JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed by the National Highways Authority of India (for short ‘the NHAI’) aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, on 29th September 2012 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’), enhancing the compensation amount over and above the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of the acquisition of land for the purpose of widening of the road situated at Varur Village in Hubballi Taluk for widening of NH-4, Hubballi-Haveri junction under the Preliminary Notification dated 12th February 2001 and Final Notification dated 05th February 2002. 2. The NHAI had awarded the compensation at the rate of 538.20 per sq.mtr or Rs.50/- per sq.ft. for the acquired land in Block No.5 of the said Village after deducting 50% of the value towards the developmental charges vide order dated 26th March 2004. But, the learned Court below in an application filed under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award filed by the land-holders-Smt.Mahadevi and others, decided the application as a suit and while decreeing the said suit, held that the deduction of 50% of the market value towards the developmental charges was liable to be set aside and the plaintiffs (land-holders) were entitled for compensation at the enhanced rate of Rs.75/-per Sq.ft. or Rs.807.30 per sq.mtr. in respect of the said land with interest and other statutory benefits. Questioning the same, the NHAI has approached this Court by way of present appeal. 3. Assailing the said order, the learned counsel for the NHAI, Mrs.P.R.Bentur, relying upon the several case-laws urged before this Court that Section 34 of the Act, under which an Arbitral Award can be set aside only on the specified limited grounds, the learned Court below has sat over the said Award as the Court of appeal and has enhanced the compensation amount, which it was not authorised to do. She has submitted that Section 34 of the Act does not permit such enhancement of compensation by the learned Court below and therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. She has relied upon the following judgments in support of her contentions: (I) Swan Gold Mining Limited Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited, Civil Appeal No.9048/2014 disposed of on 22.09.2014, (2015) 5 SCC 739 ; (II) M/s.Navodaya Mass Entertainment Vs. She has relied upon the following judgments in support of her contentions: (I) Swan Gold Mining Limited Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited, Civil Appeal No.9048/2014 disposed of on 22.09.2014, (2015) 5 SCC 739 ; (II) M/s.Navodaya Mass Entertainment Vs. M/s. J.M.Combines, Civil Appeal Nos.7128-29/2011, Disposed of on 26.08.2014, (2015) 5 SCC 698 ; (III) H.M.Shankaramurthy Vs. National Highways Authority of India, Project, 2010 ILR (Kar) 3711; (IV) National Highways Authority of India Vs. Gammon India Limited, FMA No.2536/2013 , disposed of on 21.08.2014, AIR 2015 (NOC) 1214 (CAL) : 2015 (5) Arb.L.R. 28; (V) Sumitomo Heavy Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, 2010 (11) SCC 296 ; (VI) P.R.Shah, Shares and Stock Brokers Pvt. Limited Vs. B.H.H. Securities Pvt. Limited and others, 2012 (1) SCC 594 ; (VII) Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 . 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent land-holders, Mr.S.M.Kalwad also relying upon the following judgments submitted that to meet the ends of justice, the learned Court below has not only set aside the arbitral award, but since there is no prohibition under Section 34 of the Act to award the appropriate compensation to the land-holders, the learned District Judge has rightly enhanced the compensation and therefore, the appeal filed by the NHAI deserves to be dismissed. He relied upon the following decisions: 1. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., Vs. SAW Pipes Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2629 ; 2. Fiza Developers And Inter-Trade Private Limited Vs. AMCI (INDIA) Limited And Another, 2009 (6) KAR. L.J. 576 (SC); 3. Delhi Development Authority Vs. R.S. Sharma and Company, New Delhi. (2008) 13 (SCC) 80 ; 4. The Project Director Vs. R. Karuppaiah And Another, Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.650/2013 to 680/2013 (DD-30/08/2013); 5. Hasanali Khanbhai and sons Vs. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 422 ; 6. Hindustan Zinc Ltd Vs. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 (SCC) 445 ; 7. Lalita and others Vs. Union of India, New Delhi and others, ILR 2002 KAR 259 : AIR 2003 Kar. 165 : 2003 (1) Kar.L.J. 403 8. P. Radhakrishna Murthy Vs. NBCC Limited, 2013 (4) KLJ 161 (SC); 9. Namit Sharma Vs. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 745 ; 10. M.V. Elizbeth and others Vs. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatonpeth, Vasco De Gasma, Goa. AIR 1993 SC 1014 . 5. 165 : 2003 (1) Kar.L.J. 403 8. P. Radhakrishna Murthy Vs. NBCC Limited, 2013 (4) KLJ 161 (SC); 9. Namit Sharma Vs. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 745 ; 10. M.V. Elizbeth and others Vs. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatonpeth, Vasco De Gasma, Goa. AIR 1993 SC 1014 . 5. We have heard both the learned counsels and perused the records. 6. We express our deep concern, anguish and displeasure over the manner in which the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad (Mr.K.Natarajan) has dealt with the application filed by the land-holders under Section 34 of the Act which prescribes the conditions under which an Arbitral Award can be set aside by the Court. Subsection (2) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 permits the Court to do so, only if any of the specified five conditions are satisfied for that and then the Court can set aside the Arbitral Award, otherwise the Court cannot interfere with the Award passed by the Arbitration Tribunal which has been given the finality under the provisions of the 1996 Act and is at par of an executable civil decree passed by the competent court, in contra-distinction of the provisions of the old Arbitration Act of 1940, under which an arbitration award was required to be first made a rule of Court before being executed through a Civil Court. 7. The provisions of Section 34 of the Act read as under: 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.— (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). 7. The provisions of Section 34 of the Act read as under: 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.— (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if— (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that— (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that— (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. [Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,— (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] [(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence.] (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under subsection (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. [(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.]” 8. Firstly, we are not aware how the learned Court below chose to describe the said application under Section 34 of the Act as an Arbitration Suit No.5 of 2012. The application under Section 34 of the Act cannot partake the character of a Civil suit at all. Firstly, we are not aware how the learned Court below chose to describe the said application under Section 34 of the Act as an Arbitration Suit No.5 of 2012. The application under Section 34 of the Act cannot partake the character of a Civil suit at all. Not only the application was labelled as civil suit, but the learned Court below proceeded even to decree it with costs like that only and ended up enhancing the compensation. 9. The reasons assigned by the learned Court below are quoted below for ready reference: “11. On perusal of cross examination of PW-1 and other materials on record it is an admitted fact that defendant No. I has passed the award for Varur village for the land acquired by the highway authority based on the guidelines issued by the Sub Registrar Hubli as per Ex.P-2. However the defendant No.I has not given 50% additional weightage per the guidelines issued by the Sub Registrar as per foot note No.2. therefore, the defendant No.2 arbitrator under the Act, enhanced the compensation at 50% by giving additional weightage as the land of the plaintiffs were adjoining the national highway. 12. As per Ex. P-2 rates per sq. feet are fixed by the Sub Registrar Hubli in respect of the land at Varur village Rs. 25/-per sq. feet in respect of the residential premises as per foot note No.I. It was stated therein by the Sub Registrar that for the purpose of commercial activity the value should be double i. e., Rs. 50/-per sq. feet. By considering the foot note no.I in Ex. P-2 the highway authority awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 50/-per sq. feet or Rs.538-20 per sq. meter by deducting 50% towards developmental charges. When the same was challenged before the arbitrator / Deputy Commissioner, additional weightage as per the guidelines issued by the Sub Registrar, Hubli was given to the lands of the plaintiffs, but however the defendant No.II also deducted 50% of the value towards the developmental charges. Therefore the present suit is fled by the plaintiffs to set aside the award and to modify the award in respect of deduction of 50% value towards the developmental charges. 13. Except this contention there is no other ground urged by the plaintiffs in this suit and all other things are admitted by the plaintiffs. Therefore the present suit is fled by the plaintiffs to set aside the award and to modify the award in respect of deduction of 50% value towards the developmental charges. 13. Except this contention there is no other ground urged by the plaintiffs in this suit and all other things are admitted by the plaintiffs. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex court in a number of decision that under section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the court need not interfere with the award passed by the Arbitrator unless it is shown to the court that a patent illegality or error was committed by the Arbitrator while awarding the compensation. In a decision reported in 2003 (5) SCC 705 , in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Saw pipes Ltd., the Hon’ble Apex court has rules as under: “An award contrary to substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or against the terms of the contract, would be patently illegal and if it affects the rights of the parties, open to interference by court under section 34 (2) of the Act. …if the arbitral tribunal has not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under the act, it would mean that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction and thereby the award would be patently illegal which could be set aside under section 34” 14. Keeping in mind the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court in the above case, now coming the case on hand, the defendant No.II has enhanced the compensation by 50% by giving additional weightage to the acquired lands of the plaintiffs but deduction to the extent of 50% was also made by him towards the developmental charges and the same is challenged by the plaintiffs. 15. The counsel for the plaintiffs argued that if the lands are acquired for the purpose of laying residential plots or for industrial purpose, then only deductions should be made towards the developmental charges and not otherwise. He further contended that in the case on hand the lands were acquired for the purpose of widening the road and not for laying the plots or for industrial purpose. In support of his arguments the counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on a ruling reported in 2009 (3) KCCR 2133 in the case of C.R.Nagaraja Shetty Vs. He further contended that in the case on hand the lands were acquired for the purpose of widening the road and not for laying the plots or for industrial purpose. In support of his arguments the counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on a ruling reported in 2009 (3) KCCR 2133 in the case of C.R.Nagaraja Shetty Vs. SLAO, where the Hon’ble Supreme court has held as under: “Land Acquisition Act 1894, S. 4 – Public purpose -development charges – Public purpose for which the land was acquired, was for widening of the National Highway -unable to point out any such evidence regarding the proposed development -We cannot ignore the fact that the land is acquired only for widening of the national Highway -There would, therefore, be no question of any such development or any costs therefore”. 16. The counsel for the plaintiffs also relied on another ruling reported in ILR 2006 Kar. 154 in the case of SLAO Vs. Vyjanath Since dead by Lrs., where the Hon’ble High court has held as under : “The deduction for civic amenities is to be made when the land is acquired for housing purpose –For other purpose when the land is acquired the land will be fully utilized and no deduction towards civic amenities is permissible. The compensation awarded by the reference court is inadequate”. 17. In both the cases above, the Hon’ble High court and the Hon’ble Apex court have held that deductions are permissible if the lands are acquired for housing purpose to provide civic amenities and in other cases since the lands were fully utilized there is no question of deduction towards developmental charges. 18. In the case on hand admittedly the lands of the plaintiff were acquired for the purpose of widening the highway and not for laying the housing plots. The land acquired by the authority was fully utilized for widening the road. Such being the case deduction of 50% of the value towards the developmental charges by the defendant Nos.I and II is patently illegal. Therefore, this court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the award passed by the Arbitrator, since there is apparent error committed on the face of records. 19. Such being the case deduction of 50% of the value towards the developmental charges by the defendant Nos.I and II is patently illegal. Therefore, this court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the award passed by the Arbitrator, since there is apparent error committed on the face of records. 19. On the other hand the counsel for the defendant No. I argued that in respect of acquisition of land belonging to other claimants out of block No.340/A+B, there were buildings situated on the said land, hence there was no deduction of any developmental charges. He further argued that in respect of the lands of the plaintiffs there were no buildings and the acquired land was agricultural land and as such 50% of the value was deducted for the development charges, 20. Admittedly in the award on page No.21 Sl.No.33, the defendant No.I has considered structures and the buildings on the lands of the claimants in other case in Sy. No.340/A+B and awarded the compensation without any deductions whereas, on page No. 15 at Sl. No. 2 in respect of the acquired lands of the plaintiffs he has stated that no structures or building were found and accordingly awarded the compensation of Rs.17,51,572/-. In this regard the counsel for the defendant No.I further argued that the lands of the plaintiffs were considered as Non-Agricultural lands, therefore, the question of any building or the structure does not arise. But once the lands are considered as NA lands, the compensation shall be awarded equally as awarded to the adjacent lands acquired for the same purpose and there shall not be any discrimination. 21. On perusal of the award passed by the Deputy Commissioner, though he has enhanced the compensation in respect of the land of other claimants out of Sy.No.340/A+B by relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 651 on the principle that compensation awarded to the nearby land is relevant to determine the compensation. The Arbitrator has also placed reliance on another ruling of the Hon’ble Delhi High court reported in AIR 1996 Delhi 101 to the effect that lands from same village categorized in the same block and acquired under the same notification cannot be awarded different rates. The Arbitrator has also placed reliance on another ruling of the Hon’ble Delhi High court reported in AIR 1996 Delhi 101 to the effect that lands from same village categorized in the same block and acquired under the same notification cannot be awarded different rates. By considering the above rulings the defendant No.II has enhanced the compensation at 50% to the acquired lands of the claimants in other case under Ex.P-4 but the same yardstick was not applied by the defendant No.II while awarding the compensation to the plaintiffs. Merely on the ground that in other cases there were structures and buildings but in the lands of the plaintiffs there were no structures and buildings and hence he deducted 50% towards the developmental charges, is not a good ground. As held by the Hon’ble Apex court in a ruling reported in 2009 (3) KCCR 2133 referred to above and relied on by the counsel for the plaintiffs when the land was acquired for the purpose of widening the road, the question of deduction does not arise. The award passed by the defendant No. I itself goes to show that he has considered the land of the plaintiffs as non agricultural commercial land. Once the land is considered as non agricultural and commercial land, the defendants cannot go back to deduct 50% of the value towards the developmental charges and there shall not be any discrimination in respect of the compensation awarded to the lands of the plaintiffs and to the lands of other claimants. Merely the lands of the plaintiffs were situated far away from the village limits that itself is not a ground to reject the claim of the plaintiffs. Therefore, I hold that defendant Nos.I and II have committed serious error and illegality while deducting 50% value towards the developmental charges. Therefore, the deduction made by the defendant Nos.I and II towards developmental charges is illegal and liable to be set aside. Hence I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to the compensation equal to that the compensation awarded to the other claimants under Ex.P-4 with additional 50% weightage ie., at the rate of Rs. 75/-per sq. feet or Rs. 807-30 per sq. meter. Hence I answer Point Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative. 22. Hence I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to the compensation equal to that the compensation awarded to the other claimants under Ex.P-4 with additional 50% weightage ie., at the rate of Rs. 75/-per sq. feet or Rs. 807-30 per sq. meter. Hence I answer Point Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative. 22. Point No. 2 :-For the foregoing reasons, I proceed to pass the following:- ORDER The suit filed under section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 is decreed with costs. The awards passed by the defendant Nos. I and II in No. NH4/CALAQ-II-26/2004-05 dtd. 23-6-2004 and in LAQ/ARBN/AP/Cr No. 166+215/2005-06 dtd. 3-6-2011 in respect of deduction of 50% market value towards developmental charges for Block No. 5 of the Varur village are set aside. The plaintiffs are entitled for the compensation at the rate of Rs. 75/-per sq. feet or Rs. 807-30 per sq. meter in respect of acquired extent of their lands out of Block No.5 of Varur village, with interest and other statutory benefits. Sent copy of the judgment along with the LCR to the concerned forthwith. (Dictated to the Judgment Writer, transcript computerized, corrected and then pronounced by me in the open Court, this the 29th day of September, 2012). Sd/ (K. NATARAJAN) PRL. DIST & SESSIONS JUDGE, DHARWAD.” 10. We are satisfied that in view of the settled legal position which is delineated below, the learned Court below has grossly erred in setting aside the Arbitral Award and has further compounded the said error by substituting its own valuation and compensation amount which was simply not permitted within the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Swan Gold Mining Limited Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited (supra), in paragraph 12 of the judgment held as under: “12. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 corresponds to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 making a provision for setting aside the arbitral award. In terms of subsection (2) of Section 34 of the Act, an arbitral award may be set aside only if one of the conditions specified therein is satisfied. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 corresponds to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 making a provision for setting aside the arbitral award. In terms of subsection (2) of Section 34 of the Act, an arbitral award may be set aside only if one of the conditions specified therein is satisfied. The Arbitrator’s decision is generally considered binding between the parties and therefore, the power of the Court to set aside the award would be exercised only in cases where the Court finds that the arbitral award is on the face of it erroneous or patently illegal or in contravention of the provisions of the Act. It is a well settled proposition that the Court shall not ordinarily substitute its interpretation for that of the Arbitrator. Similarly, when the parties have arrived at a concluded contract and acted on the basis of those terms and conditions of the contract then substituting new terms in the contract by the Arbitrator or by the Court would be erroneous or illegal.” 12. In M/s.Navodaya Mass Entertainment Vs. M/s. J.M.Combines, the Hon’ble Apex Court again reiterated that the scope of interference by the Court under Section 34 of the Act is very limited and the Court is not justified in re-appraising the material on record and substitute its own view in place of the abitrators view. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below: “In our opinion, the scope of interference of the Court is very limited. Court would not be justified in reappraising the material on record and substituting its own view in place of the Arbitrator’s view. Where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or the Arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position, then and then only it would be justified in interfering with the award published by the Arbitrator. Once the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the Court cannot re-appraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail. (See: Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC 109 ; Ravindra & Associates Vs. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 80 ; Madnani Construction Corporation Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 1 SCC 549 ; Associated Construction Vs. (See: Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC 109 ; Ravindra & Associates Vs. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 80 ; Madnani Construction Corporation Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 1 SCC 549 ; Associated Construction Vs. Pawanhans Helicopters Limited, (2008) 16 SCC 128 ; and Satna Stone & Lime Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr., (2008) 14 SCC 785 ).” 13. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in H.M.Shankaramurthy Vs. National Highways Authority of India, Project, 2010 ILR (Kar) 3711, also re-iterated this position in paragraph 13 as under: “13. A provision for setting aside an award contending that the award is not sustainable in law on any one of the grounds as indicated above can never be construed as a provision enabling the land owner seeking for enhancement of the compensation amount as determined by the Arbitrator. The learned Judge of the District Court has rightly rejected the application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The application itself was not tenable. The appeal also is equally not tenable and even otherwise without any merit.” 14. The Kolkota High Court in National Highways Authority of India Vs. Gammon India Limited (supra), held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, the Court does not sit as a court of appeal and the Arbitral Tribunal is the final adjudicator of the facts and evidence adduced before it. Paragraph 28 of the judgment is quoted below for ready reference: “(28) We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. Detailed submission was made on the merits of the disputes between the parties. Although we did not stop the learned Counsel from making their submission, we do not think that the same is very germane since this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act does not sit as the Court of appeal. It is settled law that the Arbitral Tribunal is the final adjudicator of the facts and evidence adduced before it. We do not find any perversity or anything contrary to public policy or the law of the land in the award. The view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible view and just because the Court may have a different view, the arbitral award should not be interfered with Under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. We do not find any perversity or anything contrary to public policy or the law of the land in the award. The view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible view and just because the Court may have a different view, the arbitral award should not be interfered with Under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The scope of Section 34 is very limited and advisedly so. When two commercial parties agree to have their disputes resolved through arbitration reference, they should be bound by the award of the Arbitral Tribunal unless, of course, rules of natural justice have been breached or there is something so shocking in the award staring at the face of the court that would prompt the Court to interfere. We find nothing like that in the instant case. (29) We are of the considered view that the Learned Judge applied the correct principles of law as discussed by us above and rightly refused to interfere with the arbitral award. We are in complete agreement with the judgment and order of the learned Judge in the Court below. This appeal fails and is dismissed without, however, any order as to costs. I agree.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, 2010 (11) SCC 296 , in paragraph 43 held as under: “43. In the present case, the findings and award of the umpire are rendered after considering the material on record and giving due weightage to all the terms of the contract. Calling the same to be perverse is highly unfair to the umpire. The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one's own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Manufacturing Corporation versus Central Warehousing Corporation reported in (2009) 5 SCC 142 , the court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. As held by this Court in Kwality Manufacturing Corporation versus Central Warehousing Corporation reported in (2009) 5 SCC 142 , the court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the material before him and after interpreting the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding.” 16. In P.R.Shah, Shares and Stock Brokers Pvt. Limited Vs. B.H.H. Securities Pvt. Limited and others, 2012 (1) SCC 594 , again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 21 held as under: “21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an arbitral tribunal by re-assessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in section 34(2) of the Act. The arbitral tribunal has examined the facts and held that both second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye Law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.” 17. In Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 46, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that none of the grounds contained in Section 34(2)(a) of the Act permitted dealing with the merits of the decision rendered by an abitral award and unless the award is in conflict with the public policy of India, the same cannot be interfered with and it can be set aside only on the grounds mentioned under Section 34(2)(a) and (b) of the Act and not otherwise. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below from the Head Note as under: “Section 34 in conjunction with Section 5 makes it clear that an arbitration award that is governed by part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be set aside only on grounds mentioned under Section 34 (2) and (3), and not otherwise. It is important to note that the 1996 Act was enacted to replace the 1940 Arbitration Act in order to provide for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of arbitration; also to provide that the tribunal gives reasons for an arbitral award; to ensure that the tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction; and to minimize the supervisory roles of courts in the arbitral process.” 18. As against the aforesaid judgments, which lay down the correct legal position, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-landholders are of no avail to the respondents. 19. In M. V. Elisabeth and others Vs. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa, 1993 AIR SC 1014 in paragraph 65, the Court held that where a statute is silent and remedy has to be sought by recourse to basic principles, it is the duty of the Court to devise procedural rules by analogy and expediency. Para 65 of the said judgment is quoted below for ready reference: “65. Where statutes are silent and remedy has to be sought by recourse to basic principles, it is the duty of the court to devise procedural rules by analogy and expediency. Actions in rem, as seen above, were resorted to by courts as a device to overcome the difficulty of personal service on the defendant by compelling him to enter appearance and accept service of summons with a view to furnishing security for the release of the res; or, in his absence, proceed against the res itself, by attributing to it a personality for the purpose of entering a decree and executing the same by sale of the res. This is a practical procedural device developed by the courts with a view to rendering justice in accordance with substantive law not only in cases of collision and salvage, but also in cases of other maritime liens and claims arising by reason of breach of contract for the hire of vessels or the carriage of goods or other maritime transactions, or tortious acts, such as conversion or negligence occurring in connection with the carriage of goods. Where substantive law demands justice for the party aggrieved, and the statute has not provided the remedy, it is the duty of the court to devise procedure by drawing analogy from other systems of law and practice. To the courts of the "civil law countries" in Europe and other places, like problems seldom arise, for all persons and things within their territories (including their waters) fall within their competence to deal with. They do not have to draw any distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam.” This judgment is in an entirely different context about the procedure to serve the summons, but it has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondents wholly out of context and has no application to the facts of the present case. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. SAW Pipes Limited, AIR 2003 SC 2629 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an arbitral award contrary to the provisions of substantive law or Act or terms of contract can be set aside under Section 34 of the Act. We do not find any such material on record on the basis of which, the award could be held illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act and therefore, the said judgment is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 21. We do not find any such material on record on the basis of which, the award could be held illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act and therefore, the said judgment is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 21. In Delhi Development Authority vs. R.S.Sharma, (2008) 13 SCC 18, again the Hon’ble Court was dealing with a case where the contractor carrying out the works contract for the Delhi Development Authority claimed extra rate of cartage over and above the contractual rate and the Court found that there was nothing on record to show that the Delhi Development Authority had insisted upon bringing the correct stone only from a particular place Nooh, in such circumstances, in view of the Arbitral Award being beyond the terms and conditions of the contract, which was binding on the parties, the arbitral award for extra cartage in favour of the contractor was held to be an error on the face of the record which was liable to be set aside under Section 34 of the Act. The facts and circumstances of the present case, on the contrary, reflect that the learned court below has substituted its own wisdom for awarding the higher compensation without any valid rhyme or reasons. 22. Another case of Madras High Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Project Director Vs. R.Karuppaiah and another (supra), is also of no help to the respondents. In that case, although, the learned Principal District Judge, Madhurai, enhanced the compensation for acquisition of land which was upheld by the High Court, but the question as to whether this could be done within the ambit and scope of Section 34 of the Act was neither raised nor discussed by the Madras High Court. The Hon’ble Madras High Court vide paragraph Nos.29 and 38 of the said judgment appears to have proceeded on the assumption that proper compensation is to be awarded for the land acquired under National Highways Authority Act and the guidance for determination of compensation is provided in Section 3-G(7)(a) of the Act and since the prices of lands are almost like gold prices, and the value of the lands are on increase and it is the general trend in the market, therefore, the compensation fixed by the learned Principal District Judge was held to be appropriate. 23. 23. We respectfully disagree with the said view taken by the Hon’ble Madras High Court, which did not consider the limitations in Section 34 of the Act and we are of the considered opinion that while dealing with the application for setting aside the Arbitral Award, unless the material is placed before the Court for satisfying him on the existence of the specified grounds under Section 34(2) of the Act, the arbitration award cannot be set aside and the Court is not entitled to substitute its own judgment or valuation in the cases for awarding compensation in the land acquisition matters under National Highways Authority Act or any other similar acquisition law. 24. Therefore, we are of the clear opinion that the Court below has erred in allowing the Application under Section 34 of the Act of the land-owners and the present appeal of the National Highways Authority deserves to be allowed. The same is accordingly allowed and the impugned order dated 29th September 2012 of the Court below is set aside. No costs. 25. Before we part with, we consider it appropriate to request the Registrar General to issue appropriate Circular with the prior approval of Hon’ble the Chief Justice to all the Subordinate Courts below to register Application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as a petition and not as Arbitration Suit.