JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. MAC Case No. 396 of 2006 was registered on August 14, 2006 upon receipt of an application under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereafter the Act) by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lalbagh, Murshidabad. It was presented by the parents, the widow and two minor children of a victim of a motor accident, Bidhan Tudu (hereafter the victim). The applicants (hereafter the claimants) pleaded in the application that the victim, who had been serving the court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lalbagh as Bench Clerk - II on the date of his premature demise, was proceeding towards Behrampur from Farakka on February 11, 2006 riding a motor cycle (WB-58F/1561) and at about 11.45 pm, on National Highway 34, a truck (WB-23/5812) (hereafter the said truck) coming from the opposite direction and being driven rashly and negligently dashed such motor cycle resulting in the victim sustaining critical injuries and dying on the spot. In the application, the owner and the insurer of the said truck were impleaded as opposite parties 1 and 2 respectively and Rs. 9,00,000/- was claimed from them as compensation, jointly and severally. 2. Since the victim was attached to the sub-divisional court at Lalbagh, the presiding officer of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lalbagh, Murshidabad did not consider it proper to decide the claim application and recused himself. On transfer, the claim application was ultimately placed for consideration before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Behrampur, Murshidabad (hereafter the tribunal), which proceeded to decide it. 3. The owner did not contest the application; however, the insurer upon obtaining leave of the tribunal under section 170 of the Act contested the application by filing a written objection. The material allegations were denied and disputed and it was contended by the insurer that it is under no obligation to pay compensation since the said truck was not involved in the accident. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the tribunal had framed 6 (six) issues; inter alia, as to whether the victim died in the said accident as a result of rash and negligent driving of the said truck, whether the insurer is liable to pay compensation and to what relief the claimants are entitled. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the tribunal had framed 6 (six) issues; inter alia, as to whether the victim died in the said accident as a result of rash and negligent driving of the said truck, whether the insurer is liable to pay compensation and to what relief the claimants are entitled. Considering the evidence of an eye-witness (PW-2), the tribunal recorded a finding that the victim died as a result of rash and negligent driving of the said truck. Based on documentary evidence (salary statement of the victim), the tribunal accepted the plea of the claimants that the victim received Rs. 6,886/- as salary in the month of January 2006. The victim was 38 years old at the time of the accident and had a permanent job. Adding 50% of the actual salary towards future prospect, the tribunal reckoned Rs. 1,23,948/- as the victim's yearly notional income. Deducting 1/4th on account of personal and living expenses of the victim [as the number of dependents were 5 (five)], the tribunal deducted Rs. 30,987/- from the annual income and calculated compensation based on Rs. 92,961/-. Selecting 15 as the multiplier, the loss of dependency was determined as Rs. 13,94,415/-. To such sum was added Rs. 2000/-, Rs. 2500/- and Rs. 5000/- as funeral expenses, loss of estate and loss of consortium respectively. The said sum of Rs. 14,03,915/- was directed to be paid by the insurer within two months from date together with simple interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application till realization. The tribunal also directed that out of the said sum, Rs. 3,00,000/- may be given to the parents of the victim since his father was in receipt of monthly pension @ Rs. 7,000/-. MAC Case No. 396 of 2006, thus, was allowed by the tribunal vide award dated November 26, 2010. The said award is under challenge in this appeal under section 173 of the Act at the instance of the insurer. 5. The only point urged by Mr. Pahari, learned advocate for the insurer is that the tribunal committed gross error in quantification of compensation payable to the claimants by completely overlooking the categorical testimony of PW-1 (the victim's father) about the factum of compassionate appointment offered to the victim's widow in 2009 in the judgeship of Murshidabad. 5. The only point urged by Mr. Pahari, learned advocate for the insurer is that the tribunal committed gross error in quantification of compensation payable to the claimants by completely overlooking the categorical testimony of PW-1 (the victim's father) about the factum of compassionate appointment offered to the victim's widow in 2009 in the judgeship of Murshidabad. According to him, the salary and allowances receivable by the victim's widow consequent to such appointment ought to have been borne in mind by the tribunal while quantifying compensation. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal (Smt.) [ (2008) 11 SCC 366 ] and Reliance General Insurance Co. v. Shashi Sharma [ (2016) 9 SCC 627 ], he prayed for modification of the impugned award. 6. Appearing for the claimants and in support of the impugned award, Mr. Debnath, learned advocate contended that the plea of the insurer proceeds on a misreading of the cited decisions. He further contended that the ratio of the said decisions is that a claims tribunal ought to ensure that double payment is not made in assessing compensation payable to the applicants before it. According to him, any money received by the dependents of a deceased because of accidental death involving use of motor vehicle(s) may be deducted but not money received in lieu of rendering service to the public, the appointment having been made in terms of rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. Referring to the decision in Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation [ (1999) 1 SCC 90 ], he submitted that if "the words 'pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death" under the Act, "it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of law" and that any amount "received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that which would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the 'pecuniary advantage', liable for deduction". The decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan [ (2002) 6 SCC 281 ) was further cited, wherein the decision in Helen. C. Rebello (supra) was explained and affirmed. The decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan [ (2002) 6 SCC 281 ) was further cited, wherein the decision in Helen. C. Rebello (supra) was explained and affirmed. Finally, the decision in Vimal Kanwar v. Kishore Dan [ (2013) 7 SCC 476 ] was placed wherein, inter alia, it has been held as follows: 20. The second issue is "whether the salary receivable by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction". 21. "Compassionate appointment" can be one of the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. In case, the employee dies in harness i.e. while in service leaving behind the dependants, one of the dependants may request for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of the deceased employee who dies in harness. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death and have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointment may have nexus with the death of an employee while in service but it is not necessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. An employee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain the family of the deceased one of the dependants may be entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot be termed as "pecuniary advantage" that comes under the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on such appointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. Mr. Debnath, thus, contended that the issue having been finally decided by the Supreme Court, the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra) is binding on us under Article 141 of the Constitution and we ought to follow the same. 8. The decision in Shashi Sharma (supra) was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Debnath by advancing two-fold argument. First, he submitted that although the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra) was cited before the Court in Shashi Sharma (supra), as it appears from paragraph 9 thereof, no opinion has been recorded that the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra) does not lay down good law. Debnath by advancing two-fold argument. First, he submitted that although the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra) was cited before the Court in Shashi Sharma (supra), as it appears from paragraph 9 thereof, no opinion has been recorded that the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra) does not lay down good law. Secondly, it was submitted that the facts of the present appeal are more akin to the facts in Vimal Kanwar (supra) than in Shashi Sharma (supra). While in the former compassionate appointment itself was held not to be covered by 'pecuniary advantage', in the latter financial assistance on compassionate grounds (not compassionate appointment) offered to the respondents before the Court was held to be a disentitling factor since such assistance was made available considering death-in-harness of a doctor in Government service as a measure to provide immediate succour to his family members. 9. Mr. Debnath, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 10. We have heard the parties at length on the limited point that has been canvassed by Mr. Pahari. 11. Since Shashi Sharma (supra) is the latest decision of the Supreme Court on the point rendered by a Bench of 3 (three) Hon'ble Judges upon consideration of all previous authorities and heavy reliance has been placed on it by Mr. Pahari, we have read it in between the lines to understand the exact points decided thereby. The respondents in the lead case before the Supreme Court had filed a claim petition consequent to the death of Dr. Ashwini Sharma in a motor accident. The Claims Tribunal partly allowed the claim petition. A sum of Rs. 4,50,000/- was awarded as compensation to the claimants (being the dependants of the deceased Dr. Ashwini Sharma) with interest @ 7.5% p.a. and the Insurance Company (appellant before the Supreme Court) was directed by the Claims Tribunal to pay the compensation amount as determined in the award to the claimants from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation. The award of the Claims Tribunal quantifying compensation, in particular deduction of compensation amount received by the claimants from other source, was carried in appeal by them before the High Court. The High Court, relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court dated December 21, 2012 in Reliance General Insurance Co. The award of the Claims Tribunal quantifying compensation, in particular deduction of compensation amount received by the claimants from other source, was carried in appeal by them before the High Court. The High Court, relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court dated December 21, 2012 in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Purnima, acceded to the contention of the claimants that the amount receivable by the dependants of the deceased under the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of the Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 (hereafter the 2006 Rules) cannot be deducted from the quantum of compensation fixed by the Claims Tribunal. On that finding, the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondents. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the Insurance Company approached the Supreme Court. 12. The contention raised by the Insurance Company and the other incidental question requiring answers are found in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision, reading as under: 9. *** In substance, the contention of the Insurance Companies is that the claimants cannot be permitted to profiteer and receive double benefit on account of the death of their family member on the same head of 'Loss of income' to them. 10. Besides the abovenoted stand of the Insurance Companies, the other incidental question to be considered is whether there is any conflict of opinion between the coordinate Benches (of two Judges) of this Court, in Bhakra Beas Management Board on the one hand, and that of Helen C. Rebello and Patricia Jean Mahajan on the other. 13. Certain findings recorded by the Court on the question as referred to in paragraph 10 (extracted supra) are required to be noted at this stage. The relevant passages are quoted below: 12. The question is: whether the principle expounded by the two-Judge Bench in Helen case, in paras 32 to 35, in particular, can be doubted? In that case, the Court was called upon to answer as to whether it will be permissible to disallow the deduction of amount receivable by the dependants of the deceased towards "Life Insurance Policy", from the amount of compensation payable under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (in that case Sections 110B, 92A and 92B of the 1939 Act corresponding to Sections 168, 140 and 141 of the 1988 Act). 13. 13. This decision in Helen case has analysed the legal position regarding the application of the general principle for estimating damages under the common law. It has also noted the distinguishing features between the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 before its amendment by Act (3 of 1951) and thereafter. *** The Court then went on to analyse the decisions of this Court and held that there is a deliberate departure in the language of the 1939 Act, revealing the intent of the legislature to confer wider discretion on the Tribunal. Therefore, the decisions based on the principles applicable to previous law cannot be invoked while adjudicating the compensation payable to the claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. *** 15. The principle expounded in this decision in Helen C. Rebello case that the application of general principles under the common law to estimate damages cannot be invoked for computing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. Further, the "pecuniary advantage" from whatever source must correlate to the injury or death caused on account of motor accident. The view so taken is the correct analysis and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, and must apply proprio vigore to the corresponding provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This principle has been restated in the subsequent decision of the two-Judge Bench in Patricia Jean Mahajan case, to reject the argument of the Insurance Company to deduct the amount receivable by the dependants of the deceased by way of "social security compensation" and "life insurance policy". 16. *** Thus understood, Bhakra Beas case is not an authority of having taken a contra view than the view expressed in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia case. As a matter of fact, in para 11 of the reported decision in Bhakra Beas case, paras 32 to 34 of Helen C. Rebello case have been reproduced in their entirety. No observation is found in the entire decision, to have doubted the correctness of the dictum in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia case. (underlining for emphasis by us) 14. As a matter of fact, in para 11 of the reported decision in Bhakra Beas case, paras 32 to 34 of Helen C. Rebello case have been reproduced in their entirety. No observation is found in the entire decision, to have doubted the correctness of the dictum in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia case. (underlining for emphasis by us) 14. Having thus found that Helen C. Rebello (supra) or for that matter Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra) is not in conflict with Bhakra Beas Management Board (supra) and also that Helen C. Rebello (supra) has correctly analyzed the provisions of the Act, the Court proceeded to decide the stand taken by the Insurance Company that the claimants cannot be permitted to profiteer and receive double benefit. The principle based on which the question that arose for decision in Shashi Sharma (supra) was answered, is captured in paragraph 18 reading as follows: 18. The principle discernible from the exposition in Helen C. Rebello case is that if the amount "would be due to the dependants of the deceased even otherwise", the same shall not be deductible from the compensation amount payable under the 1988 Act. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that loss of income is a significant head under which compensation is claimed in terms of the 1988 Act. The component of quantum of "loss of income", inter alia, can be "pay and wages" which otherwise would have been earned by the deceased employee if he had survived the injury caused to him due to motor accident. If the dependants of the deceased employee, however, were to be compensated by the employer in that behalf, as is predicated by the 2006 Rules-to grant compassionate assistance by way of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds to the dependants of the deceased government employee who dies in harness, it is unfathomable that the dependants can still be permitted to claim the same amount as a possible or likely loss of income to be suffered by them to maintain a claim for compensation under the 1988 Act. The Court then proceeded to make further observations as under: 19. The Court then proceeded to make further observations as under: 19. A perusal of the scheme of the 2006 Rules would reinforce the position that the dependants of the deceased government employee are suitably compensated for a specified period by way of financial assistance in the form of ex gratia payment on compassionate grounds equivalent to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee in the normal course without raising a specific claim. *** 25. The claimants are legitimately entitled to claim for the loss of "pay and wages" of the deceased government employee against the tortfeasor or insurance company, as the case may be, covered by the first part of Rule 5 under the 1988 Act. The claimants or dependants of the deceased government employee (employed by the State of Haryana), however, cannot set up a claim for the same subject falling under the first part of Rule 5-"pay and allowances", which are receivable by them from employer (the State) under Rule 5(1) of the 2006 Rules. In that, if the deceased employee was to survive the motor accident injury, he would have remained in employment and earned his regular pay and allowances. Any other interpretation of the said Rules would inevitably result in double payment towards the same head of loss of "pay and wages" of the deceased government employee entailing in grant of bonanza, largesse or source of profit to the dependants/claimants. Somewhat similar situation has been spelt out in Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which reads thus: "167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both." (emphasis supplied) 26. Indeed, similar statutory exclusion of claim receivable under the 2006 Rules is absent. That, however, does not mean that the Claims Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim towards loss of pay and wages of the deceased has already been or will be compensated by the employer in the form of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds under Rule 5(1). That, however, does not mean that the Claims Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim towards loss of pay and wages of the deceased has already been or will be compensated by the employer in the form of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds under Rule 5(1). The Claims Tribunal has to adjudicate the claim and determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The amount receivable by the dependants/claimants towards the head of "pay and allowances" in the form of ex gratia financial assistance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time to the claimants. True it is, that the 2006 Rules would come into play if the government employee dies in harness even due to natural death. At the same time, the 2006 Rules do not expressly enable the dependants of the deceased government employee to claim similar amount from the tortfeasor or insurance company because of the accidental death of the deceased government employee. The harmonious approach for determining a just compensation payable under the 1988 Act, therefore, is to exclude the amount received or receivable by the dependants of the deceased government employee under the 2006 Rules towards the head financial assistance equivalent to "pay and other allowances" that was last drawn by the deceased government employee in the normal course. This is not to say that the amount or payment receivable by the dependants of the deceased government employee under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, is the total entitlement under the head of "loss of income". So far as the claim towards loss of future escalation of income and other benefits is concerned, if the deceased government employee had survived the accident can still be pursued by them in their claim under the 1988 Act. For, it is not covered by the 2006 Rules. Similarly, other benefits extended to the dependants of the deceased government employee in terms of sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 including family pension, life insurance, provident fund, etc., that must remain unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted, which, any way would be paid to the dependants of the deceased government employee, applying the principle expounded in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia Jean Mahajan cases. 27. 27. A priori, the appellants must succeed only to the extent of amount receivable by the dependants of the deceased government employee in terms of Rule 5(1) of the 2006 Rules, towards financial assistance equivalent to the loss of pay and wages of the deceased employee for the period specified. 15. Having thus read the decision in Shashi Sharma (supra), we are disinclined to uphold the contention of Mr. Pahari for more reasons than one. 16. First, no documentary evidence was placed either for consideration of the tribunal or before us that the widow of the victim has been offered compassionate appointment. The tribunal cannot be faulted for not considering any evidence which was not before it at all. Even though Mr. Debnath has not disputed that the widow of the victim, Lucy Tudu, has indeed been appointed on compassionate ground and has placed before us in terms of our direction her last pay certificate, we are of the considered view that omission on the part of the insurer to even apply under Order XLI Rule 27 and urge the appellate Court to allow it to rely on additional evidence ought to be held as fatal for its cause. 17. There is another reason, weightier than the first, to negate Mr. Pahari's contention. 18. Upon reading the decision in Vimal Kanwar (supra), we are ad idem with Mr. Debnath that the issue before us is no longer res integra. In Vimal Kanwar (supra), the second issue has been noted in paragraph 20 (which is the same here) and it was answered, for the reasons assigned, in the negative in paragraph 21. No elaboration is necessary because not only are we bound thereby but also because of our own view that, compassionate appointment of a dependent of a Government employee dying-in-harness is not automatic upon such death and can never be claimed as of right; that, several criteria have to be satisfied before one could be considered for compassionate appointment and whatever money one receives as salary is in lieu of service rendered to the society; and that, in such a case, there is no question of a profit or bonanza being earned by the family of the deceased if compensation for accidental death were awarded in terms of the provisions of the Act. 19. 19. Finally, it is time for us to say why we are not persuaded to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Shashi Sharma (supra). 20. The law relating to application of precedents has been considered by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions. Law, as laid down therein, can be summarized thus : (i) it is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar, for, one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts; (ii) courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed; (iii) judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes; (iv) observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems but the same must be read in the context in which they appear; (v) a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom; (vi) a decision is not an authority on a point which has not been considered; and (vii) the ratio must be culled out from the facts of the case concerned. 21. Bearing these settled principles in mind, we have no hesitation to hold that the fact situation in Shashi Sharma (supra) does not at all fit in with the fact situation here. While financial assistance on compassionate ground was envisaged by the 2006 Rules and such assistance could have been claimed by the family of the deceased as of right upon the death of Dr. Ashwini Sharma and such assistance was in fact received, the claimants here did not receive any financial assistance on the death of the victim on account of he being a Government employee. In fact, no such scheme is in vogue in this State. Compassionate appointment to the widow of the victim, in view of the stringent rules of which we can take judicial notice, must have occasioned on her fulfillment of each and every term thereof. In fact, no such scheme is in vogue in this State. Compassionate appointment to the widow of the victim, in view of the stringent rules of which we can take judicial notice, must have occasioned on her fulfillment of each and every term thereof. Whatever salary she has been receiving as a staff of the judgeship is not a bounty or charity that has been extended to her; she is supposedly putting in hard labour and being paid therefor, as other staff are being paid for similar such nature of work. Because of the factual dissimilarities, application of the law laid down in Shashi Sharma (supra) here would be inapt and we are, accordingly, of the view that the decision in Shashi Sharma (supra) is of no assistance to us in deciding this appeal. 22. The appeal, thus, stands dismissed. There shall be no order for costs. 23. Since the amount awarded as compensation has been secured by the insurer before the Registrar General of this Court, he shall proceed to disburse the same with accrued interest to the claimants in accordance with law, as early as possible. 24. Before parting, we may record that in course of hearing Mr. Pahari did not raise any grievance in respect of the findings on facts returned by the tribunal and, therefore, we have refrained from entering into any discussion in relation thereto. 25. The records of MAC Case No. 396 of 2006 shall be returned to the concerned tribunal without any delay. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. Debi Prosad Dey, J. : I agree.