JUDGMENT : Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. 1. This Criminal Acquittal Appeal has been filed in respect of the judgment dated 20.03.2006 of the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pulwama, arising out of FIR No. 105/2003 under Section 18/29 of the Narcotics Drugs Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the NDPS Act”) read with Section 39/207 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. At the outset we may point out that initially there was six persons who were accused. The trial was conducted and completed in respect of only four persons, they being, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein. The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have absconded and, therefore, the trial could not proceed in so far as they are concerned. Consequently, although, the State had made the said respondent Nos. 5 and 6 as parties to the present appeal, the learned counsel for the State concedes that their names ought to be deleted for the purpose of the present appeal. It is ordered accordingly. 2. The prosecution case is that on 08.07.2003, one, Mumtaz Ahmad, Sub Divisional Police Officer, Awantipora, (PW-7), while checking the vehicles on the National Highway at Namblabal, intercepted a truck which did not have any registration number displayed either in the front or the rear. The said truck was proceeding from Srinagar towards Khanabal. Subsequently, it was found that the truck had Registration No. JK-02-6747. The truck was searched and during the search 14 bags of poppy husk powder was said to have been recovered. These 14 bags were allegedly concealed in a box which had been fabricated and placed between the body of the truck and the tool box. It was alleged by the prosecution that the said truck was being driven by the accused Bashir Ahmad, whereas the accused Abdul Majid Makroo and Mohammad Maqbool Bhat were also in the said vehicle. They were allegedly smuggling the contraband outside the State for commercial gain. 3. The investigation of the case was taken up by PW-7, Mumtaz Ahmad himself. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed in the court against the accused persons as mentioned above under Section 18/29 of the NDPS Act. The charge sheet also included the offences under Section 3/181 and 29/207 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 3. The investigation of the case was taken up by PW-7, Mumtaz Ahmad himself. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed in the court against the accused persons as mentioned above under Section 18/29 of the NDPS Act. The charge sheet also included the offences under Section 3/181 and 29/207 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The charge was framed against the accused on 30.12.2003 under Section 18/29 of the NDPS Act and 3/181 and 39/207 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution had arrayed as many as sixteen witnesses in support of their case. However, only seven were examined. 4. PW-1 Tariq Ahmad, who was a constable and a body guard of PW-7 has, by and large, supported the case of the prosecution to the extent that the truck was stopped, 14 bags were recovered and their weight being 6 quintals. However, he does not remember whether any seizure memo was prepared. He has also stated categorically that no samples were taken from the box and that there was no special marks affixed on the seized box. 5. PW-2 and PW-3 were stated to be independent recovery witnesses. PW-2 (Fazal Haq), however, denied any knowledge about the occurrence when he came to the witness box and also stated that nothing was seized in his presence. He was declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. During cross-examination also he stated that he did not see any poppy husk and that the police had taken his signatures on some papers, the contents of which he did not know. In so far as PW-3 (Abdul Rashid Nath) is concerned, he also stated that he had no knowledge of the case. Consequently, he was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the prosecution. In cross-examination also he only stated that he saw the accused in the police station and that certain signatures were taken on blank papers by the police. 6. PW-4 Mohammad Afzal (Constable) stated that 14 bags containing poppy husk and weighing 6 quintals were seized from the truck and three persons were in the truck. In cross-examination, he however, stated that the seizure memo was prepared before weighing of the poppy husk and that no samples were taken from the seized articles. 6. PW-4 Mohammad Afzal (Constable) stated that 14 bags containing poppy husk and weighing 6 quintals were seized from the truck and three persons were in the truck. In cross-examination, he however, stated that the seizure memo was prepared before weighing of the poppy husk and that no samples were taken from the seized articles. He also stated that he has no knowledge as to whether any civilian was called on the spot or not as a witness. The vehicle was weighed along with the contraband and separate weighing of the bags was not done. Furthermore he stated that the bags were not marked with any special mark and, importantly, the seized bags were opened in the police station. 7. PW-5 (Shabir Ahmad Khan) is the owner of the weigh bridge. He however, stated that he did not know the accused and that he had weighed the truck. But, he did not give any details as to which truck it was and on which date was the weighing done. During cross-examination he further stated that he did not know as to what articles were loaded on the truck. 8. PW-6 Gh. Ahmad Ganie (Chowkidar) also stated that he did not know the accused. He further stated he did not see the accused on the spot and did not know whether the truck was weighed. But, he stated that the truck was near the Kanda. He further stated that he was shown poppy husk by the police, but he felt that the bags contained fodder. In cross-examination he stated that he did not know when, where and from whom the seized bags were recovered. Nor did he know what was packed in the bags. He also stated that the bags were not weighed in his presence and he did not give the statement to the police which is attributed to him. 9. PW-7 (Mumtaz Ahmad), who is the Investigating Officer, alleged eye witness as also the complainant obviously supported the prosecution case with regard to checking and the recovery of the 14 bags and seizure of the same. He also stated in cross-examination that he did not send any report about the occurrence, but informed the concerned officer on telephone. According to him samples were drawn and were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory and that the report had also been received by the Forensic Science Laboratory on 29.07.2003. 10. He also stated in cross-examination that he did not send any report about the occurrence, but informed the concerned officer on telephone. According to him samples were drawn and were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory and that the report had also been received by the Forensic Science Laboratory on 29.07.2003. 10. After examining entire evidence available on record, the learned trial court found that the prosecution was unable to prove its case and, therefore, acquitted the respondents who are before us. 11. We must not in lose sight of the fact that this is an appeal against an order of acquittal. The principles applicable in such appeals have been set forth and reiterated in number of Supreme Court decisions as pointed out in Vijay Kumar vs. State, (2009) 12 SCC 629 in the following manner:- “12...........The principles which have been set out in innumerable cases have been reiterated as under:- (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. (2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse. (3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on witch the order of acquittal was based and to record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. (4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanor of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness box. (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable persons would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.........” 12. Subsequently, in Upendra Pradhan vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court further observed as under:- “15..........The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan vs. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , wherein this Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 186-87, para 7). “7.........Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two view s are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored , a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference........” 13. The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference........” 13. It will be noted from the above discussion that the order of acquittal should not generally be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is strengthened by the acquittal order. Normally, in a case where admissible evidence is ignored by the trial court, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the principle to be followed by the appellate court, considering an appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. 14. In the present case the learned counsel for the State/appellant has not been able to point out any instance where admissible evidence has been ignored by the trial court. Secondly, it has not been indicated as to how the trial court’s decision is unreasonable or the findings returned by the trial court are perverse. In such an eventuality it is not at all necessary for us to re-appreciate the evidence in order to come to a different conclusion. 15. However, in order to satisfy ourselves, we have looked at the entire evidence which has been presented by the prosecution. We find that even if we have a re-look into the matter, a conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of the evidence on record primarily for the reason that there is no independent recovery witness. Two witnesses namely PW-2 and PW-3 were cited as independent recovery witnesses, both have turned hostile and even when they were cross-examined by the prosecution they have not stated anything in favour of the prosecution. On the contrary, they have completely damaged the prosecution case. But, what is even more compelling, is the fact that we do not even know as to whether the articles allegedly seized in the bags were poppy husk powder or not. On the contrary, they have completely damaged the prosecution case. But, what is even more compelling, is the fact that we do not even know as to whether the articles allegedly seized in the bags were poppy husk powder or not. This is so because the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory of Shakeel Ahmad, who is the in-charge, Scientific Officer, FSL, Srinagar, cannot be looked into as he was not examined in court. The trial court has observed, and, in our view rightly, as under:- “........There is a report of Shakeel Ahmad Wani, Incharge Scientific Officer, Chemistry and Toxicology FSL, Srinagar on record. This witness has not been examined by the prosecution to prove the contents of his report. His report cannot be used as evidence under Section 510 Cr. P.C. in the absence of his deposition before the court to corroborate the contents thereof as he is not a chemical examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to the Govt. whose report only in terms of Section 510 Cr. P.C. can be used as evidence without his appearing in the witness box........” 16. Therefore, it is clear that it is not established by cogent evidence on record as to whether the articles seized were contraband or not. That being the case, there is no question of operation of the NDPS Act and for the respondents to be found guilty of any of the offences under Section 18/29 of the said Act. 17. Apart from this there is also the issue that the bags which were allegedly seized were not sealed on the spot. In fact, there is evidence of even the prosecution witnesses that the bags were opened in the police station. This is indicative of tampering with the alleged contraband itself. In these circumstances, apart from the other illegalities and irregularities of non-compliance with the provisions of sections 52, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act., the case for the prosecution does not hold any water at all. 18. In view of the foregoing, there is absolutely no reason for us to interfere with the judgment of acquittal delivered by the learned trial court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.