JUDGMENT : SIDDHARTHA CHATTOPADHYAY, J. 1. Challenging the legal pregnability of the order dated 16th January, 2017, passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Purulia, (by which the application of the petitioner filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. in Session Case No. 138 of 2016 was rejected) and being aggrieved at it, the petitioners filed this application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for setting aside the same and also prayed for quashing of the proceedings. Both these revisional applications have been taken up together, being arose from the same order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 2. According to the petitioner, one Acharya Sarveshvarananda Avdhuta belonging to their rival group i.e. Ranchi Administration, lodged a written complaint with the officer-in-charge Jaipur Police Station contending inter alia that the present petitioners and others being armed with lathi, tangi, iron-rods etc. went to A.M.I.T. Hostel and attacked the present private opposite party and assaulted them. Members of both the groups suffered injuries and members of Ranchi group were admitted to Pundag local hospital. Thereafter the injured persons were referred to Ranchi hospital and one Acharya Abhipremananda succumbed to his injuries on the way to Ranchi Hospital. The said complaint was not initially accepted but however it was sent by post and Jaipur P.S. case was started. The learned Magistrate framed the charges against the persons of Ranchi group under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 506 and 379 of I.P.C who had given statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Against eight persons, over the self-same issue, another criminal case was lodged on the basis of an information of one Acharya Bimuktananda Avadhuta and the same is registered under Section 147, 149, 341, 323, 326 of I.P.C. According to the present petitioners, at the relevant point of time, they were not present at the place of occurrence and all of them were out of station on various grounds. In support of their such contention they have produced air tickets, train tickets and some letters which disclosed that at that time they were not on the spot. However during the pendency of the case and after the charge-sheet has been submitted, the de-facto complainant moved an application before the Judicial Magistrate alongwith certain affidavits, challenged the prayer for discharge by the investigating agency. However during the pendency of the case and after the charge-sheet has been submitted, the de-facto complainant moved an application before the Judicial Magistrate alongwith certain affidavits, challenged the prayer for discharge by the investigating agency. On the basis of the said affidavits, the learned S.D.J.M. Purulia was pleased to issue process against the present petitioners and ultimately issued warrant of arrest against them. Challenging that part, a revisional application bearing no. C.R.R. 368 of 2005 was filed before the High Court and the co-ordinate bench held that the learned Magistrate was empowered to issue process against the petitioners though not named in the charge-sheet. According to them, in the said order the co-ordinate bench did not mention reasons and failed to take into account the legal intricacies, that after taking cognizance whether the same can be taken into account and that too without giving any order of further enquiry to see if re-inclusion is possible or not. In course of hearing, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners contended that against the order of the coordinate bench of this High Court they have moved an S.L.P before the Hon’ble Apex Court and the said S.L.P. was dismissed without assigning any reason. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the state contended that order impugned passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge does not call for any interference. 4. The main argument of the petitioner is such that even if S.L.P. is dismissed that cannot be treated as a res judicata. The second limb of argument is such that charge cannot be framed on a mere suspicion. He further added the learned Sessions Judge in his impugned order contended that charge can be framed even on a mere suspicion. 5. In support of his such contention, he has relied upon the decision reported in Yogendra Narayan Choudhury Vs. Union of India reported in 1996 (7) SCC 1 , Commissioner of Income Tax Bangalore Vs. Shree Manjuna the aware Packing Products & Camphor Works reported in 1998 (1) SCC 598 , P. Nallammal & Anr. Vs. The State reported in 1999 (6) SCC 559 , Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala reported in 2000 (6) SCC 359 , Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2002 (2) SCC 135 , Ramnik Vallavdas Madhbani Vs. Vs. The State reported in 1999 (6) SCC 559 , Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala reported in 2000 (6) SCC 359 , Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2002 (2) SCC 135 , Ramnik Vallavdas Madhbani Vs. Taraben Praveenal Madhbani reported in 2004 (1) SCC 497 , State of M.P. Vs. Sheetla Sahai & Ors. reported in 2009 (8) SCC 617 , Satish Mehra Vs. State reported in 2012 (4) SCC (Cri) 354, and Brijendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2017 SCC Online SC 491. Ratio of those judgments speak that it is settled principle of law that if the S.L.P. is dismissed in limine without assigning reasons, it does not operate as res judicata. It has been made clear by Hon’ble Apex Court that dismissal of S.L.P. will not amount to upholding of the law propounded in the decision challenged through that S.L.P. Various authorities had been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court and almost in an unequivocal terms, Hon’ble Apex Court set the law at rest that if no reason has been assigned by the Hon’ble Apex Court that cannot be treated as res judicata. 6. This apart, in the case of Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala held relying on another decision of the Apex Court in V.M. Salgaonkar & Brothers (P) Ltd., Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax came to the conclusion “holding that when a special leave petition is dismissed, this Court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal is sought. What the Court means is that it does not consider it to be a fit case for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. That certainly could not be so when appeal is dismissed though by a non-speaking order. Here the doctrine of merger applies. In that case the Supreme Court upholds the decision of the High Court or of the Tribunal. This doctrine of merger does not apply in the case of dismissal of a special leave petition under Article 136. When appeal is dismissed, order of the High Court is merged with that of the Supreme Court. We find ourselves in entire agreement with the law so stated. This doctrine of merger does not apply in the case of dismissal of a special leave petition under Article 136. When appeal is dismissed, order of the High Court is merged with that of the Supreme Court. We find ourselves in entire agreement with the law so stated. We are clear in our mind that an order dismissing a special leave petition, more so when it is by a nonspeaking order, does not result in merger of the order impugned into the order of the Supreme Court.” Therefore, there is scope on the part of the High Court to consider the same. 7. The main thrust of argument was if the present petitioners are liable to face the prosecution and if the learned Trial Court has considered the application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. in its proper perspectives. Learned Trial Court in the impugned order has come to a conclusion that even on a mere suspicion charge can be framed and so he has fixed a date for framing of charge. Now I am to discuss:- (a) “What are the factors to be considered by the court at the time of disposal of an application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. (b) When the court shall frame charges?” 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties have submitted that there being no material in the statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. the learned trial court ought to have discharged the accused persons. They also contended that since there is no material to go for a trial, charges ought not to have been framed. 9. Prior to delving into the issue it would be profitable to refer to under Sections 227 and 228 of Cr.P.C. Section 227. If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. Section 228. If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. Section 228. (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which- (a) Is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, [ or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2)Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. 10. It is needless to say that Section 227 and Section 228 Cr.P.C. can be termed as a precious safeguard i.e. pre-battle protection conferred upon the accused by the statute. 11. In Section 227 Cr.P.C. the legislature in its wisdom used the words ‘there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ whereas in Section 228(1) Cr.P.C. the legislature very consciously used the words ‘there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.’ 12. If we consider the said Section 227 Cr.P.C. very meticulously we would find that discharge is possible if there is no sufficient ground (emphasis supplied). In Section 228 Cr.P.C., the Court is empowered to see if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. For the purpose of discharge sufficient ground is required but in case of framing of charge only ground is required. The legislature very conscientiously omitted the word ‘sufficient’ in Section 228 Cr.P.C. 13. In Section 228 Cr.P.C., the Court is empowered to see if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. For the purpose of discharge sufficient ground is required but in case of framing of charge only ground is required. The legislature very conscientiously omitted the word ‘sufficient’ in Section 228 Cr.P.C. 13. On a conjoint reading of section 227 and Section 228 it appears to me that the Court is to be satisfied itself only to the extent that the allegation raised against the accused is either grossly frivolous or there is any suspicion/presumption that the offence has been committed. Be it mentioned, that the Court should be very cautious in allowing an application Section 227 Cr.P.C. because without affording any opportunity to the prosecution to substantiate the allegation through witness, the accused gets an escape from the net of law. The Court is to see if any material for presumption is there or not. If the answer is affirmative, charge has to be framed. 14. While dealing with such situation, the Court is not supposed to make an in depth study about the evidence to be carried by the prosecution during the trial. It is not the duty of the Court to consider every nitty-gritty of the case and to sift and weigh the materials of case diary by making a roving enquiry, to find out the probative value of evidence to be led. It postulates just exercise of judicial mind of the Judge concerned. The test that can be adopted by the Court is to consider if the statements and documents collected during investigation are taken to be true would be sufficient to uphold the charge or not. 15. Finding recorded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Satish Mehra case is such that it is not permissible in law to permit a prosecution to linger limp and continue on the basis of a mere hope and expectation that in the trial some material may be found to implicate the accused such a course of action is not contemplated in the system of criminal administration of justice. 16. Whether the affidavits subsequently filed by the de facto complainant can be considered by the Court after taking cognizance? The copy of the affidavits have been served upon the present petitioners. Therefore, the contents of allegation against the present petitioners are not unknown to them. 16. Whether the affidavits subsequently filed by the de facto complainant can be considered by the Court after taking cognizance? The copy of the affidavits have been served upon the present petitioners. Therefore, the contents of allegation against the present petitioners are not unknown to them. Whether the learned Trial Court shall invoke the provision of under Section 311 Cr.P.C. or 319 of Cr.P.C., cannot be decided at this stage. In a revisional application the Court will not go for addressing legal fiction and every nitty-gritty in details. If the Investigating Officer could not make all endeavours to unearth the truth, the de facto complainant’s right cannot be evaporated. Therefore, all these legal fictions are kept open for the trial Court at the time of full-fledged trial. 17. Now, I am to consider “When High Court can exercise its power under Section 401 Cr.P.C./482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of a proceeding?” 18. Now, this Court is to consider the scope of application of powers ofrevision as enshrined in the Code itself. By virtue of power given under Section 401 Cr.P.C. the High Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal under Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is very extensive and it has given power to the High Court to consider the legality, regularity or propriety of any proceeding. Although power is wide but are purely discretionary, which is to be fairly exercised, according to the exigencies of each case. It is axiomatic truth that unless there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law or any flagrant miscarriage of justice, High Court shall not interfere. The power of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very limited. Only in case of ‘abuse of process of the Court’ or ‘otherwise to secure the ends of justice’, the High Court may rise to the occasion. Its statutory recognition only indicates that there is a power to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice. If we consider the section itself, we would find that only under extreme circumstances this inherent jurisdiction can be exercised viz. (a) to give effect to an order under the Code, (b) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, (c) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 19. If we consider the section itself, we would find that only under extreme circumstances this inherent jurisdiction can be exercised viz. (a) to give effect to an order under the Code, (b) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, (c) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 19. Considering circumstances and legal fictions at this stage this Court is not inclined to invoke its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The observation made above is only restricted for the purpose of disposal of this revisional application and it would not preclude the petitioner to agitate law points as may be available to them at the time of trial, if so advised. In the result, both the criminal revisional applications merit rejection. 20. Learned Trial Court is hereby directed to proceed with the case as early as possible considering the age of the criminal case. 21. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial court for information and taking necessary action in accordance with law. 22. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.