JUDGMENT : Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the petitioners seeking quashing of the order dated 08.04.2013 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in Complaint Case (Trial) No.1257 of 2013 by which for the breach of Section 18(3) and 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'), the petitioners have been summoned to face trial. 3. The petitioner no.1 is the Managing Director and petitioner no.2 is the Director of Vishnu Sugar Mill, located at Gopalganj, which is engaged in production of Sugar from Sugarcane. 4. The sugar mills of the State of Bihar has adopted a notification issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh bearing no.1427 dated 17.12.2009 which relates to minimum wages to be paid to the workers working in the sugar factories. Thus, accordingly, a settlement was arrived at on 07.04.2010 wherein a decision was taken to adopt the said notification dated 17.12.2009 and to pay the workers accordingly. The said settlement was attended by the General Manager of Vishnu Sugar Mill. Similarly, other settlements were also made on 15.02.2011, which was attended by one Shri A.P. Singh on behalf of Vishnu Sugar Mill. 5. On 26.02.2012, an inspection was constituted by the Labour Commissioner, Bihar consisting of Joint Labour Commissioner, Bihar, Patna, Deputy Labour Commissioner, Bihar Patna and Assistant Labour Commissioner, Siwan and accordingly, inspection was carried out at the factory premises of the mill in Gopalganj. Thereafter, a letter vide no.114 dated 24.03.2012 was issued by the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj stating that during the course of inspection on 26.02.2012 statement of the workers were recorded from which it appears that they were not paid as per the settlement arrived at and, therefore, show cause was asked as to why not necessary action be taken under Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Another letter vide no.115 dated 24.03.2012 was issued by the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj, Bihar stating therein as to why not necessary action be taken under Section 18(3) of 'the Act' for not having paid the workers the minimum wage on the basis of the settlement earlier arrived. 6. Another letter vide no.115 dated 24.03.2012 was issued by the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj, Bihar stating therein as to why not necessary action be taken under Section 18(3) of 'the Act' for not having paid the workers the minimum wage on the basis of the settlement earlier arrived. 6. Accordingly, the Managing Director of Vishnu Sugar Mill Ltd. filed its reply vide its letter no.183 and 212 dated 28.04.2011 stating that there was no violation as alleged and the provisions of 'the Act' and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 are not attracted at all. Thereafter, the Labour Superintendent and Inspector, Gopalganj vide its letter no.487 dated 23.11.2012 applied under the provisions of section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 for issuance of orders sub-section (3) of Section 20 regarding payment of remaining wages with compensation. 7. Subsequently, the Special Secretary of the Government by the order of the Governor of Bihar issued letter no.187 dated 16.01.2013 wherein on the basis of the report of Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj, the petitioners along with one Sri K.S. Panikar, General Manager, Vishnu Sugar Mill were held guilty of having committed offence by not implementing the agreement after conciliation dated 07.04.2010 under the provisions of Sections 18(3) and 19(3) of 'the Act'. 8. Thus, in exercise of power under Section 34 of 'the Act', the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj was authorized to file complaint under Section 29 of 'the Act' before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj against the management of the Vishnu Sugar Mill. Accordingly, the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj made a complaint on 24.01.2013 under the Act before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj stating that since the petitioners have not followed the settlement arrived at on 07.04.2010 the same amounted to violation of Section 18(3) and 19(3) of 'the Act' and also that the reply to the show cause dated 24.03.2012 was not satisfactory. 9. 9. The allegations made in the complaint read as under:- eq[; U;kf;d n.Mkf/kdkjh] 1- xksikyxat ds U;k;ky; esa vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 ds vUrxZr vfHk;kstu %& Øekad oknh dk uke irk ¼1½ Jh fot; dqekj oekZ Je v/kh{kd] xksikyxat ¼2½ Jh fd'kqu yky oktksfj;k izca/k funs'kd] fo".kq lqxj feYl fyŒ xksikyxat Øekad ifjoknh dk uke irk ¼1½ Jh gseUr dqekj oktksfj;k funs'kd] fo".kq lqxj feYl fyŒ xksikyxat ¼2½ Jh dsŒ,lŒ if.kdj egkizca/kd] fo".kq lqxj feYl fyŒ xksikyxat Øekad xokg dk uke irk ¼1½ Jh fot; dqekj oekZ Je v/kh{kd] xksikyxat ¼2½ Jh ijekuUn dqekj lgk;d Jek;qDr d`ŒJŒ floku ¼3½ Jh vejdkUr flag mi Jek;qDr eqŒ fcgkj] iVuk ¼4½ Jh i`Fohjkt la;qDr Jek;qDr lsokfuo`r] fcgkj] iVuk 2- mYya?ku dk Lo:i vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 dh /kkjk 18¼3½ ,oa 19¼3½ dk mYy?kauA 3- n.Muh; /kkjk vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 dh /kkjk 29A 4- vfHk;kstu dk laf{kIr fooj.k & fcgkj jkT; fLFkr phuh feyksa ds dkexkjksa ds fy, mrj Áns'k ljdkj }kjk Lohd`r vuq'kalkvksa ds ifjizs{; esa fnuakd 07-04-2010 dks Jek;qDr≶≤>kSrk inkf/kdkjh] fcgkj] iVuk ds le{k laiUu f=i{kh; le>kSrk ds vuqlkj mrj Áns'k ljdkj }kjk fuxZr vf/klpwuk la[;k 1427@36&2&09&8@04 fnuakd 17-12-2009 esa mfYyf[kr etnwjh dks gq&o&gw ykxw fd;k tkuk gSA le>kSrs dh 'krZ ds vuqlkj vdq'ky etnwjksa dks 5450@& :i;s ls de etnwjh dk Hkqxrku ugha djuk gSA le>kSrk ds dk;kZUo;u dh tkap ds fy, Jek;qDr] fcgkj }kjk xfBr tkap lfefr ds lnL;ksa ¼1½ Jh i`Fohjkt] la;qDr Jek;qDr] fcgkj] iVuk ¼2½ Jh vejdkUr flag] mi Jek;qDr] iVuk ,oa ¼3½ Jh ijekuUn dqekj] lgk;d Jek;qDr] lkj.k ÁeaMy] Nijk us fnuakd 26-02-2012 dks fo".kq lqxj feYl fyŒ xksikyxat dk fujh{k.k fd;kA fujh{k.k esa dkj[kkuk esa dk;Zjr etnwjksa dk c;ku ntZ fd;k x;k] ftUgsa le>kSrs ds 'krZ ds vuqlkj etnwjh mYya?ku gS] ftlds fy, Áca/ku ds i=kad 115 fnuakd 24-03-2012 }kjk dkj.ki`PNk dh xbZA ftlds vkyksd esa egkÁca/kd ds gLrk{kj ls izkIr mrj vlarks"ktud gSA vr% v/kksgLrk{kjh dks mDr vfHk;qDr ds fo:) vfHk;kstu nk;j djus gsrq Je lalk/ku foHkkx ds i=kad 186 fnuakd 16-01-2013 }kjk Ákf/kd`r fd;k x;k gSA vr% U;k;ky; ls ÁkFkZuk gS fd bl ij laKku ysdj vfHk;qDr dks leqfpr n.M nsus dh d`ik fd;k tk;A 5- pwafd vkosnd ,d yksdlsod gS var ,oa U;k;ky; esa fnu&izfrfnu dh mifLFkfr ls foeqfDr rFkk vko';drkuqkj vfHk;ksx i= esa la'kks/ku dh ÁkFkZuk djrk gSA vuqyXud & vfHk;ksx nks Áfr;ksa esaA fo'oklHkktu gLrk{kj vLi"V@& fot; dqekj oekZ Je v/kh{kd] xksikyxatA 10. Thus, it would be evident from the aforestated complaint that the opposite party no.2, the Labour Superintendent, Gopalganj alleged in the complaint filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj that since the petitioners have not followed the settlement arrived at on 07.04.2010, the same amounted to violation of Section 18(3) and 19(3) of the Act and also that their reply to the show cause dated 24.03.2012 was not satisfactory. Hence, a request was made to take necessary penal action against the petitioners and other co-accused. 11. Pursuant to the aforestated complaint dated 24.01.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj vide impugned order dated 08.04.2013 summoned the petitioners to face trial for having committed offence under Section 18(3) and 19(3) of the Act. 12. It is submitted by Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioners that the order taking cognizance against he petitioners is bad in law as the offence alleged to have been committed i.e. violation of Section 18(3) and 19(3) of 'the Act' is not made out against the petitioners. He submitted that as per section 2(e)(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it is the Manager of the factory who is the employer and not the petitioners, who are Managing Director and Director respectively of the factory in question and, therefore, the proceeding against them for non-payment of minimum wage is wholly misconceived. He submitted that sub-Section (3) of Section 18 is attracted only in relation to settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceeding under the Act or an arbitration award. Thus, in the present case the settlement, as arrived on 07.04.2010, was not arising in the course of conciliation proceeding nor pursuant to an arbitration award, but was merely a tripartite agreement between the factory, the employer and the Department of the State Government. Therefore, at best Section 18(1) is attracted in the light of which also the petitioners cannot be held liable for the offence so alleged, as the said section clearly provides that the settlement is binding only to the parties to the agreement. 13. Referring to Annexure-2 series to the present application, Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that it would be evident from the settlement/agreement dated 07.04.2010 that the petitioners were never part of the said agreement and, therefore, they cannot be held liable for any violation of the same. 13. Referring to Annexure-2 series to the present application, Mr. Ashish Giri, learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that it would be evident from the settlement/agreement dated 07.04.2010 that the petitioners were never part of the said agreement and, therefore, they cannot be held liable for any violation of the same. He submitted that so far as Section 19(3) of the I.D. Act, 1947 is concerned, the same is also not applicable as there is no award that has been passed in the present case and the agreement dated 07.04.2010 is a settlement by agreement and the same does not fulfil the definition of award provided under Section 2(b) of the I.D. Act, 1947. He submitted that the petitioners also do not fall within the definition employer under Section 2(g) of the I.D. Act, 1947. He submitted that despite the fact that the company is a juristic person being a separate seal and identity capable to sue and being sued, it has not been made accused in the present case and in absence of the company being a party, the Managing Director and Director of the company cannot be made vicariously liable for any breach of settlement. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, learned counsel for the State submitted that the provisions of the Act are clearly attracted in the present case and since the petitioners were the Managing Director and Director of the company, they cannot escape from the liability falling from the agreement entered into by one of their office bearers on behalf of the company. He submitted that the other points raised by the petitioners in the present case are also merit less. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 16. Since an argument has been advanced by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners that even assuming, but not accepting that the provisions of the Act is applicable, yet no offence is made out against the petitioners under Section 18(3) and 19(3) of the said Act, it is deemed necessary to have a look to the aforesaid provisions of the Act, which are extracted here in below:- "18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of section 10A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable] shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part". "19. Period of operation of settlements and awards.- (1) A settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. "19. Period of operation of settlements and awards.- (1) A settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. (2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute], and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. (3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17A: Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit: Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. (4) Where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made, there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Government may refer the award or a part of it to a Labour Court, if the award was that of a Labour Court or to a Tribunal, if the award was that of a Tribunal or of a National Tribunal] for decision whether the period of operation should not, by reason of such change, be shortened and the decision of Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be] on such reference shall, be final. (5) Nothing contained in sub-section (3) shall apply to any award which by its nature, terms or other circumstances does not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award. (6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under sub-section (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award. (7) No notice given under sub-section (2) or sub-section (6) shall have effect, unless it is given by a party representing the majority of persons bound by the settlement or award, as the case may be". 17. It would be manifest from perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act that the same is attracted only in relation to settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceeding under 'the Act' or an arbitration award. Further, it would be manifest from the reading of Section 18(3) of 'the Act' that the same would be applicable and binding only on the parties to the industrial disputes or any other parties who has been so summoned to appear in the said proceeding as parties to the disputes. Since the petitioners were never a party to the industrial disputes nor any summons had ever been issued to them to appear as parties to the disputes, the violation of Section 18(3) of 'the Act' cannot be attributable against them. 18. As far as the present case is concerned, Section 19(3) of 'the Act' would not be applicable, as there is no award that has been passed in the present case and the agreement dated 07.04.2010 is a settlement by agreement and the same does not fulfil the definition of award provided in section 2(b) of the Act, which states that 'award' means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under section 10-A. 19. Since neither Labour court nor Industrial Tribunal nor National Industrial Tribunal had made any interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or any question nor any arbitrator have passed any arbitration award, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioners had committed any offence under section 19(3) of the Act. 20. As discussed here in above, since the allegations made in the complaint, even if, they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute the offences alleged or make out a case against the petitioner, the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence and summoning the petitioners cannot be sustained. 21. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 08.04.2013 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj and the entire further proceedings of the Complaint Case (Trial) No.1257 of 2013 are hereby quashed. 22. The application stands allowed.