Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 886 (ALL)

Anoop Sharma v. State of U. P. Thru Secry.

2017-03-29

RAN VIJAI SINGH, VINOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA III

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. We have heard Shri Rajesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners is permitted to correct the prayer of the writ petition during the course of the day. 3. By means of this writ petition, prayer has been made to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 17.10.2014 passed by District Magistrate, Aligarh, by which petitioners' claim under Krishak Durghatna Beema Yojna (hereinafter referred to as "the Krishak Insurance Scheme") has been rejected. 4. The application has been rejected on the ground that the same has been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The aforesaid order has been challenged on the ground that the respondents-District Magistrate has erred in treating the petitioners' application for claim to be time barred. 5. Considering the grounds taken by the petitioners, on 27.1.2015 this Court has entertained the writ petition and directed the learned Standing Counsel to file a counter affidavit. Pursuant thereto, a counter affidavit has been filed, to which rejoinder affidavit has also been filed. 6. The facts of this case, in brief, are that late Sushila Devi (mother of petitioner No. 1) and late Satish Kumar Singh (father of petitioner No. 2) had gone to pilgrimage to the State of Uttarakhand in the month of June, 2013, but due to disaster in the State, their where about was not known to the petitioners. Later on, a certificate was provided to the petitioners by the State Government informing them that the mother and father of the petitioners had died on 16.6.2013. After coming to know, the petitioners have presented their claim under the above-mentioned Insurance Scheme on 30.9.2014. The claim of the petitioners has been rejected on the ground that the same was presented beyond the period of one year. After coming to know, the petitioners have presented their claim under the above-mentioned Insurance Scheme on 30.9.2014. The claim of the petitioners has been rejected on the ground that the same was presented beyond the period of one year. While arriving at this conclusion, shelter has been taken of clause 11(1) of Krishak Insurance Scheme, which is reproduced below: ^^¼1½ e`R;q vFkok 'kkjhfjd v{kerk gksus ij d`"kd@chek /kkjd vFkok vkfJr }kjk vf/kdre 4 ekg dh vof/k esa chek nkok lHkh fu/kkZfjr&izi= iw.kZ djkdj lEcfU/kr ijxukf/kdkjh@,lŒMhŒ,eŒ vFkok lh/ks ftykf/kdkjh dks izLrqr fd;k tk;sxk] ;fn 4 ekg ls T;knk foyEc ls ijUrq 1 o"kZ ds vUnj chek nkok izLrqr fd;k tkrk gS rks foyEc dks {kek djus dk vf/kdkj ftykf/kdkjh dks gksxkA chek izi= izkIr gksus ij lEcfU/kr ftykf/kdkjh }kjk chek dEiuh dks vf/kdre 3 lIrkg esa chek izi=ksa dks rS;kj dj o vU; vkSipkfjdrk;sa iw.kZ djkdj laLrqfr lfgr izsf"kr fd;k tk;sxkA ftykf/kdkjh }kjk chek dEiuh dks chek izi= Hkstrs le; /kujkf'k izkIr djus okys dks cSad dk uke] [kkrk uEcj ,ao dksM Hkh chek dEiuh dks miyC/k djk fn;k tk;s vkSj chek dEiuh blh [kkrs esa lh/ks bysDVªkfudyh /kujkf'k dk Hkqxrku djsaA vifjgk;Z dkj.ko'k mi;qZDr izfdz;k iw.kZ u gksus ij fcUnq&8 esa mfYyf[kr izfdz;k ds vuqlkj chek dh /kujkf'k dk psd chek dEiuh }kjk lEcfU/kr ftykf/kdkjh dks lEcfU/kr O;fDr ds [kkrs esa miyC/k djkus gsrq Hkstk tk;sA** 7. We have gone through the aforesaid paragraph. From the perusal of the same, it does not transpire that since which date the period of limitation will start whether from the date of death or from the date of receipt of the death certificate/communication of date of death. 8. In view of the fact that the relevant paragraph does not mention the specific date since when the period of limitation will start, considering the facts that it is the beneficial scheme, we find it appropriate to hold that the period of limitation will start from the date of the receipt of the death certificate/communication of date of death. The aforesaid presumption has been drawn considering the facts that unless the petitioners are made aware of the fact that their mother and father had died how they could be supposed to file application for obtaining the insured amount. The aforesaid presumption has been drawn considering the facts that unless the petitioners are made aware of the fact that their mother and father had died how they could be supposed to file application for obtaining the insured amount. Otherwise also, no presumption of civil death could be drawn, unless the period of seven years have expired from the date of starting of journey in view of Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads under:- "108. Burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for seven years - (Provided that when) the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is (shifted to) the person who affirms it. 9. Here, in this case, the mother and father of the petitioners had started their religious journey in June, 2013 and it is on 6.6.2014 when the petitioners have been served with the death certificates of their mother and father. Therefore, for presenting the claim for obtaining the insured amount, the limitation has to be counted from the date of receipt of the death certificate and not from the date of the actual death. Particularly, in the present case, when after great search, the death certificates were issued to various persons, whereabouts of them could not be known for the months together and ultimately, the Authority has issued a death certificate treating the date of death, on which date, the disaster took place. 10. The view taken by us finds support from the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in Ravendra Kumar and Another vs. State of U.P. Thru' Secry and Others, Writ Petition No. 68689 of 2014, decided on 4.12.2015. 11. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the District Magistrate has erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioners as time barred. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated 17.10.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Aligarh is hereby quashed. 12. 11. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the District Magistrate has erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioners as time barred. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated 17.10.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Aligarh is hereby quashed. 12. The matter is remitted back to respondent No. 2 for passing a fresh order, in accordance with law and the observation made herein above expeditiously but not later than ten weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.