collins Dictionary: “An ex gratia payment is one that is given as a favour or gift and not because it is legally necessary.” (f) Cobuild Advanced Dictionary: “given as a favour or gratuitously where no legal obligation exists”. (g) Business Dictionary: “A sum of money paid when there was no obligation or liability to pay it. For example, a lump sum payment over and above the pension benefits of a retiring employee. In insurance claims, it may take the form of payment for which the insurer did not appear to be liable. Ex gratia is latin for “out of goodwill.” Also called ex gratia settlement.” (h) Merriam Webster: “as a favour: not compelled by legal right ex gratia pension payments.” (i) Wikipedia: “Ex gratia is latin for “by favour” and is most often used in a legal context. When something has been done ex gratia, it has been done voluntarily, out of kindness or grace. When something has been done ex gratia, it has been done voluntarily, out of kindness or grace. In law, an ex gratia payment is a payment made without the giver recognizing any liability or legal obligation.” 7.1. The meaning attached to the word ‘ex-gratia’ is well defined in various dictionaries. To find out the meaning of the word, it is permissible to consult dictionaries. (See Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17 and Mohinder Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 1367 ). If that be so, then the ‘ex-gratia’ payment is not legally necessary, but is made to show good intentions. Therefore, the scheme has been evolved by the opposite parties to extend the benefit to the family members of the deceased employee to pay a lump sum amount as a good gesture with a good intention so as to enable the bereaved family to live with human dignity. 7.2. The ‘right to life’ including the right to ‘live with human dignity’ would mean the existence of such a right up to the end of a natural life. This also includes the right to dignified life up to the point of death including a dignified procedure of death. In other words, this may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out. 7.3. In Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , the apex Court held that this fundamental rights represents the basic values cherished by the people of their country since Vedic times and they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. 7.4. In Bodhisattwa Gautham v. Subhira Chakroborthy, AIR 1996 SC 922 , the apex Court held that right to life includes the right to live with human dignity. Women also have the right to life and liberty; they also have the right to be respected and treated as equal citizens. Their honour and dignity cannot be touched or violated. They also have the right to lead an honourable and peaceful life. Rape is a crime not only against the person, but also against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. Their honour and dignity cannot be touched or violated. They also have the right to lead an honourable and peaceful life. Rape is a crime not only against the person, but also against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime again basic human rights and it violates the right to life. 7.5. In Samatha v. State of A.P., AIR 1997 SC 3297 , the apex Court held that all those rights and aspect of life which would go to make a man’s life complete and worth living would form part of right to life. 7.6. This being the legal position, while returning the application for ‘ex-gratia’ filed by the petitioner on the ground of delay, the opposite party authority has not taken note of the reasons for delay and, as such, the petitioner herself had met with an accident and was bed ridden for two years and lost her mental balance. Subsequently, due to death of her husband and thereafter son-in-law, her mental condition was not stable, inasmuch as considering this aspect, opposite party no.3 communicated letter to the petitioner on 23.10.2012 and on that basis the application having been filed afresh along with all documents, opposite party no.2 could not have returned the same on a technical plea of filing the application beyond the period of six months stipulated in the scheme. If the delay has been explained by giving proper reasons, such a plea should not have been taken recourse to, to deny the benefit as due and admissible to the petitioner in accordance with law. On a technical plea, if an application which was for grant of ‘ex-gratia’ is rejected, it frustrates the very purpose of the scheme itself, especially when the ‘ex-gratia’ payment is not legally necessary but is made to show good intentions. The intention, for which the scheme has been prepared, has not been taken into consideration. It is noteworthy to mention that ‘ex-gratia’ can be shown as a favour, rather than as a matter of right. The intention, for which the scheme has been prepared, has not been taken into consideration. It is noteworthy to mention that ‘ex-gratia’ can be shown as a favour, rather than as a matter of right. Denial of such benefit by the authority clearly indicates that no favour has been shown, rather on a technical ground of filing of application at belated stage, without appreciating the sufficiency of cause shown, it has been rejected, which is absolutely an outcome of non-application of mind and that too an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of powers by the authority. 8. In such view of the mater, this Court is of the considered view that Annexure-5 the letter dated 27.02.2013, which disentitles the petitioner to receive ‘ex-gratia’, cannot sustain in the eye of law and deserves to be quashed. Resultantly, the letter dated 27.02.2013 in Annexure-5 is hereby quashed and opposite party no.2 is directed to pay the ‘ex-gratia’ compensation to the petitioner in lieu of compassionate appointment on account of demise of husband of the petitioner, who was a staff member of the opposite party-bank, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of communication of the judgment. 9. The writ petition is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. No order to cost.