JUDGMENT : Mr. Kalyan Rai Surana, J. Heard Mr. T.J. Mahanta learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Ms. P. Bhattacharya learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. B.K. Bhattacharjee learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By filing this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the order dated 13.07.2016 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat in Misc (J) Case No. 16/2015 arising out of Title Appeal No. 7/2015 by condoning the delay in filing the said connected appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted in the petition filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act that the respondent herein had not made any specific averment as to the number of days for which the delay was sought to be condoned. It is further submitted although it is claimed in the said application that the respondent had left Jorhat to Delhi for treatment in the month of November 2013 and had returned Jorhat in the month of May 2015, but there is no document to support the said contention. 4. It is also submitted that the medical documents of respondent No. 1 also does not show that he was suffering from a disease which had incapacitated him to file the appeal on time and further there is no document showing continued treatment of the respondent No. 1 from May to September 2015 as claimed. It is submitted that not only the application is vague but the document which were annexed to the application for condonation of delay does not support the statement made in the petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the finding of the learned Court below is perverse because in the impugned order it has been recorded that the opposite party/respondent (i.e. the petitioner herein) in its written objection has not disputed the averments of the applicant/petitioner (respondent herein). It is submitted that against the application for condonation of delay, the petitioner had filed the written objection and his disputed illness by stating that the petitioner who is distantly related to the opposite party No. 1 and he had seen the respondent No. 1 doing shopping and roaming around as an able bodied person even after the judgment and decree dated 13.03.2015. Hence, it is submitted that the ground on which the application was allowed is not sustainable. 6. Hence, it is submitted that the ground on which the application was allowed is not sustainable. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case of Pankajakshi (dead) through LRS and others v. Chandrika and others, 2016 (6) SCC 207 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a view that the ailments from which the original petitioner was suffering for so many years do not make out illness as a justification for condonation of long delay of 944 days in filing the Special Leave Petition. As such the Special Leave Petition was dismissed as the long delay had remained unexplained. 7. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent, has argued in support of the impugned order by stating that in the present case there was a delay of 4 (four) months and the same was recorded in the impugned order. It is submitted that the impugned order was passed on 13.03.2015 and, as such, the period of limitation expired on 12.04.2015. However, the petition was filed before the learned District Judge on 13.09.2015 and, as such, there was a delay of 5 (months) only in filing the application. It is submitted that the illness of his wife as well as his own illness had prevented the respondent to file the connected appeal on time which can be verified from various pathological test reports that are annexed to this application from page 20 to 56. 8. Having considered the rival arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both sides and on perusal of the impugned order it appears that the learned Court below by relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 had taken a view that as per the direction contained therein the Court should adopt a liberal approach in considering the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 had taken a view that as per the direction contained therein the Court should adopt a liberal approach in considering the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The relevant portion extracted of the judgment is reproduced herein below: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 (Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the CPC, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period) of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner." 9. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner." 9. This Court has appreciated the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the causes for delay as shown in the condonation application and that the long illness of the Respondent and his wife is not sufficient to condone the delay as has been held by the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pankajakshi (dead) through LRS and others (supra). This Court has also noted with concern that the learned First Appellate Court had misread the objection and arrived at a wrong conclusion that the petitioner herein had not disputed the averments made by the respondent herein. Nevertheless, this Court finds that the learned Court below had placed reliance for its decision on the case of Collector Land Acquisition (Supra), the operative paragraph of which is reproduced above, it appears that the said learned Court below had also adopted a lenient approach in the matter of condonation of delay view of the mandate of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision. 10. As the learned Court below is found to have given its reasoning for condoning the delay, this Court is of the view that a right had accrued in favour of the respondent by admission of the appeal and therefore despite various arguable grounds raised in the present application, this Court is inclined to not interfere with the impugned order on the ground that it appears from the medical records annexed to the application that the respondent No. 1 is a senior citizen aged about 73 years old when in the year 2015 he had undertaken the test, and as he and his wife were suffering from various illness, at that advanced age, the petitioner could not file the appeal with promptness and there was a delay of 5 (five) months in filing the connected appeal. 11. In view of the said advance age of the respondent No. 1, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order and therefore this revision is dismissed. 12. The parties are left to bear their own costs.