JUDGMENT : P. Somarajan, J. 1. The identity of the tenant as disclosed in the petition and mischief thereby caused in the mind of the tenant are taken as grounds of attack in this revision, apart from the normal contentions by the tenant against the verdict of Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act'). The Rent Control Petition was filed for the grant of an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act. Though it was negatived by the Rent Control Court, it was reversed by the First Appellate Court holding that the landlords are entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act and it was ordered accordingly. Aggrieved by the said order, the tenant came up with this revision. 2. The main challenge in this revision is with respect to the identity of the tenant as described in the petition, which is as follows:- “The Regional Manager, The Tamilnadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd., Co-Optex Regional Office, 201/A, Alagesan Road, Saibaba Mission P.O., Coimbatore-II, Post Box No.2748”. 3. It was argued by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the proceedings were initiated against the Regional Manager and not against the Society. Though the name and address of the Society is incorporated in the cause title as address or identity of the Regional Manager, in fact, the Society is the tenant and as such it was argued that the cause title of the petition is defective. Further, there is no proceeding initiated against the Tamilnadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd, who is the tenant, and hence both the orders passed by the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority are not binding on the Society, the tenant. 4. Going by the cause title and identity of the tenant as described in the petition, there is only an omission to incorporate the word 'represented by' while describing the identity of the tenant in its cause title. The person who is competent to represent the Society is admittedly the Regional Manager. It is also not in dispute that the name of the Society with its address is correctly entered in the cause title. The person who is competent to represent the Society is admittedly the Regional Manager. It is also not in dispute that the name of the Society with its address is correctly entered in the cause title. So, the cause title would clearly show that the proceedings were initiated against the Society represented by its Regional Manager, though the words 'represented by' is not incorporated in the cause title. The omission to incorporate the words 'represented by' is not fatal, if it is otherwise evident from the description given in the cause title and the pleading raised in it. It is not against the personal capacity of the person who occupies the office of Regional Manager and it is well evident from the fact that the person who occupies the office or his identity with his name is neither disclosed nor incorporated or whispered anywhere in the cause title. 5. It is not permissible to defeat the proceedings which were initiated and proceeded with by both the parties fully understanding the nature and its consequences and it is not at all fatal to the proceedings wherein a suit or proceedings were initiated against an inanimate body represented by a competent person. Non inclusion of the words 'represented by' is not fatal if it is otherwise evident either from the cause title or from the description of party or from the pleadings raised. 6. Further, both parties proceeded in the Trial Court and in the First Appellate Court without raising such an objection and proceeded with the matter and defended fully knowing that the eviction proceedings were initiated against the Society represented by the Regional Manager. It is not permissible to raise a contention at first before the Revisional Court which was not taken up either in the Trial Court or in the First Appellate Court. 7. At this juncture, the application of Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure is relevant. Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extracted below for reference: 99. 7. At this juncture, the application of Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure is relevant. Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extracted below for reference: 99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction - No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder (or non-joinder) of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.” 8. Section 99 of the CPC deals with the appellate jurisdiction and its restriction. Its application is not restricted in appellate jurisdiction alone, but would extend to the revisional stage also as the grounds which were not permissible at the appellate stage cannot be taken up in the revisional stage. 9. Section 11(8) is really a luxury given to the landlord, who is in occupation of part of a premises and requires additional accommodation when compared with the mandates under Section 11(3) of the Act. The only restriction imposed under Section 11(8) is the “comparative hardship”, which expression is not defined anywhere in the Act. The Tribunal has considered the goodwill of tenant's business as one of the factor in order to balance comparative hardship. The goodwill of a business carried on by the tenant is not a factor to be considered in the assessment of comparative hardship. It must be understood as the one which would outweigh the advantage of the landlord. Comparative hardship must be understood as the one which would outweigh the advantage of the landlord by getting possession of the tenanted premises while balancing with the hardship that may result as against the tenant. The First Appellate Court rightly rejected the same. As such, the finding of the First Appellate Court does not deserve any interference by this Court and the revision fails. But, in the nature and character of the dispute, we are of the view that a reasonable time can be given to the petitioner to surrender the petition schedule building. The First Appellate Court rightly rejected the same. As such, the finding of the First Appellate Court does not deserve any interference by this Court and the revision fails. But, in the nature and character of the dispute, we are of the view that a reasonable time can be given to the petitioner to surrender the petition schedule building. The petitioner shall surrender the petition schedule shop rooms within nine months from today, subject to the following conditions: (i) The petitioner shall file an affidavit before the Rent Controller undertaking to surrender the petition schedule building within a period of nine months from today and the said affidavit must be filed within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (ii) The petitioner shall pay entire arrears of rent, if any, within a period of one month from today and he shall continue to pay monthly rent on or before 15th of each month. (iii) In the event of failure, the time granted to vacate the petition schedule building would stand automatically withdrawn and the respondents will be at liberty to execute the order on expiry of two weeks or on the date of violation, if any.