JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing of the order dated 04.07.2013 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in G. C. No.15 of 2013, Trial No.5192 of 2013 by which he has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”) and summoned the petitioner and others to face trial. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the sugar mills of the State of Bihar had adopted a notification issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh bearing no.1427 dated 17.12.2009, which related to minimum wages to be paid to the workers working in the sugar factories. Thus, accordingly, a settlement was arrived at on 07.04.2010 wherein a decision was taken to adopt the said notification dated 17.12.2009 and to pay the workers accordingly. The said settlement was attended by the Executive President of M/s Bharat Sugar Mills, located at Sidhwalia in the district of Gopalganj. The petitioner was not part of it. 4. On 27.02.2012, an Inspection Team was constituted by the Labour Commissioner, Bihar consisting of Joint Labour Commissioner, Bihar, Patna, Deputy Labour Commissioner, Bihar Patna and Assistant Labour Commissioner, Saran Division, Chapra, which carried out inspection at the factory premises of the mill in Gopalganj district at Sidhwalia. Thereafter, a letter no.116 dated 24.03.2012 was issued by the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj stating that during the course of inspection on 27.02.2012 statement of the workers were recorded from which it appears that they were not paid as per the settlement arrived at vide agreement dated 07.04.2010 and, therefore, an explanation was sought from the petitioner as to why not necessary action be taken under section 29 of “the Act”. 5. Accordingly, the petitioner filed his reply on behalf of Bharat Sugar Mills, vide letter no.1941 dated 08.05.2012 stating that the filing of any prosecution under Section 29 of “the Act” would be unwarranted, malafide and oppressive. 6. The petitioner took a plea that the statements of the so called workers were not taken in accordance with law. Their identity is not disclosed. 6. The petitioner took a plea that the statements of the so called workers were not taken in accordance with law. Their identity is not disclosed. Further, the statements were not taken in presence of any management representative and there is every chance of imposters and unauthorized persons to have made such complain. 7. Thereafter, the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj vide his letter no.256 dated 18.06.2012, addressed to the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, Patna, submitted a report, which was perused by the State Government after which an order was passed by the State Government through Special Secretary of Governor dated 31.01.2013 wherein it is held that the State Government had reason to believe that the petitioner along with the Executive Chairman, Bharat Sugar Mills had committed offence under Section 18(3) and 19(3) of “the Act”, which are punishable under Section 29 of “the Act” by not implementing the agreement after conciliation dated 07.04.2010. Thus, in exercise of power under Section 34 of “the Act”, the opposite party no.2, the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj was authorized to file complaint under Section 29 of “the Act” before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj against the management of the M/s Bharat Sugar Mills. 8. Thereafter, the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj made a complaint on 17.05.2013 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj stating that since the Bharat Sugar Mills, Sidhwalia, Gopalganj, Bishnu Kumar Surekha, the Executive President and Chandrashekhar Nopani, the Managing Director of the aforestated sugar mills did not follow the settlement arrived at on 07.04.2010, which amounted to violation of Section 18(3) and 19(3) of “the Act” and also that the reply to the show cause dated 24.03.2012 submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory. 9. 9. The allegations made in the complaint reads as under:- eq[; U;kf;d n.Mkf/kdkjh] xksikyxat ds U;k;ky; esa vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e&1947 ds vUrxZr vfHk;kstu 1- oknh dk uke ,oa irk eksgEen vkQrkc vkye] Je v/kh{kd] xksikyxatA 2- vfHk;qDr dk uke ,oa irk ¼1½ Jh pUnz'ks[kj uksikuh] izca/k funs'kd] Hkkjr lqxj feYl] fl/kofy;k] xksikyxatA ¼2½ Jh ch0ds0 lqjs[kk] dk;Zikyd v/;{k] Hkkjr lqxj feYl] fl/kofy;k] xksikyxatA ¼3½ esllZ Hkkjr lqxj feYl fl/kofy;k] xksikyxatA 3- xokg dk uke ,oa irk 1- Jh fot; dqekj oekZ] Je v/kh{kd] xksikyxatA 2- Jh ijekuUn dqekj] lgk;d Jek;qDr ¼d`0J0½] flokuA 3- Jh vejdkUr flag] mi Jek;qDr ¼eq0½] fcgkj] iVukA 4- Jh i`Foh jkt] la;qDr Jek;qDr ¼lsokfuo`r½] fcgkj] iVukA 4- mYya?ku dk Lo:Ik vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e& 1947 Dh /kkjk&18&¼3½ ,oa 19&¼3½ dk mYya?kuA 5- n.Muh; /kkjk vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e & 1947 dh /kkjk &29 6- vfHk;kstu dk laf{kIr fooj.k fcgkj jkT; fLFkr phuh feyksa ds dkexkjksa ds fy, mÙkj izns'k ljdkj }kjk Lohd`r vuq'kalkvksa ds ifjis{; esa fnukad 07-04-2010 dks Jek;qDr≶≤>kSrk inkf/kdkjh] fcgkj] iVuk ds le{k laiUu f=i{kh; le>kSrk ds vuqlkj mÙkj izns'k ljdkj }kjk fuxZr vf/klwpuk la[;k& 1427@36&2&09&6@04 fnukad 17-12-2009 esa mfYyf[kr etnwjh dks gq&c&gw ykxw fd;k tkuk gSA le>kSrs dh 'kÙkZ ds vuqlkj vdq'ky etnwjksa dks 5450@&:0 ls de etnwjh dk Hkqxrku ugh djuk gSA le>kSrk ds dk;kZUo;u dh tkap ds fy, Jek;qDr] fcgkj }kjk xfBr tkap lfefr ds lnL;ksa& ¼1½ Jh i`Foh jkt] la;qDr Jek;qDr] fcgkj] iVuk ¼2½ Jh vejdkUr flag] mi Jek;qDr] iVuk ,oa ¼3½ Jh ijekuUn dqekj] lgk;d Jek;qDr] lkj.k izeaMy] Nijk us fnukad 27-02-2012 dks esllZ] Hkkjr lqxj feYl] fl/kofy;k] xksikyxat dk fujh{k.k fd;kA fujh{k.k esa dkj[kkuk esa dk;Zjr etnwjksa dk c;ku ntZ fd;k x;k] ftUgsa le>kSrs ds 'kÙkZ ds vuqlkj etnwjh ugh nh tk jgh FkhA ;g vkS/kksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 dh /kkjk&18¼3½ ,oa 19¼3½ dk mYya?ku gS] ftlds fy, izca/ku dks i=kad&116 fnukad 24-03-2012 }kjk dkji`PNk dh xbZA ftlds vkyksd esa dk;Zikyd v?;{k ds gLrk{kj ls izkIr mÙkj vlarks"ktud gSA vr% v/kksgLrk{kjh dks mDr vfHk;qDr ds fo:} vfHk;kstu nk;j djus gsrq Je lal/kku foHkkx ds i=kad& 1369 fnukad 08-05-13 }kjk izkf/kd`r fd;k x;k gSA vr% U;k;ky; ls izkFkZuk gS fd bl ij laKku ysdj vfHk;qDr dks leqfpr n.M nsus dh d`ik fd;k tk;A pw¡fd vkosnd ,d yksd lsod gS vr,o U;k;ky; esa fnu izfrfnu dh mifLFkfr ls foeqfDr rFkk vko';drkuqlkj vfHk;ksx i= esa la'kks/ku dh izkFkZuk djrk gSA vuqyXud & vfHk;ksx & i= dh nks izfr;ksa esaA ¼eksgEen vkQrkc vkye½ Je v/kh{kd] xksikyxatA 10. Pursuant to the aforestated complaint dated 17.05.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj, vide impugned order dated 04.07.2013, summoned the petitioner and others to face trial for having committed offence under Section 29 of “the Act”. 11. It is submitted by Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioner that the order taking cognizance against the petitioner is bad in law, as the offences alleged to have been committed, i.e. violation of Section 18(3) and 19(3) of “the Act” are not made out in the present case. He has submitted that as per Section 2(e)(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it is the Manager of the factory, who is the employer and not the petitioner, who is Director of the factory in question and, therefore, the proceeding against him for lesser payment of wages is wholly misconceived. He submitted that sub-section (3) of Section 18 is attracted only in relation to settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceedings under “the Act” or an arbitration award. However, in the present case, the settlement, as arrived on 07.04.2010 was not arising in the course of conciliation proceeding nor pursuant to an arbitration award. Hence, there is no question of violation of sub-section (3) of section 18 of “the Act”. 12. Referring to Annexure-2 series to the present application, Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that it would be evident from the settlement/agreement dated 07.04.2010 that the petitioner was never part of the said agreement and, therefore, he cannot be held liable for any violation of the same. He submitted that so far as Section 19(3) of “the Act” is concerned, the same is also not applicable as there is no award that has been passed in the present case and the agreement dated 07.04.2010 is a settlement by agreement and the same does not fulfil the definition of award provided under Section 2(b) of “the Act”. He submitted that the petitioner also does not fall within the definition of employer under Section 2(g) of the Act. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned counsel for the State submitted that the provisions of “the Act; are clearly attracted in the present case and since the petitioner was the Director of the company, he cannot escape from the liabilities falling from the agreement entered into between the parties. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned counsel for the State submitted that the provisions of “the Act; are clearly attracted in the present case and since the petitioner was the Director of the company, he cannot escape from the liabilities falling from the agreement entered into between the parties. He submitted that the other points raised by the petitioner in the present case are also meritless. The defence taken by the petitioner can be tested by the trial court at appropriate stage and on such grounds the prosecution cannot be interdicted at a preliminary stage. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 15. Since an argument has been advanced by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner that even assuming, but not accepting that the provisions of the Act are applicable yet no offence is made out against the petitioner under Section 29 of the said Act, it is deemed necessary to have a look to the aforesaid provision of the Act, which prescribes penalty for breach of settlement or award under the Act, it reads as under:- “29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award.- Any person who commits a breach of any terms of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first and the Court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine realized from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion, has been injured by such breach”. 16. Sections 18 and 19 of “the Act” which are relevant in the present case read as under:- “18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. 16. Sections 18 and 19 of “the Act” which are relevant in the present case read as under:- “18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub- section (3A) of section 10A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable] shall be binding on-- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part”. “19. Period of operation of settlements and awards.- (1) A settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. “19. Period of operation of settlements and awards.- (1) A settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. (2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute], and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. (3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17A: Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit: Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. (4) Where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made, there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Government may refer the award or a part of it to a Labour Court, if the award was that of a Labour Court or to a Tribunal, if the award was that of a Tribunal or of a National Tribunal] for decision whether the period of operation should not, by reason of such change, be shortened and the decision of Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be] on such reference shall, be final. (5) Nothing contained in sub-section (3) shall apply to any award which by its nature, terms or other circumstances does not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award. (6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under sub- section (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award. (7) No notice given under sub- section (2) or sub-section (6) shall have effect, unless it is given by a party representing the majority of persons bound by the settlement or award, as the case may be”. 17. It would be manifest from perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of “the Act” that the same is attracted only in relation to settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceeding under “the Act” or an arbitration award. Further, it would be manifest from the reading of Section 18(3) of “the Act” that the same would be applicable and binding only on the parties to the industrial disputes or any other parties, who has been so summoned to appear in the said proceeding, as parties to the disputes. Since the petitioner was never a party to the industrial disputes nor any summons had ever been issued to him to appear as parties to the disputes, the violation of Section 18(3) of “the Act” cannot be attributable against him. 18. As far as the present case is concerned, Section 19(3) of “the Act” would not be applicable, as there is no award that has been passed in the present case and the agreement dated 07.04.2010 is a settlement by agreement and the same does not fulfil the definition of award provided in section 2(b) of “the Act”, which states that “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under section 10-A. 19. Since neither Labour court nor Industrial Tribunal nor National Industrial Tribunal had made any interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or any question nor any arbitrator have passed any arbitration award, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioner had committed any offence under section 19(3) of “the Act”. 20. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 04.07.2013 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in G.C. No.15 of 2013, Trial No.5192 of 2013, is hereby quashed. 21. The application stands allowed.