JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The petitioners by way of present petition has challenged the legality and validity of the award dated 9.4.2004 (Exh. 93) passed by the Central Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in Reference ITC No. 77 of 2001. The said challenge is limited to the extent by which the learned Tribunal has directed the petitioner Corporation to take the concerned persons in regular employment of the petitioner Corporation and treat them as regular permanent employees of the Corporation with all benefits of continuity. A further grievance is also made towards the direction given by the learned Tribunal to the petitioner Corporation to fix wages of the respondents at par with permanent confirmed employees by treating them as regular employees of the Corporation and paying them all other benefits amenable to permanent employees of the Corporation. It is qua this award of the learned Tribunal that the present petition is filed by invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Before adverting to the main challenge, few facts are required to be considered which have generated the present litigation: 2.1 The petitioner Corporation, a limited company under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956, is engaged in exploration and production of petroleum products like oil and natural gas having establishments and installations spread over the entire country and having one of its installations at Cambay in the State of Gujarat. 2.2 The petitioner Corporation, for the purpose of carrying on its activities which are of intermittent nature or casual nature or primary or essential functions or indefinite or indeterminable nature or uncertain or varying frequency or for which it is not practicable or feasible to engage fixed number of persons on permanent basis or on full time basis, awards contracts for getting such work executed by the contractor himself or through of his employees. 2.3 For the purpose of carrying on the work at Cambay Project, the petitioner Corporation had awarded a contract for getting certain specified jobs executed through the contractor. In pursuance thereof, the contractor to whom the contract was awarded considered it appropriate to get the works executed through its members since it was a cooperative society. As a result thereof, the concerned persons were deployed in the Cambay Project by the respondent Society (Opponent No. 2 in the proceedings before the Tribunal) being members or employees of the society. As a result thereof, the concerned persons were deployed in the Cambay Project by the respondent Society (Opponent No. 2 in the proceedings before the Tribunal) being members or employees of the society. The concerned persons were under the control, administration and management of the contractor i.e. respondent Society. The concerned persons were neither selected nor recruited nor engaged nor deployed nor supervised by the petitioner Corporation and there was no relationship much less of employer and employee relationship between the petitioner Corporation and the concerned persons. The petitioner Corporation was not exercising any power or authority much less of supervision, administration, management or control over the concerned persons in any manner. The concerned persons were not performing permanent or perennial nature of work and were not subject to any administrative or disciplinary or financial action or control by the petitioner Corporation. Payment of their wages was also being done by the respondent Society and not by the petitioner Corporation. The concerned persons were not selected or recruited by the petitioner Corporation nor they were engaged after complying with any procedure and requirements prescribed in the recruitment regulations of the petitioner Corporation. 2.4 The scope of work specified in the subject contract dated 1/7/1998 was essentially of maintenance of electronics and other communication equipments including jobs like day to-day maintenance of various electronics test measuring equipments to assist in the regular and day-to-day maintenance, maintenance of EPABX Telephone Cabling Network etc. The system installed in the project was direct inward dialing based system which did not have operator control and therefore, there was no question of the concerned persons working as telephone operator and/or telecom operator/technician and that there was no work of radio operator or data entry operator at the relevant time in the Cambay Project of the petitioner Corporation. After 30/6/2001, the petitioner Corporation has not awarded any contract for the works for which the contracts in question were awarded in the past. 2.5 This being the position, four persons namely, M/s. S.L. Pandya, R.G. Radhod, K.N. Dafda and K.M. Parmar raised a dispute through the respondent Society on improper and unjustified construction and same was treated by the appropriate Government as an industrial dispute. The petitioner Corporation has submitted that there was no employer and employee relationship between the petitioner Corporation and the said persons. The petitioner Corporation has submitted that there was no employer and employee relationship between the petitioner Corporation and the said persons. The said dispute came to be referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal(Central) by the appropriate Government without due application of mind to the fact that there was no employer and employee relationship between the petitioner Corporation and the said persons and therefore, the dispute made by the said persons cannot be said to be an industrial dispute. Upon making the order of reference dated 6/9/2001 by the appropriate Government, the same culminated into Reference (ITC) No. 77 of 2001. 2.6 The said reference is being challenged by the petitioners herein in this petition as being illegal, misconceived, unjustified, without jurisdiction and authority in law and unsustainable. Before approaching the conciliation authority, the Union had filed Special Civil Application No. 10140 of 2000 which came to be disposed of by this Court. Against the said order, Letters Patent Appeal No. 561 of 2001 came to be referred. While disposing of said Letters Patent Appeal, the respondent Society was directed to approach the conciliation authority. 2.7 During the course of proceedings of the said reference, the respondent Society filed a Statement of Claim in or around November, 1001. In response thereto, the petitioner Corporation filed written statement controverting the allegations made in the Statement of Claim and placing on record relevant and correct facts and details. 2.8 The petitioner Corporation as well as the respondent Society placed on record several documents. The filed an application at Exh. 18 demanding production of document and a reply to the same was filed by the petitioner Corporation at Exh. 19 dated 3/6/2002 on or around 27/6/2002 and an order came to be passed by the Tribunal on or around 5/7/2002. Thereafter, an application at Exh. 21 was filed by the respondent Society to draw an adverse inference with respect to documents not produced by the petitioner Corporation. In the proceedings, oral evidence of Mr. S.L. Pandya (Exh. 32), Mr. R.G. Radhod (Exh. 35), Mr. K.N. Dafda (Exh. .47) and Mr. K.M. Parmar (Exh. 47) were recorded. 2.9 The petitioner Corporation led oral evidence of Mr. Nagrajan. However, after the examination-in-chief of said witness was over but before completion of cross-examination, due to some unavoidable circumstance, said witness could not remain present for further cross-examination and hence, an order at Exh. 35), Mr. K.N. Dafda (Exh. .47) and Mr. K.M. Parmar (Exh. 47) were recorded. 2.9 The petitioner Corporation led oral evidence of Mr. Nagrajan. However, after the examination-in-chief of said witness was over but before completion of cross-examination, due to some unavoidable circumstance, said witness could not remain present for further cross-examination and hence, an order at Exh. 68 dated 8/10/2003 came to be passed by the Tribunal holding that evidence of Mr. Nagrajan would not be taken into consideration. While passing the said order, the Tribunal did not take into account the reply at Exhs. 70 to 68 submitted by the petitioner Corporation. Thereafter, oral evidence of Mr. C.K. Vaishnav at Exh. 72 was recorded as a witness of petitioner Corporation. 2.10 The respondent Society had also filed written statement dated 23/6/2003 at Exh. 27 in the proceedings along with list of documents at Exh. 28. 2.11 After giving submissions in writing, the learned Tribunal was requested by the parties to the proceeding to declare the award and resultantly, the learned Tribunal has passed the award on 9/4/2004 whereby the employees named in the award are directed to be considered and treated as regular employees of Cambay Project of ONGC and to be reinstated to their original position within a period of 30 days. The learned Tribunal has directed not only to reinstate to their original posts but to accord them salary and other benefits amenable to permanent employees from the date of reinstatement with continuity in service and it is this award which is the subject matter of controversy in the present proceeding by way of challenge by the petitioners. 3. This Court vide order dated 19/1/2005 issued notice and thereafter on 13/9/2005, the petition came to be admitted and in the meantime, subject to compliance of section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the operation of the impugned award was ordered to be stayed. The petitioner Corporation under said order was directed to pay section 17-B benefits by enhancing the amount being paid to them and the said detailed order is passed in the following form: "Rule returnable on 16/11/2005. Ms. Gupta waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondents. In the mean time implementation of the impugned award is stayed. Learned advocate Ms. Ms. Gupta waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondents. In the mean time implementation of the impugned award is stayed. Learned advocate Ms. Gupta appearing for the workmen submitted that despite the direction by the Court to pay the workmen concerned benefits under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner is not making full payment and the payment being received by the workmen is short of their entitlement. She further submitted that each workman is receiving Rs. 50 per day less than his actual entitlement. Learned Advocate Shri Thakar appearing for the petitioner submitted that he does not admit that the workmen are receiving payment short of their entitlement. He further submitted that if the Court passes an appropriate order the petitioner without prejudice to its contention shall carry out such a direction during the interregnum period. Considering the submissions made the petitioner is directed to pay 17-B benefits to the respondents by enhancing the amount being paid to them by Rs. 50/- per day for each workman. It will be open for the petitioner to file an application before the Court to modify this order by producing proper material." 4. The record indicates that another order also came to be passed on 18/6/2008 whereby the matter got adjourned after recording the statement of the petitioner that section 17-B wages will be paid within a week. The matter came to be adjourned from time to time and thereafter, the record indicates that this Court was constrained to pass following order on 25/8/2008 as there was some grievances voiced out with respect to payment of section 17-B benefits on the basis of last drawn wages: "1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. KB Naik for the petitioner and learned Advocate Ms. Asha H. Gupta for the respondents. Agony is highlighted by the learned Advocate Ms. Gupta for not receiving the last drawn wages in time from the petitioner. Today, last drawn wages for the month of June, July and now August, 2008 are to be paid by the petitioner. 2. Therefore, on request being made by the learned Advocate Mr. Asha H. Gupta for the respondents. Agony is highlighted by the learned Advocate Ms. Gupta for not receiving the last drawn wages in time from the petitioner. Today, last drawn wages for the month of June, July and now August, 2008 are to be paid by the petitioner. 2. Therefore, on request being made by the learned Advocate Mr. Naik for time, while accepting the said request, it is directed to the petitioner to pay due amount of section 17B of the ID Act, 1947 including the last drawn wages of August, 2008 as per the order of this court on or before 5th September, 2008 meaning thereby, that three months last drawn wages are to be paid by the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. to the concerned respondents on or before 5th September, 2008 failing which the interim relief granted by this court shall automatically stand vacated without reference to this Court. Matter is adjourned to 9th September, 2008." 5. The matter upon such development, as stated above, has come up for final hearing with a representation by Mr. Kunal B. Naik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners on behalf of M/s. Trivedi & Gupta Advocates, Mr. J.V. Japee, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Ms. Asha H. Gupta, learned advocate appearing for respondent No. 5. 6. Mr. Kunal B. Naik, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that the learned Tribunal has committed a serious error in passing the impugned award and has contended that while passing the award, the learned Tribunal has transgressed the jurisdiction and travelled beyond the terms of the reference which is nothing but a clear error of exercise of jurisdiction. Mr. Naik has further contended that not only the learned Tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of the reference but has erroneously concluded that the contract was camouflaged and now to arrive at this conclusion, Mr. Naik has submitted that there is absolutely no material worth the name which can infer in that direction and therefore, in the absence of any evidence to that nature, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal is not only unjust and arbitrary but perverse to the record which requires intervention of this Court. Mr. Naik has submitted that there is absolutely no material worth the name which can infer in that direction and therefore, in the absence of any evidence to that nature, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal is not only unjust and arbitrary but perverse to the record which requires intervention of this Court. Mr. Naik has further contended that none of the respondent workmen were engaged in any prohibited work and that grievance which has been tried to be projected is ill-founded from the material record. Mr. Naik has further contended that assuming without admitting that the respondents workmen were engaged in such a situation and there is a violation, then it can at the best be said to be a breach of the terms of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act and for that, appropriate proceedings could have been initiated but for that, the reference cannot be allowed. For that purpose, Mr. Naik has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1992)1 SCC 695 to which, a reference will be made at an appropriate stage in the present judgment. Mr. Naik has further contended that in view of the settled position of law, even the learned Tribunal has also got no jurisdiction to go into the validity of terms of the contract and abolition thereof. The learned Tribunal has a very limited jurisdiction to deal with a situation of this nature and for that purpose, Mr. Naik has relied upon yet another decision reported in (2009) 13 SCC 374 . The Court reiterates that the said decision also will be given due consideration at an appropriate stage in the present judgment. Mr. Naik has further contended specifically that if the order of reference is to be seen, then the terms of the reference are not related to a grievance whether the contract was sham and bogus and therefore, in the absence of such reference being made, no conclusion can be arrived at which has got a consequence of passing of the impugned award and therefore, from very inception, an error is committed by the learned Tribunal in passing the award. Mr. Naik has submitted that it is on page 120 of the petition compilation where order of reference is projected. 7. Mr. Mr. Naik has submitted that it is on page 120 of the petition compilation where order of reference is projected. 7. Mr. Kunal Naik, learned advocate for the petitioner, has further contended that even assuming without admitting that a situation may erupt where the contract has expired and therefore, termination is substantially arising on account of the expiration of the terms of the contract and therefore, in such a situation, whether this kind of reference which has been framed can be made or not is also a serious debatable issue. On the contrary, according to Mr. Naik, no such reference can be made and in this connection, he has relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 . Mr. Naik has submitted that even if the respondent workmen are aggrieved of the consequent termination/discontinuance then, they would have been properly advised to approach before an appropriate forum but not before Industrial Tribunal and therefore also, the award passed by the learned Tribunal is not legally sustainable. 8. Mr. Kunal Naik has further submitted that even assuming without admitting that such a reference in the present form can be maintained, but then, for adjudication thereof, what would be the scope is well defined by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Airport Authority. Such judgment will be again considered at an appropriate stage as stated earlier. Mr. Naik has further submitted that the respondents being members of co-operative society are not permitted to make any allegation and therefore, looking to their position prevailing on record, it is not possible to allow such an award to sustain in the eye of law. Mr. Naik has made a reference to the Statement of Claim which has been submitted coupled with the pleadings and in co-relation thereto, he has drawn the attention on the order of making reference and the relevant term contained in the contract and submitted that the entire conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable in the eye of law and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed in the interest of justice. Mr. Mr. Naik has further submitted that the entire evidence on record which is reflecting clearly suggests that there is a total lack of application of mind on the part of learned Tribunal and the entire evidence appears to have been misconstrued and therefore, the relevant evidence touching to the root of controversy having not been properly dealt with, the finding arrived at is clearly perverse. To content this, Mr. Naik has drawn the attention of this Court to various depositions taken during the adjudication of the proceeding before the learned Tribunal and for that purpose, a reference is made by Mr. Naik first of all to paragraph No. 5 of the Statement of Claim which is reflected on page 122 of the petition compilation and by referring to this paragraph, the main gist of centre of controversy is projected by Mr. Naik. In this context, Mr. Naik has drawn the attention to the relevant paragraph No. 10 of the written submissions which are reflecting on page 140 of the petition compilation and deposition of Mr. S.L. Pandya examined at Exh. 32 which is on page 174 of petition compilation and submitted that as per the law, it is required to maintain in the form of register which is well maintained by the petitioners. Mr. Naik has further submitted that a contradictory stand is taken by the respondent workmen and an attempt is made by the respondent workmen to convert themselves into operational field of their job. It has also been contended taking through the deposition of Mr. S.L. Pandya as well as Mr. Dafda that the work they were undertaking was not being undertaken in operational field. They were merely working as wireless messengers and nothing beyond that. Mr. Naik has further drawn the attention to the evidence of another witness Mr. Kamlesh Parmar, whose evidence is reflecting on page 283 of petition compilation and contended that none of the respondents were allowed to work in any prohibited working place and work of each of the workmen was described from the evidence and has contended that what has been claimed is not amenable to them under the authority of law in any circumstance. It was also contended specifically that the respondents were paid not by the organization but by the contractor and the control on the affairs was with that of the contractor of a work in which and under which respondent workmen were working. Mr. Naik has further submitted that not only the reference at the instance of the respondents was not maintainable but has specifically contended that they cannot have any industrial dispute after the contract getting lapsed and no consequential reference can lie regarding reinstatement or absorption. Mr. Naik has thereafter submitted that no interference could have been drawn by the petitioner Corporation. Yet another decision is also relied upon by Mr. Naik reported in (2011) 1 SCC 635 and ultimately contended to set aside the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal. Mr. Naik has further submitted that all the respondent workmen numbering four were members of co-operative society and have never worked as confirmed or regular or employees of the respondent Corporation and their stand appears to be that since the respondent workmen are working in prohibited category, they are entitled to have the benefit of permanent employees. Mr. Naik has then seriously contended that even assuming without admitting that the Tribunal has some jurisdiction to go beyond the contract but then, the Tribunal has not even made any attempt to analyse the contract, though it is not permissible, but to have the overall assessment of the grievance, except an evasive attempt, no minute examination has been undertaken. The contract was related to various kinds of jobs and therefore, even apart from technicality of the issues, no attempt is made by the Tribunal to go to the root of the matter and has ultimately examined the evidence from the perspective of the respondent workmen and no independent examination of the evidence has been made. Mr. Naik has submitted that apart from this, even if there is some illegality reflecting from the record, then at the best, on account of passage of time, payment of compensation would meet the ends of justice. Mr. Naik has further submitted that the stand of the respondent workmen is very much answered by the decisions which are reported in (2004) 2 GLH 692 as well as AIR 2009 SC (Suppl) 2656. Mr. Mr. Naik has further submitted that the stand of the respondent workmen is very much answered by the decisions which are reported in (2004) 2 GLH 692 as well as AIR 2009 SC (Suppl) 2656. Mr. Naik has further contended that this is not an award which can be allowed to be sustained in the eye of law and therefore, requested the Court not to allow such an award to stand. 9. Mr. Naik has further submitted that in view of the aforesaid position prevailing on record, when the award of the Tribunal is not based upon sound reasoning, proper appreciation of evidence on record and also without consideration of the evidence in its true perspective, such non-application of mind can be corrected by this Court in exercise of power either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He has further submitted that even under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as well, the Court can go into the details and examine the award which has been challenged in the petition. By referring and contending this, Mr. Naik without raising any submission has requested the Court to allow the petition and set aside the impugned award passed by the Tribunal. No other submissions have been made. 10. Oppose the stand taken by Mr. Kunal Naik, learned advocate, Mr. J.V. Japee, appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 has taken a lead to oppose the stand of the petitioner. Mr. Japee has taken the Court minutely to the evidence on record as a whole and has specifically contended that there is no error committed by the learned Tribunal and such a well reasoned judgment being just and proper in the eye of law cannot be allowed to be interfered with in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Mr. Japee has contended that instead of taking the technical view of the matter, the learned Tribunal has examined the core issue involved in the reference and the demand which has been sought by the respondent workmen is very much permissible to be adjudicated by the learned Tribunal and therefore, there is no error committed by the learned Tribunal. The issues, which have been framed as contended by Mr. The issues, which have been framed as contended by Mr. Japee, are very much in consonance with the main terms of the reference and they have been framed after considering the pleadings which have surfaced on record and therefore, it was permissible for the Tribunal to go into the aspect whether the respondent workmen have undertaken the work in prohibited employment or not. Even if notification is not issued, it is always open for the Tribunal to examine and go into the scrutiny about their status of employment in the petitioner Corporation. Mr. Japee has further contended that from the overall Statement of Claim, there are several pages with contentions which related to the contract system and therefore, the pleadings are centering around an issue as to whether the contract system is sham and bogus or not can be adjudicated by the Tribunal or not. Mr. Japee has further contended that the finding of the Tribunal is based upon documentary evidence and the depositions available on record and therefore, said finding cannot be said to be erroneous. Mr. Japee has raised the grievance that subsequent to the argument before the Tribunal, the document neither came to be produced nor exhibited nor proved and therefore, the Tribunal has rightly not given any undue importance and therefore, the jurisdiction which is vested in the Tribunal came to be rightly exercised. There is a categorical finding arrived at by the Tribunal that in the absence of any cogent documentary evidences, a justifiable reasonable inference can be drawn about the agreement. Mr. Japee has further contended that the affidavit which is sought to be relied upon is filed after almost a period of 10 years and that too for bringing additional evidence and such a belated attempt may not be encouraged by the respondents. The reply affidavit which is submitted on 9th of February, 2005 is travelling beyond the record which was available before the Tribunal and therefore, Mr. Japee has raised a serious grievance that what was available before the Tribunal was to be considered than the fresh stand which is now being canvassed and therefore, on that basis, it cannot be said in any way that the Tribunal has materially erred in exercising jurisdiction. Japee has raised a serious grievance that what was available before the Tribunal was to be considered than the fresh stand which is now being canvassed and therefore, on that basis, it cannot be said in any way that the Tribunal has materially erred in exercising jurisdiction. The scope of reference is very much permitting examination of incidental issues centering around the terms of the contract and therefore, the same has rightly been examined by the Tribunal and hence, the order is sustainable in the eye of law. Mr. Japee has raised the grievance that the decision which is sought to be relied upon is overruled by efflux of time and therefore, he has drawn attention one of the decisions reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 which will be dealt with at a later point of time. Mr. Japee has further contended that irrespective of the record which is available, the Court can lift the veil and can see behind the smoke screen which is created and can unearth the real intend and therefore, it has rightly been examined by the Tribunal and therefore, it cannot be said in any way that any error is committed by the Tribunal. Yet other decisions which are tried to be pressed into service are reported in (2004) 1 GLR 729 , (2003) 6 SCC 528 , (1979) 4 SCC 257 and AIR 2009 SC (Suppl) 2656. There are several other decisions also which are tried to be pressed into service to contend that the order of the Tribunal is thoroughly justified in the eye of law and therefore, cannot in any way deserves to be dismissed more particularly in view of exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Mr. Japee has further contended that in the absence of any perversity and extra-ordinary contrary material, even if another view is possible, the same may not be disturbed atleast in exercise of inherent jurisdiction which is brought to be invoked and therefore, Mr. Japee has contended that what has been decided by the Tribunal is within the four corners of law and therefore, it cannot be set at naught by quashing and setting aside the same. Mr. Japee has contended that what has been decided by the Tribunal is within the four corners of law and therefore, it cannot be set at naught by quashing and setting aside the same. Mr. Japee has further contended that how and in what manner the exploitative pattern is adopted by the petitioner Corporation is not only reflected from the evidence on record as well as finding of the Tribunal but even from the order dated 25/8/2008 passed by this Court in the present proceeding and therefore, no such exploitative pattern be permitted to be adopted at the behest of mighty Corporation. The ultimate request which is made by Mr. Japee is to dismiss the petition. 12. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the entire material which is pressed into service and the findings which have been arrived at by the Tribunal correspondingly to the scope of exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction, some of the stinking issues, which are prevailing on record, are worth to be touched for arriving at a final conclusion. However, the self-imposed limitation upon the Court is also requires to be observed as a part of judicial discipline by the Court and therefore, before dealing with the issues centering around the present proceeding, the scope of exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction is kept in mind which is in the following form and the extracts of the said scope is reproduced hereinafter: 12.1 The Apex Court has, in case of Commissioner of Income-Tax, Ujjain v. Dawoodi Bohara Jamat, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 222 , observed and held in Para-17, 23, 25 and 27 as under : "17. Normally a finding of fact as decided by the last fact finding authority is final and ought not to be lightly interfered by the High Court in an appeal. The exceptions to the said rule have been well delineated by this Court and for the present case do not require to be noticed. The appellate Courts however ought to be cautious while weeding out such questions and should the question in examination involve examination of finding of fact, ex cautela abundanti the appellate Courts would require to examine that whether the question involves merely the finding of fact or the legal effect of such proven facts or documents in appeal. The appellate Courts however ought to be cautious while weeding out such questions and should the question in examination involve examination of finding of fact, ex cautela abundanti the appellate Courts would require to examine that whether the question involves merely the finding of fact or the legal effect of such proven facts or documents in appeal. While the former would be a question of fact which may or may not be interfered with, the latter is necessarily the question of law which would require consideration. 23. In Dnyaneshwar Ranganath Bhandare v. Sadhu Dadu Shettigar, (2011) 10 SCC 433 , the second appeals challenging the judgment and decree of the first appellate court was dismissed by the High Court holding that the finding of fact by the lower appellate court that the respondents were not gratuitous licensees did not call for interference and therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appellants before the High Court were before this Court in appeals by special leave against the aforesaid judgment and order by the High Court. This Court opined that the rejection of appeals at the outset by the High Court on grounds that the case involved no substantial question of law was erroneous and what ought to have been looked into was whether it involved the question of fact or legal effect of proven facts or documents which in turn would be a question of law requiring adjudication by the High Court. 25. In our considered view, determination of nature of trust as wholly religious or wholly charitable or both charitable and religious under the Act is not a question of fact. It is but a question which requires examination of legal effects of the proven facts and documents, that is, the legal implication of the objects of the respondent-trust as contained in the trust deed. It is only the objects of a trust as declared in the trust deed which would govern its right of exemption under Section 11 or 12. It is the analysis of these objects in the backdrop of fiscal jurisprudence which would illuminate the purpose behind creation or establishment of the trust for either religious or charitable or both religious and charitable purpose. Therefore, the High Court has erred in refusing to interfere with the observations of the Tribunal in respect of the character of the trust. 27. Therefore, the High Court has erred in refusing to interfere with the observations of the Tribunal in respect of the character of the trust. 27. The phrase charitable purpose is expansive and inclusive. The expression "charitable purpose" is defined in the dictionary clause of the Act under Section 2(15) as follows: ""charitable purpose" includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, preservation of environment (including watersheds, forests and wildlife) and preservation of monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility: Provided that the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose, if it involves the carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention, of the income from such activity: Provided further that the first proviso shall not apply if the aggregate value of the receipts from the activities referred to therein is twenty-five lakh rupees or less in the previous year." 13. Keeping in view the aforesaid propositions in mind, the Court has to deal with the specific finding which has been arrived at by the Tribunal to ultimately examine whether the same appears to be perverse to the record or germane to law. From the reading of the award passed by the Tribunal, it is emerging that the claim submitted by the respondent Society is that the respondent workmen were working continuously in the electronic and telecommunication department of the petitioner Corporation by doing the work of data entry operator, computer operator, telephone operator, radio operator, wireless operator and attendant and the case putforth is that the arrangement made with these respondent workmen by the petitioner Corporation is in complete violation of the Government notification dated 8/9/1994 whereby the categories in which the respondent workmen were placed are prohibited by this very notification and ultimately with a view to see that they may not be paid the benefits amenable to permanent employees, their services were put to an end on 30/6/2001. 13.1 The case appears to have been putforth that though the above work is of permanent nature and a continuing work, still however, this permanent work was allocated to a contractor and ultimately by lapse of time, these workmen came to be discontinued from the services on the ground of lapse of contract on 30/6/2001. 13.2 It appears that pleading is also made that prior to 1991, even after establishment of Society registered under the provisions of Co-Operative Societies Act, the respondent workmen were very much in the services and therefore, the contract was camouflaged with a view to deprive the respondent workmen from seeking permanent work and therefore, arrangement was done to pay their salary through the contractor and therefore, simply because the payment of salary was made through the contractor, it cannot be said that the respondent workmen were employees of contractor and not that of the petitioner Corporation. 13.3 The record further indicates that as per the Government notification dated 8/9/1994, pursuant to which the Society has secured a license, the work which is undertaken by the respondent workmen was not legally permissible. A specific assertion was also appearing from the record that even after the lapse of the contract with the society, the respondent workmen were working in the petitioner Corporation which is very much reflected from the documents produced on record in the form of mark 73/2. 13.4 The record also indicates that for imparting the work as a Wireless Operator, under the provisions of Indian Telegraphic Act, there is a clear requirement of securing license and though the wireless operative system was prevailing in the petitioner Corporation, the petitioner Corporation did not appear to have obtained any specific license under the said Act and therefore, there is a clear violation on the part of the petitioner Corporation for which the respondent workmen may not be penalised. It is to be noted that there was no material produced in any form by the petitioner Corporation that any such license was ever secured by it. 13.5 The learned Tribunal has also examined the evidence from the stand point of view whether these respondent workmen were denied the work orally with effect from June, 2001 and for that purpose, the management witnesses have been examined which led to a conclusion that they were discontinued from the services. 13.5 The learned Tribunal has also examined the evidence from the stand point of view whether these respondent workmen were denied the work orally with effect from June, 2001 and for that purpose, the management witnesses have been examined which led to a conclusion that they were discontinued from the services. Of course, the reason assigned is the lapse of the contract. 13.6 It is further observed by the learned Tribunal that these four respondent workmen during the course of their working never faced with any disciplinary action nor any warning has ever been issued to them and their working was in consonance with their duties being assigned to them and it was also found from the depositions that these respondent workmen have continuously worked in the petitioner Corporation. 13.7 The record has further indicated that these respondent workmen though were working through the contractor in the petitioner Corporation, it was admitted that their salary was being paid by the contractor and pursuant to the terms of the contract, necessary equipments, raw material, etc. were being provided by the petitioner Corporation and the work force was to be supplied by the contractor. It was also observed that the permanent work was being undertaken through these respondent workmen for which the posts were lying vacant of permanent nature and by placing these respondent workmen through a contractor, the said permanent nature of work was undertaken and therefore, this arrangement was examined by the Tribunal upon dealing with series of depositions. The Tribunal on the basis of evidence has observed that the arrangement which was made with the respondent workmen contractor and the petitioner was nothing but a camouflage and therefore, having found irregularity in the nature of taking work from the respondent workmen, the learned Tribunal has held that such camouflage may not be allowed to be precipitated any further. All these issues which have been dealt with has led the learned Tribunal to believe that such paper arrangement was found to be bogus, camouflage and impermissible in the eye of law and therefore, keeping in view of the circumstances, order of reinstatement with consequential effect as stated earlier appears to have been passed vide award dated 9/4/2004. 14. All these issues which have been dealt with has led the learned Tribunal to believe that such paper arrangement was found to be bogus, camouflage and impermissible in the eye of law and therefore, keeping in view of the circumstances, order of reinstatement with consequential effect as stated earlier appears to have been passed vide award dated 9/4/2004. 14. Now these findings, which have been arrived at, are in consonance with the evidence or with the propositions of law, are the subject matter of consideration by this Court and as such, from the record, following stinking circumstances are not possible to be ignored by this Court which are enumerated hereinafter: 14.1 In addition to the findings of the learned Tribunal as referred to above, a specific reference which has been made vide order dated 6.9.2001 reads as under: "Whether the demand of the union for reinstatement of the services of S/Shri Sharad Kumar L. Pandya, Rajubhai G. Rathod, Kanubhai N. Dafda and Kamleshbhai M. Parmar and absorption of these employees as directed employees of ONGC Ltd. is legal, proper and justified? If so, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled to and from which date and what other directions are necessary in the matter?" In the above specific reference, if the Statement of Claim which has been submitted by the respondent workmen in addition to the grievance which has been set forth for adjudication is perused, a further grievance is tried to be pressed into service which appears to be in paragraph No. 5 of the Statement of Claim attached to page 122 of petition compilation. If the aforesaid paragraph is to be looked into along with specific reference which was referred to for adjudication, the same would clearly indicate the stand which has been taken by the respondent Society which is appearing to be travelling beyond the scope of reference. It is appearing from the record that the petitioner has raised a specific issue that this above stand contained in paragraph No. 5 of the Statement of Claim cannot form the subject matter of adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot go into such an issue. It is appearing from the record that the petitioner has raised a specific issue that this above stand contained in paragraph No. 5 of the Statement of Claim cannot form the subject matter of adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot go into such an issue. 14.2 The record further indicates that a specific plea was taken in the written statement that the concerned workmen, whom the respondent Society is representing, were neither in the employment through any required procedure nor were the employees of the Corporation nor were under the direct control of management of the petitioner Corporation but, in fact, they were under the control of contractor and there was a specific tenure stipulated in the contract about the subsistence of contract upto 31st June, 2001 only. 14.3 A specific denial is also emerging from the plea of the petitioner that even contractor had not engaged any worker on prohibited category nor engaged in such a position which may violate even any terms of the contract. 14.4 It is also emerging from the record that the petitioner Corporation is merely a principal employer registered under section 7 of the Contract Act and the contractor got a valid license under section 12 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and therefore, when the contractor was in charge of workmen whom the Society is representing, a plea is taken that there is no master and servant relationship subsisting between the Corporation and the listed workers which may permit any grievance to be raised against the petitioner. 14.5 In addition to the aforesaid situation prevailing on record, an affidavit is also filed by Jay Yogeshwar Labour Co-operative Society Ltd. at Exh. 27 stating that the workers were serving in ONGC prior to establishment of the Society referred to above i.e. prior to 1/5/1989 and the Society was registered in 1991 and therefore, two employees namely, Mr. Sharad Kumar L. Pandya and Mr. Kanubhai N. Dafda were working prior to the said order of the society. So far as other employees concerned namely, Mr. Kamleshbhai M. Parmar, who, according to the contractor, was working in Electronics Maintenance Section from 1996 and Mr. Rajubhai G. Rathod, who was working as Telephone Operator from August, 1998, a specific stand is taken that they were not the members of the Society. So far as other employees concerned namely, Mr. Kamleshbhai M. Parmar, who, according to the contractor, was working in Electronics Maintenance Section from 1996 and Mr. Rajubhai G. Rathod, who was working as Telephone Operator from August, 1998, a specific stand is taken that they were not the members of the Society. From the reading of this affidavit, it is further emerging that not only these workmen were not members of the Society but after the establishment of the Society, payment of their salary was being made through the Society. In paragraph No. 8 of the said reply of contractor, it has been stated that after last work order with the Society, there is no further contract of labour supply with Society of the petitioner Corporation and still, from July, 2001, these workers, who are represented by Society, are working permanently with the petitioner. It has also been asserted that the moment the High Court has lifted the interim order, these employees were discontinued and a categorical stand is taken by this contractor that society is not responsible in any way as, after the interim order being lifted, ONGC has discontinued their services. It appears that the society has produced several documentary evidences vide pursis dated 23/6/2003. 14.6 The depositions of respective employees, which are attached to petition compilation, reflect that Mr. Kanubhai N. Dafda had joined the services in ONGC, Khambhat in E & T Section as Wireless Messenger and Technician and in the identity card which has been issued by ONGC, his position was mentioned as Wireless Messenger and therefore, with effect from 1/5/1989, he was serving in ONGC E&T Section and was paid on voucher a payment of Rs. 702/- per month which continued upto 30/1/1991. According to his deposition, right from 3/5/1989 to 30/6/2001, he was working as Wireless Messenger and was also dealing with wireless repairing and telephone repairing as well. In cross-examination, this witness has stated that he has not undertaken any course pertaining to either telephone repairing or wireless repairing. However, the fact remains that this employee has not worked after 30/6/2001 which is an undisputed position appearing on record. 14.7 Similarly, Mr. Kamleshbhai M. Parmar, who was deposed at Exh. 43, was also working as Technician in E&T Section since December, 1996 at ONGC, Khambhat. However, the fact remains that this employee has not worked after 30/6/2001 which is an undisputed position appearing on record. 14.7 Similarly, Mr. Kamleshbhai M. Parmar, who was deposed at Exh. 43, was also working as Technician in E&T Section since December, 1996 at ONGC, Khambhat. On the same line, this employee has also stated that in the identity card issued by the organization, his post was mentioned as Technician and this card was stated to have been valid upto 31/8/2001. In cross-examination, this employee has categorically admitted that prior to engaging himself in the employment, he has not applied through any advertisement nor ONGC has issued him any appointment letter. He has categorically admitted that when he was discontinued from the services, his name was reflecting in Jay Yogeshwar Labour Co-Operative Society Ltd. and this workman appeared to have joined the services after the contract which came to be executed between the petitioner Corporation and the respondent Society. 14.8 Another employee, Mr. Rajubhai G. Rathod, has also stated that he was kept in employment of E&T Section of ONGC as Telephone Operator from August, 1998. This employee has also made an attempt to indicate that he along with Mr. Sharad Kumar L. Pandya was working in two shifts simultaneously. However, this employee has stated that the tools and raw materials were being provided by ONGC and their presence was being noted down in a register maintained at E&T Section. This employee has stated that he has worked with effect from 1/8/1998 to 30/6/2001, however, his salary was being paid by the afore mentioned society. He has also stated that he is not the member of the society. This employee in cross-examination in turn has admitted that in the identity card issued, there was a seal of Jay Yogeshwar Labour Co-operative Society Ltd. and from which, salary was being paid. However, he has chosen not to be a member of the society but has made an attempt that he was working as an employee of ONGC but then the salary, issuance of identity card, deduction of contribution of provident fund, maintenance of register, etc. were in Jay Yogeshwar Labour Co-Operative Society Ltd. In the last phase of his deposition, he has stated that he is associated with the business of his elder brother and doing the work of transportation of cloth from one place to another. were in Jay Yogeshwar Labour Co-Operative Society Ltd. In the last phase of his deposition, he has stated that he is associated with the business of his elder brother and doing the work of transportation of cloth from one place to another. There is no other person remained present on behalf of the society. It is a trite law that a person who has not been employed through proper recruitment procedure and not through a selection process and has worked for very short span also having not adequate requisite qualification, is not entitled to seek in regularization or claim any benefit as that of permanent employee. Since this law is well defined, the Court is not inclined to deal with this issue in much detail but, keeping this factor in mind also, some of the issues are being dealt with hereinafter in the present controversy. 14.9 The aforesaid position takes the Court through even the terms of the contract which appear to have been executed between the petitioner Corporation and the society. Some of the clauses namely, I.3.1, II and III of this contract which was attached to petition compilation on page 347 are relevant to be quoted hereinafter: "I.3.1 The SOCIETY shall start work only after registering himself under the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act 1979 (if applicable) and obtaining registration and license under the Contract Labour (R&A) Act, 1970 at its own cost." "II. SCOPE OF WORK II.1 Work to be carried out: 11.1.1 Cambay Project has various Wireless System for intra and inter project communications. The systems to be operated are:- 1. HF SSB WIRELSSS 2. UHF WIRELESS 3. HF ISB WIRELESS 4. HOT LINE (Through Microwave Digital Radio) 11.1.2 Job also involves preliminary operational checking of communication systems like availability of power supply, cable connections, link selection, extending of voice facility through telephones, neatness of equipment, visual checking of antennae, etc. 11.1.3 HF SSB operation involves radio telephony and morse telegraphy. 11.1.4 VHF operation involves radio telephony. 11.1.5 HF ISI operation involves radio telephony, morse telegraphy, RITY and remote telephone patching. 11.1.6 HOT LINE operation involves receiving and routing income and outgoing calls. 11.1.7 Incoming messages from various systems are to be distributed to address in office and colony premises as and when they are received throughout the operating hours of above systems. 11.1.5 HF ISI operation involves radio telephony, morse telegraphy, RITY and remote telephone patching. 11.1.6 HOT LINE operation involves receiving and routing income and outgoing calls. 11.1.7 Incoming messages from various systems are to be distributed to address in office and colony premises as and when they are received throughout the operating hours of above systems. OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES: II.1.8 HF SSB :All days round the clock UHF :All days round the clock HF ISB :All working days 8AM to 8 PM HOT LINE :All working days 8AM to 8 PM QUALITY OF SERVICE 11.1.9 Services for the above wireless links are to be rendered by qualified proficiency certificate holders and should conform to the rules and regulations as laid down in Indian Telegraph Act 1885 by Central Government. 11.1.10 Proficiency Certificate means certificate not less than RTIM (Radio Telephony Inland Maritime) for the operation of wireless links. 11.1.11 The programme of work will be decided by the operations incharge and the SOCIETY will endeavour to adhere to this schedule. Any change in the schedule made by the SOCIETY must be with the prior approval of operations incharge. 11.1.12 SOCIETY shall also agree to deploy the required number of personnel of requisite qualification to undertake the above job simultaneously when the need arises. 11.1.13 SOCIETY also agrees to co-ordinate with other services in event of emergency/abnormal conditions. 11.1.14 SOCIETY will be provided with necessary tools/equipments for operation and maintenance of the links. II.2 Beginning of the work: II.2.1 SOCIETY shall undertake to start the work within 15 (fifteen) days of issue of letter of Acceptance or within1 5 (fifteen) days from the receipt of Telegram) Telex issued by the COMMISSION regarding acceptance of the offer. In case of failure to do so, COMMISSION will award the work to any other party at its sole discretion. The COMMISSION's decision in this regard will be final and binding on SOCIETY. III. EXECUTION OF THE WORK AND OBLIGATION OF THE SOCIETY: 111.1 SOCIETY shall execute the work with professional competence and in an efficient and workman-like manner as described under Article-II. 111.2 For carrying out the work, the SOCIETY shall at his own cost:- III.2.1 provide services using Tools/equipment of COMMISSION through incharge operations on all days of the agreement round the clock. III.2.2 Undertake to provide an efficient supervision of the regular maintenance of links. 111.2 For carrying out the work, the SOCIETY shall at his own cost:- III.2.1 provide services using Tools/equipment of COMMISSION through incharge operations on all days of the agreement round the clock. III.2.2 Undertake to provide an efficient supervision of the regular maintenance of links. III.2.3 Provide and be responsible for payment of wages, salaries, bonus, social charges, insurance, accommodation, etc. to this employees as per laws, regulations and Acts in these respects of the Government of Gujarat and the Government of India as are now or which may hereafter be from time to time in force. The SOCIETY should get himself registered under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act and any other Act applicable for execution of the job with appropriate authorities before starting the work and obtain a license. 111.2.3.1 SOCIETY shall provide services in time to the authorised representative, as per the programme given by incharge operations of commission. 111.2.3.2 Authorised representative means an officer of Class-I designated by the Incharge Operations from time to time. 111.2.3.3 The SOCIETY shall replace such of those personnel, whose performance and/or behaviour in the opinion of the COMMISSION in not satisfactory within 48 (Forty Eight) hours of receipt of such order from COMMISSION. The COMMISSION's decision on the performance or behaviour of an individual shall be final and shall be binding on the SOCIETY. III.2.3.4 In the event COMMISSION finds that the workmen/personnel deployed by the SOCIETY are not of the required calibre or otherwise not satisfactory owing to any reason of which the COMMISSION shall be the sole judge, or the work is not of the required specifications for which the COMMISSION shall be the sole judge, COMMISSION will be entitled to reject such jobs, cancel the contract and to get the work, done through other contractor at the risk and cost of the SOCIETY without any liability for damages, reserving always to itself the right to forfeit the Security Deposit if any furnished by the SOCIETY for the fulfilment of the Contract. III.2.3.5 the SOCIETY shall be responsible for any injury to any person/animals or things and for all damages to the structural and/or decorative part of the property which m ay arise from the operations of SOCIETY due to negligence, carelessness, misbehaviour, theft or failure to obey safety procedures or other fault of himself or of any subcontractor appointed by him with the previous written consent of the COMMISSION or any of his employees or sub-contractor's employees. III.2.4. SOCIETY shall instruct his personnel to take utmost care to the COMMISSION's equipment and shall in no case damage them during execution of work. SOCIETY shall be responsible for all such damages caused either by negligence or any willful act of his personnel and shall pay compensation for such damages as assessed by COMMISSION which shall be final and binding on the SOCIETY." 14.10 It appears that one another contract in continuance of the earlier contract has also been executed which came into force with effect from 1/11/1994 wherein also, some of the clauses are almost similar to that of earlier one with respect to scope of work, operational schedule, beginning of work and most importantly clause 8.4 is worth to be relevant and as such is reproduced hereinafter: "8.4 The contractor shall at its own cost carry with the provision of all laws, rules, orders and regulations and notifications whether central or state or local as applicable to him or to this contract from time to time. These Acts, rules, include without limit i.e. the following:- I. Minimum Wages Act and the rules and orders and notifications issued thereunder from time to time. II. Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. III. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. IV. The Workmen Compensation Act with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. V. Mines Act, Factories Act or Shop and Establishments Act whichever applicable with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. VI. Payment of Bonus Act, 1964 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. VII. Payment of Wages Act, 1972 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. VIII. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. IX. VI. Payment of Bonus Act, 1964 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. VII. Payment of Wages Act, 1972 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. VIII. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. IX. Provident Fund Act with rules, orders and notifications made thereunder from time to time. Contractor should have provident fund code number from the appropriate authority. X. All other Acts/rules/regulations, by-laws, orders, notification etc. present or future applicable to the contractor from time to time for performing the aforesaid jobs. 8.5 The contract shall be........ maintained under various labour laws:- (a) Muster roll (b) Register of Wages. (c) Register of Overtime. (d) Register of Fines. (e) Register of Deductions. (f) Register of Advances. (g) Wage slips. The above registers are subject to scrutiny by ONGC or any of its..... from time to time." In this very contract, clause 4.11 has cast a legal duty to observe the rules pertaining to Contract Labour Act, 1970 and clause 14.12 is related to the Payment of Wages to the workers who have been engaged. Clause 14.13 is dealing with necessary license to be secured by the society for execution of assigned work with the petitioner Corporation. These three clauses are reproduced hereinafter: "14.11 The contractor shall comply with all the rules made under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and shall disburse the wages to the workmen in presence of principal employer or his authorised representative. 14.12 The contractor shall pay the wages directly to workmen without any intervention of Jamadars/Thakedars. The contractor shall also ensure that no amount by way of commission or otherwise is deducted or recovered by Jamadars/Thakedars. The contractor should have registration under employees P.F. And other Miscellaneous Provision Act. 14.13 The contractor shall within 15 days or the commencement and completion of the job contract have to submit a return to the licencing officer and will abide by Minimum Wages Act/policy Enforcement by Labour Department of the Central Government." 14.11 The record further indicates that in response to this, ONGC has also issued work orders for its execution. One memorandum of application dated 28/1/1987 is appearing on the record with respect to Mr. Sharad Kumar L. Pandya, who was interviewed pursuant to his application and the interview was scheduled on 7/12/1987. One memorandum of application dated 28/1/1987 is appearing on the record with respect to Mr. Sharad Kumar L. Pandya, who was interviewed pursuant to his application and the interview was scheduled on 7/12/1987. 14.12 The petition contains a further record on page 429 of petition compilation by which, the petitioner has produced Certified Standing Orders for contingent employees of ONGC. Now this document is very much available on record which has indicated that there are some governing rules and regulations for service conditions of the employees even on contingent basis kept by the petitioner Corporation. The gist of these standing orders indicates that these standing orders are made applicable to all workmen called contingent employees employed in various units of ONGC but does not apply to regular employees of the Corporation to whom Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Central Civil Services (Temporary-Services) Rules, Revised Leave Rules and Civil Service Regulations have been extended. Therefore, these standing orders are pertaining to only contingent employees who are classified as temporary and casual. The termination of employment under these standing orders about contingent employees is governed by Clause 14 of the Standing Orders and the disciplinary action for misconduct is stipulated in Clause 16 of the standing orders. Prima facie, it appears that provisions of these standing orders are not applicable to workmen who are represented by the respondent Society and during the course of submissions also, no stress was indicated on applicability of standing orders. Though these standing orders are made part of the record, neither side has strenuously pressed into service these standing orders but have submitted other issues than these standing orders. 14.13 From the aforesaid record, the main grievance which has been raised by the petitioner Corporation is that none of the employees were regularly appointed by the petitioner Corporation nor they were kept in employment after following any recruitment procedure as required under the rules and none of the employees were represented by the respondent Society where there is direct control of the petitioner Corporation. A specific plea has been raised by the petitioner Corporation that they are essentially the employees and members of the society whose contract has already come to an end and therefore, by efflux of time, upon that eventuality of lapse of contract, their services were put an end to. A specific plea has been raised by the petitioner Corporation that they are essentially the employees and members of the society whose contract has already come to an end and therefore, by efflux of time, upon that eventuality of lapse of contract, their services were put an end to. The main further grievance was also raised that looking to the order of reference, the scope of inquiry before the learned Tribunal was within the periphery of the reference issue. Whereas though there was no challenge referred to of questioning validity of contract, the learned Tribunal has transgressed its jurisdiction and over-stepped by adjudicating an issue which was not the subject matter of reference and therefore, the petitioner has raised a serious grievance that there is a material error in exercising jurisdiction. Now in the context of this, the petitioner has also pointed out that discontinuance of workmen represented by respondent Society was done way back in June, 2001 and therefore, now after a lapse of almost 15 years, it is not only impracticable but impossible to implement the award in its literal form and therefore also, serious issues have been raised before the Court vehemently by learned advocate for the petitioner Corporation and thereby requested the Court to set aside the impugned award which is ex-facie unsustainable in the eye of law. 14.14 In the aforesaid factual matrix, now if the record as stated above is analysed, it would make it clear that what has been referred to for adjudication before the learned Tribunal is merely to examine whether the demand of the respondent Society for reinstatement of services is legal, proper and justified and if yes, then from what date and with what direction and therefore, in the absence of any alteration of this order of reference, prima facie, it appears that what has been decided by the Member of the learned Tribunal is something which can be said to be travelling beyond the scope of reference and this ultimate conclusion appears to be substantially influenced and overlapped by the contract system which has been agitated by respondent Society. Therefore, it appears to this Court that no doubt the reference issue has been dealt with but it has been dealt with in the context of questioning of a contract system in which the employees were directed to work. 15. Therefore, it appears to this Court that no doubt the reference issue has been dealt with but it has been dealt with in the context of questioning of a contract system in which the employees were directed to work. 15. In the aforesaid facts situation prevailing on record, what has been emerging is that prior to the contract which came into force, the respondent employees were very much discharging their duties, of course, intermittently but appears to be not on a regular set up. It is also an undisputed position that after coming into force and the existence of the Society, these respondent employees were part of the set said set up and they appeared to have worked through the contract system. It is also undisputed that after efflux of time, when their tenure came to be over way back in June, 2001, none of the respondent employees were discharging their function on their respective position and therefore, since the validity of the contract system was never a specific reference, the same could not have been questioned in the manner in which it has been tried to be projected. On going through the record, it appears that substantial control of these respondent employees were with the Society which entered into a contract with the petitioner Corporation, so much so that payment of their salary was also made by the Society and therefore, in the substantive form, the respondent employees, who were the employees belonging to the Society, could not have been said to be a part of regular set up of the petitioner Corporation. Therefore, whatever is to be agitated was related to a contract system which was prevailing and therefore, when the initial stage itself is not reflecting such a challenge nor being a part of reference order, that validity could not have been gone into by the learned Tribunal as it tantamounts to be beyond the scope of jurisdiction. If the record is seen, the sum and substance apart from this technicality is that, at the best, the respondent employees had worked in the petitioner Corporation but undisputedly from June, 2001, they do not appear to have been in the services. If the record is seen, the sum and substance apart from this technicality is that, at the best, the respondent employees had worked in the petitioner Corporation but undisputedly from June, 2001, they do not appear to have been in the services. Under the circumstances, after almost a period of 15 years, granting the relief as prayed for in the literal form cannot be considered at this stage particularly when over the period of time, in the substantive form, the structure of employment appears to have been changed. In addition thereto, when a specific stand has been taken by the petitioner Corporation that there were no set up posts available to undertake such kind of work, reinstatement would not be practicable and almost after a long lapse of time of 15 years, to grant such a relief would not only put the petitioner Corporation to severe difficult situation but at the same time, in view of settled position of law, would not be germane and impracticable. In light of this situation which is prevailing, the Court is mindful of the fact that belatedly, relief of reinstatement normally cannot be granted and for that purpose, the Court has an assistance of catena of decisions which are delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 15.1 The Apex Court, in case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal & Ors., reported in (2010) 6 SCC 773 , observing the scenario prevailing of that recent time, held that the relief of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of employee is found to be illegal or in contravention of the procedure and therefore, monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages may found to be appropriate. Relevant extract of the said decision is in Para.9 and 10 which are reproduced hereinafter: "9. In last few years it has been consistently held by this Court that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate, (See U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey; Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi; State of M.P. & Ors. Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey; Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Lalit Kumar Verma; Madhya Pradesh Administration v. Tribhuban; Sita Ram & Ors. v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute; Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai & Anr.; Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar & Anr. and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr.). 10. In a recent judgment authored by one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) in the case of Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr., the aforesaid decisions were noticed and it was stated : "7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee". This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee". 15.2 Similar is the view taken by the Apex Court in case of Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr., reported in (2009) 15 SCC 327 wherein also, the Apex Court was of the view that granting of reinstatement with full back wages cannot be automatically and to that extent, even if there appears to be violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947, the award of reinstatement should not automatically be passed. Relevant extract of the said decision are in Para-7, 14, 15 and 17 which reads, thus; "7. It is true that earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention to the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 14. It would be, thus, seen that by catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 15. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages. As a matter of fact, in all the judgments of this Court referred to and relied upon by the High Court while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages, this Court has awarded compensation. 17. While awarding compensation, the host of factors, inter alia, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service are relevant. Of course, each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances." 15.3 Yet in another decision in case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 456 , the Apex Court on analysis of basic facts has found and propounded that the termination of service after expiry of contract, does not amount to retrenchment and consequently, the workman cannot be reinstated under Section 25H of the I.D. Act, 1947. The relevant extracts contained in the said judgment are reproduced hereinafter: "9. The above order was signed by the respondent and, therefore, bound by the terms and conditions of the office order. The question is, termination of the service of the respondent on the expiry of the periods mentioned above would amount to retrenchment? Facts in this case clearly show, so found by the Labour Court itself that the respondent had not worked continuously for 240 days in an year to claim the benefit of Sections 25F, G and H of the ID Act. Therefore, the only question to be considered is whether termination of service of the respondent on the basis of the contract of appointment would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sections 25H of the ID Act so as to claim reinstatement. 14. Section 25H will apply only if the respondent establishes that there had been retrenchment. Facts will clearly indicate that there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5387 of 2012 as well. 15. Facts will clearly indicate that there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5387 of 2012 as well. 15. We are sorry to note that the Labour Court, learned single Judge and the Division Bench have not properly appreciated the factual and legal position in this case. When rights of parties are being adjudicated, needless to say, serious thoughts have to be bestowed by the Labour Court as well as the High Court. For the above-mentioned reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside the award passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs." 16. Considering the aforesaid position prevailing on record, in view of the proposition of law laid down hereinbefore, the Court is of the considered opinion that the relief which has been prayed for is not possible to be granted nor it is proper to grant at this stage of proceeding and therefore, at the best, some lump-sum amount of compensation be made available to the respondent employees. For this purpose, during the course of hearing, with a view to find an ultimate resolution, even the deliberations took place between the learned advocates in respect of such kind of lump-sum amount. However, figures which are projected by the respondent Society are not possible to be accepted by the petitioner Corporation as has been conveyed and therefore, in the light of this, in order to strike a balance between the two parties to the proceeding, some amount of compensation is to be determined by the Court as has been contended by learned advocate for the petitioner and therefore, in such a situation, the Court has made an attempt to undertake such an exercise in the light of following propositions of the Hon'ble Apex Court that if the interest of justice demands, the Court has the power to mould the relief and therefore, the factual scenario is such in which a reasonable amount of lump-sum compensation is to be awarded in substantiation of the award which has been granted. 17. 17. From the record, it has been found that one of the respondents - Shri Sharadkumar L. Pandya, who appears to have worked with the organization as Telephone/Radio Operator from 1.5.1989 till the contract assigned to respondent No. 5 i.e. 1.8.1998 and therefore, it appears that approximately about 109 months at monthly salary of Rs. 2100/- he has worked with the organization. Now, this period if to be considered, approximately he must have earned Rs. 2,28,900/-, whereas undisputedly he also merged himself in the contract employment w.e.f. 1.7.1998 which contract came to be ended on 30.6.2001 and therefore, in actual terms he is entitled for a less amount even to be awarded for that period in which he has worked with the petitioner organization. But in view of the fact that both the sides at one point of time were in broad agreement to resolve the dispute and in which the figures have also been given, it appears that if this employee is given a lumpsum compensation of Rs. 2,28,900/- + cost of Rs. 50,000/-, in all Rs. 2,78,900/-, the same would meet ends of justice. 18. Similar is the case with respect to another employee - Rajubhai G. Rathod, who also worked at a monthly salary of Rs. 2100/- as Telephone Operator and was engaged in operating telephones wireless data operating from August, 1998 and this employee as such appears to have joined when the contract system was prevailing from 1.7.1998 and therefore, it appears that he does not deserve to be awarded any amount of lumpsum compensation. The lump-sum compensation is being awarded on account of the fact that earlier some of the employees did serve the petitioner organization before the contract but, not as a confirmed employee. This employee is not entitled to any amount of compensation from the petitioner organization. 19. So far as another employee - Kanubhai N. Dafda is concerned, the said employee was working as telephone instrument repairer and was also looking after telephone maintenance and wireless maintenance work, had joined the petitioner organization w.e.f. 1.5.1989 and after introduction of contract system on 1.7.1998, he was being taken care of by respondent contractor and therefore, it appears that this employee has worked for a period of approximately 109 months at a monthly salary of Rs. 1900/- and therefore, he must have earned approximately Rs. 1900/- and therefore, he must have earned approximately Rs. 2,07,100/- and hence, in a similar way to that of other employees, he is entitled to Rs. 2,07,100/- + Rs. 50,000/- as total emoluments plus some litigation cost to arrive at this figure and therefore, this lumpsum compensation of Rs. 2,57,100/- is found to be proper for this employee. 20. With respect to another employee - Shri Kamleshbhai M. Parmar, who was working as a technician from December, 1996 at a monthly salary of Rs. 1900/- and was looking after maintenance works of electronics and had merely worked for 19 months before introduction of contract system and therefore, he must have earned an amount of Rs. 36,100/-. Therefore, this employee is entitled to Rs. 36,100/-+ Rs. 50,000/- as total emoluments plus some litigation cost to arrive at this figure and therefore, this lump-sum compensation of Rs. 86,100/- is found to be proper for this employee. 21. The aforesaid amount which is determined is independent of the amount receivable by the respective employees under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act, 1947 as per the earlier orders passed in the proceedings. The aforesaid amount of lump-sum compensation appears to be proper to be awarded for respondents - workmen. The claim which has been tried to be made by the respondents workmen through the counsel is possibly on the pretext that they are the regular employees of petitioner organization and working on the sanctioned post and lawfully employed till the age of retirement and even post retirement benefits are also sought to be projected which is found to be thoroughly unreasonable and hence keeping in view of aforesaid circumstance, the same not fit to be granted. On the contrary, this amount appears to be based upon a voluntary gesture made by the petitioner organization so as to see that some final resolution of this litigation to come to an end and therefore, background of this peculiar set of circumstance turns out to be just to award a lump-sum amount of compensation. 22. The aforesaid measure is adopted in view of recent development in proposition of awarding lump-sum compensation and therefore, the petition is being disposed of in following terms. 22. The aforesaid measure is adopted in view of recent development in proposition of awarding lump-sum compensation and therefore, the petition is being disposed of in following terms. "The petitioners are directed to pay the aforesaid amount which has been determined as a part of lump-sum compensation and the same shall be paid to each of the workman through account payee cheque in their name within a period of 8 weeks hereof with interest at the rate of 9% till realization. This disposal of the petition in the aforesaid terms is in a peculiar set of circumstance and will have not bearing upon any of the legal right if available to the respondents, if exists." 23. The award under challenge is hereby quashed and set aside and is modified in the aforesaid terms. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Disposed off.