JUDGMENT : MANOJ MISRA, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 14.2.2017 passed in SCC Revision No. 10 of 2015 by which application 49-Ga filed by the petitioner to bring on record permission letter dated 15.7.1988 as additional evidence in revision proceeding has been rejected on the ground that conditions, as envisaged by Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, on which additional evidence can be accepted were absent. 3. A perusal of the record would reveal that SCC Suit No. 183 of 2000 was filed by the plaintiff-respondent for arrears of rent and eviction. On the pleadings of the parties as many as five points for determination were framed. The critical issue which is relevant for these proceedings was as to whether the defendant without the permission in writing of the landlord had sublet the premises. The said issue was decided against the tenant by holding that there was subletting for which no written permission of the plaintiff landlord was obtained. The plaintiff's suit was decreed not only on the above issue but on other grounds also. Against the decree of the trial court SCC Revision No. 10 of 2015 was filed which remains pending. In this pending revision, application 49-Ga was filed claiming that at the time of preparation of the case for final hearing it was discovered that the document which indicated that written permission was granted for subletting was not filed before the trial court and therefore, upon legal advice, the same was being filed now. It was claimed that since the document went to the root of the matter, the same be accepted in evidence. 4. The alleged document sought to be brought on record by way of additional evidence appears to be a typed letter dated 15.7.1988 purportedly signed by one Raja Ram Mishra, a Sarwarkar of the plaintiff-respondent. 5. By the impugned order, the court below rejected this application. 6. Although, the proceedings in which additional evidence was sought to be adduced were revisional proceeding under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, but the principles on which additional evidence can be entertained by an appellate court, as per the Code of Civil Procedure, are applicable to the revisional proceeding under Section 25 of the said Act. Although, the proceedings in which additional evidence was sought to be adduced were revisional proceeding under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, but the principles on which additional evidence can be entertained by an appellate court, as per the Code of Civil Procedure, are applicable to the revisional proceeding under Section 25 of the said Act. Accordingly, it would be useful to examine the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 CPC. Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, consequent to High Court amendment, reads as under: "27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if - (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (b) the evidence sought to be adduced by a party to the appeal is evidence, which after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree under appeal was passed or made, or (c) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order passed by the court below on the ground that the document was necessary for doing complete justice between the parties and it was required for the purpose of pronouncing the judgment therefore the court should have accepted the document as an additional evidence under clause (c) of sub rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 of the Code, as applicable in U.P., which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code. In support of the aforesaid submission, a decision of the Apex Court in Wadi v. Amilal, 2015 (1) SCC 677 , has been cited, in which, in paragraph 5 of the report, it has been held that the general principle incorporated in sub rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate court to cure a lacuna or fill up a gap in a case. The exceptions to that principle are enumerated there under in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) (in the context of State of Uttar Pradesh should be read as (a), (b) and (c)). The court observed that while considering whether clause (b) is applicable to the facts of a case, the court must have regard to the ends of justice and if the court feels that pronouncing a judgment in the absence of such evidence would result in a defective decision and to pronounce an effective judgment, admission of such document is necessary, the said clause enables it to adopt that course. It was observed that for invocation of the said clause, the vigilance or negligence of the parties would not be relevant. 8. A bare perusal of the judgment which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner would go to show that the said clause is applicable in a case where the court is of the view that pronouncing a judgment in the absence of such evidence would result in a defective decision and to pronounce an effective judgment, the document/ evidence is necessary. 9. The apex court in K.R. Mohan Reddy v. Net Work Inc., (2007) 14 SCC 257 , while dealing with clauses (aa) and (b) of sub rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 of the Code, which should be read as clauses (b) and (c) in the context of State of U.P., held as under: "17. It is now a trite law that the conditions precedent for application of clause (aa) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 is different from that of clause (b). In the event the former is to be applied, it would be for the applicant to show that the ingredients or conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. It is now a trite law that the conditions precedent for application of clause (aa) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 is different from that of clause (b). In the event the former is to be applied, it would be for the applicant to show that the ingredients or conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. On the other hand if clause (b) to sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 CPC is to be taken recourse to, the appellate court is bound to consider the entire evidence on record and come to an independent finding for arriving at a just decision; adduction of additional evidence as has been prayed by the appellant was necessary. The fact that the High Court failed to do so, in our opinion, amounts to misdirection in law. Furthermore, if the High Court is correct in its view that the respondent-plaintiff had proceeded on the basis that the suit is entirely based on a cheque, where-for, it was not necessary for it to file the books of accounts before the trial court, finding contrary thereto could not have been arrived at that the same was in fact required to be proved so as to enable the appellate court to arrive at a just conclusion. 19. The appellate court should not pass an order so as to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial court, but it will be different if the court itself requires the evidence to do justice between the parties. The ability to pronounce judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce judgment satisfactorily to the mind of the court. But mere difficulty is not sufficient to issue such direction. While saying so, however, we do not mean that the court at an appropriate stage would be precluded from considering the applicability of clause (b)." 10. Further, the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Mahendrakumar Parshottambhai Desai, (2006) 9 SCC 772 , relying upon Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 , held as under: "10. ... Further, the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Mahendrakumar Parshottambhai Desai, (2006) 9 SCC 772 , relying upon Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 , held as under: "10. ... though the appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision did not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way." 11. In Mahavir Singh v. Naresh Chandra, (2001) 1 SCC 309 , the apex court while dealing with the import of clause (b) (should be read as clause (c) in the context of the State of Uttar Pradesh), observed as follows: ["5...................... In the third circumstance, the appellate court may require any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce the judgment, or for any other substantial cause. The expression "to enable it to pronounce judgment" has been the subject of several decisions including Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy, AIR 1979 SC 553 wherein it was held that when the appellate court finds itself unable to pronounce judgment owing to a lacuna or defect in the evidence as it stands, it may admit additional evidence. The ability to pronounce a judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce a judgment satisfactory to the mind of the court delivering it. It is only a lacuna in the evidence that will empower the court to admit additional evidence (see: Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 ). But a mere difficulty in coming to a decision is not sufficient for admission of evidence under this rule. It is only a lacuna in the evidence that will empower the court to admit additional evidence (see: Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 ). But a mere difficulty in coming to a decision is not sufficient for admission of evidence under this rule. The words "or for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires", which is set out at the commencement of the provision, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate court requires additional evidence, that this rule would apply as noticed by the Privy Council in Kessowji Issur v. G.I.P. Rly. It is under these circumstances such a power could be exercised. Therefore, when the first appellate court did not find the necessity to allow the application, we fail to understand as to how the High Court could, in exercise of its power under Section 115 CPC, have interfered with such an order, particularly when the whole appeal is not before the Court. It is only in the circumstances when the appellate court requires such evidence to pronounce the judgment the necessity to adduce additional evidence would arise and not in any other circumstances. When the first appellate court passed the order on the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, the whole appeal was before it and if the first appellate court is satisfied that additional evidence was not required, we fail to understand as to how the High Court could interfere with such an order under Section 115 CPC. "] 12. From the law noticed herein above, the legal position, as it stands, is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate court except on the principles enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 of the Code, as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, which are pari materia clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of the Code. Clause (c), which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code, is applicable where the appellate court requires a document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce the judgment, or for any other substantial cause. Clause (c), which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code, is applicable where the appellate court requires a document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce the judgment, or for any other substantial cause. The expression "to enable it to pronounce judgment" has been interpreted so as to mean that when the appellate court finds itself unable to pronounce judgment owing to a lacuna or defect in the evidence as it stands, it may admit additional evidence. But that does not mean that the clause should be resorted to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial court, though, if the court itself requires the evidence to do justice between the parties, it may accept it. The ability to pronounce a judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce a judgment satisfactory to the mind of the court delivering it. But a mere difficulty in coming to a decision is not sufficient for admission of evidence under this rule. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can satisfactorily pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. The words "or for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires", which is set out at the commencement of the provision, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate court requires additional evidence, that this clause would apply. Furthermore, if recourse is to be taken to the said clause, that is clause (c), which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code, the appellate court is required to consider the entire evidence on record to come to an independent conclusion whether for arriving at a just decision, adduction of additional evidence, as has been prayed for, is necessary. Therefore, ordinarily, an application seeking adduction of additional evidence by taking recourse to the aforesaid clause is to be considered at the time of hearing by taking a conspectus of the entire evidence on record for drawing satisfaction whether the evidence, the adduction of which is sought, is necessary for pronouncing a judgment. 13. Therefore, ordinarily, an application seeking adduction of additional evidence by taking recourse to the aforesaid clause is to be considered at the time of hearing by taking a conspectus of the entire evidence on record for drawing satisfaction whether the evidence, the adduction of which is sought, is necessary for pronouncing a judgment. 13. In the instant case, the parties were aware of the issues on which they were required to lead evidence. The first issue itself was as to whether the defendant had sublet the premises without a written permission of the landlord. Under the circumstances, if the defendant had in his possession the document in respect of written permission for subletting, then he ought to have brought the same on record. In the event such document was not produced before the trial court, then for its adduction in appellate court, it ought to have been demonstrated that after exercise of due diligence, the document was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree under appeal was passed. But, in the instant case, the application seeking adduction of the document does not disclose that the document was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not have been produced before the trial court despite exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, the application was clearly not maintainable under the second clause that is clause (b), which is pari materia clause (aa) of the Code. In so far as applicability of clause (c), which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code, is concerned, suffice to say that it is not the case of the petitioner that the Court would be unable to pronounce a satisfactory judgment in absence of the said document. This court has already noticed that recourse to the said clause is not to be used to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial court. Accordingly and in view of the discussion made above, this court is of the view that the order rejecting the application to adduce additional evidence does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the same calls for no interference. 14. The petition is dismissed.