JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 08.11.2006, passed by learned District Judge (Forest), Shimla, in Civil Appeal No.63-S/13 of 2006/04, reversing the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2003 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Court No.3, Shimla, whereby suit of the plaintiff was decreed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) is a tenant of Shop No.20, Lower Bazar Shimla and the said shop was having a rolling shutter which was worn out and required repairs. It is averred by the plaintiff that, with a view to replace the existing rolling shutter, he submitted an application to the respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendant) for obtaining permission to repair the said rolling shutter alongwith its plan. The said proposal of the plaintiff was accepted by the defendant and thereafter the plaintiff replaced the rolling shutter. It is averred by the plaintiff that the landlord of this shop made a complaint to the defendant that the plaintiff has carried out major additions and alterations in the said shop when the rolling shutter was installed. It is alleged that the landlords of the shop, in connivance with the defendant, got a notice served upon the plaintiff that he has not replaced the rolling shutter in accordance with the plan sanctioned by the defendant and as such the sanction granted to the plaintiff was withdrawn. It is further averred by the plaintiff that the proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff under the provisions of the then Municipal Corporation Act and thereafter vide orders dated 27.7.1987 and 1.8.1987, the plaintiff was ordered to demolish the said rolling shutter, which orders were assailed by the plaintiff firstly before the Divisional Commissioner, exercising the appellate powers under the Municipal Corporation Act and thereafter by filing a writ petition before this Court. It is further averred by plaintiff that in the writ petition this Court vide its order dated 22.7.1997 gave a liberty to the plaintiff to institute a regular civil suit challenging the orders of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla. In this background, the plaintiff has filed the suit praying therein for issuance of decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from demolishing the aforesaid rolling shutter. 3. In this background, the plaintiff has filed the suit praying therein for issuance of decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from demolishing the aforesaid rolling shutter. 3. The defendant, by way of filing written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiff on the grounds of want of notice under Section 392 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, suppression of material facts and maintainability of the suit for non compliance of the provisions of Order 30 Rule 1 CPC. It is alleged by the defendant that while raising the construction of rolling shutter, the plaintiff has encroached upon the Municipal Corporation road/drain and, as such, he was found to have encroached upon 1’ and 7” of the Municipal Corporation Land. It is denied by the defendant that these orders were passed by the defendant in connivance with the landlords of shop No.20. It is averred by the defendant that the orders of withdrawal of sanction dated 27.7.1987 and 1.8.1987 are legal and within the jurisdiction of the defendant. In the aforesaid background, the defendant sought dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff. 4. By way of replication, the plaintiff, while denying the allegations made in the written statement, reaffirmed the averments made in the plaint and controverted the contrary averments made in the written statement. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed? OPP. 2. Whether the suit is bad for non compliance of the section 392 of HPMC Act, 1994? OPD. 3. Whether the suit si not maintainable? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit due to his own act and conduct etc.? OPD. 5. Relief.” 6. Subsequently, learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, defendant preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Court of learned District Judge (Forest), Shimla, who, taking note of the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court. 8. 8. In the aforesaid background, appellant-plaintiff filed instant Regular Second Appeal laying therein challenge to the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge (Forest), Shimla, whereby suit of the plaintiff was dismissed with a prayer to quash and set aside the same. 9. This Court vide order dated 07.12.2007 admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has acted in an erroneous and perverse manner to raise adverse inferences against the plaintiff-appellant for non producing of record by ignoring the fact that such record was in the custody of the defendant who failed to produce the same? Has not the Lower Appellate Court misunderstood and misapplied the principles of Evidence Act in unnecessarily drawing adverse inferences against the plaintiff when the relevant acts which ought to have been proved by the defendant-respondent, remained unsubstantiated for want of legal evidence? 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has acted arbitrarily by recording erroneous and perverse findings by ignoring the most material documentary evidence i.e. Ex.PW1/D and PW1/E by brushing aside the findings of the competent authority recorded on the basis of the evidence of the officials of the defendant? 3. Whether the impugned judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court stand vitiated on account of misreading of relevant and material evidence and ignoring from consideration the overwhelming evidence of the plaintiff establishing that the impugned action of the defendants was not only without jurisdiction but was illegal against the relevant provisions of Municipal Corporation Act. 4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave error of law and jurisdiction in not properly understanding the relevant provisions of H.P. Municipal Corporation Act and recording such findings which are based on no evidence, vitiating the same?” Substantial Questions of Law No.1 to 4: 10. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected, therefore, they are being taken up together for consideration. 11. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff, who was tenant qua the premises in question, was granted permission vide communication dated 2.2.1985 Ex.PW-1/C by defendant for installing rolling shutter as per drawing submitted by the plaintiff subject to the condition that no encroachment would be carried out over the municipal road/drain. It is also not in dispute that pursuant to aforesaid permission granted by the defendant, plaintiff installed rolling shutter in the year 1985 itself. It is also not in dispute that pursuant to aforesaid permission granted by the defendant, plaintiff installed rolling shutter in the year 1985 itself. Similarly, there is no dispute that show cause notice Ex.PW-1/G came to be issued against the plaintiff on I.8.1987, whereby he was called upon to remove unauthorized construction within a period of three days from the receipt of order. Further, perusal of Ex.PW-1/F i.e. order dated 27.7.1987 suggests that plaintiff, pursuant to notice issued by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla, presented himself before the authority concerned, wherein he was informed that he has not fixed/erected rolling shutter as per plan. Vide aforesaid order, it was informed that the plaintiff has deviated from the plan and as such has encroached upon 1’ 7” land of Municipal Corporation. It also emerge from the record that complaint with regard to alleged encroachment over the Municipal Corporation land by the plaintiff was filed by one Shri Purshottam Kumar Dalmia and others, who happened to be owners of the premises occupied by the plaintiff. 12. It has specifically come in the statement of DW-1 i.e. sole witness produced by the defendant-Corporation that proceedings came to be initiated for alleged encroachment having been made by the plaintiff on Municipal Corporation land on the complaint of Shri Purshottam Kumar Dalmia i.e. original owner of the tenanted premises occupied by the plaintiff. It also emerge from the order dated 27.7.1987 Ex.PW-1/F that the plaintiff specifically intimated the defendant-authorities that the order, if any, with regard to alleged encroachment made by the plaintiff, shall effect him adversely in the civil litigation already going on with the landlord. 13. It also emerge from para-5 of the plaint filed by the plaintiff that factum with regard to filing of proceedings by landlord under H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 were also made known to the Municipal Corporation. While denying aforesaid contention of plaintiff, defendant specifically denied that its official connived with the owner of the tenanted premises. Defendant further contended that while fixing the rolling shutter, the plaintiff increased the length of the shop from 18’-0” to 21’-2” and the front wall was projected by 1’-7” beyond the sanction/completed/plan. 14. While denying aforesaid contention of plaintiff, defendant specifically denied that its official connived with the owner of the tenanted premises. Defendant further contended that while fixing the rolling shutter, the plaintiff increased the length of the shop from 18’-0” to 21’-2” and the front wall was projected by 1’-7” beyond the sanction/completed/plan. 14. It may also be taken note of the fact that the plaintiff also placed on record copy of judgment passed by learned Rent Controller-4, Shimla in case No.6/2 of 88, Ex.PW-1/D, to demonstrate that original owner had filed eviction petition under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act,1971 inter alia on the ground that respondent (plaintiff herein) has made material alterations and additions in the premises in question by fixing iron shutter. Careful perusal of judgment, referred above passed by learned Rent Controller, clearly suggests that aforesaid plea of encroachment by plaintiff was not accepted. Interestingly, in the case referred above, two conflicting reports were placed on record with regard to alleged encroachment on the part of the plaintiff. One Shri A.L. Gupta, in his report, submitted that rolling shutter was fixed as per the sanctioned plan i.e. Ex.PC, but Shri S.K. Sharma, J.E. of Municipal Corporation stated that sanction plan in question was of 1908 and there is deviation between sanctioned plan and completion plan. However, fact remains that issue with regard to encroachment, if any, by the plaintiff, who had allegedly fixed rolling shutter without there being permission from Municipal Corporation, was decided against original owner. Perusal of Ex.PW-1/E, judgment dated 4.12.1992 passed by learned Appellate Authority, Shimla, in appeal No.19-S/14 of 91, having been preferred by original owner Purshottam Kumar Dalmia and others against the judgment of Rent Controller, further suggests that aforesaid findings returned by trial Court under Rent Act were upheld. But since defendant Municipal Corporation, despite there being specific findings rendered by Courts below qua the issue of encroachment allegedly made by the plaintiff by fixing rolling shutter provided to initiate proceeding against the appellant under Municipal Corporation Act, plaintiff approached this Court by way of writ petition, which was disposed of with the direction to plaintiff to approach civil court for redressal of his grievance. 15. 15. In the aforesaid background, instant suit came to be filed against the defendant for perpetual prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from taking any action on the basis of orders dated 27.7.1987 and 1.8.1987, whereby order was issued to demolish the shutter of shop No.20, Lower Bazar, Shimla tenanted/occupied by plaintiff. Learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by respective parties, decreed the suit and restrained the defendant from giving effect to demolition order passed by the Municipal Corporation. 16. After having carefully perused judgment passed by learned first appellate Court, this Court sees considerable force in arguments raised by Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, representing the plaintiff that there is total mis-appreciation, mis-reading and mis-construction of evidence led on record by first appellate Court, while setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Court below. Learned first appellate Court, while dismissing the objections having been made by defendant with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction of civil court, proceeded to conclude that learned trial Court had no occasion to place reliance, if any, on documents Ex.PW-1/D and Ex.PW-1/E i.e. orders passed in proceedings initiated by original owner to the suit property in Rent Control Act, wherein admittedly issue with regard to encroachment, if any, on the part of plaintiff was decided against the owner. Learned first appellate Court, while disagreeing with the findings returned by the trial Court, observed that issue involved in the proceedings under the Rent Act was altogether different because their dispute was whether plaintiff made material additions or alterations in the shop or not. But, perusal of judgment passed by Rent Controller, Ex.PW-1/D, clearly suggests that it was specifically alleged in that suit that respondent (plaintiff herein) has made material alterations and additions in premises in question by fixing iron shutter, which is also subject matter of the present suit and as such learned first appellate Court erred in concluding that issue before learned trial Court in those proceedings was not with regard to encroachment of Municipal Corporation land by plaintiff. Once it stood duly admitted by DW-1 i.e. Shri Subhash Chander, Assistant Executive Engineer of Municipal Corporation that proceedings were initiated by defendant on the complaint of the landlord of the plaintiff firm, it was incumbent upon first appellate Court below to examine the entire case in the light of findings returned by Rent Controller vide judgments Ex.PW-1/D and Ex.PW-1/E. Since, similar issue with regard to encroachment allegedly made by plaintiff over the Municipal Corporation land was involved in earlier proceedings having been filed by owner of the tenanted premises, first appellate Court ought to have taken into consideration findings returned by Rent Controller and thereafter by appellate Authority while deciding appeal having been filed by the defendant in the instant case. 17. After having carefully perused the judgments referred hereinabove, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that finding of learned first appellate Court that no importance should have been given to the orders Ex.PW-1/D and Ex.PW-1/E by trial Court while decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, is erroneous and without any basis. Similarly, this Court, after having carefully peeped into the record of the case, is persuaded to agree with the contention of Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the appellant that learned first appellate Court wrongly arrived at conclusion that best piece of evidence, which could be material in adjudicating the present case, was withheld by the plaintiff. 18. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that suit for permanent perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from taking any action on the basis of orders dated 27.7.1987 and 1.8.1987, i.e. order of demolition of the shutter of the tenanted premises issued by defendant- Corporation. Defendant, while refuting the claim of the plaintiff, specifically admitted in the written statement that permission was granted to the plaintiff vide letter No.MCS/47/RB/85-268, dated 2.2.1985 containing therein specific condition that no encroachment shall be made on the Municipal road/drain. Defendant also averred in the written statement that while fixing rolling shutter, plaintiff increased the length of the shop from 18’-0” to 21’-2” and the front wall was projected by 1’-7” beyond the sanction/completed/plan. Since defendant took specific stand with regard to encroachment over Municipal Corporation land by the plaintiff by way of erecting rolling shutter beyond plan, was it not incumbent upon defendant to place on record sanctioned/completed plan? 19. Since defendant took specific stand with regard to encroachment over Municipal Corporation land by the plaintiff by way of erecting rolling shutter beyond plan, was it not incumbent upon defendant to place on record sanctioned/completed plan? 19. As has been taken note above, in the instant suit, having been filed by the plaintiff, prayer was made to restrain the defendant from effecting demolition in terms of demolition order passed by the Municipal Corporation, defendant with a view to sustain its demolition order ought to have placed on record sanctioned plan which was admittedly issued in favour of plaintiff on 2.2.1985, otherwise also perusal of sanctioned letter dated 2.2.1985 Ex.PW-1/C clearly suggests that no encroachment was to be made on the municipal road/drain by the plaintiff-firm, while fixing the rolling shutter. But interestingly no evidence worth the name was led on record by the defendant to prove encroachment, if any, over the municipal road/drain. DW-1 i.e. sole defendant witness nowhere stated that plaintiff encroached over the municipal drain by erecting rolling shutter in terms of sanctioned letter dated 2.2.1985. Similarly, as has been taken note above, no document worth the name was led on record suggestive of the fact that the plaintiff carried out unauthorized construction on the spot. DW-1 categorically admitted in cross-examination that defendant-Corporation has not placed any such document on record to prove unauthorized construction on spot by the plaintiff-firm. He further in his cross-examination admitted that he cannot say that before 1960 whether there was any wall in existence as shown in the photograph Ex.P-5 on the point ‘A’ to ‘A’. 20. Apart from above, it clearly emerge from the record that it has not been disputed anywhere that since 1957 plaintiff-firm is tenant in the premises and since then rolling shutter was fixed and same was sought to be replaced by the plaintiff after having obtained due permission/sanction in the year 1985. 21. In the instant case, learned first appellate Court drew adverse inference against the plaintiff for not placing on record sanctioned plan to prove that construction was carried out in terms of sanctioned plan. Though this Court, from perusal of judgment passed by the trial Court, finds that no specific issue was framed with regard to construction made by plaintiff beyond sanctioned plan, otherwise, it clearly emerge from record that rolling shutter was fixed by the plaintiff after having obtained sanction on 2.2.1985. Though this Court, from perusal of judgment passed by the trial Court, finds that no specific issue was framed with regard to construction made by plaintiff beyond sanctioned plan, otherwise, it clearly emerge from record that rolling shutter was fixed by the plaintiff after having obtained sanction on 2.2.1985. This Court finds from the record that the plaintiff had also placed on record drawing plan of shop No.20 Ex.PW-3/B to demonstrate that no encroachment was made over municipal land/drain, while fixing rolling shutter, but, no document was placed on record by defendant-Corporation to rebut aforesaid plan placed on record by the plaintiff. 22. Needless to say, defendant, being custodian of record pertaining to the properties situated within its limits, is always presumed to be in possession of record including sanction/permission having been granted by it to the plaintiff for erecting rolling shutter. It is not understood why learned Court below not insisted upon defendant to place on record plan sanctioned by it while granting permission to plaintiff for fixing rolling shutter on the tenanted premises. Record was available with the defendant-Corporation, who failed to produce and prove the same and as such there was no occasion for first appellate Court to draw adverse inference against plaintiff for non-production of the same. In these circumstances, onus was upon defendant to prove by placing original sanction plan on record that drawing submitted by the plaintiff was not sanctioned one and it has carried construction on the spot beyond permissible limits. 23. Similarly, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that defendant was not able to rebut overwhelming evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff with regard to construction made by it strictly in accordance with the plan sanctioned by the defendant, evidence of defendant was absolutely lacking to establish the fact that rolling shutter was fixed on the land of Municipal Corporation. 24. This Court also finds from record that learned first appellate Court failed to appreciate oral evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which, erroneous findings came on record to the detriment of plaintiff, who by way of leading cogent and convincing evidence successfully proved on record that rolling shutter was fixed on the tenanted premises strictly in accordance with the permission granted by defendant-Corporation. 25. 25. PW-1 Shri D.P. Kapoor, PW-2 Shri Kapil Dev and PW-3 Shri H.S. Bisht, Technical Expert, specifically proved on record that construction of rolling shutter is/was in accordance with the drawing Ex.PW-3/D as well as sanction letter dated 2.2.1985 Ex.PW-1/F. On the other hand, defendant’s sole witness DW-1 Shri Subhash Chander, Assistant Executive Engineer, categorically admitted that no document has been placed on record by the defendant- Corporation to demonstrate unauthorized construction raised on spot by plaintiff-firm 26. Leaving everything aside, as has been observed above, proceedings, if any, were initiated against the plaintiff on the ground that it has violated terms and conditions in sanction letter dated 2.2.1985, whereby he was advised not to encroach upon Municipal Corporation road/drain by erecting rolling shutter on the tenanted premises. But, interestingly, neither in the pleadings nor in the oral deposition made by DW-1 it has come that plaintiff in the process of fixing shutter encroached upon Municipal Corporation land and drain. 27. This Court also finds no merit in the findings returned by Court below that the plaintiff was not able to prove on record that orders passed by Municipal Corporation on 27.7.1987 and 1.8.1987 are null and void. It emerge from the record that since no declaration was sought by the plaintiff to declare aforesaid orders passed by the defendant- Corporation to be null and void, plaintiffs were not held entitled by the first appellate Court for relief of injunction as was granted by trial Court below. In this regard, it may be observed that though it may not have been specifically stated by the plaintiff in the plaint that the aforesaid orders be declared null and void, but in the prayer clause the plaintiff specifically, while praying for decree for permanent prohibitory injunction against defendant restraining them from taking action against the orders dated 27.7.1987 and 1.8.1987, prayed that any other relief to which plaintiff may be entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case may be awarded to the plaintiff, hence, in view of aforesaid specific prayer made by plaintiff in the plaint, this Court sees no merit in the aforesaid findings returned by the Court below. This Court, after having carefully perused ample evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff, has no hesitation to conclude that there was no occasion for the defendant- Corporation to issue letter dated 27.7.1987 when it stood duly proved on record that rolling shutter was erected in the tenanted premises strictly in conformity with the plan sanctioned by the Corporation itself. 28. Since findings qua issue of maintainability and jurisdiction raised by the defendant has attained finality as no appeal was preferred against the judgment passed by the learned first appellate Court by defendant, this Court sees no reason to entertain plea of jurisdiction and maintainability having been raised by Shri Hamender Chandel, learned counsel representing the defendant at this stage and as such same is rejected. 29. This Court sees substantial force in the arguments of Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, that learned first appellate Court, while disagreeing with the judgment passed by the Court below, has not dealt with each and every issue involved in the case and has not assigned any reason to differ with the findings returned by the trial Court. 30. In this regard reliance is placed upon Laliteshwar Prasad Singh vs. S.P. Srivastava, (2017) 2 SCC 415 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has specifically held that appellate Court is final Court of facts and as such its judgment must reflect application of mind and must record its findings supported by reasons. Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, taking note of the earlier judgment passed in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , has held as under: “13. An appellate court is the final court of facts. The judgment of the appellate court must therefore reflect court’s application of mind and record its findings supported by reasons. The law relating to powers and duties of the first appellate court is well fortified by the legal provisions and judicial pronouncements. Considering the nature and scope of duty of first appellate court, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391 , it was held as under:- “12. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756 , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 13. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 14. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) 15. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) 15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 , this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5) “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 , SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756 SCC p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 14. The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by the trial judge in arriving at the finding in question. When appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court are erroneous.” (Emphasis supplied) 31. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court sees valid reason to interfere in the judgment passed by first appellate Court, which is apparently not based upon the proper appreciation of evidence as well as law. Accordingly judgment passed by learned first appellate Court is quashed and set aside and that of the learned trial Court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.