JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. An award dated September 30, 2013 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Asansol (hereafter the tribunal) passed in M.A.C. Case No. 21 of 2012 is under challenge in this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter the Act) at the instance of National Insurance Company Limited (hereafter the appellant), the opposite party no.2 before such tribunal. 2. It is revealed from the records that the respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal (hereafter the claimants) had the occasion to approach the tribunal owing to the unfortunate death of Bijan Behari Das (hereafter the victim) in a road accident involving the use of two motor vehicles on February 23, 2010. The claimants in the application under Section 166 of the Act, presented on May 4, 2010, happen to be the widow, the children (son and minor daughter) and the mother of the victim. It was pleaded in the claim application that while the victim was returning home late in the evening riding his scooter bearing registration no.WB-38U/7951, he was dashed from behind by an Ambassador car bearing registration no.JH-10C/5289 (hereafter the offending vehicle). As a result thereof, the victim fell down and sustained severe head injury. He was immediately shifted to the local sub-divisional hospital where he succumbed to his injury. The owner of the offending vehicle and the appellant were impleaded as the opposite parties 1 and 2, respectively. The victim, aged 50 years, was a railway employee and in receipt of Rs.30,000/- as salary. As such, a sum of Rs.27,00,000/- was claimed as compensation by the claimants from the opposite parties. The owner of the offending vehicle filed a written objection disowning the claim but thrust it on the appellant. He did not, however, contest the claim application at any subsequent stage. However, the claim application was seriously contested by the appellant by filing a written objection. It pleaded therein that the victim was riding the scooter without wearing a helmet, and that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid driving license; hence, it was not liable to bear compensation. On behalf of the claimants several documents were adduced in evidence apart from the oral testimony of three witnesses, including an eyewitness of the accident. On behalf of the claimants several documents were adduced in evidence apart from the oral testimony of three witnesses, including an eyewitness of the accident. The appellant also led oral and documentary evidence to substantiate that the offending vehicle was driven by a person without having a valid driving license. The tribunal upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence led before it arrived at a finding that the victim died because of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. No argument on behalf of the appellant was advanced to the effect that the victim was not wearing a helmet and, therefore, it was a case of contributory negligence; hence, the tribunal did not return any finding in that behalf. It was further found by the tribunal that the offending vehicle was covered by a policy of the appellant. The objection raised by the appellant that the driver of the offending vehicle did not have a valid driving license was overruled, albeit without assigning any specific reason. However, having regard to a particular submission made on behalf of the claimants which is noted in the award, it might have crossed the mind of the tribunal that merely because the offending vehicle was driven by one without a valid driving license was not sufficient reason to absolve the appellant of its liability to pay compensation and, consequently, it was held liable. After regarding the age of the victim as 50 years 4 months + in terms of the post mortem report, reckoning Rs.3,19,762/- as his annual income, applying the multiplier of 11 (as per the Second Schedule of the Act) and deducting 1/3rd on account of personal and living expenses, it was observed that the claimants are entitled to Rs.23,45,762/- on account of compensation. The widow of the victim was also held entitled to Rs.5,000/- as loss of consortium. The compensation so assessed was directed to be paid by the appellant in the manner specified within 45 days of receipt of the award, failing which it would carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till payment. 3. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. The compensation so assessed was directed to be paid by the appellant in the manner specified within 45 days of receipt of the award, failing which it would carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till payment. 3. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Singh, learned advocate raised the following contentions: (i) The case set up in the claim application should have been completely disbelieved having regard to belated registration of the First Information Report (hereafter the FIR); (ii) The tribunal fell in error in not assigning any reason while overruling the objection that the offending vehicle was being driven contrary to the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance and hence the appellant was not liable; (iii) The quantum of death benefits received by the claimants upon death of the victim should have been deducted from the compensation assessed as payable; and (iv) Appointment on compassionate ground of the son of the victim was a relevant factor that the tribunal overlooked in assessing compensation payable to the claimants. 4. It was, accordingly, prayed that the award be set aside and the appellant absolved of its liability to compensate the claimants. 5. Answering the contentions raised in support of the appeal, Mr. Roy, learned advocate for the claimants submitted that absolutely no case for interference in exercise of appellate powers had been set up; on the contrary, the claimants are entitled to higher amount of compensation which they are entitled in law to claim even without filing a memorandum of cross-objection. 6. To repel the first contention of Mr. Singh, our attention was drawn to the postmortem report first and it was contended that such examination was conducted on the cadaver of the victim at 13.00 hours in relation to Asansol (S) P.S. UD Case No. 102/10 dated February 24, 2010. Secondly, the oral evidence of the widow of the victim (PW-1) in course of cross-examination was placed. She deposed of her unstable mental condition being the reason for belated registration of the FIR. Mr. Roy also submitted that delay of 20 (twenty) days in approaching the police, after completion of the last rites according to Hindu customs, cannot be fatal and in this regard he placed reliance on the decision in Ravi v. Badrinarayan [ (2011) 4 SCC 693 ]. 7. It was next contended by Mr. Mr. Roy also submitted that delay of 20 (twenty) days in approaching the police, after completion of the last rites according to Hindu customs, cannot be fatal and in this regard he placed reliance on the decision in Ravi v. Badrinarayan [ (2011) 4 SCC 693 ]. 7. It was next contended by Mr. Roy that the failure of the tribunal to assign reason while overruling the particular objection ipso facto cannot render its award bad. He submitted that the principle of ‘pay and recover’ may be applied, if at all it is found that the appellant was not liable to indemnify the insured on account of the latter breaching any of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. 8. So far as the third contention of Mr. Singh is concerned, Mr. Roy placed reliance on the decision in Ummehani Bewa v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. [2016 (4) T.A.C. 104 (Cal)] to contend that receipt of death benefits by the heirs of the deceased from his employer has never been treated as a factor for reduced compensation. 9. Finally, Mr. Roy contended that there was no evidence before the tribunal of the son of the victim having been appointed on compassionate ground and, therefore, such contention is equally unmeritorious. Even otherwise, the point is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Vimal Kanwar v. Kishore Das [ (2013) 7 SCC 476 ]. 10. It was further contended by Mr. Roy that the tribunal fell in error in not awarding any interest on the assessed compensation from the date of filing of the claim application. According to him, no reason was assigned by the tribunal why it considered the claimants not entitled to interest from such date and awarding interest only on default of the appellant to pay compensation within the date as specified in the award. 11. Also, relying heavily on the decision in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [ (2013) 9 SCC 54 ], Mr. Roy contended that even in respect of a claim application arising out of death of a clerk in a motor accident of 2007, the Supreme Court awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for the three minor children and Rs.25,000/- on account of funeral expenses. 12. At this stage, Mr. Roy contended that even in respect of a claim application arising out of death of a clerk in a motor accident of 2007, the Supreme Court awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for the three minor children and Rs.25,000/- on account of funeral expenses. 12. At this stage, Mr. Singh submitted that the appellant cannot be worse off for presenting this appeal and he prayed for liberty to cite an authority for the proposition that in the absence of a cross-objection, the High Court in an appeal under Section 173 of the Act, which is filed by the owner/insurance company for reducing compensation, cannot increase compensation over and above what is awarded by the Claims Tribunal. 13. Availing the liberty granted by us, Mr. Singh cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager [ (2011) 14 SCC 639 ] and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Swaminathan [2006 (1) T.A.C. 965 (SC)], and unreported decisions of the Madras High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Nazir Ahmed dated August 14, 2015 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. S. Rajya Lakshmi dated June 2, 2014, respectively. 14. Per contra, Mr. Roy referred to the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereafter the CPC) and contended that the wide ranging power conferred on an appellate court thereby would bestow on the High Courts exercising appellate power the authority to award higher compensation in a given case where the Claims Tribunal is found to have committed glaring mistakes in computing notional income, selecting the appropriate multiplier, not awarding interest without any cause, etc. To buttress his contention, Mr. Roy placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 1516 ], Mahant Dhangir v. Shri Madan Mohan [ AIR 1988 SC 54 ], Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi [ AIR 2000 SC 43 ], Ravi Kumar v. Julmidevi [(2010) 3 WBLR (SC) 745], Sanobanu Nazirbhai Mirza v. Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service [ (2013) 16 SCC 719 ] and the decisions of this Court in Bijan Kumar Chakraborty v. Suchandra Bardhan [2000 (2) CLJ 554], the Orissa High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ramchandra Gauda [2012 (3) T.A.C. 748] and the Bombay High Court in The State of Maharashtra v. Smt. Kamaladevi Kailashchandra Kaushal [2017 Supreme (Mah) 321]. 15. It is now time for us to consider the rival contentions and render our decision on each one of them. 16. Asansol (S) PS FIR No.60/10 dated March 14, 2010 under Sections 279/304-A/427 of the Indian Penal Code was registered on the written complaint of the son of the victim, wherein he reported the accident that took away the life of his father and also furnished particulars of the vehicles that were involved in such accident. The cause for belated lodging of complaint was explained by referring to the “funeral process” and the “mental state” of the bereaved family. The FIR and the written complaint (Exhibits 1 and 2 respectively), read with the post-mortem report (Exhibit 7) and the uncontroverted oral testimony of the PW-1, leave no manner of doubt that the delay of nearly 20 (twenty) days in lodging the complaint with the police, notwithstanding that the police station was a stone’s throw away from the residence of the claimants, was not intentional or driven by ulterior motives but occasioned plainly due to circumstances beyond the control of the claimants. 17. The Supreme Court in Ravi (supra) had the occasion in similar circumstances to rule as follows: “17. It is well settled that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground to doubt the claimant’s case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to first rush to the police station immediately after an accident. Human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance to get the victim treated rather than to rush to the police station. Under such circumstances, they are not expected to act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR with the police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the ground to deny justice to the victim. 18. In cases of delay, the courts are required to examine the evidence with a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the FIR should also be scrutinised more carefully. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the ground to deny justice to the victim. 18. In cases of delay, the courts are required to examine the evidence with a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the FIR should also be scrutinised more carefully. If the court finds that there is no indication of fabrication or it has not been concocted or engineered to implicate innocent persons then, even if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the claim case cannot be dismissed merely on that ground. The purpose of lodging the FIR in such type of cases is primarily to intimate the police to initiate investigation of criminal offences. 19. Lodging of FIR certainly proves the factum of accident so that the victim is able to lodge a case for compensation but delay in doing so cannot be the main ground for rejecting the claim petition. In other words, although lodging of FIR is vital in deciding motor accident claim cases, delay in lodging the same should not be treated as fatal for such proceedings, if claimant has been able to demonstrate satisfactory and cogent reasons for it. There could be a variety of reasons in genuine cases for delayed lodgement of FIR. Unless kith and kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of tranquility of mind and are composed to lodge it, even if, there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In such circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by cogent reasons.” 18. In view the above and having meticulously perused the FIR together with explanation for the delay and the relevant evidence of the witness for the claimants, we find no reason to hold that belated registration of the FIR should be viewed as a ground for interference with the award impugned. The contention is without basis and, thus, stands overruled. 19. Turning now to the second contention of Mr. Singh, ostensibly there seems to be some merit that the tribunal did not assign any specific reason for overruling the objection of the appellant of not being liable since the offending vehicle was driven by someone without having a valid driving license. It appears from the seizure list (Exhibit 6) that a driving license, bearing no.WB-37-005957 issued in the name of Subhashis Chatterjee, was seized. It appears from the seizure list (Exhibit 6) that a driving license, bearing no.WB-37-005957 issued in the name of Subhashis Chatterjee, was seized. It also appears that the said Subhashis Chatterjee surrendered before the relevant court in course of investigation of the FIR and was released on bail. In the police report (charge-sheet) submitted under Section 173(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code by the investigating officer (Exhibit 3), the said Subhashis Chatterjee was named as the accused who was driving the offending vehicle on the fateful evening. However, the document (Exhibit A) led in evidence by the witness of the appellant (an official attached to the Motor Vehicles Department, Asansol) reveals that the license bearing no. WB-37-005957 was issued in favour of one Sher Bahadur on May 4, 1996 and was valid till June 5, 2011. There is apparently a contradiction, which the tribunal did not discuss. However, this by itself may not be sufficient to hold that the appellant is cleared of its liability to pay compensation to the claimants. The appellant must pay the compensation at the first instance, for, it is undisputed that the offending vehicle had been duly covered by a policy issued by it. We, therefore, do not see reason to interfere simply on the ground of non-assigning of any reason by the tribunal. 20. However, needless to observe, the appellant could recover the compensation paid by it to the claimants from the owner of the offending vehicle provided leave therefor is granted by us in that behalf. We were minded to pass an order in that direction but do not feel inclined so to do because of the reason following. 21. In terms of rule 33(a) of Chapter V of the Appellate Side Rules titled “General Rules of Procedure”, the requisites for service of notice of appeal on the respondents therein are required to be put in by the appellant within 4 (four weeks) of a notice to be issued and displayed in the manner specified therein. We need not examine whether such notice was displayed or not because the departmental noting in this regard is not too clear. However, the appeal was registered on October 15, 2015 and notice of arrival of lower court records was served on Mr. Singh on March 31, 2016. These appear from the departmental noting on two of the order-sheets. We need not examine whether such notice was displayed or not because the departmental noting in this regard is not too clear. However, the appeal was registered on October 15, 2015 and notice of arrival of lower court records was served on Mr. Singh on March 31, 2016. These appear from the departmental noting on two of the order-sheets. There is also a note dated November 22, 2016 to the effect that the appellant has not put in the requisites for service of notice of appeal on the owner of the offending vehicle. Service of notice of receipt of the lower court records by this Court upon registration of the appeal, in the circumstances, is deemed to be sufficient notice served on Mr. Singh regarding registration of the appeal. Till date of final hearing of the appeal, the requisites had not been put in. Although the rules permit extension of time to put in the requisites, no prayer was made before us to adjourn hearing of the appeal to enable the appellant to take steps for service of notice of appeal on the owner of the offending vehicle. A defaulting party cannot urge that discretion should be exercised in its favour to the detriment of another party, particularly when such party is not even put on notice of pendency of proceedings where an order would be sought for detrimental to its interest. 22. Permitting the appellant to initiate proceedings for recovery before the tribunal behind the back of the owner would result in violation of principles of natural justice and hence, we refrain from granting leave to the appellant. 23. Next, we move on to the third point argued by Mr. Singh. PW-1 admitted that she was receiving pension of Rs.12,000/- per month. However, such amount cannot be taken into consideration for assessing compensation. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Ummehani Bewa (supra), upon taking into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court, held that amount of family pension given to the family of the deceased cannot be deducted while calculating dependency of the claimants. We are in respectful agreement with the decision in Ummehani Bewa (supra), and hold that the argument of Mr. Singh is unacceptable. 24. Finally, the aspect of compassionate appointment would exercise our consideration. There was no concrete evidence before the tribunal that the son of the victim was appointed on compassionate ground. We are in respectful agreement with the decision in Ummehani Bewa (supra), and hold that the argument of Mr. Singh is unacceptable. 24. Finally, the aspect of compassionate appointment would exercise our consideration. There was no concrete evidence before the tribunal that the son of the victim was appointed on compassionate ground. Compassionate appointment, it is well-settled, cannot be claimed as a matter of right. PW-1 in her deposition was careful in saying that either of her children could be considered for compassionate appointment. Whether any one of the children has been so appointed should have been brought on record in a manner known to law. In the absence of any evidence adduced before us in accordance with law, and also bearing in mind the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra), we are not persuaded to accept the argument of Mr. Singh. 25. All the contentions that were raised in support of the appeal, therefore, fail. 26. We would now examine the award of the tribunal, viewed in the light of the contentions of Mr. Roy. It does appear to us to suffer from certain infirmities in relation to computation of compensation payable to the claimants. 27. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Alok Shankar Pandey v. Union of India ( AIR 2007 SC 1198 ) that: “9. *** there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say 10 years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B 10 years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned interest on it for this period. Hence, equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B.” 28. Section 171 of the Act enables the Claims Tribunal, whenever it allows an application for compensation made thereunder and determines compensation that is payable, to direct payment of simple interest at such rate and from such date not prior to making of the claim as specified in the award. Section 171 of the Act enables the Claims Tribunal, whenever it allows an application for compensation made thereunder and determines compensation that is payable, to direct payment of simple interest at such rate and from such date not prior to making of the claim as specified in the award. Since the appellant was held liable to pay compensation to the claimants, absence of any direction for payment of interest from the date of filing of the claim application without the claimants being at fault for non-disposal of the claim application at an early date and, on the contrary, direction for payment of interest only on default committed in payment of compensation within the laid down time-frame [which otherwise is not permissible in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur ( AIR 2004 SC 1581 )] seems to us to be clearly illegal. The tribunal, thus, allowed the appellant to pocket the interest on the compensation awarded from the date of filing of the claim application till payment in terms of its award. We have no hesitation to hold that the claimants, in the absence of any specific reason assigned by the tribunal for its denial, were entitled to interest but the tribunal unjustly deprived them of the same. 29. Reliance placed on Rajesh (supra) by Mr. Roy was apt, as on date we had reserved judgment on this appeal. If the tribunal had the benefit of looking into such decision which was rendered nearly 5 (five) months before the award under challenge came into existence, the compensation awarded to the claimants could have been on the higher side. It is noticed that the learned advocate for the claimants failed to place such decision before the tribunal, for which the tribunal cannot be faulted. We also hasten to record that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a recent decision dated October 31, 2017 (National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi), has held the law laid down in Rajesh (supra) not to be a binding precedent. However, having regard to the conclusions recorded in paragraph 61 thereof, the claimants could claim enhanced compensation under the heads of future prospect, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses over and above what the tribunal awarded in their favour. 30. However, having regard to the conclusions recorded in paragraph 61 thereof, the claimants could claim enhanced compensation under the heads of future prospect, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses over and above what the tribunal awarded in their favour. 30. At this juncture, it is necessary for us to consider the provisions in Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC and decide whether in the absence of any cross-objection from the side of the claimants, they are entitled to any sum on account of interest and/or higher sums as determined in Pranay Sethi (supra). For facility of reference, it is quoted below: “33. Power of Court of Appeal.— The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. Illustration A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and suit against both obtains a decree against X. X appeals and A and Y are respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y. 31. The said provision was considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal (supra). It was ruled as follows: “12. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y. 31. The said provision was considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal (supra). It was ruled as follows: “12. Even a bare reading of 0.41 Rule 33 is sufficient to convince any one that the wide wording was intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondent as ‘the case may require’. ***” (underlining for emphasis by us) 32. In Mahant Dhangir (supra), the Supreme Court once again noted the wide power conferred on an appellate court by the relevant provision. It held : “15. *** The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words ‘as the case may require’ used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these: That the parties before the lower court should be there before the appellate court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities.” (underlining for emphasis by us) 33. In Basanti (supra), the Supreme Court quoted the above explanatory passage with approval and applied it to the appeal at hand. 34. However, it is noted that none of these cases arose out of claim applications under the Act. The fact situations were also entirely different from the one of which we are in seisin. 35. The decisions cited by Mr. Singh relate to claim applications under the Act and, thus, would have a bearing on the issue presently under consideration. 36. We may first look at the decision in Ranjana Prakash (supra). The facts and the contentions raised by the parties have been noted in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the decision. The concerned Claims Tribunal awarded compensation in a sum of Rs. 24,12,936/- with interest @ 9% per annum in favour of the claimants. On appeal by the insurer, the High Court while upholding the findings in regard to income and calculation of compensation held that the Claims Tribunal ought to have deducted 30% of the annual income towards income tax. Consequently, the High Court deducted 30% and reduced the compensation to Rs.16,89,055/- with interest @ 9% per annum. The said order was under challenge before the Supreme Court at the instance of the claimants. They contended that the High Court committed an error in reducing compensation from Rs.24,12,936/- to Rs.16,89,055/- and sought restoration of the compensation as awarded by the Claims Tribunal. Before the High Court, the insurer contended that where the annual income of the deceased was in taxable range, the annual income for the purpose of computation of compensation should be the annual income less income tax; and that in the absence of any evidence as to the actual income tax paid, the Claims Tribunal ought to have deducted 30% from the income towards income tax and calculated the loss of dependency with reference to the “net” income. The claimants, on the other hand, contended before the High Court that as the deceased was holding a permanent job under a statutory body, with assured increments and career progression and was aged between 40 and 50 years, as per the decision in Sarla Verma (supra) the income ought to have been increased by 30% keeping the future prospects in view. They further contended that if the income had been increased by 30% by taking note of the future prospects and if 30% had been deducted towards income tax, that would virtually leave the income assessed by the Claims Tribunal undisturbed and therefore, computation of compensation by the Claims Tribunal by taking the monthly income as Rs.23,134/- without any deductions, did not call for any interference. It was on consideration of the aforesaid contentions that the Supreme Court proceeded to hold as follows: “6. *** Therefore, in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the appellant can certainly put forth a contention that if 30% is to be deducted from the income for whatsoever reason, 30% should also be added towards future prospects, so that the compensation awarded is not reduced. The fact that the claimants did not independently challenge the award will not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation awarded, on other grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the claimants will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objections. 7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation.” (underlining for emphasis by us) 37. In R. Swaminathan (supra), the claimant had approached the Claims Tribunal seeking Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation for injury suffered by him in a motor accident. The Claims Tribunal awarded compensation in a sum of Rs.4,50,000/-. An appeal was presented by the insurer before a Single Bench of the High Court. The appeal was allowed and the compensation reduced to Rs.3,00,000/-. On a Letters Patent appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court enhanced the compensation and awarded Rs.7,44,000/- to the claimant. For such enhancement, the Division Bench assigned the following reason: “In this connection, we may observe that we are aware of the fact that we are enhancing the compensation even though the injured has not claimed it. On a Letters Patent appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court enhanced the compensation and awarded Rs.7,44,000/- to the claimant. For such enhancement, the Division Bench assigned the following reason: “In this connection, we may observe that we are aware of the fact that we are enhancing the compensation even though the injured has not claimed it. But, the question is covered by catena of decisions justifying enhancement of compensation even in cases where the injured has not preferred an appeal, provided the circumstances of the case warrants the same.” The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court was under challenge before the Supreme Court. The issue was whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in increasing the compensation amount beyond the amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal despite the fact that its award had not been challenged by the claimant. The aforesaid reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court was observed to be “a very facile way of interfering with the award when no interference was called for”. The Court then proceeded to hold as follows: “We called upon the learned Counsel on both sides to show us at least one case (out of the catena of judgments referred to in the impugned judgment) in support of this proposition. Learned Counsel frankly confessed that there was none. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in Banarsi v. Ram Phal reported in (2003) 9 SCC 606 , which supports the proposition that in an appeal filed by the defendant laying challenge to the grant (sic of) a smaller relief, the plaintiff as a respondent cannot seek a higher relief if he had not filed an appeal on his own or had not taken any cross-objection. In the present appeal it would appear that the claimant neither appealed against the Award of compensation passed by the Tribunal, nor filed any cross-objection in the first appeal filed by the Insurance Company. This (sic thus), we are satisfied that the Division Bench of the High Court wholly erred in increasing the compensation amount beyond the amount awarded by the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company.” (underlining for emphasis by us) 38. This (sic thus), we are satisfied that the Division Bench of the High Court wholly erred in increasing the compensation amount beyond the amount awarded by the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company.” (underlining for emphasis by us) 38. In Banarsi (supra), the Supreme Court referred to various precedents including Panna Lal (supra) and ruled as under : “21. In the case before us, the trial court found the plaintiff (in his suit) not entitled to decree for specific performance and found him entitled only for money decree. In addition, a conditional decree was also passed directing execution of sale deed if only the defendant defaulted any paying or depositing the money within two months. Thus to the extent of specific performance, it was not a decree outright; it was a conditional decree. Rather, the latter part of the decree was a direction in terrorem so as to secure compliance by the appellant of the money part of the decree in the scheduled time-frame. In the event of the appellant having made the payment within a period of two months, the respondent would not be, and would never have been, entitled to the relief of specific performance. The latter decree is not inseparably connected with the former decree. The two relief’s are surely separable from each other and one can exist without the other. Nothing prevented the respondent from filing his own appeal or taking cross-objection against that part of the decree which refused straight away a decree for specific performance in his favour based on the finding of comparative hardship recorded earlier in the judgment. The dismissal of appeals filed by the appellant was not resulting in any inconsistent, iniquitous, contradictory or unworkable decree coming into existence so as to warrant exercise of power under Rule 33 of Order 41. It was not a case of interference with the decree having been so interfered with as to call for adjustment of equities between the respondents inter se. By his failure to prefer an appeal or to take cross-objection the respondent has allowed the part of the trial court’s decree to achieve a finality which was adverse to him. 22. It was not a case of interference with the decree having been so interfered with as to call for adjustment of equities between the respondents inter se. By his failure to prefer an appeal or to take cross-objection the respondent has allowed the part of the trial court’s decree to achieve a finality which was adverse to him. 22. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the first appellate court ought not to have, while dismissing the appeals filed by the defendant-appellants before it, modified the decree in favour of the respondent before it in the absence of cross-appeal or cross-objection. The interference by the first appellate court has reduced the appellants to a situation worse than in what they would have been if they had not appealed. The High Court ought to have noticed this position of law and should have interfered to correct the error of law committed by the first appellate court.” (underlining for emphasis by us) Although Panna Lal (supra) was noticed to have set out the scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC in the widest terms, a dilution is indeed discernible in the aforesaid extract from the decision in Banarsi (supra) which did not also consider Mahant Dhangir (supra) and Basanti (supra), being decisions of co-equal strength. 39. Be that as it may, since the decision in Panna Lal (supra) and other decisions of high authority while interpreting Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC have been noticed in Banarsi (supra), which in turn has been relied on in R. Swaminathan (supra) while deciding a claim application under the Act, we consider it imprudent to proceed on the basis of our own understanding of the decision in Panna Lal (supra). The essence of the decisions cited by Mr. Singh is that, an appellant cannot be worse off for filing an appeal (should there be no cross-objection there against) and the award of the Claims Tribunal attains finality on the claimant accepting the same without carrying it higher up. We have no option but to accept such position as the law governing even claim appeals under the Act, although we shall briefly indicate our view hereafter which, though at variance, is of no consequence in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. Enhancement of compensation claimed by Mr. We have no option but to accept such position as the law governing even claim appeals under the Act, although we shall briefly indicate our view hereafter which, though at variance, is of no consequence in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. Enhancement of compensation claimed by Mr. Roy by pressing into service Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC may not, therefore, be a permissible course here in view of the decisions in R. Swaminathan (supra) and Ranjana Prakash (supra). 40. Having said so, it cannot be overlooked that the provision in Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC although not part of the substantive law relating to appeals (under Section 96 and 100 of the CPC) quite unusually confers wide powers on an appellate court. The marginal note of Rule 33 says “Power of Court of Appeal”. The wide expanse of power conferred on a court of appeal authorizes it to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require (underlining for emphasis by us). Importantly, this power is available to be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection (underlining for emphasis by us). 41. There is a perception that if a party who has been declined part of several relief claimed in a suit does not challenge that part of the decree declining relief but, in an appeal by a defendant, is granted such part of the relief in course of appellate proceedings, much of Order XLI Rule 22 conferring power on an aggrieved party to file cross-objection would be dead letter. At first blush, it might seem attractive but on closer reading it does not appear so. The power conferred on a court of appeal by Order XLI Rule 33 is discretionary and no relief thereunder can be claimed as of right, as can be claimed if a cross-appeal or a cross-objection were filed. The words in Order XLI Rule 33 must be given the widest possible amplitude to serve the purposes of the legislation, viz. The power conferred on a court of appeal by Order XLI Rule 33 is discretionary and no relief thereunder can be claimed as of right, as can be claimed if a cross-appeal or a cross-objection were filed. The words in Order XLI Rule 33 must be given the widest possible amplitude to serve the purposes of the legislation, viz. appellate court’s power to do justice between the parties by making any decree or order that the case may require notwithstanding that a cross appeal/objection may not have been filed, which the provision itself has conferred. It has most appropriately been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Mahant Dhangir (supra) that no liberal interpretation is required, for the rule itself is liberal enough. 42. We also need to bear in mind that the scheme for payment of compensation to the legal representatives of a victim of a motor accident or to a surviving victim is a beneficent piece of legislation, the object wherefor is to ensure that he does/they do receive “just” compensation. What is “just” compensation? We can do no better than reproduce below a passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty [ (2003) 7 SCC 197 ] reading thus: “15. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which to it appears to be ‘just’. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance with the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life, which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be ‘just’ and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be ‘just’ compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of ‘just’ compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression ‘which appears to it to be just’, a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression ‘just’ denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so, it cannot be just.” The aforesaid decision emphasizes that while compensation cannot be an unimaginable bounty, it cannot also be niggardly. 43. The expression ‘just’ denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so, it cannot be just.” The aforesaid decision emphasizes that while compensation cannot be an unimaginable bounty, it cannot also be niggardly. 43. Having noted what is expected of a Claims Tribunal while assessing “just” compensation and specifically bearing in mind that the laws relating to territorial jurisdiction, the laws of limitation as well as the strict rules of pleadings do not apply to claim applications and also that in a given case a Claims Tribunal is empowered, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh ( AIR 2003 SC 674 ) and those following it in Ibrahim v. Raju [ (2011) 10 SCC 634 ], Sanjay Batham v. Munnalal Parihar [ (2011) 10 SCC 665 ] and Sanobanu Nazirbhai Mirza (supra), even to award compensation beyond what has been claimed with the only rider that it should be “just” as ordained by Section 168 of the Act and not arbitrary or fanciful, the principle that one cannot be worse off for presenting an appeal may not be apt in appeals under Section 173 of the Act. In this context, one cannot be unmindful of the dilatory tactics adopted by insurers in disposal of claim applications before the Claims Tribunals. The same has also not escaped the attention of the Supreme Court. It would be worthwhile to set out hereunder the concerns expressed in Ibrahim (supra): “8. *** A very large number of people involved in motor accidents are pedestrians, children and women and, on account of sheer ignorance, poverty and other disabilities, majority of them are unable to engage competent lawyers for putting their cause before the Tribunals and the courts. The insurance companies, with whom the vehicles involved in the accidents are insured always have the advantage of assistance of legally trained mind (law officers and panel lawyers). They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical objections for ensuring that their clients are either completely absolved or their liability is minimised and in the process, adjudication of the claims filed by the victims and/or their legal representatives is delayed for years together. At times, the delay in disposal of the claim cases and litigation expenses make the award of compensation meaningless for survivors of the accidents and/or families of the victims. 9. At times, the delay in disposal of the claim cases and litigation expenses make the award of compensation meaningless for survivors of the accidents and/or families of the victims. 9. This Court has time and again emphasised that the officers, who preside over the Tribunals adopt a proactive approach and ensure that the claims filed under the Act are disposed of with required urgency and compensation is awarded to the victims of the accident and/or their legal representatives in adequate measure keeping in view the relevant factors. Unfortunately, despite repeated pronouncements of this Court in which guiding principles have been laid down for determination of the compensation payable to the victims of road accidents and/or their families, the Tribunals and even the High Courts do not pay serious attention to the imperative of awarding just compensation to the claimants.” (underlining for emphasis by us) In the self-same decision, the Court in paragraph 21 observed: “21. We are conscious of the fact that in the petition filed by him, the appellant had claimed compensation of Rs 3 lakhs only with interest and costs. It will be reasonable to presume that due to financial incapacity the appellant and his family could not avail the services of a competent lawyer and make a claim for adequate compensation. However, as the Tribunal and the High Court and for that reason this Court are duty-bound to award just compensation, we deem it proper to enhance the compensation from Rs 1,89,440 to Rs 6 lakhs.***” (underlining for emphasis by us) 44. We are, thus, of the humble view looking at the object sought to be achieved that cases relating to compensation under Chapter XII of the Act call for a different approach and treatment altogether. 45. Having regard to the conduct of insurance companies all over the state in presenting appeals at the drop of a hat, majority of which eventually get dismissed (we have drawn from our experience on the bench), it is high time that we take a serious view of procrastination of the lis by insurers to deprive the legal representatives of victims of motor accidents of compensation as long as possible. If the power to grant compensation more than what is claimed rests with the Claims Tribunal, and it is the solemn duty of the Claims Tribunals, the High Courts and the Supreme Court to award “just” compensation to the victims/their dependants, as held in Ibrahim (supra), we see no reason as to why in an appeal by an insurer the High Court would be lacking in jurisdiction, in an appropriate case, to enhance compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal so as to make it “just” to the extent possible. The provisions of Chapter XII of the Act should be so interpreted that an insurer, or for that matter an owner of an offending vehicle, would run the risk of being saddled with more compensation than what it/he is required to bear in terms of the award of the Claims Tribunal, should the High Court find that the Claims Tribunal erred in computing notional income or selected an incorrect multiplier or unjustly deprived the claimants of interest on the compensation amount, thereby resulting in inadequate compensation being assessed for payment, and the appeal of the insurer/owner is nothing but an exercise to tire out the claimants in their struggle for receiving “just” compensation and ultimately create a situation where they are compelled to succumb to a settlement either out of Court or in course of other proceedings for a lesser amount of compensation. Had it not been for the decision in Ranjana Prakash (supra) and R. Swaminathan (supra), we would have most certainly enhanced the compensation in exercise of our appellate powers to provide “just” compensation to the claimants and thereby do complete justice between the parties since, in our view, this is an exceptional case warranting such approach. 46. We, however, part with the observation that unless the Supreme Court revisits the issue and reverses the ratio of the decisions in R. Swaminathan (supra) and Ranjana Prakash (supra) and lays down the law authoritatively for guidance of the High Courts thereby paving the way for award of enhanced compensation in course of appeal proceedings without there being any cross-objection, in exceptional cases warranting such approach, Order XLI Rule 33 cannot come to the rescue of the respondents/claimants for enhanced compensation in an appeal by the owner or the insurer for reducing the compensation awarded. 47. We had enhanced compensation while deciding FMA 3208 of 2016 (ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. 47. We had enhanced compensation while deciding FMA 3208 of 2016 (ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Maryam Pervin & ors.) by judgment and order dated July 18, 2017; however, such decision was rendered without taking into consideration the decisions in R. Swaminathan (supra) and Ranjana Prakash (supra). It is, therefore, a decision per incuriam and does not deserve to be followed. 48. Insofar as the present exercise is concerned, we are unable to accept Mr. Roy’s contention and accordingly refrain from enhancing compensation. However, it is clear on a reading of the discussions on the merits of the appeal that the impugned award does not merit interference. The purpose of compensation is to put the claimant in the same position as he was insofar as money can, but for the claimants here it has been a far cry. Although the appellant obtained a stay of operation of the award (vide order dated September 9, 2014) by securing the amount of compensation awarded by the tribunal as far back as on October 31, 2014, the claimants have not seen the colour of compensation so long. We, therefore, propose to dismiss the appeal with costs being of the clear opinion that an unworthy cause was unnecessarily carried to this Court and thereby the dependants of the victim were made to suffer untold misery for the last several years. 49. The appeal stands dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/-. Such costs shall be paid to the claimants by the appellant within a month from date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order. 50. The Registrar General, immediately upon being approached by the claimants, shall ensure that the amount of compensation awarded by the tribunal (since secured by the appellant before him) is disbursed in their favour together with accrued interest in accordance with law as early as possible. 51. The records of the tribunal shall be returned to it forthwith. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. DEBI PROSAD DEY, J. I agree.