JUDGMENT : 1. The workman-D.Parameswarappa has filed this writ petition aggrieved by the order dated 11.03.2009 of the learned Labour Court, Hubli, rejecting his Application No.8/2005 filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(for short, ‘the Act’). 2. An Award came to be passed on 18.08.1984 in favour of the present petitioner-workman and few others by the learned Labour Court in Reference No.104/1978, directing their reinstatement with continuity of service along with full backwages and all other consequential benefits together with costs of Rs.100/-. The petitioner was accordingly, reinstated back in service on 5.8.1985 and was given consolidated pay of Rs.289/- per month, as there was no regular pay scale for the post of Water Meter Reader from which he was terminated on 30.04.1984 and was directed to be reinstated in service in Ref.No.104/1978 vide Annexure-A, the order of the learned Labour Court, dated 18.08.1984. 3. The petitioner and four others approached the learned Labour Court, Bangalore, by way of an Application No.9/1986 under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, which came to be rejected by the learned Labour Court vide order dated 31.05.1989 with the following observations. “The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has also relied upon another decision reported in 1974 Lab.L.C. page 1018 wherein the scope of the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the powers of the Labour Court on an application filed under Section 33C(2) are given briefly. “A proceeding under Section 33C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for.” As per the above quoted two decisions, the applicants cannot put forward a claim in respect of a relief which was not based on an existing right. In an application filed under Section 33C(2), the Court cannot give a finding stating that the applicants are entitled to get salary for which the regular employees of the second party Corporation are entitled to. In an application filed under Section 33C(2), the Court cannot give a finding stating that the applicants are entitled to get salary for which the regular employees of the second party Corporation are entitled to. By relying upon the above two quoted decisions, I hold that the present application filed by the applications to compute the monetary benefit on the basis that other persons who are working in the respondent Corporation are getting. Whether the applicant are entitled to get salary equal to the salary that the regular employees are getting is to be first adjudicated by a competent court and thereafter the applicants can make a request to the Court to compute the monetary benefit as they have prayed for. Since the monetary benefit to be computed is not based on the existing right of the applicants to get the salary as they have claimed the application is not maintainable. In the result, the application is dismissed. Sd/ (G.C. SANJEEVAIAHA) Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bangalore. “ 4. The petitioner, thereafter, appears to be filed a Representation to the Management of the respondent-Corporation for giving him the higher pay-scale of Rs.390-550/- and that representation also came to be rejected by the Management vide Annexure-F, dated 21.8.1999, giving the following reasons. “On 21.12.1989, Sri. D. Parameshwarappa gave an undertaking for having received all the backwages that were payable by the Corporation and sought consideration of his appointment as a Class-IV employee in the applicable pay scale. In consideration of his request, Sri. D. Parameshwarappa was appointed as a Watchman in the pay-scale of Rs.780-1040 which was accepted by him. Having accepted the pay scale of Rs.780-1040, he is estoppeled from claiming the regular pay scales and backwages effective from 8.8.1985 since he was not offered any regular pay scale prior to his regular appointment. His contention of violation of Court order is factually incorrect. In fact his application to Labour Court in this regard came to be dismissed. For the purposes of computing leave benefits, bonus, leave encashment, wages and other consequential reliefs, 30-04-1978 is reckoned as the date of entry into Service on daily wages. For all purposes, his eligibility for reliefs has been computed with effect from 30.04.1978 on daily wages. In fact his application to Labour Court in this regard came to be dismissed. For the purposes of computing leave benefits, bonus, leave encashment, wages and other consequential reliefs, 30-04-1978 is reckoned as the date of entry into Service on daily wages. For all purposes, his eligibility for reliefs has been computed with effect from 30.04.1978 on daily wages. As a result, his contention to effect confirmation of his service in the pay scale of Rs.390-550 with effect from 30.04.1978 does not stand to reason and hence the following order. ORDER After considering all aspects of the case in view of his working as Water-meter-reader, a postnon-existant in KSSIDC and in view of the fact that he has given an undertaking on 21.12.1989 that he has received all backwages and there are no dues payable by KSSIDC to him as Water-meter-reader, his request for considering his pay scale in Rs.390-550 effective from 30.04.1978 alongwith other consequential benefits has been considered and rejected. Sd/- (P. KOTILINGANAGOUD) Chairman & Managing Director, 5. Thereafter, the petitioner-workman appears to have filed fresh application before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, after the rejection of his representation by the Management vide order dated 21.08.1999, claiming a sum of Rs.6,52,784/- with interest at the rate of 18% per annum and the petitioner workman filed an Application No.8/2005, before the learned Labour Court, which came to be rejected by the Labour Court by the impugned order dated 11.03.2009, with the following observations:- “8. Xxxxxx.. I have carefully perused the order in Application No.9/86. The prayer therein was for computation of monetary benefits i.e. backwages on the basis of the award in Ref. No.104/1978 on par with the other regular employees of the respondent. Holding that such right should be determined by the competent Court and not in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, it was dismissed. No doubt, as contended by Sri. I.S. Uppin, it is for the respondent to show how the award in Ref. No.104/1978 has been given effect to by it. It is also true that contrary of service with all consequential benefits includes promotion, periodical increments and allowances. However, Ex.A1 shows that the applicant was appointed as Water-meter-reader. Ex.A2 lists the duties attached to that post. Ex.A4 shows that a Junior Assistant was posted to look after that duty. No.104/1978 has been given effect to by it. It is also true that contrary of service with all consequential benefits includes promotion, periodical increments and allowances. However, Ex.A1 shows that the applicant was appointed as Water-meter-reader. Ex.A2 lists the duties attached to that post. Ex.A4 shows that a Junior Assistant was posted to look after that duty. It is equally true as rightly submitted by Smt. G. Meerabai, an existing right is a pre-requisite for invoking the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The applicant has not been able to establish that Water Meter Reader’s post is equal to Junior Assistant’s post. Since the post of Water Meter-Reader has ceased to exist, the respondent took him back to a nearer post and protected his pay. The applicant is stated to have subsequently been promoted twice. When in the previous proceedings a Court of parallel jurisdiction has viewed that the computation of monetary benefits could not take place without a declaration of the applicant’s right in appropriate proceedings, and that view has been upheld by the Hon’ble High Court, it is not open to this Court to entertain the same question again. 9. Smt.G. Meerabai has invited my attention to Ex.R1 which is a copy of the letter dated 21.12.1989 by which the applicant requested specifically for reinstating him in the cadre of Grade IV Watchman and he has received Rs.27,779/- in full and final settlement of his claims under the award in Ref.No.104/78. The applicant pleads that his signature was taken to some blank sheet of paper. On a bare perusal of Ex.R1, this version does not appear to be true. The applicant is estopped from making any claim in the face of the above document. 10. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. But in the peculiar circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Sd/- (N. NARAYANA) District Judge & Presiding Officer, Prl. Labour Court, Hubli.” 6. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner workman has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition. 7. Mr. 10. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. But in the peculiar circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Sd/- (N. NARAYANA) District Judge & Presiding Officer, Prl. Labour Court, Hubli.” 6. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner workman has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition. 7. Mr. Ravi Hegde, the learned counsel for the petitioner-workman, inter-alia relying upon the additional documents produced along with IA No.1/2016 on 6.10.2016 in this Court submitted that even the Basic Pay-scale of the Watchman, which he was appointed in the year 1978 in the pay-scale of Rs.390-550/- vide Annexure-M, the respondent-Corporation has prescribed the pay-scale of the Peons/Watchman/Hamal/Gardener/Cleaner/Sweeper with effect from 1.4.1982. Therefore, as per the Award in favour of the workman in Application No.104/1978, giving the benefit of reinstatement with full backwages and all other consequential benefits, the present workman was entitled to atleast this pay-scale at the time of the reinstatement and the dues computed accordingly were required to be given to him under the provisions of Section 33-C of the Act. Therefore, he submitted that the learned Labour Court has erred in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner vide impugned order dated 11.3.2009. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 8. Per contra, Mrs. Sharmila M. Patil, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation KSSIDC has supported the impugned order and explaining the circumstances in which the representation of the workman petitioner came to be rejected by the Chairman and Managing Director of the respondent Corporation, she has urged that on the concession or the written request of the petitioner workman dated 21.12.1989 only, he was appointed as a Watchman in the pay-scale of Rs.780-1040 and which pay scale given to him on 22.12.1989 was duly accepted by him. Therefore, he is estopped from raising the said grievance for fixation of his salary in the pay- scale of Rs.390-550/-, when immediately he was reinstated in service in pursuance of the order of the learned Labour Court dated 18.08.1984, and it cannot be raised by him at this stage. Therefore, she submitted that the learned Labour Court was perfectly justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner workman filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Therefore, she submitted that the learned Labour Court was perfectly justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner workman filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. She has further urged that within the scope of Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the rights of the claim of the workman or any entitlement cannot be determined or adjudicated upon and the proceedings under Section 33-C of the Act are akin to the execution proceedings and unless there is a pre-existing right of the workman admitted by the employer duly determined or adjudicated upon by the competent Court, the directions to pay the said amounts cannot be given by the Labour Court within the scope of Section 33-C of the Act. 9. I have heard the learned counsels at length and perused the records. 10. The provisions of Section 33-C of the Act are quoted below: “33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.- (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [Chapter VA or Chapter VB] the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such, application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months]: Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may; for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] (3) For the purpose of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case. (4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub-section(1). (5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen. Explanation.- In this section “Labour Court” includes any Court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.] “ 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a large number of cases has already decided the scope of Section 33-C of the Act and the disputed rival claim about the alleged due claimed by the workmen, cannot be adjudicated in the proceedings under Section 33-C of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a large number of cases has already decided the scope of Section 33-C of the Act and the disputed rival claim about the alleged due claimed by the workmen, cannot be adjudicated in the proceedings under Section 33-C of the Act. It is only the crystallized or duly determined liability of the dues of the workman, which, if not paid by the Management otherwise, can be directed to be paid on an application under Section 33-C of the Act. The Court cannot sit over as the Court of original jurisdiction or as the Appellate Court to decide the dispute itself in an application under Section 33-C of the Act. 12. The reliance in the present case can be placed on the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope of the Section 33-C of the Act. (i) Punjab Beverages Private Ltd. Vs. Suresh Chand & another, 1978(2) LLJ SC 1 (ii) Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak & Another, 1995(1) SCC 235 (iii) State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. Brijpal Singh, 2005(8) SCC 58 (iv) Rajasthan SRTC & Others Vs. Moha Singh 2009(1) LLJ 149 SC 13. The ratio of all these judgments is clear as stated above that it is beyond the scope of Section 33-C of the Act to determine or adjudicate the claim of the workman in the face of the dispute of liability raised by the Management-Employer. The present writ petition is nothing but a futile effort of the workman, who had lost not only in the earlier round of application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, but his representation for again wage revision and pay fixation having been rejected by the respondent Management on valid grounds. He again somehow came to file the present application under Section 33-C of the Act, which has been rightly rejected by the Court below. Even otherwise the claim raised by the workman was highly belated and the same does not deserve to be decided now. Hence, there is no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court. 14. The present writ petition of the workman has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition of the workman is dismissed. No costs. Hence, there is no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court. 14. The present writ petition of the workman has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition of the workman is dismissed. No costs. In view of the dismissal of the above writ petition, IA No.1/2016 filed for production of additional documents does not survive for consideration, hence, it stands disposed of accordingly.