JUDGMENT : G.S. PATEL, J. 1. This order will dispose of the Plaintiff’s Chamber Summons. It is filed in unusual circumstances. The Plaintiff seeks leave to lead what they describe as “further evidence” in regard to the preliminary issue of jurisdiction under Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). The second prayer in the Chamber Summons is to direct the Defendants to produce audited balance sheets and tax returns of the deceased original Defendant No. 1 for various assessment years and in the alternative, in prayer (c), to issue a witness summons to the deceased 1st Defendant’s Auditors to produce those various documents. 2. I propose to dismiss this Chamber Summons having heard Mr. Sancheti and Mr. Mehta for the Plaintiff and Mr. Shah for the Defendants quite extensively. My reasons follow. 3. The Suit itself was filed seeking first a declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner in respect of certain immovable properties mentioned at Serial Nos. 2 and 3 of Exhibit “B” to the plaint. These properties are office premises in South Mumbai and a property in Lonavala respectively. The second prayer, consequential on the first, was that the Defendants had no right, title or interest in those properties; the third prayer was for possession. Then there is prayer (d): “(d) That the estate of the deceased and the Defendant be ordered and decreed to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Rs. 38,96,39,799/- of which Rs. 29,12,52,251/- is the principal outstanding, Rs. 9,83,57,548/- is towards interest @ 24% p.a. From 01.01.2013 to 31.05.2014 together with further interest on principle outstanding @ 24% p.a. From 01.06.2014 till payment or realisation to the Plaintiff as per the Particulars of Claim being Exhibit “K-1” hereto.” 4. The next prayer (e) was framed in this way: that in the event this Court concluded that the Plaintiff was not the owner of these two immovable properties, then the Court ought to decree a monetary amount of Rs. 55,00,000/- to the Plaintiff and to declare that this amount was secured by a charge on the two immovable properties. 5. The Plaintiff was the original 1st Defendant’s son. The original 2nd Defendant was the 1st Defendant’s second wife. The original 1st Defendant having died, the suit now continues only against original 2nd Defendant as a sole contesting Defendant. 6. 55,00,000/- to the Plaintiff and to declare that this amount was secured by a charge on the two immovable properties. 5. The Plaintiff was the original 1st Defendant’s son. The original 2nd Defendant was the 1st Defendant’s second wife. The original 1st Defendant having died, the suit now continues only against original 2nd Defendant as a sole contesting Defendant. 6. The Defendant in the course of hearing of the Plaintiff’s application for interim relief raised a preliminary issue of jurisdiction under Section 9A of the CPC. The ground taken was that the Suit is barred by limitation. This preliminary issue was framed on 24th November 2014. The Plaintiff indicated that he wished to lead evidence. He marked seven documents in evidence. He then filed two Affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief. The first is dated 21st April 2015. The second is dated 4th September 2015. The Plaintiff was cross-examined on commission. This is an admirably brief cross-examination of no more than 14 questions. At the end of this, on 3rd March 2016, the Advocates then appearing for the Plaintiff informed the learned Commissioner that the Plaintiff had no further witnesses, and that, as a result, the Plaintiff closed his evidence. The Commissioner made his report. 7. In order to appreciate this controversy, there are two paragraphs of the plaint that are crucial. Paragraph 35 of the plaint is a one-line paragraph: “35. No part of the Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the law of limitation.” 8. Therefore, at no point has the Plaintiff ever claimed in his pleadings that there was any saving of the bar of jurisdiction on account of any acknowledgement of liability or any admission contained in any document of whatever description. The Plaintiff only says very simply that his suit is within time and he goes no further than this. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, however, the Plaintiff says this: “4. The Plaintiff states that the deceased has been advanced by the Plaintiff various sums from time to time which when netted aggregate to Rs. 41,16,53,391/-. The advances and repayments from time to time are reflected in the personal balance sheets of the deceased and as well as in the ledger account maintained by the Plaintiff in his books of accounts. The Plaintiff states that the deceased has been advanced by the Plaintiff various sums from time to time which when netted aggregate to Rs. 41,16,53,391/-. The advances and repayments from time to time are reflected in the personal balance sheets of the deceased and as well as in the ledger account maintained by the Plaintiff in his books of accounts. A copy of the said ledger account of the deceased in the books of the Plaintiff for the period from 1st April 2007 to 31st march 2014 are annexed hereto and marked as Exhibit-A1. A copy of the deceased duly audited balance sheet of financial year 2013-14 is annexed hereto and marked as Exhibit-A2.” 9. Now these documents are certainly financial documents and tax returns. The one that is controversial for our purposes is the one at Exhibit “A2” which is said to be a copy of the original 1st Defendant’s duly audited balance sheet for Financial Year 2013-2014. 10. To begin with, the Plaintiff does not explain anywhere either in this plaint or in any Affidavit of Evidence on the preliminary issue how he comes by this document. The only explanation offered, and that too only across the Bar, is that the Plaintiff and his father, the deceased original 1st Defendant, shared a common Chartered Accountant. The response to that is simply: therefore, what? These are after all confidential documents, and we are taking evidence. The fact that two persons share a Chartered Accountant does not mean that they can use each other’s confidential documents in this fashion without showing how one party happens to have the other’s document. We test not the adequacy of the explanation (the witness might well say he found it lying around), but whether there exists an explanation at all, a very different thing. It is not the provenance that is being examined, but the overall integrity of the case placed, and this assumes importance in some situations; the present case is one such, for the Defendant contends that this document is not authentic — there has been extensive fabrication and manipulation including of the accounts. The correctness of the document at Exhibit “A2” needed to be established. 11. Two points are to be noted here. The first is that even in the plaint, the Plaintiff does not rely on Exhibit “A2” as saving the bar of jurisdiction at all. The correctness of the document at Exhibit “A2” needed to be established. 11. Two points are to be noted here. The first is that even in the plaint, the Plaintiff does not rely on Exhibit “A2” as saving the bar of jurisdiction at all. Even more interestingly, even in the present Chamber Summons, the Defendant does not seek to introduce the document at Exhibit “A2”. What he seeks instead is to demand from the Defendant all manner of other documents saying that if these are produced then conceivably and presumably the Plaintiff will be able to demonstrate that his suit is within time. The document with which the Plaintiff came to Court is not sought to be proved in evidence at all. 12. At the broadest level, how this can be said to be an application for recall of the Plaintiff or to lead further evidence within the framework of the law as it currently stands, viz. Order XVIII Rule 17 of the CPC is not at all clear. 13. When this matter was first moved, a submission was attempted that the Commissioner has no power to close a party’s case. I accept that straight away. In fact, I do not think the Commissioner has done anything of the kind. He has only noted and reported what he was told by the Plaintiff himself, that the Plaintiff had no further witnesses and that it was the Plaintiff who chose to close his case. The Commissioner did not make him do this. No Court made him do this. The Plaintiff did this on his own. 14. Even today, there is no explanation as to why the Plaintiff has not produced the documents annexed to the Plaint and why is unable to produce his copy of that document if today he believes that this document will assist him in saving the bar of limitation. It is of course another matter that any such evidence would have to be shown to be supported by a necessary pleading and which, as I have noted, is not to be found. 15. In his first Evidence Affidavit, the Plaintiff contended: “14. Defendant No. 1 has not denied his liability to me. It is of course another matter that any such evidence would have to be shown to be supported by a necessary pleading and which, as I have noted, is not to be found. 15. In his first Evidence Affidavit, the Plaintiff contended: “14. Defendant No. 1 has not denied his liability to me. Defendant No. 1 has been filing Income Tax Returns from time to time and in his Income Tax Returns the amounts which are received by Defendant No. 1 from me and from M/s. Prabhudas Vithaldas on my behalf and the amounts which are repaid by Defendant No. 1 to me or to Prabhudas Vithaldas on my behalf are reflected. I say that the Income Tax Returns are filed by Defendant No. 1 through the same Chartered Accountant namely Atul HMV & Associates, who has been filing my Income Tax Returns also. I call upon Defendant No. 1 to produce his Income Tax Returns for the period 1.4.2012 to 31.3.2012.” 16. Now it is on this basis that the application is made and it is submitted before me that in my role as a Judge and in my ‘quest for the truth’ I should allow the Plaintiff in exercise of my discretion, and, of course, if all else fails, on quaffing a wee dram of what increasingly seems to be assumed to be the elixir of litigation life that springs forth from Section 151 of the CPC to let this additional document in. The other submission strenuously canvassed is that it is the Defendant that is “suppressing” vital material, a practice that has been deprecated by the Privy Council in T.S. Murugesam Pillai vs. Manichavasaka Desika Gnana Sahbanda Pandara Sannadhi & Others, (1916-1917) 21 CWM 761 : AIR 1917 PC 6 . The submission is misconceived. A defendant or opposing party may not, clearly, suppress a document that is otherwise admitted simply by refusing to produce it, especially if it is beyond the reach of a party who relies on it. That appears to have been the case before the Privy Council in regard to the regular fair day books and the ledgers which were in the possession of the Defendants but were not put in evidence. These were found to be of assistance to a Court, and therefore, the Privy Council said they ought to have been led in evidence. 17. These were found to be of assistance to a Court, and therefore, the Privy Council said they ought to have been led in evidence. 17. I pause here to note briefly that I am not hearing the suit finally. This is not a trial of all the issues in the suit or an assessment of it on merits. This is a very special procedure and provision applicable to this State in the form of Section 9A of the CPC. It often so happens that while testing this issue, a sort of mini-trial becomes inevitable. The test here and the question before the Court is therefore not so much on the merits of the case but on whether the preliminary issue is substantiated or not; specifically, in this case, whether the suit is within time or not. This is the limited inquiry before the Court and it is for this limited purpose that we assess the evidence and the documents on records. 18. For this reason, the reliance placed by Mr. Mehta on Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 is, in my view, more than somewhat misplaced. The Supreme Court did set out the overall purpose and objective of a Court while conducting a trial and the necessity of trying to ascertain the truth, and that is undoubtedly correct. But this does not mean at a specific level that a Court is entitled to act in disregard of the statute or well-established principles of trial procedure. It does not mean that evidence contrary to or unsupported by pleadings can be let in. it does not mean that the narrow scope of statutory provisions should be expanded without any explanation or justification given for showing any such indulgence. 19. As I have noted the pleading on a saving of the limitation bar is non-existent. Mr. Shah is correct in relying on provisions of Order VII Rule 6 of the CPC which say that in a Plaint instituted after the prescribed period of limitation a ground upon which exemption is claimed must be shown: 6. 19. As I have noted the pleading on a saving of the limitation bar is non-existent. Mr. Shah is correct in relying on provisions of Order VII Rule 6 of the CPC which say that in a Plaint instituted after the prescribed period of limitation a ground upon which exemption is claimed must be shown: 6. Grounds of exemption from limitation law Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed: Provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint. The proviso to the Rule allows a Court to permit the Plaintiff to claim exemption on a ground not set out in the Plaint provided that ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the Plaint. There is in fact no ground set out in the Plaint at all, and the Plaint proceeds on the footing that the suit is entirely within time. 20. The controversy really is about the scope of what the Court can or cannot do within Order XVIII Rule 17 of the CPC: 17. Court may recall and examine witness The Court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit. 21. In this regard, I believe that Mr. Shah is correct in saying that this provision is used for the purposes of obtaining a clarification where one is necessary. It is not to be used to fill in a lacuna in the evidence nor to allow the introduction of material that the witness may have forgotten to put in previously when he was in the witness box. Mr. Shah relies on the decision of a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Rajiv Khanna vs. M/s. Sunrise Freight Forwarders Pvt. Ltd. & Another, 2016 SCC On Line Del 3359. Here again there was a question of acknowledgement of liability. Both sides made reference to a document. Mr. Shah relies on the decision of a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Rajiv Khanna vs. M/s. Sunrise Freight Forwarders Pvt. Ltd. & Another, 2016 SCC On Line Del 3359. Here again there was a question of acknowledgement of liability. Both sides made reference to a document. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that a mere reference to a document does not constitute an acknowledgement of liability. 22. More to the point on the question of the frame of Order XVIII Rule 17 extracted above, are the three decisions of the Supreme Court in Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar vs. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410 , Bagai Construction vs. Gupta Building Material Store, (2013) 14 SCC 1 and Ram Rati vs. Mange Ram & Others, (2016) 11 SCC 296 . These make it clear that the purpose of Order XVIII Rule 17 is to enable a Court to clarify any doubts it may have with regard to the evidence led by the parties. It is not meant to fill up an omission. Most importantly, the Supreme Court tells us that in no uncertain terms that this is a power to be exercised most sparingly and carefully and not to be granted for the asking. In Ram Rati vs. Mange Ram, the Supreme Court reviewed the entire Law. It reiterated the principles that was set out by the earlier decisions in Vadiraj and Bagai Construction. Paragraphs 25 to 30 of Vadiraj must be set out. 25. In our view, though the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC have been interpreted to include applications to be filed by the parties for recall of witnesses, the main purpose of the said Rule is to enable the court, while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard to the evidence led by the parties. The said provisions are not intended to be used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. 26. As indicated by the learned Single Judge, the evidence now being sought to be introduced by recalling the witness in question, was available at the time when the affidavit of evidence of the witness was prepared and affirmed. 26. As indicated by the learned Single Judge, the evidence now being sought to be introduced by recalling the witness in question, was available at the time when the affidavit of evidence of the witness was prepared and affirmed. It is not as if certain new facts have been discovered subsequently which were not within the knowledge of the applicant when the affidavit evidence was prepared. 27. In the instant case, Sadanand Shet was shown to have been actively involved in the acquisition of the flat in question and, therefore, had knowledge of all the transactions involving such acquisition. It is obvious that only after the cross-examination of the witness that certain lapses in his evidence came to be noticed which impelled the appellant to file the application under Order 18 Rule 17 CPC. Such a course of action which arises out of the fact situation in this case, does not make out a case for recall of a witness after his examination has been completed. 28. The power under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC is to be sparingly exercised and in appropriate cases and not as a general rule merely on the ground that his recall and reexamination would not cause any prejudice to the parties. That is not the scheme or intention of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC. 29. It is now well settled that the power to recall any witness under Order 18 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the court either on its own motion or on an application filed by any of the parties to the suit, but as indicated hereinabove, such power is to be invoked not to fill up the lacunae in the evidence of the witness which has already been recorded but to clear any ambiguity that may have arisen during the course of his examination. 30. Of course, if the evidence on re-examination of a witness has a bearing on the ultimate decision of the suit, it is always within the discretion of the trial court to permit recall of such a witness for reexamination-in-chief with permission to the defendants to cross- examine the witness thereafter. There is nothing to indicate that such is the situation in the present case. (Emphasis added) 23. There is no question of this Plaintiff claiming that he has come upon new material that he did not otherwise have. There is nothing to indicate that such is the situation in the present case. (Emphasis added) 23. There is no question of this Plaintiff claiming that he has come upon new material that he did not otherwise have. That is not even a case in the Affidavit in Support of the Chamber Summons. 24. It is on this basis that I must assess whether any case has been made out beyond for the reliefs that are now sought. Beyond saying that the Defendant has certain tax and financial documents in her possession which will prove the Plaintiff’s case on limitation, there is nothing. Indeed the Plaintiff has pleaded no case on limitation other than saying that the Suit as filed is within time. It is this that the Plaintiff must show. There is no foundational averment in the pleading that any part of the cause of action is saved from limitation on account of any facts or set of facts. It is the Plaintiff who chose not to lead further evidence and, while I am not at this stage assessing the evidence on the preliminary issue, I must refer to one question and its answer in cross-examination. In question 6, the Plaintiff was asked if he could identify the dates on which from time to time he claimed to have allegedly lent and advanced money to his father, the original 1st Defendant. His answer was that he could not identify those dates. Nothing prevented the Plaintiff at any stage from introducing in evidence the document that he annexed as Exhibit “A2” to the Plaint. Why he chose not to lead this document in evidence is not my concern. Indeed, this is precisely why evidence on that document becomes important: in the plaint, as I have noted, it is said to contain an admission or acknowledgement of liability, though this is not cited in support of the saving of a bar of limitation. The document is disputed. It was therefore necessary for the Plaintiff to introduce that document and to then prove its correctness. In view of the denial by the Defendant, the Plaintiff had to prove the correctness of the relevant entries, including any acknowledgement of liability. The Plaintiff chose to do none of this. He chose to not even introduce this document at all. It was therefore necessary for the Plaintiff to introduce that document and to then prove its correctness. In view of the denial by the Defendant, the Plaintiff had to prove the correctness of the relevant entries, including any acknowledgement of liability. The Plaintiff chose to do none of this. He chose to not even introduce this document at all. Instead, he now seeks to bring into evidence documents about which there is no averment in his parent pleading, viz., the plaint, and sans all particularisation even in his evidence affidavit. Whether or not the assertions in the Evidence Affidavit, being unsupported by pleadings, can at all be considered is another matter that I leave for another date. The fact remains that even in his own evidence (leave aside the pleadings), the Plaintiff set no proper evidentiary context for what he now seeks to do. If he gave loans, surely he would have documentation to show this. If he gave loans, surely he is the best person to know when he did so. Instead, he only said in cross-examination that he could not identify a single date of any loan. Apart from anything else therefore there is not a single supporting strut for the kind of evidence that is now sought to be dragooned via this back-door invocation of ‘equity’, ‘justice’, ‘truth’, etc. If the Plaintiff seeks ‘the truth’ i.e., that there were loans, then the Plaintiff must be able to speak to this ‘truth’. If he cannot, it is not for me or the Defendant to assist him in this aimless argosy in quest for some golden fleece that might perhaps show something that could possibly be argued to conceivably shore up a case he has never pleaded. 25. I will not permit the Plaintiff to fill up any such the lacunae in his evidence, and I will most certainly not fill them for him myself. There are no ‘doubts’ that need clarification such as would justify granting the relief sought. 26. I see no merit in this Chamber Summons. It is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 27. List the suit for hearing on preliminary issue on 31st January 2017.