JUDGMENT : ARIJIT BANERJEE, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner challenges an order dated 15th December, 2012 passed by the AC (TTD), KMC. By the said order, the said officer of KMC directed that the petitioner’s application for mutation in respect of the premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road, Kolkata to be processed for joint mutation in the names of the petitioner and the private respondents. The grievance of the petitioner is that the private respondents have no right, title or interest in respect of the said premises and the same should be mutated in the sole name of the petitioner. 2. The material facts of the case are briefly that the petitioner claims to be the owner of premises no. 2 Choubhaga Road, Kolkata having purchased the same in a court proceeding. The petitioner relies on extracts from the Assessment Registrar of Tollygunge Municipality in respect of his claim of ownership in respect of the said premises. The petitioner applied for mutation of the property in his name. In view of the inaction on the part of the KMC Authorities, the petitioner moved WP No. 2177 of 2003 in this Court which was disposed of by an order dated 25 November, 2003 by directing the Municipal Commissioner, KMC to consider and dispose of the writ petitioner’s representation by a reasoned order within four weeks from the date of communication of the said order. Alleging non-compliance with the said order the petitioner filed a contempt application being CC No. 245 of 2004. In the said contempt application the Municipal Commissioner filed an affidavit disclosing an order dated 22 February, 2005, the operative portion thereof reads as follows:- “It is rather difficult for the Municipal Authority to identify 2, Choubhaga Road without proper demarcation by Survey passed Commissioner appointed by authority of Law. This authority undertakes to mutate the name after demarcation of the property and production of registered rectification deed. I once again find it difficult to come to a conclusion in granting mutation in favour of Sri Bimal Kumar Ghosh until and unless demarcation is taken place under the authority of appropriate court or the registered deed of conveyances are rectified by the appropriate registering authority.” 3. The said order dated 22 February, 2005 was challenged by the petitioner by filing WP No. 985 of 2005. The said order dated 22 February, 2005 was challenged by the petitioner by filing WP No. 985 of 2005. An order dated 7 August, 2007 was passed on the said writ application, the operative portion whereof reads as follows:- “After taking into consideration the order of the Municipal Commissioner dated 22 February, 2005, I am of the opinion that the matter can be resolved by appointing a Surveyor from the panel of Surveyors maintained by the High Court who shall, along with a competent official deputed by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, conduct a survey in respect of premises no. 2 Choubhaga Road, based on the said report of the Municipal Commissioner. Upon completion of his survey, the Surveyor shall file a report before this Court. The Surveyor shall also demarcate the portion belonging to the writ petitioner clearly, at the time of the filing of the report based upon his survey. This report may be filed before this Court within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order. The writ petitioner shall also be entitled to participate when the survey is conducted by the Surveyor in terms of this order. ……………………………. The matter shall appear in the list seven weeks hence under the same heading.” 4. By an order dated 2 December, 2010, the time to conduct the survey and to file a report before this Court was extended by eight weeks from the date of the order after recording the inability of Mr. Bibhas Nandy to act as the Surveyor and by replacing Mr. Nandy by Mr. Pradipta Mukhopadhyay who was the second person named in the earlier order dated 7 August, 2007. 5. Alleging violation of the said order the petitioner filed a contempt application being CC No. 73 of 2011 against the Commissioner, KMC and the Assessor-Collector-KMC. By an order dated 8 September, 2011, this Court held the contemnor no. 2 guilty of committing contempt of Court for wilful disobedience of the order dated 2 December, 2010 passed in WP No. 985 of 2005. By a subsequent order dated 13 September, 2011, this court imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- on the contemnor and further extended the time to conduct the survey of the premises in question and file a report before this court till 30 October, 2011 in terms of this court’s earlier order dated 2 December, 2011. 6. By a subsequent order dated 13 September, 2011, this court imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- on the contemnor and further extended the time to conduct the survey of the premises in question and file a report before this court till 30 October, 2011 in terms of this court’s earlier order dated 2 December, 2011. 6. Subsequently, inspection and survey report were filed in this court by the Special Officer. The operative portion of the said report dated 28 October, 2011 reads as follows:- “From scrutiny of records in KMC Assessment Register for 1952-53, it is revealed that (a)Premises No. 13, Choubhaga Road covered Dag Nos. 312, 212, 214, 219, 191/349, 192 and 1323, but not dag no. 994: and (b) Premises no. 2, Choubhaga Road covered Dag Nos. 994, 994/1084, 994/1085, 1000/1086 and also Dag no. 903/1000 which does not figure in the Petitioner’s Deed of sale.” 7. WP No. 985 of 2005 was disposed of by this court by an order dated 25th September, 2012, operative portion thereof reads as follows:- “But to insist on demarcation when the boundaries find mention in the sale deed cannot in anyway be a reason not to mutate the said premises in favour of the petitioner. Admittedly, the constructions are illegal. This has been the finding of this court in WP no. 1149 of 2001 wherein an order was passed on 14th August, 2002 directing the authorities to exercise powers under Section 400(1) of 1980 Act. In fact, contempt proceeding was initiated and no punishment was imposed on the contemnors as it was submitted at the hearing of the contempt application that the steps have been taken to demolish the unauthorised construction. Thereafter, one is not aware what happened to the proceeding under Section 400(1) of the 1980 Act. It has been submitted by Counsel for the respondent authorities that the 1980 Act may not apply to the illegal construction, but no such submission was made in 2002. From a reading of the report of the Special Officer, it is evident that dag nos. 903/1000 although a part of premises No. 2, Chowbaga Road but the same does not find mention in the petitioner’s deed of sale. Therefore, no mutation can be effected in respect of the said dag. From a reading of the report of the Special Officer, it is evident that dag nos. 903/1000 although a part of premises No. 2, Chowbaga Road but the same does not find mention in the petitioner’s deed of sale. Therefore, no mutation can be effected in respect of the said dag. Accordingly, the order dated 22nd February, 2005 cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is set aside in view of the discussion above. The particulars of the properties sold have been specified in the decree and as dag no. 903/1000 is not mentioned anywhere and the same has been excluded such rectification will also not be required. Accordingly, the respondent no. 4 is directed to mutate the said premises in favour of the petitioner and in the event any objection is raised at the time of mutation, the same be considered in accordance with law. The said exercise be completed within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 8. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 25 September, 2012, the AC (TTD) has passed the order which is under challenge in the present writ petition. The operative portion of the impugned order reads as follows:- “In the view of above, the Department is directed to process applicants’ application for mutation as joint mutation against the premises, as they have purchased a part of the premises.” Contention of the petitioner:- 9. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner handed up to me a map prepared by the inspection team wherein dag no. 994 has been shown as part of 13 Choubhaga Road. Learned Counsel submitted that this has been done fraudulently and in collusion with the private respondents. He submitted that the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner identifies the property purchased by the petitioner with sufficient precision. The stand of the KMC that mutation can be granted in favour of the petitioner only after demarcation and registration of the premises in question and rectification of the registered sale deed, is not justified. The petitioner is seeking mutation only in respect of the property mentioned in the sale deed. 10. Learned Sr. Counsel submitted that the constructions made on the land in respect of which the petitioner seeks mutation, are illegal and cannot be regularised. In support of this contention, Mr. The petitioner is seeking mutation only in respect of the property mentioned in the sale deed. 10. Learned Sr. Counsel submitted that the constructions made on the land in respect of which the petitioner seeks mutation, are illegal and cannot be regularised. In support of this contention, Mr. Bhattacharya has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Dipak Kumar Mukherjee vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, (2013) 5 SCC 336 , para 7 and 8. (ii) Rajesh Verma vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, 2014 (4) CHN (Cal) 409. (iii) Priyanka Estates International Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Assam, (2010) 2 SCC 27 , paras 55-57 11. Learned Counsel then referred to Sec. 183 of the KMC Act and submitted that notice of transfer was duly given by the petitioner as required by the Act. In this connection he referred to an application for entry of names in the Assessment Register under Sec. 183 of the KMC filed by the petitioner with the KMC authorities. Contention of KMC:- 12. Mr. Ashoke Kumar Banerjee, Learned Sr. Adv. Appearing for the KMC submitted that there is clearly a civil dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents. None of the parties have approached the civil forum for resolution of such dispute. KMC cannot decide the dispute regarding title. However, KMC will abide by this Court’s decision. Contention of the respondent no. 9:- 13. Appearing for the respondent no. 9, Mr. Rahul Karmakar, learned counsel submitted that the properties comprised in Dag No. 994, 994(P), 994/1084, 994 and 903/994 belonged to one Khuda Bux Kayal and other co-sharers. By executing a sale deed dated 27 January, 1931, the said properties were conveyed to one Sridhar Chandra Roy and Bijoy Krishna Roy being the executors of the estate of late Chandra Nath Roy. 14. Vide a deed dated March 11, 1949, the said Bijoy Krishna Roy along with Atul Krishna Roy, Prativa Chandra Roy and Pranab Prasad Roy executed a registered Arpannama and dedicated the said properties to Sri Sri Mangal Chandi Thakurani, Sri Sri Saraswati Thakurani and Sri Sri Chandra Nath Shib Thakur Jew. The she baits of the said deities made an application before the concerned District Judge praying for leave to transfer a portion of the deities’ properties including the aforesaid dag numbers. Such liberty was granted by the Court vide order dated August 9, 1986. The she baits of the said deities made an application before the concerned District Judge praying for leave to transfer a portion of the deities’ properties including the aforesaid dag numbers. Such liberty was granted by the Court vide order dated August 9, 1986. In the year 1987 the heirs of Khuda Bux Kayal namely Sk. Samser Ali Kayal and others filed a suit for partition against Prativa Chandra Roy and others in respect of the said properties, being TS No. 118 of 1987. 15. On August 7, 1990, a proceeding being UL Case No. 6(1)/248 of 1982 was finally decided against Prativa Chandra Roy and 16,147 sq. mtrs. of land was directed to be surrendered. Some portion of the land was surrendered from 13 Choubhaga Road being about 9024 sq. mtrs. 16. In April, 1996 the heirs of Khuda Bux Kayal withdrew TS No. 118 of 1987 upon executing a solenama that they are not interested to proceed with the suit. It was also recorded in the solenama that the agreement entered into by the heirs of Khuda Bux Kayal with Bimal Kumar Ghosh being the present petitioner shall be a nullity and if any claim is raised by Bimal Kumar Ghosh in future, the same shall be answered by one Asit Kumar Chatterjee. 17. The respondent no. 9 purchased 5 cottahs of land with structure in Dag No. 994(P)/1084 vide conveyance dated June 28, 1996 from Uma Nanda Roy and others. 18. The respondent no. 9 purchased another plot of land with structure measuring about 6 cottahs 8 chittaks in Dag No. 994 vide conveyance dated July 19, 2000 from Goutam Roy and others. The respondent no. 9 also purchased a plot of land with structures measuring about 2 cottahs 7 chittaks in Dag No. 903/994 vide registered sale deed dated August 10, 2001. In aggregate, the respondent no. 9 has acquired 18 cottahs and 15 chittaks of land by way of four sale deeds. 19. Learned Counsel submitted that it is an admitted position that Khuda Bux Kayal and other co-sharers were the owners of properties including properties comprised in Dag Nos. 994, 994/1083, 994/1085 and 100/1086. In aggregate, the respondent no. 9 has acquired 18 cottahs and 15 chittaks of land by way of four sale deeds. 19. Learned Counsel submitted that it is an admitted position that Khuda Bux Kayal and other co-sharers were the owners of properties including properties comprised in Dag Nos. 994, 994/1083, 994/1085 and 100/1086. If in the year 1931 the entirety or part of such properties were transferred to Sridhar Chandra Roy and another, nothing remained for the Kayals to convey to the writ petitioner on a subsequent date even by virtue of a Court sale. 20. Further, the said properties were subsequently conveyed in favour of the family deity of the Roys by virtue of a registered Arpannama in the year 1949. 21. The fact of the Title Suit No. 118 of 1987 being withdrawn and thereafter the property in question being conveyed to the respondent no. 9 was suppressed by the writ petitioner. It is only when the fact was placed before this Court at the time of hearing, that the writ petitioner came out with a new case of the said suit being restored and subsequently the writ petitioner being added as a party therein. The petitioner had initiated demolition proceeding against the respondent no. 9 and also filed a writ petition against him in this Court. The very fact that the petitioner made the respondent no. 9 a party in the demolition case in the year 2001 but did not make the respondent no. 9 a party in any of the subsequent writ petitions excepting the present one, is indicative of the mala fide of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner has deliberately moved all the writ petitions behind the back of the respondent no. 9 in an order to steal a march in total suppression of the disputed boundaries of the plots in question. The petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands and suppressed material facts and on that ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Learned Counsel relied on the following two decisions in this regard. (i) Bejoy Kumar Bose vs. The Traffic Manager, Calcutta Port Trust, 1994 (1) CLT 108. (ii) Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114 . 22. Learned Counsel relied on the following two decisions in this regard. (i) Bejoy Kumar Bose vs. The Traffic Manager, Calcutta Port Trust, 1994 (1) CLT 108. (ii) Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114 . 22. Learned Counsel then submitted that from the two reports filed on March 14, 2005 and October 8, 2011 it would appear that demarcation of the plot has been effected in the sale deed. However, the Mouza map was not consulted while conducting the survey for demarcating the land. It has also been recorded that the Mouza map was not available while conducting survey. The map relied upon by the petitioner is at best a derivation from the Mouza map and primarily deals with only two premises. No reliance can be placed on the same and the same cannot be a substitute for the Mouza map. For conducting the survey and demarcation of land, land marks and fixities are the sine qua non and without the same, the entire exercise of survey is futile and fraud. Hence, the report based on which demarcation is being sought for is bad in the eye of law since the same was prepared without consulting the Mouza map. In this connection reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Shri Manabesh Chandra Mukherjee vs. Dipak Kumar Singha, (2001) 1 CLT 137. 23. It was then submitted that the respondent no. 9 has set up his title based on registered deeds and till date such deeds have not been challenged. A registered deed is a public document and the world at large is deemed to have knowledge of a registered conveyance from the date of registration. In this connection reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision in Dilboo (Smt) (Dead) By Lrs vs. Dhanraji (Smt) (Dead), (2000) 7 SCC 702 . 24. Mr. Karmakar submitted that it is evident from the sale deeds that the respondent no. 9 is the absolute owner of the demarcated portion of the properties included in Dag Nos. 994, 994/1083, 994/1085, 100/1086 and is in possession thereof since the respective dates of conveyance. By not challenging the said deeds, the writ petitioner has admitted the title and possession of the respondent no. 9. It is evident that the ownership of the said dag nos. 994, 994/1083, 994/1085, 100/1086 and is in possession thereof since the respective dates of conveyance. By not challenging the said deeds, the writ petitioner has admitted the title and possession of the respondent no. 9. It is evident that the ownership of the said dag nos. is in dispute and the Writ Court cannot go into disputed questions of title. The dispute with regard to the title and possession of the properties in question remains unresolved till date. Both the petitioner and the respondent no. 9 have registered sale deeds in their favour and the deeds of the respondent no. 9 being prior in point of time shall prevail over the deed of the writ petitioner. The demarcated plots of which the respondent no. 9 is in possession shall have to be carved out of the portion claimed by the petitioner and only then separate mutation could be granted in favour of the petitioner. That there is dispute of title is admitted in paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-reply. In support of the proposition that the Writ Court cannot decide disputed questions of title, learned Counsel relied on the following two decisions:- (i) State of Rajasthan-vs.-Bhawani Singh, (1993) 1 (supp) SCC 306. (ii) Swati Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. vs. Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO), (2015) 4 SCC 204 . 25. Learned Counsel also relied on the decision in Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad vs. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689 in support of his submission that mutation does not confer title and if there is a disputed claim of title in respect of a property for which mutation is sought, the Writ Court cannot go into such dispute and no orders can be passed unless such dispute is resolved by the appropriate forum. He submitted that as per Sec. 183 (3) of the KMC Act, the person who claims title has to produce evidence of such title and thereafter claim mutation. In the instant case, both the petitioner and the respondent no. 9 have produced evidence of ownership of the said dag numbers. Unless the dag numbers are demarcated, no separate mutation can be granted for premises no. 2 and 13 Choubhaga Road and hence rightly joint mutation has been directed to be made. Title and/or possession cannot be decided by the KMC and until demarcation is effected on the basis of the Mouza map, no separate mutation can be granted. Unless the dag numbers are demarcated, no separate mutation can be granted for premises no. 2 and 13 Choubhaga Road and hence rightly joint mutation has been directed to be made. Title and/or possession cannot be decided by the KMC and until demarcation is effected on the basis of the Mouza map, no separate mutation can be granted. 26. Mr. Karmakar then submitted that the petitioner’s prayer for mandamus directing KMC to grant mutation in his favour in support of the property in question cannot be allowed. An act which an authority is duty bound to perform under the statute is to be done in terms of the statute and the Court cannot perform the act of the statutory authority by usurping the powers envisaged under the statute. He relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of UP vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985) 3 SCC 131 . 27. Learned Counsel submitted that all through-out the petitioner is trying to evict the respondent no. 9 in a devious manner. First he filed a demolition case against the respondent no. 9. Then he obtained several orders for mutation behind the back of the respondent no. 9. The petitioner is trying to eject the respondent no. 9 from the properties in question without having the dispute regarding title decided by the appropriate forum. 28. Learned Counsel finally submitted that the writ petition suffers from suppression of material facts and involves several disputed questions of fact which cannot be decided by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel prayed for dismissal of the writ petition with exemplary costs. Petitioner’s in reply:- 29. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in reply submitted that deliberate misstatements have been made by the respondent no. 9 in the list of dates filed in Court. There has been gross suppression of facts including the fact that TS No. 118 of 1987 was restored and the petitioner was added as a party in the suit. He relied on the following two decisions regarding suppression of facts. (i) Union of India vs. Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90 , paras 8 and 12. (ii) K.D. Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481, paras 38, 39, 51 and 52. 30. Learned Counsel reiterated emphatically that dag no. He relied on the following two decisions regarding suppression of facts. (i) Union of India vs. Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90 , paras 8 and 12. (ii) K.D. Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481, paras 38, 39, 51 and 52. 30. Learned Counsel reiterated emphatically that dag no. 994 does not fall within 13 Choubhaga Road but is a part of 2 Choubhaga Road. He referred to several documents in this regard. 31. Learned Counsel further submitted that till 2010, KMC has raised bill on 2 Choubhaga Road. However, in the recent report, KMC says there is no such premises. This is clearly indicative of the fact that the KMC is biased in favour of the respondent no. 9. In this connection, learned Counsel relied on the following three decisions:- (i) Ujjwal Barter Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, 2015 (4) CHN (Cal) 379, paras 27 and 37. (ii) Read Estate Agencies vs. Govt. of Goa, 2013 (3) CHN (SC) 126, paras 9 and 10. (iii) ABL International Ltd. vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 , paras 16, 17, 19, 27 and 51. Court’s view:- 32. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. This writ petition has a chequered history as would appear from the submissions of the parties recorded hereinbefore. 33. As it appears to me, the moot point involved in the present case is whether Dag No. 994 is a part of 2 Choubhaga Road, or whether it is a part of 13 Choubhaga Road. If Dag no. 994 falls within 2 Choubhaga Road, then, there can be no legitimate reason for KMC not to mutate premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road in the sole name of the petitioner. 34. At least two reports of the KMC authorities are on record. In the report dated 22 February, 2005 prepared by the Municipal Commissioner, on the first page it is stated inter alia as follows:- “………. Shri Bimal Kumar Ghosh attended the hearing. He produced the sale deed in respect of Dag No. 994, 994/1083, 994/1085, 994/1084 and 1000/1086 being premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road. But it appears from the Assessment Register for the period 1/52-53, 2 Choubhaga Road comprises Dag No. 994, 903/1000, 994/1085, 994/1084 and 1000/1086……”. 35. Shri Bimal Kumar Ghosh attended the hearing. He produced the sale deed in respect of Dag No. 994, 994/1083, 994/1085, 994/1084 and 1000/1086 being premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road. But it appears from the Assessment Register for the period 1/52-53, 2 Choubhaga Road comprises Dag No. 994, 903/1000, 994/1085, 994/1084 and 1000/1086……”. 35. However, at page 3 of the said report it is stated inter alia as follows:- “………… it is reiterated that Dag No. 994 appears to have been existed in premises No. 2 as well as 13 Choubhaga Road. It is rather difficult for the Municipal Authority to identify 2 Choubhaga Road without proper demarcation by Survey passed Commissioner appointed by authority of Law. This authority undertakes to mutate the name after demarcation of the property and production of registered rectification deed……….”. 36. In the Survey Report dated 8 October, 2011 carried out by the Special Officer at page 2 it is stated inter alia as follows;- “………… buildings on the northern part of the designated area comprising Dag no. 994 and 1083 were all found to be bearing the common address as 13 Choubhaga Road….”. 37. At page 3 of the said report it is stated inter alia as follows:- “………….. from scrutiny of records in KMC Assessment Register for 1952-53, it is revealed that (a) Premises No. 13, Choubhaga Road covered Dag Nos. 312, 212, 214, 219, 191/349, 192 and 1323, but not Dag No. 994; and (b) Premises No. 2, Choubhaga Road covered Dag no. 994, 994/1084, 994/1085, 1000/1086 and also Dag No. 903/1000 which does not figure in the Petitioner’s Deed of sale …”. 38. Thus, they appears to be an utter confusion as to whether Dag No. 994 is a part of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road or a part of premises No. 13 Choubhaga Road. Even the KMC authorities are not sure. 39. To add to the confusion, both the petitioner and the respondent No. 9 have produced registered sale deeds in support of their claim that Dag No. 994 is owned by them. The sale deeds in favour of the respondent No. 9 are prior in point of time. The same have not been challenged by the petitioner in any Court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, prima facie, the sale deeds in favour of respondent No. 9 shall prevail over the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. 40. The sale deeds in favour of the respondent No. 9 are prior in point of time. The same have not been challenged by the petitioner in any Court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, prima facie, the sale deeds in favour of respondent No. 9 shall prevail over the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. 40. There is clearly a title dispute in this case. The respondent No. 9 claims to be in possession of some portion of 2 Choubhaga Road as owner thereof. Hence, the KMC authorities have expressed their inability to mutate premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road in the sole name of the petitioner. I appreciate such difficulty of the KMC authorities and I am in agreement with the submission of Mr. Karmakar that unless such title dispute is resolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction, mutation in respect of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road cannot be granted in the sole name of the petitioner. In Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad-vs.-State of Maharashtra (supra), a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court, in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the reported judgment, observed as follows:- “13. It is settled that mutation does not confer any right and title in favour of any one or other, nor cancellation of mutation extinguishes the right and title of the rightful owner. Normally, the mutation is recorded on the basis of the possession of the land for the purposes of collecting revenue. 14. In the present case, we find that a disputed question of fact was raised by the parties with regard to the title over the land in question. The appellant Corporation on the one hand based its claim of title on payment of amount by depositing it in the court and possession of the land taken pursuant to the agreement reached between the appellant Corporation and the father of the Respondent 2. On the other hand, the case of the second respondent is that the amount was not deposited by the appellant Corporation with regard to the land in question. In view of the fact that there is a disputed question of fact, we are of the view that it was not a fit case for the High Court to decide the question of mutation doubting the title in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and thereby reversing the concurrent finding of fact by the competent authorities.” 41. In view of the fact that there is a disputed question of fact, we are of the view that it was not a fit case for the High Court to decide the question of mutation doubting the title in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and thereby reversing the concurrent finding of fact by the competent authorities.” 41. It is trite law that disputed questions of title cannot be decided by the writ Court. Such questions are to be decided by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. In this connection one may refer to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Rajasthan-vs.- Bhawani Singh (supra) and Swati Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd.vs.- Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO) (supra). In Swati Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd.-vs.-Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO) (supra), the Apex Court held that where a disputed question of fact regarding ownership of a plot of land arises in a writ petition, the High Court would be justified to dismiss the petition and direct the parties to approach the Civil Court for resolving such dispute. In State of Rajasthan-vs.-Bhawani Singh (supra), the Apex Court held that in the facts of that case the writ petition was misconceived in so far as it asked for, in effect, a declaration of the writ petitioner’s title to the concerned plot of land. It was observed that disputed questions relating to title cannot be satisfactorily gone into or adjudicated in a writ petition. 42. Although there is no absolute bar in the writ Court entertaining a writ application involving disputed questions of fact, ordinarily the writ Court would not do so in exercise of its discretion. This is because the procedure followed by the writ Court is not apposite for the purpose of deciding disputed questions of fact. Generally, a detailed trial involving witness action is required for deciding disputed questions of fact for which a Civil Court is the appropriate forum. 43. Further, as the Hon’ble Apex Court held in the case of State of UP-vs.- Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra), KMC is the statutory authority which has been vested with the power of granting mutation and the Court should not ordinarily usurp such power and pass a mandatory order directing KMC to grant mutation, unless the Court feels that there is absolutely no reason or justification for the KMC to refuse mutation. In my opinion, in the present case, the refusal of the KMC authorities to grant mutation in respect of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road in the sole name of the petitioner cannot be said to be wholly unjustified or unreasonable or arbitrary. There are clearly rival claims of the petitioner and the respondent No. 9 in respect of portion of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road and until such dispute is resolved by a competent Court in an appropriately constituted civil action, in my opinion, the KMC authorities would be justified in declining mutation of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road in the sole name of the petitioner. Surely, the Municipal Authorities cannot be expected to decide such disputed question of title nor do they have the power to do so. 44. Several orders have been passed in previous writ petitions filed by the present petitioner as noted above. In that none of the said orders there is an absolute or unconditional mandate on the KMC to grant mutation of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road in the exclusive name of the petitioner. Even in the order dated 25 September, 2012 whereby WP No. 985 of 2005 was disposed of by directing the authorities to mutate the premises in question in favour of the petitioner, the learned Judge observed that in the event any objection is raised at the time of mutation, the same would be considered in accordance with law. Such objection was in fact raised on behalf of the respondent No. 9 and since the AC (TTD) does not have the power to decide questions of right, title or interest in property, he passed the order directing joint mutation of premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road. 45. In view of the aforesaid I unable to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioner. KMC should not be directed to record premises No. 2 Choubhaga Road in the sole name of the petitioner without first there being proper demarcation and resolution of the title dispute indicated above by a competent Civil Court. 46. I have not gone into the allegations of suppression of material facts levelled against each other by the petitioner and the respondent No. 9 as I did not deem it necessary to do so for disposing of this writ application. 47. WP No. 350 of 2013 is accordingly disposed of without however, any order as to costs. 48. 46. I have not gone into the allegations of suppression of material facts levelled against each other by the petitioner and the respondent No. 9 as I did not deem it necessary to do so for disposing of this writ application. 47. WP No. 350 of 2013 is accordingly disposed of without however, any order as to costs. 48. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.