JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner - Indian Red Cross Society and Mr. Panchal, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. The petitioner placed under challenge award dated 12.9.2006 passed by the learned Labour Court at Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No. 1226 of 1995 whereby the learned Labour Court directed the petitioner society to reinstate the claimant on his original post with continuity of service, however, without backwages. 3. So far as the factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record that - "(i) the claimant was appointed as Junior Clerk w.e.f. 29.10.1984, vide appointment order dated 6.11.1984. He was engaged, inter alia, on trial basis of 3 months and with the stipulation that thereafter his service may be engaged on probation for further 12 months; (ii) after said 3 months (i.e. after 28.1.1985) the claimant was continued on probation for 12 months i.e. till 28.1.1986 and thereafter, vide order dated 2.1.1986, his probation was extended for further 3 months (i.e. till 28.4.1986), but he was continued (even after 28.4.1986) for one more month; (iii) and his service came to be terminated w.e.f. 31.5.1986 vide office order dated 20.5.1986; (iv) feeling aggrieved by the said order terminating his service, the claimant approached the learned Civil Court and filed Regular Civil Suit No. 3269 of 1986. The plaint was filed on or after 28.5.1986. In the suit, present respondent prayed for declaration that the termination of his service is illegal. He also prayed for restraint order against the society to the effect that his service should not be terminated; (v) the suit was opposed by the society on the ground that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to try the suit and appropriate remedy would be before the learned Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short). The said objection against maintainability of the suit was taken at initial stage, i.e. immediately after the plaint was filed; (vi) it appears that the request for interim relief was rejected and therefore, the claimant filed Appeal from Order in the High Court which was registered as Appeal from Order No. 192 of 1986. The said objection against maintainability of the suit was taken at initial stage, i.e. immediately after the plaint was filed; (vi) it appears that the request for interim relief was rejected and therefore, the claimant filed Appeal from Order in the High Court which was registered as Appeal from Order No. 192 of 1986. It also appears that subsequently, the said Appeal from Order was withdrawn by present claimant; (vii) Thereafter, he submitted a purshis dated 28.10.1994 before the learned Civil Court declaring that he wants to withdraw the suit with a view to instituting appropriate proceedings before the learned Labour Court; (viii) the learned Civil Court, vide order dated 28.10.1994, granted permission and the suit came to be conditionally withdrawn; (ix) meaning thereby a suit which was instituted in 1986, came to be withdrawn in 1994; (x) thereafter, the claimant raised industrial dispute and appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court at Ahmedabad. The dispute was registered as Reference (LCA) No. 1226 of 1995. In the said reference, the learned Labour Court has passed impugned award." 4. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner society assailed the award on the premise that - "(a) the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the reference was hit by delay and laches and such stale claim should not have been entertained. Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director of Sericulture Department and others [(2015) 15 SCC 1]; (b) the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the claimant was appointed for temporary period and at the relevant time, he was on probation. Since the service came to be discontinued on completion of probation period, the provisions under section 2(oo) and section 25F would not be applicable; (c) Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner society relied on the observations by the learned Labour Court in the impugned award that the claimant admitted that he was appointed for temporary period and that his service was terminated on completion of the work/job he was engaged for. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner society relied on the observations by the learned Labour Court in the impugned award that the claimant admitted that he was appointed for temporary period and that his service was terminated on completion of the work/job he was engaged for. In view the said observation, it is claimed that the provision under section 25F would not be attracted; (d) the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that vide his own request dated 1.8.1986, the claimant had requested that unpaid amount towards balance leave may be paid and service (experience) certificate may be issued and that after said request and after receiving the amount as well as the certificate, the dispute did not survive and the claimant could not have prosecuted the reference." 5. Besides above mentioned contentions, Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner society raised usual contentions against the award, viz. that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record, the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court are erroneous and contrary to evidence and that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate relevant provisions and the learned Labour Court also ignored the admission by the claimant. He also contended that the directions to reinstate the claimant with continuity of service are not justified. 6. Mr. Panchal, learned advocate for the claimant submitted that the suit was withdrawn with permission by the learned Civil Court and with specific condition that the claimant wants to institute appropriate proceedings before appropriate forum and that, therefore, the institution of the proceedings before the learned Labour Court cannot be objected to or it cannot be considered that the proceedings before the learned Labour Court were not maintainable. He also submitted that the claimant was bona fide prosecuting remedy which was, unfortunately, not proper remedy and therefore, the proceedings cannot be opposed on ground of delay or on the ground that it is stale claim. He also contended that the service of the claimant was terminated without following procedure prescribed by law and the learned Labour Court, having found that the employer had not followed the procedure prescribed by law, passed the impugned order and that there is no error in the award and the same may not be interfered with. 7. I have heard rival submissions as well as the impugned award and material available on record. 8. 7. I have heard rival submissions as well as the impugned award and material available on record. 8. In present case, the factum of present respondent's employment with the petitioner society is not in dispute. The date of joining the service with the petitioner society and the date of termination from service are also not in dispute. The length of service, i.e. total period of employment with the petitioner is also not in dispute. 8.1 On conjoint consideration of the said facts, it emerges that the claimant worked with the petitioner society from 6.11.1984 to 31.5.1986, i.e. for more than 12 months and during the said tenure, he worked for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months. 9. In present case, it is also not in dispute that at the time when the service of the claimant was terminated, the petitioner society did not comply the procedure and conditions prescribed by section 25F. 10. The notice pay and/or retrenchment compensation were not paid to the claimant at the time when his service came to be discontinued. 11. In the aforesaid background, question arises as to whether provision under section 25F of the Act would be applicable or not. 12. Any issue on the ground that the petitioner society is not an industry, was neither raised nor proved before the learned Labour Court. Therefore, question of examining the said issue does not arise in present petition. 13. The order under which the claimant came to be appointed, is available on record. The said appointment letter reads thus: "No. STF/APT/887 6th November 1984 OFFICE ORDER With reference to his application dated 11th January 1984, and subsequent personal interviews, Shri Surendra Ambalal Panchal is hereby appointed as a Junior Clerk on the monthly salary of Rs. 421.50 plus D.A. as per Minimum Wages Act, with effect from 29.10.1984. No other allowances in any form will be admissible. He will be on a trial basis of three months. If his work is found satisfactory, he will be continued on probation for further twelve months. He should note that his appointment is purely temporary and his services are liable to be terminated at any time without any notice. His appointment is subject to the production of the original certificates with regard to his qualifications, date of birth etc. He will be required to work at such other departments as asked by the undersigned. He should note that his appointment is purely temporary and his services are liable to be terminated at any time without any notice. His appointment is subject to the production of the original certificates with regard to his qualifications, date of birth etc. He will be required to work at such other departments as asked by the undersigned. This may please be confirmed." 14. On plain reading of the said order, it emerges that there is no stipulation and/or any clear and specific intimation to the claimant that his appointment is for temporary duration and/or that his appointment is the is engaged for) specified work/job and for fixed period and on completion of the work/job and/or on expiry of fixed period, his appointment with the society will come to an end. The said appointment order also does not declare and specifically state that on completion of the period mentioned in the appointment order, the period of employment will expire and his service will automatically stand terminated. On the contrary, the appointment order declares that the claimant shall work on trial basis for initial 3 months and thereafter he will work on probation basis and a window is kept open for continuing him for further period. Of course, the appointment order declares that the appointment is temporary and his service is liable to be terminated at any time without notice, however, specific period of employment or specific nature for job for which the claimant was appointed and/or that the work for which the claimant was employed, was of temporary duration, etc., are not mentioned. 15. In this view of the matter, appointment of respondent would not fall within purview of clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act {see: in case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka [ (2003) 4 SCC 27 }. 16. There is another reason for holding that the respondent's appointment would not fall within purview of section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act because vide office order dated 2.1.1986, the claimant's service was extended upto 28.4.1986. 17. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka [ (2003) 4 SCC 27 }. 16. There is another reason for holding that the respondent's appointment would not fall within purview of section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act because vide office order dated 2.1.1986, the claimant's service was extended upto 28.4.1986. 17. Even if it is assumed, for the sake of examining petitioner's contention, that the period of respondent's employment with the petitioner society was limited upto 28.4.1986, then also the facts obtaining on record belies the said contention inasmuch as the service of the claimant was continued even after 28.4.1986 and he came to be terminated on 31.5.1986 vide office order dated 20.5.1986. 18. Under the circumstances, it can neither be held that the service of the claimant was terminated on completion of period of probation and/or on completion of the fixed and temporary period of employment. In this view of the matter, the contention should fail. 19. Besides this, learned advocate for the petitioner failed to show any provision which empowered the petitioner society to fix the period of probation for period of more than 6 months. 20. Even if it is assumed that the society was competent to fix the period of probation beyond 6 months, then also the petitioner cannot be termed to be on probation at the time when his service was discontinued inasmuch as the claimant's service came to be terminated in May 1986 and there is nothing on record to prove that the claimant's probation was extended till 30.5.1986. 21. Learned advocate for the petitioner has not shown any provision which conferred authority to the society to fix period of probation for more than 6 months. Learned advocate for the petitioner also failed to satisfy the Court that even if it is assumed that period of probation was fixed by special contract, i.e. appointment order, such contract would prevail over statutory provision which restricts probation period to 6 months and even if the said condition in the appointment order is treated as binding to the claimant, then also the termination would not fall within the purview of termination of service on completion of probation period because the claimant's service came to be terminated more than one month after the so-called extended probation came to an end on 28.4.1986 the was terminated on 30.5.1986). 22. 22. For all these reasons, the petitioner is not entitled to claim and contend that the respondent's service came to be terminated on completion of probation period and/or that the respondent's appointment was covered under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act and therefore, section 25F would not be attracted in present case. 23. Foregoing discussion brings out that the claimant's service came to be terminated without following mandatory provision prescribed under section 25F of the Act. Consequently, the findings and conclusions by the learned Labour Court holding that the termination of claimant's service was illegal, cannot be faulted. The said conclusion and finding, therefore, cannot be disturbed. 24. This situation brings in picture the issue about appropriate relief. 25. The petitioner society is justified in contending that the claimant was put to a notice about the fact that the suit is not maintainable and the learned Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. 25.1 Despite this fact, the claimant continued the suit proceeding for almost 8 years and he approached the learned Civil Court to withdraw the suit as late as in 1994. 25.2 Even the plea raised by the claimant before the learned Labour Court about pendency of the Appeal from Order would not help the claimant because in his application dated 1.8.1986 addressed to the society, the claimant had claimed that he has withdrawn the proceeding. The learned Labour Court has proceeded on the premise that the reference of withdrawal of the proceeding in the application dated 1.8.1986 related to Appeal from Order No. 192 of 1986. Consequently, as per the respondent's declaration before the learned Labour Court the appeal was not pending after 1.8.1986. 25.3 Under the circumstances, there was no reason or justification to continue and keep pending the civil proceedings even after the society raised objection before the learned Civil Court and in any case, after withdrawal of the appeal from the High Court. 25.4 In this background, question arises as to whether the petitioner's inaction with regard to the proceeding before the learned Civil Court and/or his inaction in raising industrial dispute will convert the respondent's dispute into stale claim. 26. 25.4 In this background, question arises as to whether the petitioner's inaction with regard to the proceeding before the learned Civil Court and/or his inaction in raising industrial dispute will convert the respondent's dispute into stale claim. 26. Ordinarily, in view of the fact that the proceedings were pending before the learned Civil Court and the said proceedings came to be withdrawn conditionally, the said delay in raising industrial dispute would not convert respondent's dispute into stale claim, though delay or laches can be attributed to the claimant. 27. However, in present case, it has emerged that during the said interregnum, i.e. from the date when the petitioner society raised objection against maintainability of the suit and until his deposition came to be recorded before the learned Labour Court, the claimant was, according to his own admission, continuously gainfully employed in one or another establishment. 28. It is interesting that at one place of employment, the claimant himself voluntarily abandoned the service because he felt that his salary was too less. 29. In view of such facts, it appears that the claimant was continuously gainfully employed and that, therefore, he had abandoned the proceeding before the learned Civil Court and he did not take any steps to prosecute the suit proceeding before the learned Civil Court or to institute reference proceeding before the learned Labour Court. The claimant was completely in 'inaction mode' so far as the civil court proceedings are concerned and it appears that he was satisfied with the employment in which he was gainfully engaged. 30. Of course, the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe any period of limitation, however, that does not mean that the Court which adjudicates the dispute, would ignore the fact about laches as well as delay while evaluating conduct of the claimant. A person who belatedly approaches the Court and raises the claim after inordinate delay, is obliged to offer explanation to the Court and he must make out sufficient cause, by offering satisfactory explanation for raising dispute belatedly. 31. In absence of satisfactory explanation, the Court can exercise discretion for refusing relief. 32. In present case, it has emerged that except the fact that he had filed a suit and the suit remained pending for almost 8 years, the claimant did not offer any explanation for the delay caused in raising industrial dispute. 31. In absence of satisfactory explanation, the Court can exercise discretion for refusing relief. 32. In present case, it has emerged that except the fact that he had filed a suit and the suit remained pending for almost 8 years, the claimant did not offer any explanation for the delay caused in raising industrial dispute. The said fact is coupled with the fact that during interregnum the claimant was gainfully employed. 33. While passing the direction granting continuity of service, the learned Labour Court failed to take into account above mentioned facts and circumstances. 34. In light of the said facts and circumstances, benefit of relief of continuity of service should not have been granted and the said relief should have been denied in same manner in which the learned Labour Court denied backwages. 35. Now, question, which survives, is with regard to the direction to reinstate the claimant. 36. Foregoing discussion has brought out that the petitioner committed breach of mandatory condition while terminating service of the claimant. The said defect in petitioner's action would, ordinarily, earn reinstatement for the claimant. 36.1 However, in present case, it has emerged that the claimant was almost in gainful employment during the interregnum. 36.2 Further, the proceedings before the learned Labour Court were hit by delay and laches. 36.3 Moreover, on record it appears that at the time when the claimant instituted the suit, his age was 30 years. Thus, as of now, the claimant must have attained age of superannuation (i.e. 58 years/60 years). 36.4 Besides this, almost 30 years have passed since the claimant's service was discontinued. 36.5 For these reasons, the order directing the reinstatement of the claimant deserves to be modified. In light of the facts and circumstance, proper relief would be of lump sum compensation. 37. Having regard to above discussed facts and the last drawn salary of the claimant, this Court is of the view that if the petitioner is directed to pay Rs. 15,000/- as lump sum compensation to the claimant, then equity would be balanced and the said direction would meet ends of justice. Therefore, following order is passed: "(a) The petition is partly allowed. The impugned award is partly set aside and modified. (b) The order directing the petitioner society to reinstate the claimant is set aside and modified by awarding lump sum compensation of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only). Therefore, following order is passed: "(a) The petition is partly allowed. The impugned award is partly set aside and modified. (b) The order directing the petitioner society to reinstate the claimant is set aside and modified by awarding lump sum compensation of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only). (c) Since the direction to reinstate the claimant is set aside and modified, the direction granting continuity of service would not survive. (d) The petitioner society shall pay aforesaid lump sum compensation to the claimant as expeditiously as possible and preferably within eight weeks from the receipt of the certified copy of this judgment." With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, the petition is disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.