ORDER : SANJAY YADAV, J. Petitioner seeks review of the order dated 29-6-2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 119/2017. 2. The petition was directed against the order dated 2-1-2015 which is in the following terms:- ^^uo vkj{kd 790 foosd 'kekZ ftyk iqfyl cy fHk.M dh lsokvksa dh vko';drk ugha gksus ls fnukad 2-1-2015 ds vijkUg ls mldh lsok;sa lekIr dh tkrh gSA** 3. The petitioner was appointed by order dated 15-3-2013 as Constable in grade Rs. 5200-20200 + grade pay Rs. 1900/-. The appointment was temporary and subject to certain terms and condition including that:- 1- e/;Áns'k 'kklu ds 'kkldh; lsok ¼vLFkkbZ@v/kZLFkkbZ lsok fu;e 1960½ ds mifu;e 12 ds vuqlkj vH;FkhZ dh lsok;sa fdlh Hkh le; mHk; i{kksa ds }kjk ,d ekg dk uksfVl nsdj ;k mlds ,ot esa ,d ekg dk osru@HkRrs dk Hkqxrku dj dHkh Hkh lekIr dh tk ldrh gSaA 2- ;g fu;qfDr iw.kZ:i ls vLFkkbZ gSA dk;Z larks"ktud u ik;s tkus vFkok 'kkldh; lsok ;k in ij mi;qDr u ik;s tkus ij lsok,sa dHkh Hkh fcuk uksfVl fn;s lekIr dh tk ldrh gSA 3- vH;FkhZ ds }kjk p;u ds laca/k esa ÁLrqr fd;s x;s ¼'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk@tkfr Áek.k i= ;k vU;½ nLrkostksa dh tkap djk;h tkosxhA ;fn Áek.k i= xyr ;k voS/k ik;k tkrk gS] rks vH;FkhZ dh lsok,a rRdky ÁHkko ls lekIr dh tkosaxh ,oa oS/kkfud dkuwuh dk;Zokgh dh tk,xhA 4. Taking into consideration that the services of the petitioner were dispensed with by an innocuous order during probation, the challenge was negatived. 5. It is urged that since the termination of the petitioner was not without foundation because the petitioner was proceeded against vide crime No. 2/2015 and charge-sheeted for an offence under sections 417, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of Indian Penal Code and sections 3(d)(1) and 2/4 of the Madhya Pradesh Recognized Examination Act for his selection in the written test of PCRT-2012 with the help of racketeers/middlemen/impersonators, incumbent it was upon the Authorities to have conducted an enquiry and afforded an opportunity of hearing, because dispensing of service was not innocuous but stigmatic. It is contended that the Court ought to have lifted the veil. 6. Secondly, it is contended that since the petitioner's services were governed by Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi Permanent Services) Rules, 1960 (For short ‘the Rules of 1960). It is contended that the Court ought to have lifted the veil. 6. Secondly, it is contended that since the petitioner's services were governed by Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi Permanent Services) Rules, 1960 (For short ‘the Rules of 1960). It is urged that rule 12(a) contemplates one month's notice and since the termination of service of the petitioner was not in consonance with rule 12(a) of the Rules of 1960, the same was void ab initio. This aspect, it is urged, has been glossed over. Petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions in W.P. No. 11353/2015, Krishna Kumar Yadav v. Madya Pradesh Professional Examination Board decided on 5-8-2015 and W.P. No. 7529/2015, Girraj Singh Gurjar v. State of M.P. decided on 15-6-2016 to bring home the submission that non-giving of thirty days prior notice would vitiate the order. 7. Taking up the second submission first, sub-rule (a) of rule 12 of the Rules of 1960 provides for as under: “12(a) Subject to any provision contained in the order of appointment or in any agreement between the Government and the temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant: Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith and on such termination, the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before such termination or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. Provided farther that the payment of allowances shall be subject to the conditions under which such allowances are admissible.” Thus, though it is imperative for the appointing authority to give notice to a Government servant who is not in quasi permanent service, however, the proviso ease out the rigor of the provision that in case where service of such Government servant is to be terminated forthwith, he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately prior to such termination or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. In the case at hand, the impugned order dispenses with the services of the petitioner with immediate effect, he is at liberty to claim a sum equivalent of the amount of his pay and allowances as provided under sub-rule (a) of rule 12 of the Rules of 1960. In our considered opinion, the termination order does not get vitiated merely for want of one month prior notice. Reliance placed by the petitioner on the decisions by the coordinate Benches in Krishna Kumar Yadav (supra) and Girraj Singh Gurjar (supra) are distinguishable on the ground that the Bench took into consideration the provision contained in rule 12(a) of the Rules of 1960, however, the proviso appended therewith has been glossed over. 8. The normal function of a ‘proviso’ as has been observed in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh is “to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment.” 9. In Anand Nivas (P.) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi, AIR 1965 SC 414 it is observed: “32.……………………Having regard to the plurality of its meaning, the sense in which the expression is used in different sections, and even clauses, must be ascertained from the context of the scheme of the Act; the language of the provision and the object intended to be served thereby.” 10. In Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Banks Employees Union, (2004) 1 SCC 574 , it has been held that “when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter.” 11. In view whereof, we are of the considered opinion that the order terminating the petitioner from service simplicitor does not get vitiated for want of one month notice. On that count, no error crept in on the face of the record while dismissing the writ petition. 12. As to the submission that whether it was incumbent upon the Court to have lifted the veil to ascertain that misconduct was the foundation for dispensing the service. 13. Apparently, the order terminating the service of the petitioner is innocuous. The petitioner submits that since there is a mention about the criminal case being lodged against the petitioner in the judgment, the review whereof is being sought, the termination order cannot be said to be an order simplicitor but has a foundation which ought to have been considered by lifting the veil. Petitioner places reliance on the decision in State Bank of India v. Palak Modi, (2013) 3 SCC 607 wherein their Lordships were pleased to observe: “25. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice.” Thus, in a case where competent Authority holds the inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent Authority cannot be castigated as punitive. What is punitive is when the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation for termination. In the case at hand no material is commended at to establish that the termination preceded the allegation of misconduct. 14. In Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 4 SCC 447 , it is held that:— “10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither any notice is required to be given to the appellant nor he is required to be given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher authorities were called for and they were looked into before any decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be continued in service or not.” 15. Further contention which is in relation to the circular relied upon, i.e. Circular No. 69-3727-1(3)/65 dated 7-1-1966 that the same has been issued under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules, 1966; however, the careful reading of circular does not bear such testimony. Further contention which is in relation to the circular relied upon, i.e. Circular No. 69-3727-1(3)/65 dated 7-1-1966 that the same has been issued under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules, 1966; however, the careful reading of circular does not bear such testimony. The circular is reproduced hereunder:- 24- lkŒÁŒfoŒ KkiŒ ØŒ 69&3727&,d ¼rhu½@65] fnukad 7-1-1996 ¼d½ vLFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa dh lsokvksa dk lekIr fd;k tkuk & vLFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa ds ekeys esa lsok fu;eksa dks mudh inkof/k laca/kh lsok 'krsZ fofgr djuk 'kklu ij fuHkZj gksxkA fu;qfDr Ákf/kdkjh fu;qfDr vkns'kksa esa ,sls deZpkfj;ksa dh inkof/k dk Lo:i fufnZ"V djus ds fy;s Hkh l{ke gSA fdUrq ;fn bl inkof/k laca/kh lsok 'krksZ ds vuqlkj] Hkys gh os fu;eksa esa nh xbZ gksa ;k fu;qfDr vkns'k esa] fdlh vLFkk;h deZpkjh dh lsok,a lekIr dj nh tk,] rks vuqPNsn 311¼2½ ykxw ugha gksxk D;ksafd ,slh lsok lekfIr fdlh vopkj ds QyLo:i ;k vU;Fkk nkafMd dk;Zokgh ds :i esa ugha dh tkrh vfirq lsok'krksZ ds vuqlkj dh tkrh gS rFkk mDr vuqPNsn ds vFkkZUrxZr ;g c[kkZLrxh ;k gVk;k tkuk ugha ekuk tk,xkA vr% ;fn dksbZ 'kkldh; deZpkjh vxys vkns'k i;ZUr vLFkk;h rkSj ij fu;qDr fd;k gks rks fu;qfDr Ákf/kdkjh fdlh Hkh le; vxyk vkns'k tkjh djds mldh lsok,a lekIr dj ldsxkA mi;qDr rjhds ls vLFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa dh lsok,a lekIr djus laca/kh vkns'k tkjh djrs le; ;g lko/kkuh cjrh tkuh pkfg;s fd lsok lekIr djus dk dksbZ dkj.k ugha fn;k tk, ;k mDr O;fDr ij dksbZ ykaNu ugha yxk;k tk,A bruk dguk gh i;kZIr gksxk fd lsok,a lekIr dh tkrh gS D;ksafd vkxs mudh vko';drk ugha gSA rFkkfi tgka lsokvksa dh lekfIr oLrqr% lacaf/kr 'kkldh; deZpkjh ds vopkj] mis{kk] v{kerk ;k vU; fujgZrk ij vk/kfjr gks] ogka ;g dk;Zokgh nkafMd Lo:i dh ekuh tk,xh vkSj vuqPNsn 311¼2½ ykxw gksxk rFkk bl laca/k esa lsokvksa ds vLFkk;h vkSj LFkk;h lnL;ksa ds chp vkSj LFkk;h vFkok vLFkk;h inkf/kdkfj;ksa ds chp dksbZ varj ugha gksrkA Apparently, there is no mention that the instructions were issued under 1966 Rules. Rather, it is an executive instruction may be in exercise of powers under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. The decision in Ajaya Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, (2011) 11 SCC 136 wherein it is held that the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be amended by way of executive instructions is of no assistance to the petitioner in given facts. The decision in Ajaya Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, (2011) 11 SCC 136 wherein it is held that the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be amended by way of executive instructions is of no assistance to the petitioner in given facts. Be that as it may, even if the contention of the petitioner is taken to be true then also it cannot be a case of error apparent on the face of record. 16. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 it is held: “14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice………………” “16. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review………………” 17. In the case at hand as the petitioner fails to establish any error apparent on the face of record, we are not inclined to cause any indulgence. 18. Consequently, Review Petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.