JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed to set aside the order dt.19/11/1998 by which he has been removed from service as well as the order dt.19/02/1999 passed in appeal whereby his appeal has been rejected. 2. Brief facts for consideration of this Court are that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable on 18th April, 1978 and was promoted as Head Constable in January, 1998. While he was working as Head Constable, an incident occurred at Police Station, Phulera where the petitioner was In charge of ‘Kot’ (a place where ammunition are kept/stored). It is alleged that ammunition including 9 mm pistol with magazine and 20 bullets had been found to be stolen. The allegations levelled against the petitioner vide memorandum dt.28/08/1998 were that he was on duty from 08.00 to 16.00 hours in the capacity of general supervision and ‘Kot’ In charge and during his duty hours he had lost one 9 mm pistol with 20 bullets and one spare magazine. In the statement of allegations, it was mentioned that at 7.45 am, he had taken under his charge eight.303 Rifles with 160 bullets, one 9 mm pistol with 20 bullets, one spare magazine, one leaning rod, two hand-cubs, eight safety chains and two keys, one of ammunition box and the other of ’Kot’ Lock from the other Duty In charge Gurudayal and at around 14.30 hours, when he handed over ammunition to the Scouting Duty Staff of Vehicle No.214, it was found that one 9 mm pistol with 20 bullets and one spare magazine were not available in the ‘Kot’ and informed Inspector Parsuram of possibility of the same having been stolen. As the incident had happened during his duty hours, allegations of negligence and causing loss to reputation of police were levelled against him. 3. Enquiry was conducted with regard to the same. On 23/09/1998, the enquiry report was submitted. Copy of enquiry report was served upon the petitioner and he was asked to give his representation. The enquiry officer held him guilty of the charges. The petitioner submitted that one of his colleague Constable had been involved in the theft and the petitioner could not be held guilty of negligence as he was assigned various jobs which included the job of giving ammunition to the Constables who were going on duty. The enquiry officer held him guilty of the charges. The petitioner submitted that one of his colleague Constable had been involved in the theft and the petitioner could not be held guilty of negligence as he was assigned various jobs which included the job of giving ammunition to the Constables who were going on duty. It was also submitted that the theft was a misfortune while the petitioner was a rewarded personnel. 4. Taking into consideration the reply and enquiry report, an order was passed on 19/11/1998 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges and he was served with punishment of removal from service against which departmental appeal was preferred which was rejected vide order dt. 19/02/1999. 5. It is asserted that regarding the said incident, disciplinary proceedings were also undertaken against Constable Anil Kumar; Sub-Inspector Parsuram and Inspector Ram Singh. While the petitioner was removed from service, all the three persons were punished with much lesser punishment and while Constable Anil Kumar was punished with stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect, Sub-Inspector Parsuram was punished with stoppage of three grade increments with cumulative effect and Inspector Ram Singh was punished with stoppage of three grade increments with cumulative effect. It has been also pointed out that Constable Prahlad Singh, against whom there was an allegation of having committed theft, was not punished and even charge of committing theft was not alleged against him and the only charge of unauthorized presence at the place of incident was levelled and he was punished with down-gradation to minimum of pay-scale for a period of five years. It has come out during the course of arguments that Constable Prahlad Singh was later on removed from service on 31/12/1999 on account of unauthorized absence. 6. The case set up by the petitioner in the petition is that the charge levelled against the petitioner was lesser than that of Anil Kumar against whom the charge-sheet was with regard to handing over the key of the store and of the Malkhana where the ‘Kot’ was also placed to Prahlad and when Prahlad entered Malkhara, he found the pistol lying with 20 bullets and spare magazine which remained on table while taking out other arms and ammunition from the ‘Kot’ by mistake and had the keys not been given to the said Constable Prahlad by Anil Kumar, the theft would not have occurred. It is also submitted that a court of enquiry was also conducted wherein it was found that on account of negligence of Anil Kumar, the theft had occurred and certain advisory was also issued for future care. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the punishment, which has been awarded to the petitioner on the basis of the allegation of being negligent during the course of his duties due to which the theft has occurred, is harsh and while other persons, who were also similarly situated, have been left out with minor punishments, removal order has been passed with regard to the petitioner. It is also not the case that the petitioner was anywhere involved in the theft. It is submitted that the previous service of the petitioner had been outstanding and there have been awards given to the petitioner for his distinguished service and for such an incident, punishment is too severe and does not commensurate with the allegations. He has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Saxena Vs. State Bank of Patiala & ors.: 2016(11) SCC 289 ; Man Singh Vs. State of Haryana and others: (2008) 12 SCC 331 and Rajendra Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and others: 2013(3) SCC 73 with regard to the discrimination in relation to the punishment in departmental enquiries amongst co-delinquents. 8. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that each individual has been punished according to the level of delinquency found to have been committed. He relied upon the judgments passed in the case of Union of India and others Vs. P. Gunasekaran : 2015(2) SCC 610 ; State of Meghalaya & ors. Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak: 2008(7) SCC 580 ; H.B. Gandhi, Excise And Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and others Vs. M/s Gopi Nath & Sons and others: 1992(sup2) SCC 312; State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha & Anr.: 2009(8) SCC 310 and in the case of Union of India & ors. Vs. Diler Singh: 2016(13) SCC 71. 9. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the enquiry was conducted in fair and proper manner and in accordance with rules. The petitioner was In charge of ‘Kot’ where the arms and ammunition were kept and it was his duty to see that that they all intact before locking the ‘Kot’. 9. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the enquiry was conducted in fair and proper manner and in accordance with rules. The petitioner was In charge of ‘Kot’ where the arms and ammunition were kept and it was his duty to see that that they all intact before locking the ‘Kot’. Th negligence of leaving 9 mm pistol with magazine and 20 bullets while handing over the ammunition to the scouting party staff cannot be treated as a minor mistake as such arms and ammunition in hands of others can be utilized for wrongful deeds and cause havoc in society and accountability has to be therefore assigned of the individual was was instrumentality in the loss/theft of the arms and ammunition and a Constable in Police Force has to be placed at a higher pedestal with regard to the attentiveness other than individuals. He is expected to be more attentive and it is submitted that punishment cannot be said to be harsh. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material available on record as well as the case law cited at bar. 11. It has come on record that while the petitioner has been punished with the punishment of dismissal from service, the other Constable Anil Kumar, who was involved in the incident, has been punished with the punishment of stoppage of one grade increments for one year only; Sub-Inspector Parsuram has been punished with stoppage of three grade increments with cumulative effect and Inspector Ram Singh has been punished with stoppage of three grade increments with cumulative effect which was later on reduced to one grade increment with cumulative effect. Prahlad Singh, who is stated to have stolen the ammunition, was not charge-sheeted for the said fault but was charge-sheeted for unauthorized presence at the place of incident and was punished with the punishment of downgrading the pay to the minimum of pay-scale for a period of five years. Thus, the punishment awarded to the petitioner vis-a-vis others is on severe side. 12. In the case of Union of India and others Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra), the scope of judicial review with regard to the departmental enquiry was reiterated and it was observed in Para 13 as under:- “13. Thus, the punishment awarded to the petitioner vis-a-vis others is on severe side. 12. In the case of Union of India and others Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra), the scope of judicial review with regard to the departmental enquiry was reiterated and it was observed in Para 13 as under:- “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re( appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a). the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b). the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c). there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d). the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e). the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f). the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g). the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h). the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i). the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 13. In the case of State of Meghalaya & ors. Vs. go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 13. In the case of State of Meghalaya & ors. Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak (supra), the issue relating to quantum of punishment was discussed and the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution was considered and it was held in as under:- “A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental inquiry, the court should also take into consideration, the mental set up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision making process. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. The respondent belonged to a disciplined force. He was supposed to carry out instructions given to him by his superior. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. The respondent belonged to a disciplined force. He was supposed to carry out instructions given to him by his superior. Not only he flouted the instructions but conducted himself in such a manner that he caused loss of part of pay to be deposited with the exchequer and loss of service revolver with ammunition which could be misused. When a statute gives discretion to the administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The proved charges clearly established that the respondent, who was a police officer failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the exchequer and society. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the Appellate Authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.” 14. In the case of H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karna and others Vs. M/s Gopi Nath & Sons and other (supra), it has been held in Para 8 as under:- “But here what was assailed was the correctness of findings as if before an appellate forum. Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on the matter which it is authorized by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.” 15. In the case of State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha & Anr. (supra), it has been held in Para 12 as under:- “12. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. The Court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to re- appreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer and examine the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back to the High Court.” 16. In the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Diler Singh (supra), it has been held in Para 23 as under:- “23. We are inclined to think so as a member of the disciplined force, the respondent was expected to follow the rules, have control over his mind and passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to fly in fancy. It is not a mild deviation which human nature would grant some kind of lenience. We are inclined to think so as a member of the disciplined force, the respondent was expected to follow the rules, have control over his mind and passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to fly in fancy. It is not a mild deviation which human nature would grant some kind of lenience. It is a conduct in public which has compelled the authority to think and, rightly so, that the behaviour is totally in disciplined. The respondent, if we allow ourselves to say so, has given indecent burial to self-control, diligence and strength of will-power. A disciplined man is expected, to quote a few lines from Mathew Arnold:- “We cannot kindle when we will The fire which in the heart resides, The spirit bloweth and is still, In mystery our soul abides: But tasks in hours of insight wild Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled. Though the context is slightly different, yet we have felt, it is worth reproducing.” 17. In the case of AK Saxena Vs. State Bank of Patiala & ors. (supra), it has been held in Paras no.2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 as under:- “2. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that even according to the bank there were four people involved in the alleged fraud and the bank proceeded only against the appellant. The complainant Mr. Yadav initiated criminal proceedings against the other three persons but not against the appellant. He further submitted that the Labour Court having regard to the evidence available before it, has taken a plausible view that it is not possible to establish the charges levelled against the appellant and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in reversing the plausible view taken by the Labour Court. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the Bank however, submitted that the appellant was Head Cashier and at his instance only the other three employees were roped in as a part of the fraud, without knowing that it was a fraud. He further submits that the Bank had also initiated Disciplinary Proceedings against those three employees. However, the High Court in the impugned judgment has ordered that those three employees must not be given any further increment or promotion. 5. He further submits that the Bank had also initiated Disciplinary Proceedings against those three employees. However, the High Court in the impugned judgment has ordered that those three employees must not be given any further increment or promotion. 5. In the above factual matrix, we put query to the learned counsel for the Bank as to how the appellant alone is discriminated and dismissed from service. The learned counsel has invited our attention extensively to the evidence 2 that appellant was the kingpin of the whole transaction, being a Head Cashier other three have only obeyed his request for consequential steps. We find it difficult to appreciate the submission in view of the factual position as noted above. 6. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be advanced in case the punishment imposed on the appellant is suitably altered. 7. The appellant has attained the age of superannuation and that he has received hefty amounts from the Bank while remaining out of service after 1993. Hence, it is ordered that the appellant shall be treated to have been retired from service on completion of 15 years of service and accordingly, his retiral benefits shall be settled for the purpose of future pension from the month of February, 2016. Since he has already received wages in between, there shall be no arrears of pension.” 18. In the case of Man Singh Vs. State of Haryana and others (supra), it has been held in Para 20 as under:- “20. We may reiterate the settled position of law for the benefit of the administrative authorities that any act of the repository of power whether legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial is open to challenge if it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it. The concept of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India embraces the entire realm of State action. It would extend to an individual as well not only when he is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of right, but also in the matter of imposing liability upon him. Equal is to be treated equally even in the matter of executive or administrative action. It would extend to an individual as well not only when he is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of right, but also in the matter of imposing liability upon him. Equal is to be treated equally even in the matter of executive or administrative action. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of equality is now turned as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of a governmental action. The administrative action is to be just on the test of 'fair play' and reasonableness.” 19. In the case of Rajendra Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and others (supra), it has been held in Paras 12, 13 and 14 as under:- “12. The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. 13. The principle stated above is seen applied in few judgments of this Court. The earliest one is Director General of Police and Others v. G. Dasayan (1998) 2 SCC 407 , wherein one Dasayan, a Police Constable, along with two other constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same acts of misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority exonerated two other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on Head Constable. This Court, in order to meet the ends of justice, substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place of the order of dismissal from service on Dasayan, applying the principle of parity in punishment among co-delinquents. This Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah case (supra), the workman was dismissed from service for proved misconduct. However, few other workmen, against whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail of the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme. This Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah case (supra), the workman was dismissed from service for proved misconduct. However, few other workmen, against whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail of the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme. In such circumstances, this Court directed that the workman also be treated on the same footing and be given the benefit of voluntary retirement from service from the month on which the others were given the benefit. 14. We are of the view the principle laid down in the above mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts of the present case. We have already indicated that the action of the Disciplinary Authority imposing a comparatively lighter punishment to the codelinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted in law, since they were all involved in the same incident. Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith. Appellant is, therefore, to be re- instated from the date on which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.” 20. Thus, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court, this Court finds that the limited jurisdiction of judicial review available to this Court is only with reference to the decision making process and if the said decision making process is found to be vitiated and contrary to the settled proposition of law, the action would stand vitiated and has to be set aside. As observed above, in the facts of this case, a joint enquiry was required to be conducted. 21. The Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 provides a procedure for imposition of major punishment under Rule 153 of the Rules of 1987 which is quoted as under:- “153. As observed above, in the facts of this case, a joint enquiry was required to be conducted. 21. The Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 provides a procedure for imposition of major punishment under Rule 153 of the Rules of 1987 which is quoted as under:- “153. Procedure for imposing major punishments: 153.1 Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquires act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in ranks shall be passed on any enrolled member of the Force (save as mentioned in rule 161) without holding an inquiry, as far as may be in the manner provided hereinafter, in which he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded a reasonable opportunity of defending himself. 153.2.1. Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an enrolled member of the Force, it may itself inquire into or appoint an Inquiry Officer higher in rank to the enrolled member charged but not below the rank of Inspector, or institute a Court of Inquiry to inquire in to the truth thereof. 153.2.2. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds the inquiry, any reference to the Inquiry Officer in these rules shall be construed as reference to the disciplinary authority. 153.3. On receipt of complaint or otherwise, the disciplinary authority on going through the facts alleged or brought out shall decide whether it is a case for major punishment. No attempt shall be made to convert cases punishable under section 16 A or section 17 into disciplinary cases nor divert cases in respect of which major punishments are imposable to the category of cases where minor or petty punishments are imposable. No attempt shall be made to convert cases punishable under section 16 A or section 17 into disciplinary cases nor divert cases in respect of which major punishments are imposable to the category of cases where minor or petty punishments are imposable. 153.4 Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against an enrolled member of the Force under this rule, the disciplinary authority may order that the enrolled member shall not e transferred to any other place nor given leave without its written permission till the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, and the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up – (a) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge; (b) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support or each article or charge which shall contain,- (i) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the enrolled member of the Force; (ii) a list of document by which and a list of witness by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. 153.5 The disciplinary authority shall to be delivered to the delinquent member, at least seventy-two hours before the commencement of the inquiry, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of imputations of misconduct or msbehaviour and a list of documents and witness by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and fix a date when the inquiry is to commence; subsequent dates being fixed by the Inquiry Officer. 153.6 Where the enrolled member charged has absconded or where it is not possible to serve the documents on him in person or where he deliberately evades service, the procedure laid down in sections 62, 64, and 69 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall be adopted by the Inquiry Officer for service of such documents and the same shall be deemed to be a conclusive proof of service. 153.7 For securing the presence of private prosecution witness, the Inquiry Officer may allow free travel passes according to their status in accordance with extant Railway Rules. 15.8 The enrolled member charged shall to be in a legal practitioner at the proceedings but he may be allowed to take the assistance of any other member of the Force(hereinafter referred to as :friend). 15.8 The enrolled member charged shall to be in a legal practitioner at the proceedings but he may be allowed to take the assistance of any other member of the Force(hereinafter referred to as :friend). Where in the opinion of the Inquiry Officer nay, at the request of the party charged, put his defence properly. Such “friend” must be a serving member of the Force of or below the rank or Sub-Inspector for the time being posted in the same division or the battalion where the proceeding are pending and not acting as a “friend” in any other proceedings pending any where. Such “friend” shall, how ever, not be allowed to address the Inquiry Officer nor to cross-examine the witness. 153.9. If the enrolled member charged fails to turn up on the day fixed for the start of inquiry and no reasonable excuse is offered for not being present on the fixed time and day, the Inquiry Officer may commence the inquiry ex parte. 153.10 At the commencement of the Inquiry, the party charged shall be asked to enter a plea of “guilty” or “mot guilty” after which evidence necessary to establish the charge shall be let in. The evidence shall be material to the charge and may either be oral or documentary. If oral- (a) it shall be direct; (b) it shall be recorded by the Inquiry Officer in the presence of the party charged; and the party charged shall be allowed to cross-examine the witness. 153.11 If the witnesses are government officers of a rank superior to the party charged, the Inquiry Officer may, at the request of the party charged, put the questions to such officer. 153.12 If the evidence shall be recorded, in the presence of the party charged, by the Inquiry Officer himself or on his dictation by a scribe. Cross-examination by the party charged or the fact of his declining to cross-examine the witness, as the case may be, shall also be recorded. The statement of each witness shall be read over to him and explained, if necessary, in the language of the witness, whose signature shall be obtained as a token of his having understood the contents. Statement shall also be signed by the Inquiry officer and the party charged. Copy of each statement shall given to the party charged who shall acknowledge receipt on the statement of witness itself. Statement shall also be signed by the Inquiry officer and the party charged. Copy of each statement shall given to the party charged who shall acknowledge receipt on the statement of witness itself. The Inquiry Officer shall recorded a certificate of having read over the statement to the witness in the presence of the party charged. 153.13 Documentary exhibits, if any, are to be numbered while being presented by the concerned witness and reference of the number shall be noted in the statement of the witness. Such documents may be admitted in evidence as exhibits without being formally proved unless the party charged does not admit the genuineness of such a document and wishes to cross-examine the witness who is purported to have signed it. Copies of the exhibits may be given to the party charged on deemed except in the case of voluminous documents, where the party charged may be allowed to inspect the same in the presence of Inquiry Officer and take notes. 153.14 Unless specifically mentioned in these rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall not apply to the departmental Proceedings under these rules. 153.15 The party charged shall then be examined and his statement recorded by the Inquiry Officer. If the party charged has pleaded guilty and does not challenge the evidence on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. If the pleads “nor guilty” he shall be required to file within 10 days a written statement together with a list of such witness as he may wish to produce in his defence and giving therein a gist of evidence that each witness is expected to give. If he declines to file a written statement, he shall again be examined by the Inquiry Officer on the expiry of the period allowed and his statement, if any, recorded. 153.16 If the party charged refuses to produce any witnesses of produce any evidence in his defence, the proceedings shall be closed for orders, if he produces any evidence, the Inquiry officer shall produced to record the evidence. 153.16 If the party charged refuses to produce any witnesses of produce any evidence in his defence, the proceedings shall be closed for orders, if he produces any evidence, the Inquiry officer shall produced to record the evidence. If the Inquiry Officer considers that the evidence of any witness or any document which the party charged wants to produce in his evidence is not material to the issue involved in the case, he may refuse to call such witness or to allow such document to be produced in evidence, but in all such cases he must briefly record his reasons for considering the evidence inadmissible. When all relevant evidence has been brought on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders after recording the statement, if any, of the party charged and obtaining any clarification, if necessary, from him. 153.17 Under no circumstances additional prosecution witness shall be examined after the defence has been let in unless supplementary defence witness have been allowed on that ground. How ever of at any stage during the inquiry, it appears to the Inquiry Officer that examination of any witness who ahs not been produced by either party so far or recall of any witness who has already been examined is essential in the interest of justice or to clear any doubt, he may summon him for the purpose and examine him as a witness of the Inquiry Officer after recording his reasons for doing so. Such a witness may also cross-examined by the party charge, if desired. 153.18 Whenever any Inquiry Officer after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry, cases to exercise jurisdiction threin and is succeeded by another Inquiry Officer who has and exercises such jurisdiction, the Inquiry Officer so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by him or himself record it fresh as he deems expedient. 153.19 At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer shall prepare a report or the inquiry recording his findings on each of the charges with reasons therefore. The findings must be of “guilty” or “not guilty” and no room shall be allowed for “benefit or doubt” or personal surmises. 153.19 At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer shall prepare a report or the inquiry recording his findings on each of the charges with reasons therefore. The findings must be of “guilty” or “not guilty” and no room shall be allowed for “benefit or doubt” or personal surmises. A charge shall be deemed to heve been proved if after considering the evidence before him, the Inquiry Officer believes the ingredients constituting the charge to exist or considers their existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they exist. 153.20 If in the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, the proceedings of the Inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed, he may record his findings on such charges: Provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the party charged has admitted the facts constituting them and has had an opportunity of defending himself against them.” 22. However, where there are more than one enrolled members involved, then the procedure has to be followed as per Rule 163 which is quoted as under:- “163. procedure when two or more enrolled members are involved: Where two or more enrolled member of the Force including those on deputation to the Force are involved in any case, the disciplinary action against two or all of them may be taken in a common proceeding.” 23. The argument taken by learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the departmental enquiry having been held separately for co-delinquent and thus contrary to the concept of the rules, deserves to be accepted. 24. The word ‘may’ in Rule 163 has to be considered as mandatory and not directory in nature because where more than one person are being charged relating to the same incident, it would be in the fitness of things that both are faced with the similar evidence which has brought on record by the prosecution and they may have their defence accordingly. Where separate enquiries are conducted relating to the same incident against two different persons, it would go against the principles of natural justice if in one case the same set of evidence may depose as against ‘A’ while in the other departmental proceedings, the same set of evidence may depose against ‘B’ and the disciplinary authority would hold both of them guilty for the same charge without asserting as to what is the individual role in committing of the alleged delinquency or there may be contradictory statements to hold one of them. In these circumstances, this would also result into passing of different punishment orders as can be noted in the present case. 25. In view of the departmental action taken separately, the resultant position which is seen is that the different punishments have been awarded in different separate proceedings which has resulted in dismissal of the petitioner while others have been allowed to continue. Even the person, who is alleged to have committed the theft of arms and ammunition, has been dealt with leniently by stopping his five increments although it has come on record later on that on account of willful absence from duty, the said Prahlad Singh was later on removed from service. It has come on record during the course of enquiry that the ‘Kot’ itself was situated in a room and the room was locked and its keys were kept with another Constable Anil Kumar who had handed over the keys to Prahlad Singh. Thus, Anil Kumar and Prahlad Singh are also similarly situated as the petitioner but different yardsticks have been adopted for the purpose of imposition of punishment. In view of the observations made by the Apex Court herein above, this Court finds that the order of dismissal from service, therefore, cannot be allowed to sustain. 26. Consequently, the writ petition is partly allowed. The orders impugned dt.19/11/1998 and 19/02/1999 are hereby quashed & set aside following the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Saxena Vs. State Bank of Patiala & ors. (supra). The appellant has attained the age of superannuation. 26. Consequently, the writ petition is partly allowed. The orders impugned dt.19/11/1998 and 19/02/1999 are hereby quashed & set aside following the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of A.K. Saxena Vs. State Bank of Patiala & ors. (supra). The appellant has attained the age of superannuation. Hence, it is ordered that the appellant shall be treated to have retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation and accordingly his retiral benefits and pension shall be calculated/computed making notional fixation of pay and paid by the respondents within a period of three months from the date the certified copy of this order is communicated in their office. However, the petitioner shall not be entitled for any actual wages in between the period from dismissal till the date of superannuation. No costs.