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2017 DIGILAW 904 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Nanduben

2017-04-27

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant - State has filed the present criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order, dated 20.6.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 69 of 2005, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Ahmedabad whereby, the trial court has been pleased to acquit the respondents accused from the charges for which he has been tried. 2. The facts leading to the rise of the case of prosecution is that complainant Varshaben, who is the daughter of Mohanbhai Chavada, gave her complaint on 9.11.2004 while she was in LG Hospital in burns ward taking treatment of burns injuries. It has been asserted in the complaint that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 - accused persons committed an offence along with one accused Arvindbhai Hirabhai Chavada (died). By asserting that on account of dispute related to property, on 9.4.2011 the complainant and brother Dilip, who were at the house and other family members were out for their respective works, the respondents accused with one another co-accused Arvindbhai came to their house, gave abuse and accused Arvindbhai, who was armed with knife, was trying to inflict blow on the brother of the complainant, she came in between for rescue and on account of which, the deceased accused Arvindbhai along with another co-accused Nanudben, wife of Arvindbhai and son-in-law Mukesh picked up the complainant, dragged her to their house by lifting and accused Mukesh and Nanduben caught hold the complainant and accused Arvind poured kerosene and ignited the fire and on account of which she sustained serious injuries. In that process, it is the case of prosecution that the complainant caught Nanduben's sari as well as Arvindbhai, on account of which they also sustained burns injuries and crowd gathered at the house and extinguished fire and in that process, the complainant was taken to the hospital for treatment. The said complaint came to be registered as I.C.R. No. 44 of 2004 at Kagdapith Police Station, Ahmedabad initially for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. However, the complainant later on succumbed to the injuries. Resultantly, offence of Section 302 of IPC came to be added which upon receipt of the said complaint came to be investigated by the Investigating Officer. However, the complainant later on succumbed to the injuries. Resultantly, offence of Section 302 of IPC came to be added which upon receipt of the said complaint came to be investigated by the Investigating Officer. Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer has filed the charge-sheet before the Magistrate and after having found that the offence is triable by the court of sessions, the same came to be transmitted to the court of Sessions after passing a committal order under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. It was then registered as Sessions Case No. 69 of 2005 which came up for consideration before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Ahmedabad. 2.1 Upon committal, the trial court has framed the charge at Exh. 1 for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 452, 504, 506, 114 and 34 of the IPC which came to be read over to the respondents accused whereby, a plea was recorded of the respondents accused vide Exh. 3 and 4 respectively. Since the respondent accused Arvindbhai Hirabhai Chavada expired on 21.11.2004, the case came to be abated qua him and the sessions case has thereafter travelled for its adjudication. After recording the plea, the prosecution was given an opportunity to lead the evidence whereby, the oral as well as documentary evidence came to be adduced. As many as 17 witnesses have been examined and 24 documentary evidence came to be led to establish the case against the respondents accused in the following manner: 2.2 The prosecution has thereafter appeared to have submitted a closure pursis at Exh. 56 and subsequent thereto, further statements came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. of the respondents accused wherein, since the respondents accused have denied the offence being committed, the case was put up for further trial wherein, the issues came to be framed and after evaluating the evidence and after examining the material on record, on 20.6.2006 the trial court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 235 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to pass an order of acquittal in favour of the respondents accused. Resultantly, the State has approached this Court by way of present appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. 2.3 The appeal appears to have been admitted by this Court in the month of July, 2007 wherein, after receipt of the paper-book compilation, the appeal came to be placed for final disposal and in that context, the same is taken up for final hearing. 3. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP for the appellant - State has vehemently contended that a serious error is committed by the trial court in passing an order of acquittal and though there was no basis for granting benefit of doubt, the same is granted just to vitiate the very exercise of jurisdiction and therefore, serious error crept in, deserves to be corrected by granting the relief as prayed for. Learned APP has further contended that the prosecution has made a serious attempt of establishing the case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned APP has further pointed out that as many as 17 witnesses have been examined and documentary evidence in large number have been produced which have established the case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondents accused. Still, however, the trial court based upon wrong interpretation of the evidence, granted the benefit of doubt which is thoroughly not justified and therefore, learned APP has requested the Court not to allow such order to stand in the eye of law. Learned APP has further contended that not only the witnesses are supporting but, irrespective of that even if some of the witnesses have turned hostile then also, on the basis of testimony of Investigating Officer, who has given ample evidence, the prosecution has established the case and apart from that, the dying declaration of the deceased was sufficient enough to hold the respondents accused guilty of an offence. Learned APP also submitted that the trial court has miserably failed to appreciate such consistency reflecting on dying declaration given by the deceased. Learned APP also submitted that the trial court has miserably failed to appreciate such consistency reflecting on dying declaration given by the deceased. Learned APP has further contended that though there are four dying declaration but, the basic substratum of the version put up by the complainant (deceased) is establishing the case beyond reasonable doubt and there appears to be no major contradiction in any of the dying declaration though they are four in numbers and therefore, learned APP has contended specifically that in appreciating such dying declarations, a serious error is committed which requires to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the order in question. 3.1 Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP has further contended that the dying declaration which has been recorded before the Executive Magistrate which has been proved and substantiated by the testimony of Executive Magistrate, who has not turned hostile and therefore, when the dying declaration is recorded in its proper perspective, signed by the Executive Magistrate, thumb impression is also taken that of the deceased, the credential of dying declaration is established which ought not to have been ignored. Learned APP has further contended that there is no inconsistency between ocular evidence and the medical opinion as well. The panchnama of scene of offence as also the other material is substantiating the case of prosecution and therefore, the reasons which are assigned by the trial court in granting the benefit of doubt are not germane to law. On the contrary, it is a fit case in which the order of acquittal is required to be disturbed. Learned APP has further contended that even from the panchnama of scene of offence, half burnt match sticks are found and some particles of burnt clothes have also been found and therefore, sufficient indication is available to the case of prosecution from this material which ought not to have been ignored by the trial court. Learned APP has further contended that the cause of death is also substantiating the burns injuries which are reflecting on the inquest panchanama as well as postmortem note and therefore, there appears to be no inconsistency in such evidence which would warrant a generation of benefit of doubt in any manner. Learned APP has further contended that the cause of death is also substantiating the burns injuries which are reflecting on the inquest panchanama as well as postmortem note and therefore, there appears to be no inconsistency in such evidence which would warrant a generation of benefit of doubt in any manner. On the contrary, the medical officer who has deposed before the court has clearly conveyed that deceased was in conscious state of mind and burns injuries were not such magnitude which would not permit her to deliver the dying declaration and therefore, when there is no possibility of raising any doubt in case of prosecution, the order passed by the trial court is far from logic. Learned APP has further contended that consistently from the beginning the story put up by the prosecution is getting corroborated; firstly, from the averments contained in the FIR and secondly, from the material gathered during the course of investigation and thirdly, from the testimony of the witnesses, who deposed before the court and therefore, if this testimony is to be looked into in co-relation with the medical opinion, there is hardly any justifiable reasons available for the trial court to grant any benefit of doubt and therefore, in no circumstance the order can be said to be justified in the eye of law. Learned APP has further contended that simply because the material witnesses have turned hostile, such hostility cannot result into miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of any such circumstance, it is hardly any circumstance available for the trial court to discard such evidence. Learned APP has further contended that the law on the subject is such that the dying declaration is not required to be even corroborated. There are instances in which based upon dying declaration itself, the courts have passed an order of conviction and here is the case wherein there appears to be a consistent version of the deceased about role being played by each of the accused, about the manner in which the offence is committed and the material which has been gathered is pointing clearly finger towards the respondents accused and therefore, when entire chain of circumstance is getting completed in establishing the guilt of the respondents accused, the benefit of doubt is out of question in the background of this peculiar set of circumstance. Therefore, learned APP has contended that even if there is some flaw in the case of prosecution, the basic substratum of the case is maintained throughout the trial, there was no reason for the trial court to discard such evidence which has clearly established the guilt of the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the cross-examination of these hostile witnesses in continuance of the testimony of Investigating Officer is sufficient enough to come to the conclusion that respondents are guilty of offence for which they have been tried, the order of acquittal based upon grant of benefit of doubt is not sustainable in the eye of law and therefore, learned APP requested to quash and set aside the same and the appeal be allowed. No other submissions are made by learned APP. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Ms. Ratna Vora, learned counsel representing the respondents accused has vehemently contended that the State appeal has no merit. It has been contended by learned counsel that the incident in question has occurred on 9.11.2004 whereas the deceased died much after i.e. 17.11.2004 and in between on account of some natural consequence development medically, she might have succumbed to the injuries for which the respondents accused are not to be held guilty. Ms. Ratna Vora has further contended that there are different versions coming out from the complainant's dying declaration, there is no consistency about the name of the accused persons, about the role of the accused persons and about the incident where it has taken place, is also not surfacing cogently and therefore, when there is a serious inconsistency in the dying declarations and the version of the complainant, the trial court has rightly granted benefit of doubt. Ms. Vora has submitted that there are 4 dying declarations treated by the prosecution to establish the case but, there is no nexus inter-se about the clear attribution to the respondents accused which was recorded at hospital vide Exh. 14. The second dying declaration taken by the Executive Magistrate and bare reading of this dying declaration, there appears to be a clear contradiction about not only the name of the accused persons but, even their role allegedly played while committing the crime and therefore, the dying declaration is not worth enough to be relied upon and rightly has not been relied upon by the trial court. On the contrary, it is settled proposition of law that no doubt, the dying declaration has got its own evidentiary value provided the same is consistent, truthful and with clarity. Here, on the contrary, serious contradictions about the respondents accused are emerging from 4 dying declarations and therefore, this raises clear doubt about the case of prosecution which would lean in favour of respondents accused and therefore, the trial court has not committed any error in passing the judgment. Ms. Ratna Vora has further contended that apart from that, the material requirement to rely upon the dying declaration is that while taking dying declaration, the mental and physical fitness of the person is required to be ascertained and certified from the doctor and after ascertaining, such dying declaration is to be recorded which is completely missing in the present case and therefore, the credence of this dying declaration is seriously taken note of by the trial court and passed an order granting the benefit of doubt which is thoroughly justified. Ms. Ratna Vora has further contended that even from the panchnama of scene of offence, nothing incriminating is found. On the contrary, it is consistently the case of prosecution that the incident in question has occurred in the house of deceased Arvindbhai i.e. respondents accused house. Now, if that house is to be looked into through the eyes of the panchnama, it is not revealing any sign of burns and therefore, the incident appears to have not occurred at all in the house which story put up by the prosecution has fallen down. 4.1 Ms. Ratna Vora, learned counsel has contended that apart from variance in dying declarations, even the parents of the deceased including the grand parent has not supported the case of prosecution. Even the independent corroboration is also not reflecting from the material on record and therefore, Ms. Vora has submitted that this is not a fit case in which order of acquittal is required to be disturbed. Ms. Vora has submitted that the prosecution has made an attempt to examine as many as 17 witnesses. But most of them have turned hostile including the parents of the deceased and therefore, the case practically based upon no concrete evidence which can justify remotely the guilt of the respondents accused. Ms. Vora has submitted that the prosecution has made an attempt to examine as many as 17 witnesses. But most of them have turned hostile including the parents of the deceased and therefore, the case practically based upon no concrete evidence which can justify remotely the guilt of the respondents accused. Learned counsel has further contended that the main witness - Dilip who can be said to be a material witness has chosen not to be examined by the prosecution and apart from this, the spot at which the occurrence has taken place, said area was thickly populated area. But surprisingly the prosecution has found not a single independent witness to justify the version of the prosecution. It has also been contended that it is alleged that deceased accused - Arvind came to the house with a knife as alleged in the incident. But the knife has also not been recovered which also has raised a serious doubt about the case of prosecution. No trustworthy material has emerged from the evidence which can sound in favour of prosecution. Ms. Vora, learned counsel has relied upon a decision in case of Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in 2012 (1) GLH 658, in case of State of Maharashtra v. Hemant Kawadu Chauriwal, reported in 2015(O) AIJEL-SC-57661 and in case of State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, reported in 2016(O) AIJEL-SC-58776 and by referring to these decisions, learned counsel has contended that this is not a case in which any interference is called for more particularly when the entire evidence has been examined at length by the trial court. From the document at Exh. 52, Ms. Vora has further submitted that it might be a case of suicide but, for which the connectivity of respondents accused is not emerging even remotely and therefore, in the background of this fact when the entire evidence is suggesting that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the respondents accused, the order does not call for any interference and ultimately, requested the Court to dismiss the appeal. No other submissions are made by learned counsel for the respondents. 5. No other submissions are made by learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record and having also perused the reasons which are assigned by the trial court, following circumstances are not possible to be ignored which tilts the balance in favour of the respondents accused. 5.1 The dying declarations which have been pressed into service by prosecution are 4 in numbers wherein, on close reading of it, there appears to be no consistency and who poured the kerosene on her is also not consistent. In addition thereto, the dying declaration which has been placed on record at Exh. 43 in which there appears to be no signature of doctor of LG hospital and therefore, the medical opinion whether the deceased was in fit state of mind or not to deliver the dying declaration is not appeared to have been taken and the same is not reflecting from Exh. 43 itself. It is also emerging from the record that even no attempt has been made to examine independent witnesses though the occurrence is within the radius of thickly populated area and in addition thereto, the material witness i.e. brother Dilip has chosen not to be examined by the prosecution which has raised a clear doubt about the case of prosecution. 5.2 The record of the case further revealed that the medical history which has been given in which also no specific assertion about the names, who took part in commission of crime is reflecting nor mentioned. Further, who poured kerosene either Arvindbhai or Mukesh, the accused persons is also reflecting contradictory from all these dying declarations which are treated as such, namely, Exh. 14, Exh. 36, Exh. 43 and Exh. 46 and therefore, there appears to be a serious doubt which has rightly been visualized by the trial court. In furtherance of this, upon examination of record it is revealed that the incident is said to have occurred in the house of the accused persons and if this is to be tested in context of panchnama of scene of offence which has been executed reflecting on Page-303 of paper book compilation, there seem to be no incriminating material found in the house which suggests the veracity of the case of prosecution. 5.3 The record further indicates that the parents of the deceased themselves including the grand parent has also not supported the case of prosecution. On the contrary, these witnesses ought to have in a natural course should have supported the case. The same having not reflecting, the version becomes doubtful more particularly when the prosecution has chosen not to examine Dilip who is the main witness and who could have been pressed into service. In addition thereto, it transpires from the record that the knife which has been stated to have used in commission of crime is also not recovered. Further to ascertain the trustworthiness of dying declaration, the consistency is there or not, is also visualized by the trial court from the reading of Exh. 14 and Exh. 34 (FIR) as well as another dying declaration at Page-439 of paper book compilation wherein role is different and coming in contrast to each other and therefore, this being the position prevailing in the absence of any corroboration, it is hardly possible to believe the trustworthiness of dying declaration so as to convict the person which rightly appears to have been concluded by the trial court. 5.4 The record of the case on further examination reveals that medical opinion is reflecting that she was in conscious state of mind and has sustained only 59% of burns injuries which would have permitted her to remain inconsistent so as to attribute something against the respondents accused as can be seen from the record and therefore, when the panchnama of scene of offence is not reflecting any incriminating circumstance and when material witness has not been examined, when case is not corroborated by independent witness and the knife having not been recovered are the circumstances creating doubt especially in the context of 4 dying declarations which are not consistent to each other and therefore, it has rightly been observed by the trial court that prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, grant of benefit of doubt. 6. 6. The entire comprehensive analysis of the evidence suggests that the observations and the reasonings which have been assigned by the trial court are not so perverse which can permit us to dislodge the same in the absence of any corroborative distinguishable material and therefore, keeping in view the salutary principles propounded by series of decisions about the scope of interference in appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an order of acquittal, we are not in a position to disturb the findings and the conclusion arrived at by the trial court. Had it been a case that the trial court could not have dealt with any of the material witness or clinching evidence or might have lost the sight of the trial court, possibly we could have taken a different stand but, the same is not reflecting any more. On the contrary, no other view is possible to be taken than what has been arrived at by the trial court and therefore, when there appears to be no infirmity or perversity, the order requires no interference. We have considered the decisions delivered by the Apex Court and cited before us by learned counsel appearing for the respondents accused and having gone through in the following terms, we are of the considered opinion that the order does not call for any interference. First of all, we may deal with the decision in case of State of Maharashtra v. Hemant Kawadu Chauriwal, reported in 2015(O) AIJEL-SC 57661 wherein, taking into consider Para. 8 and 12 of the said decision, we are of the view that dying declaration in the present form is not sufficient enough to convict the respondents accused. Relevant extracts of the said decision are reproduced hereinafter: "8. In our considered opinion, two main arguments have been advanced before this Court and we shall now examine each and every contention in light of the arguments adduced before us. It is a settled law that dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction and it does not require any corroboration. But it is equally true that dying declaration goes against the cardinal principle of law that 'evidence must be direct'. Thus, dying declaration must be judged and appreciated in light of the surrounding circumstances and its weight determined by reference to the principle governing the weighing of evidence. But it is equally true that dying declaration goes against the cardinal principle of law that 'evidence must be direct'. Thus, dying declaration must be judged and appreciated in light of the surrounding circumstances and its weight determined by reference to the principle governing the weighing of evidence. In the present case, dying declaration was recorded by the Naib Tehsildar after she was informed vide a Memo by the police authorities. However, it is on record that the said police official who delivered the Memo was never produced or examined before the Court. The Naib Tehsildar deposed before the Court that fitness certificate as to mental capacity of the deceased was taken from the doctor. However, the certificate nowhere states that the deceased was in a fit and stable mental condition at the time of making the statement. The dying declaration was recorded on 20.06.2004 i.e. the same day of incident but the same was recorded at 5:45 PM and it is undisputed that the incident occurred in the morning at 8:00 AM. The Naib Tehsildar specifically deposed that she ordered the blood relation of the deceased to be removed from the ward. The dying declaration was signed by the Naib Tehsildar P.W. 1, the doctor P.W. 5 and thumb impression of the deceased was taken at about 5:55 PM. The dying declaration then formed the basis of the FIR on 21.06.2004 at Ghatanji Police Station, however, there is no explanation as to in whose custody the said crucial piece of evidence was placed for one full day. The prosecution did not give any evidence to explain the said delay. 12. In our opinion, the two pivotal evidence i.e. dying declaration and the alleged letters having not been proved, strikes at the very root of the prosecution case. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court rightly pointed out the lacunae in the shabby investigation of the case. Moreover, the prosecution failed to stand its ground and bring home its case." 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon yet another decision delivered by the Apex Court in case of Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in 2012 (1) GLH 658 wherein, the issue related to dying declaration has been dealt with. Since the observations are taken in aid while dealing with the present order, we deem it proper to reproduce the same hereinafter; "11. Since the observations are taken in aid while dealing with the present order, we deem it proper to reproduce the same hereinafter; "11. We have already noted that admittedly at the time of recording the statement of the deceased by P.W. -2, no endorsement of the doctor was made about her position to make such statement. On the other hand, an application was filed by Hira Lal, (PW-11) to Doctor In-charge PGI, Chandigarh seeking clarification "whether she is fit to make the statement or not" and for the said query an endorsement was made by the doctor mentioning that "patient conscious answering the questions, patient fit to give statement". We compared the dying declaration Ex. PD recorded by P.W. -2 as well as the endorsement made in the requisition of Hira Lal, ASI (PW-11). The verification of both the documents show different doctors have certified and made such a statement. Dr. Vipul Sood, P.W.9, PGI Chandigarh in his evidence has stated Kamlesh Rani was admitted in the Emergency ward of PGI Hospital on 26.06.1991 at about 4.30 a.m. With 95% burns. He also deposed that when Ex. C/1 was submitted by P.K. Sharma, P.W. -2 on which he gave his opinion that the patient is fit to make a statement on 26.06.1991 at about 7.25 a.m. It is clear that at the time when P.W. -2 recorded the statement of the deceased Dr. Vipul Sood (PW-9) was not present and subsequently on the request of the police officer, he offered his opinion to the effect that the patient was fit to make a statement. The procedure adopted by P.W. -2 while recording the statement of dying declaration is not acceptable. 14. Another important aspect relating to failure on the part of prosecution is that on the date of the incident, the deceased had two children aged about six and four years respectively and both of them were present there, admittedly, the I.O. has not enquired them about the genuineness of the incident. Though, there are number of immediate neighbours/co-tenants in the same premises, their statements were not recorded which means that nobody supported the version of the prosecution. Though, there are number of immediate neighbours/co-tenants in the same premises, their statements were not recorded which means that nobody supported the version of the prosecution. Though there is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration but the court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary and in that event, there is no impediment in basing conviction on it, without corroboration. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Likewise, where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any declaration the evidence with regard to it is rejected. The dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. All these principles have been fully adhered to by the trial Court and rightly acquitted the accused and on wrong assumption the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal." 8. Yet another decision delivered by the Apex Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, reported in 2016(O) AIJEL-SC 58776 which has been pressed in to service by learned counsel for the respondent wherein, the issue has been dealt with by the Apex Court related to not only dying declaration but, about the onus and burden of proof to be discharged by the prosecution and for that purpose, relevant extract contained in Para. 10 and 13 are reproduced hereinafter: "10. The courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration. In the case on hand, there are two sets of evidence, one is the statement/declaration made before the police officer and the Executive Magistrate and the other is the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before her father who was examined as P.W.1. On a careful scrutiny of the materials on record, it cannot be said that there were contradictions in the statements made before the police officer and the Executive Magistrate as to the role of the respondent herein in the commission of the offence and in such circumstances, one set of evidence which is more consistent and reliable, which in the present case being one in favour of the respondent herein, requires to be accepted and conviction could not be placed on the sole testimony of P.W. -1. A number of times the relatives influence the investigating agency and bring about a dying declaration. The dying declarations recorded by the investigating agencies have to be very scrupulously examined and the court must remain alive to all the attendant circumstances at the time when the dying declaration comes into being. In case of more than one dying declaration, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other innocent dying declarations have to be rejected. Such a trend will be extremely dangerous. However, the courts below are fully entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them the basis of conviction, where the dying declarations pass all the above tests. 13. The burden of proof in criminal law is beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and it is also the rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted." 9. From the aforesaid set of circumstance and keeping in view of aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that the order in question does not require any interference and in furtherance of this, we are mindful of the fact that scope of appellate jurisdiction is such in which if any other only view is possible then, interference is warranted. Otherwise, no substitution of view is permitted. The following propositions laid down by the decisions delivered by the Apex Court which we worth to take note of and reproduce hereinafter. 9.1 In the decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar V/s. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 9.2 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. 9.3 In the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld. 9.4 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: 21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 10. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 . 10. From the aforesaid proposition of law and peculiar set of circumstance prevailing on record, we are of the considered opinion that the order is not required to be interfered with as is not suffering from any legal infirmity or perversity which can be said to have resulted into miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of such circumstance, the appeal filed by the State has no merit and the same deserves to be dismissed. 11. In view of above, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 20.6.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 69 of 2005, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Ahmedabad, is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.