JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. This judgment shall dispose of both these petitions, which with the consent of the parties, were heard together. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present petitions are that an FIR was registered under Sections 452, 392, 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, dated 13.12.2015 at Police Station Indora, District Kangra, on the complaint of Ram Mohammad Isa Singh to the effect that the complainant was a practicing lawyer at Pathankot and his elder brother Raj Vikram and his parents used to remain at home. As per the complainant, on the previous day, he had gone to Chandigarh in connection with his cases and he reached home at around 10:30 p.m. His father Dilbag Rai was lying on his bed, whereas his mother Abhinash Rai prepared food, which was eaten by him as well as his brother Raj Vikram. At around 11:30 p.m., all family members went to sleep in their respective rooms. It was further mentioned in the FIR that at around 6:15 a.m. in the morning, their servant Yashpal, who used to come for milking cow, raised alarm that his parents (parents of the complainant) had been beaten by some one and they were drenched in blood. He opened the door of his parents' room and saw injuries on the face and head of his mother, who was lying unconscious on the bed, whereas his father was lying on a separate bed in the same room and there were blood stained injuries on the head and body of his father. Thereafter, he went to the room of his brother Raj Vikram and found him also lying in an injured condition with blood on his head and face. All articles lying in the Almirahs of both the rooms were thrown open and lockers of the Almirahs were also broken. Important documents as well as cash and jewellary, which were kept in the Almirahs were found stolen. It was further mentioned in the FIR that Raj Vikram slowly told the complainant that men of Baljinder Singh had injured them and that about 3-4 persons had entered their house and had hit them with deadly sharp edged weapons. Important documents as well as cash and jewellary, which were kept in the Almirahs were found stolen. It was further mentioned in the FIR that Raj Vikram slowly told the complainant that men of Baljinder Singh had injured them and that about 3-4 persons had entered their house and had hit them with deadly sharp edged weapons. It was further mentioned in the FIR that Baljinder Singh, son of Kartar Singh, who at the relevant was confined in Gurdaspur Jail in connection with a case lodged against him by the complainant, had threatened him and his family and that he suspected that Baljinder Singh Bajwa was behind the attack on his family members. 3. Records demonstrate that as a result of injuries which were suffered by him, Dilbag Rai passed away on 13.12.2015 itself. Smt. Abhinash Kaur also succumbed to her injuries on 23.12.2015. 4. On 25.12.2015, Manjeet Singh, son of Budh Singh, resident of Prem Nagar, Tehsil Batala, District Gurdaspur and Surender Singh, son of Waryam Singh, resident of Touki, Tehsil and Police Station Indora were arrested, who after investigation were released on 29.12.2015. Accused Lakhwinder Singh was arrested on 17.02.2016 and he was produced before the Court on 18.02.2016. Police remand of Baljinder Singh was obtained on 04.03.2016. Petitioner before this Court, namely, Balbir Singh was later on arrested on 17.09.2016. Challan was filed against Baljinder Singh and Lakhwinder Singh on 16.05.2016. 5. Petitioner filed an application under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora on 16.01.2017. It was mentioned therein that petitioner was in custody since 17.09.2016 in FIR No. 251 of 2015, dated 13.12.2015, registered under Sections 452, 392, 307, 302 & 120-B of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Indora, District Kangra, H.P. and that he was falsely implicated in the case. It was further mentioned in the application that after investigation, State had failed to file charge sheet against him within 90 days and as he had spent more than 92 days in judicial custody since his arrest on 17.09.2016 and as no charge sheet stood filed against him, he be released from judicial custody in the interest of justice. 6. Application so filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora vide order dated 16.01.2017, which reads as under : "16.01.2017 Present: Sh. 6. Application so filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora vide order dated 16.01.2017, which reads as under : "16.01.2017 Present: Sh. Sanjeev Kumar Lakha, APP, for the State. Accused Balbir Singh @ Rana S/o Sh. Lakhwinder Singh produced through Video Conference, at 12:30 p.m. in custody of Sh. Vinod Sharma Asstt. Superintendent of Sub-Jail Nurpur, in the presence of Sh. Sanjay Sehra, Advocate for the accused. The accused has been stated about his right to move his bail application and also about any problem in Sub-Jail Nurpur. An application seeking judicial remand of accused Balbir Singh @ Rana has been filed by the SHO, Police Station Indora, through Ld. APP. SHO Police Station Indora has sought time for filing the challan in this Court after withdrawing the same from the Court of Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala as Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala is on leave and therefore no effective order has yet been passed by the Court of Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala. Prayer considered and allowed. In these circumstances, to my mind, to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence at this stage, accused is required to be remanded to judicial custody. Moreover, present case is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. Therefore, keeping in view gravity of offence, application moved by the Police for judicial remand of the accused is considered and allowed and the accused (Balbir Singh @ Rana) is remanded into judicial custody till 28.01.2017, on which date, he be produced before this Court at 10:00 A.M. sharp through legal process as per law. Put up on 28.01.2017. Endorsement be made on jail warrant. Today, an application U/S 167(2) of Cr. P.C. has also been filed by ld. Counsel for the accused seeking release of accused Balbir Singh @ Rana from the judicial custody. Reply to this application has been filed by the SHO, Police Station Indora through ld. APP, in which, it is stated that the Challan against the accused Balbir Singh @ Rana has been filed before the Court of Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on dated 13.12.2016 as per R.C. No. 213/16 dated 13.12.2016. In view of these circumstances, present application U/S 167(2) of Cr. APP, in which, it is stated that the Challan against the accused Balbir Singh @ Rana has been filed before the Court of Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on dated 13.12.2016 as per R.C. No. 213/16 dated 13.12.2016. In view of these circumstances, present application U/S 167(2) of Cr. P.C. is not maintainable at this stage and hence, present application is dismissed as the Challan has already been filed in the Court against the present accused namely Balbir Singh @ Rana. Accordingly, present application is disposed of. It be tagged with relevant case file/FIR after its due completion/registration. Put up on 28.01.2017. Endorsement be made on jail warrant. Sd/- (Niranjan Singh), JMIC, Indora." 7. Thereafter, on 17.01.2017, the following order was passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora: "Office report seen. Ld. APP stated that the case arising from present FIR against accused Balbir Singh & Surjeet Singh have not been committed before the Court of Ld. Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala as charge sheet was not filed by the Police against them when charge sheet was filed against accused Baljinder Singh & Lakhwinder Singh and these are in judicial custody till 28.01.2017. Although other accused persons namely Lakhwinder Singh and Baljinder Singh are facing trial before the Court of Ld. Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala after committing the case by this Court vide order dated 04.07.2016. Heard. Record perused. There are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused Balbir Singh and Surjeet Singh for commission of offence punishable U/Ss. 452, 392, 307, 302 read with Section 120-B of IPC. As it is alleged that it is a supplementary challan, therefore, copy of the same is required to be supplied to all the accused persons. Therefore, let production warrant be issued to the concerned Superintendent of Jail to produce the accused persons namely Lakhwinder Singh, Baljinder Singh, Balbir Singh & Surjeet Singh in person before this Court on dated 28.01.2017, at 10:00 a.m. sharp, so that copy of this supplementary challan be supplied to them and also for further orders. Sd/- (Niranjan Singh), JMIC, Indora." 8. On 27.01.2017 and 28.01.2017, the following orders were passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora: "27.01.2017: Presented by SHO Tilak Raj, P.S. Indora. Crl. Ahlmad to check and report for 28.01.2017. Sd/- (Niranjan Singh), JMIC, Indora." 8. On 27.01.2017 and 28.01.2017, the following orders were passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora: "27.01.2017: Presented by SHO Tilak Raj, P.S. Indora. Crl. Ahlmad to check and report for 28.01.2017. Sd/- (Niranjan Singh), Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P." "28.01.2017: Pt.: Sh. V.K. Rehalia, PP, for the State. Office report seen. This supplementary challan be tagged with other supplementary challan fixed for today." Sd/- (Niranjan Singh), Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P." 9. Application for grant of regular bail filed by the present petitioner under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala vide order dated 18.02.2017. 10. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed Cr.MPM No. 626 of 2017 under Section 439 read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for release of petitioner on regular bail in FIR No. 251 of 2015, dated 13.12.2015 registered against him at Police Station Indora. In the petition so filed, the following prayer was made: "It is therefore most humbly and respectfully submitted that the petitioner may be ordered to be released on bail, pending Trial, in FIR No. 251/2015 dated 13.12.2015 under Section 452, 392, 307, 302 and 120-B IPC Police Station Indora District Kangra (HP)." 11. During the course of arguments in the said petition, learned counsel for the petitioner made submissions qua the illegality of order which was passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora, dated 16.01.2017, vide which, application filed by the petitioner before the said Court under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed. When it was pointed out that in the petition itself, no relief was claimed by the petitioner for quashing of order dated 16.01.2017, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora, on 21.06.2017, a prayer was made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court to permit the petitioner to independently assail the said order, which liberty was granted by this Court on 21.06.2017. Thereafter, Cr.MMO No. 222 of 2017 was filed by the petitioner, in which the following prayers were made: "It is therefore most humbly and respectfully submitted that Impugned Order Dated 16.01.2017 (Annexure P-5) passed u/s 167(2) Cr. PC by Ld. Thereafter, Cr.MMO No. 222 of 2017 was filed by the petitioner, in which the following prayers were made: "It is therefore most humbly and respectfully submitted that Impugned Order Dated 16.01.2017 (Annexure P-5) passed u/s 167(2) Cr. PC by Ld. JMIC Indora in FIR No. 251/2015 Dated 13.12.2015 under sections 452,392,307,302,120-B IPC Police Station Indora District. Kangra (HP) may be quashed in the interest of justice. With The further prayer that all/any further proceeding arising as a consequence of the said order may also be quashed. With The further prayer that the petitioner may be released forthwith in the abovenoted case. With The further prayer that any other order/writ/direction this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in the interest of justice." 12. Both the cases were heard together on 28.06.2017. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has primarily argued that the order so passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora, dated 16.01.2017, vide which, the application filed by the present petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed, is a perverse order and not sustainable in the eyes of law, as while dismissing said application, filed by the present petitioner, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Indora erred in not appreciating that as the challan was not filed against the petitioner within the statutory period as is contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as detention of the petitioner thereafter was totally illegal. 14. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, perusal of the impugned order demonstrates that the application by the petitioner was dismissed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora on the ground that challan already stood filed against accused Balbir Singh in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on 13.12.2016 as per R.C. No. 2134/16 dated 13.12.2016 and application by the petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was thus dismissed as not maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the findings so returned by the learned Court below were perverse findings as no challan stood filed against the petitioner in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on 13.12.2016 and in fact challan against the petitioner was filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora on 27.01.2017 and the same was ordered to be tagged with other supplementary challan by the said Court on 28.01.2017. 15. On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General, on the basis of records has submitted that challan stood filed against the petitioner in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on 13.12.2016 and because the said challan was filed within the statutory period, there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that no challan was filed within the period contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submitted that even if it is assumed that the challan was filed in a wrong Court of law, then also no benefit of the irregularity so committed by the prosecution can be taken by the accused, because it is not as if no challan was filed at all by the prosecution within the statutory period. On these bases, learned Deputy Advocate General has prayed that the petitions be dismissed. 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case, which have been placed before this Court by the State on 12.07.2017. 17. Records demonstrate that In-charge Police Station Indora, District Kangra vide communication dated 11.12.2016 filed a supplementary challan under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in FIR No. 251/15, dated 13.12.2015, under Sections 452, 392, 307,302 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station Indora against the present petitioner Balbir Singh and one Surjit Singh (photocopy of the same is ordered to be placed on record). 18. There are two Road Certificates on record, dated 13.12.2016 and 17.01.2017 (photocopies of the same are ordered to be placed on record). 18. There are two Road Certificates on record, dated 13.12.2016 and 17.01.2017 (photocopies of the same are ordered to be placed on record). Road Certificate dated 13.12.2016 demonstrates that vide the said Road Certificate issued by MHC Police Station Indora, he forwarded supplementary challan in Case FIR No. 251/15, dated 13.12.2015, under Sections 452,392,302,307 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station Indora through HC Inderjeet No. 203 to the learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala. There is also an endorsement "Received", which finds mentioned therein and the same is also dated 13.12.2016. Road Certificate dated 17.01.2017 is addressed by MHC Police Station Indora to the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Indora stating therein that challan with regard to Case No. 251/15, dated 13.12.2015 under Sections 302,392,307,452 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was being sent through SI Subhash Singh. There is also on record an application addressed by In-charge, Police Station Indora dated 16.01.2017 (photocopy of the same is ordered to be placed on record) to the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora in Case FIR No. 251/15, dated 13.12.2015, under Sections 452,392,302,307 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station Indora on the following subject: "Aaropi Balvir Singh Urf Rana wa Surjit Singh Uproket ke Khilaf Prastuet Challan Ke Sandherb Mai." A perusal of the same demonstrates that it is mentioned therein that petitioner Balbir Singh was arrested on 17.09.2016 and the limit of 90 days was expiring on 15.12.2016. It is further mentioned in this application that challan against the petitioner stood filed on 13.12.2016. Relevant extract of this application is quoted hereinbelow: "......Jahan tak anupurek challan balbir singh wa surjit singh ke virudh taiyar karne ka sambandh hai 90 din nayayik samay Awadhi ko dekhete hue challan tithi 13.12.2016 ko maanniye atiriket zila awam sater nayayadhis-III ki aadalet mai mutabik RC No.213/16 dinank 13.12.2016 ko wadest mu aa inderjeet no. 203 ke prastut nayayalya kiya ja chukka hai. Mahodeya ne tithi 22.12.2016 ko aadesh diya ki Committal Proceeding ke liye challan JMIC Indora aadalet mai paish kiya jawe. 203 ke prastut nayayalya kiya ja chukka hai. Mahodeya ne tithi 22.12.2016 ko aadesh diya ki Committal Proceeding ke liye challan JMIC Indora aadalet mai paish kiya jawe. Is sambandh mai maaniye atiriket zila awam sater nayayadhis-III, Kangra Sthith Dharamshala mai Committal Proceeding ke liye challan mahodeye ki aadalet mai bhazene bare guzarish ki zani thi lakin sambandhit nayayadhis mahodeye thithi 13.1.2017 tak awakash awam 14,15-1-2017 ka awakash hone ki wajeh se agle kal thithi 17.01.2017 ko is sambandh mai guzarish ki jayegi. Yeh bilkul satye na hai ki police dhono aaropiyon ke virudh challan pesh karne mai asmerth rahi hai. Challan samay par nayayaley mai prastut kiya ja chukka hai. Ata wistrit report pesh aadalet hai." 19. One thing which is apparent from this application is that prosecution was directed on 22.12.2016 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora that challan be filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class Indora for committal proceedings and on account of these orders, challan was filed against the petitioner in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Indora on 17.01.2017. This challan was delivered in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Indora by SI Subhash Singh vide Road Certificate of even date. The order passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora dated 17.01.2017 (Annexure- P6) reads as under: "Office report seen. Ld. APP stated that the case arising from present FIR against accused Balbir Singh & Surjeet Singh have not been committed before the Court of Ld. Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala as charge sheet was not filed by the Police against them when charge sheet was filed against accused Baljinder Singh & Lakhwinder Singh and these are in judicial custody till 28.01.2017. Although other accused persons namely Lakhwinder Singh and Baljinder Singh are facing trial before the Court of Ld. Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala after committing the case by this Court vide order dated 04.07.2016. Heard. Record perused. There are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused Balbir Singh and Surjeet Singh for commission of offence punishable U/Ss. 452,392,307,302 read with Section 120-B of IPC. As it is alleged that it is a supplementary challan, therefore, copy of the same is required to be supplied to all the accused persons. Heard. Record perused. There are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused Balbir Singh and Surjeet Singh for commission of offence punishable U/Ss. 452,392,307,302 read with Section 120-B of IPC. As it is alleged that it is a supplementary challan, therefore, copy of the same is required to be supplied to all the accused persons. Therefore, let production warrant be issued to the concerned Superintendent of Jail to produce the accused persons namely Lakhwinder Singh, Baljinder Singh, Balbir Singh & Surjeet Singh in person before this Court on dated 28.01.2017, at 10:00 a.m. sharp, so that copy of this supplementary challan be supplied to them and also for further orders." 20. Therefore, from the above facts, it is clear that challan for the first time came to be filed before the competent Court, i.e. the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora against the present petitioner on 17.01.2017 vide application so addressed to the said Court by Incharge Police Station Indora dated 17.01.2017, as is envisaged under Section 2(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. There is nothing on record from which it can be deciphered that on 13.12.2016 challan/supplementary challan was filed against the petitioner, as provided in Section 2(r) (supra) before a Magistrate competent to take cognizance of such challan. Though as per Road Certificate dated 13.12.2016, challan was also sent to the Court of learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala by MHC Police Station Indora, but there is no order on record passed by the learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala about taking cognizance of the challan so filed before it. In fact, there is no earlier order to the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora dated 17.01.2017 (supra) pertaining to cognizance being taken of any challan/supplementary challan having been filed by the prosecution against the accused. Moreover, the very fact that challan was filed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Indora by sending the same through Road Certificate itself demonstrates that the challan was with the police before the same was so filed before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora. At the cost of repetition, I state that what happened with challan which was purportedly filed vide Road Certificate 13.12.2016 before the learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala, District Kangra is not on record. At the cost of repetition, I state that what happened with challan which was purportedly filed vide Road Certificate 13.12.2016 before the learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala, District Kangra is not on record. During the course of arguments, a pointed question was put to the learned Deputy Advocate General in this regard, who on the basis of instructions as well as records fairly submitted that save and except Road Certificate dated 13.12.2016, there was nothing on record to suggest that challan/supplementary challan was actually filed in the Court of learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala against the petitioner on 13.12.2016. Learned Deputy Advocate General has further on instructions submitted that on record there is no order passed on the challan which was purportedly sent through Road Certificate dated 13.12.2016 to the Court of learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala by the said Court. 21. Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 envisages that every investigation under Chapter XII of the said Code shall be completed without unnecessary delay and as soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in-charge of the Police Station shall forward to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating therein particulars as are mentioned in Sub-section (2) (i) thereof. 22. Section 2(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code reads as under: "2(r) "police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section(2) of section 173" 23. A harmonious perusal of Section 2(r) and Section 173 demonstrate that law envisages submission of a police report after completion of investigation to be filed by officer in-charge of the Police Station before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the said police report. It has not been disputed during the course of arguments that the Magistrate, who was empowered to take cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner was Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, before whom challan was presented/filed on 17.01.2017. It is not in dispute that as from the date of arrest of the petitioner, the statutory period of 90 days as is contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure expired on 15.12.2016. It is not in dispute that as from the date of arrest of the petitioner, the statutory period of 90 days as is contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure expired on 15.12.2016. It is also not in dispute that there is nothing on record from which it can be inferred that before 15.12.2016, any challan/supplementary challan was filed by In-charge of Police Station Indora before the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. What happened to the challan which was purportedly filed before the learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala on 13.12.2016 has not been explained by the State. On instructions, what was stated by learned Deputy Advocate General was that as the challan was wrongly presented on 13.12.2016 before the learned Fast Track Court, the mistake was subsequently rectified by filing the challan before the Magistrate competent to take cognizance, i.e. Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Indora on 17.01.2017. 24. In these circumstances, the moot question which has to be decided by this Court is whether presentation of challan/supplementary challan vide Road Certificate dated 13.12.2016 by officer In-charge Police Station Indora before the learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala, which Court otherwise was not competent to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the petitioner, as envisaged under Section 2(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be termed to be sufficient compliance of provisions of Section 173 of the said Code. In my considered view, the answer is no for reasons mentioned hereinafter. 25. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 Supreme Court Cases 453, per majority after relying upon various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an indefeasible right accrues to the accused on the failure of the prosecution to file the challan within the period specified under sub-section(2) of Section 167 and right can be availed of by the accused if he is prepared to offer the bail and abide by the terms and conditions of the bail. Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that the said indefeasible right does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that the said indefeasible right does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. While holding so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon the Constitutional Bench judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI (1994) 5 SCC 410 . Hon'ble Supreme Court further went on to hold as under: "13.....................On the aforesaid premises, we would record our conclusions as follows: 1. Under sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorize detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorize detention of the accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/Court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. If the accused is unable to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of Explanation I and the proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued custody of the accused even beyond the specified period in para (a) will not be unauthorized, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the accused would stand extinguished. 6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt Case must be understood to mean when the accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para(a) of the proviso to sub-section(2) of Section 167 if the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the Court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same."` 26. Therefore, it is evident from the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that on expiry of the statutory period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is to be released on bail if is prepared to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 27. In Union of India through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Nirala Yadav alias Raja Ram Yadav alias Deepak Yadav (2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 457, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "44. 27. In Union of India through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Nirala Yadav alias Raja Ram Yadav alias Deepak Yadav (2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 457, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "44. At this juncture, it is absolutely essential to delve into what were the precise principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case and how the two- Judge Bench has understood the same in Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra). We have already reproduced the paragraphs in extenso from Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case and the relevant paragraphs from Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra). Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra) has drawn support from Rustam and others case to buttress the principle it has laid down though in Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case the said decision has been held not to have stated the correct position of law and, therefore, the same could not have been placed reliance upon. The Division Bench in paragraph 56 which have been reproduced hereinabove, as referred to paragraph 13 and the conclusions of Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case. We have already quoted from paragraph 13 and the conclusions. 45. The opinion expressed in paragraph 54 and 58 in Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra) which we have underlined, as it seems to us, runs counter to the principles stated in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra) which has been followed in Hassan Ali Khan and another (supra) and Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi. The decision in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi's case has been rendered by a three-Judge Bench. We may hasten to state, though in Pragyna Singh Thakur's case the learned Judges have referred to Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case but as stated the principle that even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that the charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail, if charge- sheet is filed the said right to be enlarged on bail is lost. This opinion is contrary to the earlier larger Bench decisions and also runs counter to the subsequent three-Judge Bench decision in Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak's case. We are disposed to think so, as the two-Judge Bench has used the words "before consideration of the same and before being released on bail", the said principle specifically strikes a discordant note with the proposition stated in the decisions rendered by the larger Benches. 46. We are disposed to think so, as the two-Judge Bench has used the words "before consideration of the same and before being released on bail", the said principle specifically strikes a discordant note with the proposition stated in the decisions rendered by the larger Benches. 46. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to refer to the dissenting opinion by B.N. Agarwal, J. in Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case. The learned Judge dissented with the majority as far as interpretation of the expression "if not already availed of" by stating so:- "29. My learned brother has referred to the expression "if not already availed of" referred to in the judgment in Sanjay Dutt case for arriving at Conclusion 6. According to me, the expression "availed of" does not mean mere filing of application for bail expressing therein willingness of the accused to furnish the bail bond. What will happen if on the 61st day an application for bail is filed for being released on bail on the ground of default by not filing the challan by the 60th day and on the 61st day the challan is also filed by the time the Magistrate is called upon to apply his mind to the challan as well as the petition for grant of bail? In view of the several decisions referred to above and the requirements prescribed by clause (a)(ii) of the proviso read with Explanation I to Section 167(2) of the Code, as no bail bond has been furnished, such an application for bail has to be dismissed because the stage of proviso to Section 167(2) is over, as such right is extinguished the moment the challan is filed. 30. In this background, the expression "availed of" does not mean mere filing of the application for bail expressing thereunder willingness to furnish bail bond, but the stage for actual furnishing of bail bond must reach. If the challan is filed before that, then there is no question of enforcing the right, howsoever valuable or indefeasible it may be, after filing of the challan because thereafter the right under default clause cannot be exercised." On a careful reading of the aforesaid two paragraphs, we think, the two- Judge Bench in Pragyna Singh Thakur's case has somewhat in a similar matter stated the same. As long as the majority view occupies the field it is a binding precedent. As long as the majority view occupies the field it is a binding precedent. That apart, it has been followed by a three-Judge Bench in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi's case. Keeping in view the principle stated in Sayed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi's case which has based on three-Judge Bench decision in Uday Mohanlal Acharys's case, we are obliged to conclude and hold the principle laid down in Paragraph 54 and 58 of Pragyna Singh Thakur's case(which have been underlined by us) do not state the correct principle of law. It can clearly be stated that in view of the subsequent decision of a larger Bench that cannot be treated to be a good law. Our view finds support from the decision in Union of India and others v. Arviva Industries India Limited and others. 47. Coming to the facts of the instant case, we find that prior to the date of expiry of 90 days which is the initial period for filing the charge-sheet, the prosecution neither had filed the charge-sheet nor had it filed an application for extension. Had an application for extension been filed, then the matter would have been totally different. After the accused respondent filed the application, the prosecution submitted an application seeking extension of time for filing of the charge-sheet. Mr. P.K. Dey, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the same is permissible in view of the decision in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra) but on a studied scrutiny of the same we find the said decision only dealt with whether extension could be sought from time to time till the completion of period as provided in the Statute i.e., 180 days. It did not address the issue what could be the effect of not filing an application for extension prior to expiry of the period because in the factual matrix it was not necessary to do so. In the instant case, the day the accused filed the application for benefit of the default provision as engrafted under proviso to sub- Section (2) of Section 167 CrPC the Court required the accused to file a rejoinder affidavit by the time the initial period provided under the statute had expired. There was no question of any contest as if the application for extension had been filed prior to the expiry of time. The adjournment by the learned Magistrate was misconceived. There was no question of any contest as if the application for extension had been filed prior to the expiry of time. The adjournment by the learned Magistrate was misconceived. He was obliged on that day to deal with the application filed by the accused as required under Section 167(2) CrPC. We have no hesitation in saying that such procrastination frustrates the legislative mandate. A Court cannot act to extinguish the right of an accused if the law so confers on him. Law has to prevail. The prosecution cannot avail such subterfuges to frustrate or destroy the legal right of the accused. Such an act is not permissible. If we permit ourselves to say so, the prosecution exhibited sheer negligence in not filing the application within the time which it was entitled to do so in law but made all adroit attempts to redeem the cause by its conduct." 28. Chapter II of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the constitution of criminal Courts and offices. Section 6 of the same reads as under: "6. Classes of Criminal Courts- Besides the High Courts and the Courts constituted under any law, other than this Code, there shall be, in every State, the following classes of Criminal Courts, namely:- (i) Court of Session; (ii) Judicial Magistrate of the first class and, in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrate; (iii) Judicial Magistrates of the second class; and (iv) Executive Magistrates." 29. Provisions regarding jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in the matter of inquiries and trials are provided in Chapter XIII of the Code. How warrant cases and summon cases are to be conducted is provided under Chapter XII and XX of the Code respectively. The powers, functions and jurisdiction of the Courts are thus clearly defined and unless and until specific powers are conferred under the Code, no Court can take cognizance and entertain any application or petition contrary to the said statutory provisions. In this backdrop, learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala even otherwise cannot be construed to be the Court of Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offences before whom report of police officer on completion of investigation was to be submitted under the provisions of Section 173 of the Code. In this backdrop, learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala even otherwise cannot be construed to be the Court of Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offences before whom report of police officer on completion of investigation was to be submitted under the provisions of Section 173 of the Code. Even otherwise, this fact has not been disputed by the State that the competent Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the accused was learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora and not learned Fast Track Court, Dharamshala. Application under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of bail was filed by the petitioner before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora on 16.01.2017. Same was dismissed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora vide order of the even date. 30. A perusal of this order demonstrates that on the said date when the matter was listed before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, a request was made by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor before the said learned Magistrate seeking time for filing challan before the said Magistrate after withdrawing the same from the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on the ground that as learned Additional Sessions Judge- III, Kangra at Dharamshala was on leave, therefore, no effective order as yet been passed by the Court on the same. This prayer was considered and allowed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora. Vide the same order wherein prayer for filing challan before it after withdrawing the same from the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala was allowed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, said Magistrate dismissed the application filed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure so preferred before it by the petitioner on the ground that challan against the petitioner stood filed in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on 31.12.2016 as per R.C. No. 213/16 dated 13.12.2016. However, in my considered view, while passing the said order, Magistrate erred in not appreciating that the so called challan filed against the petitioner in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala was no challan in the eyes of law as the same did not meet the requirements of either Section 2(r) or Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge- III, Kangra at Dharamshala was not the Court of a Magistrate competent to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the accused. 31. Therefore, from the above discussion, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that as on 16.01.2017, when the petitioner preferred an application under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for being released on bail on the ground that no report/challan, as is envisaged under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed within 90 days from the date of his arrest. Indeed no challan against him was filed by the prosecution in the Court of a Magistrate competent to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the accused. The order passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, dated 16.01.2017, vide which application so filed by the petitioner was dismissed by holding that said challan already stood filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala on 13.12.2016, is therefore erroneous and perverse and not sustainable in the eyes of law. 32. Accordingly, Cr. MMO No. 222 of 2017 is allowed. Order passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, dated 16.01.2017, vide which, it rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is quashed and set aside and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, on his furnishing personal bond to the tune of Rs. Order passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Indora, dated 16.01.2017, vide which, it rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is quashed and set aside and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, on his furnishing personal bond to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court, subject to the following conditions: (i) He shall make himself available for the purpose of interrogation, if so required and regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; (ii) He shall not hamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; (iii) He shall not make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; and (iv) He shall not leave the territory of India without prior permission of the Court. 33. It is clarified that the observations made by this Court in this judgment are only for the purpose of adjudicating upon the present petitions and the learned trial Court shall not be influenced by any of these observations while deciding the case on merits, in the course of trial. Cr. MPM No. 626 of 2017 34. In view of the order passed in Cr. MMO No. 222 of 2017, no order is required to be passed in this petition, which is accordingly disposed of. Miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.