JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri N.N. Jaiswal learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Rakesh Kumar Yadav for the respondent No. 5 and learned Standing Counsel has appeared on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 2. This appeal questions the interim directions issued by the learned Single Judge in the pending writ petition whereby the appellant had been called upon to issue necessary orders with regard to continuance and payment of salary to the respondent No. 5 as a Class-IV employee in the institution. 3. The litigation has a chequered history. The respondent No. 5 had earlier been proceeded against and the Principal of the institution had taken action and had not allowed the respondent No. 5 to work in the institution as a result whereof the District Inspector of Schools passed an order on 11.2.2003 calling upon the Principal of the institution to allow the respondent No. 5 to join and also to pay him salary from the date he joined. The respondent No. 5 had not received his salary in spite of this order dated 11.2.2003 and consequently he filed Writ Petition No. 6193(S/S) of 2004 that was disposed off on 10.3.2006 holding that the respondent No. 5 was nowhere at fault and, therefore, the order and direction by the District Inspector of Schools ought to be implemented. The writ petition filed by the respondent No. 5 was allowed with a direction that the respondent No. 5 shall be allowed to join the institution and perform his duties and receive regular salary including arrears thereof. It was, however, observed that in the event there was any charge of unauthorized absence or indiscipline it was open to the authority to take any action permissible according to law. 4. When the respondent No. 5 did not receive the benefits of the said judgment he filed contempt application being Contempt Application No. 2190 of 2006. During the pendency of contempt application an affidavit was filed stating that the direction that was issued for compliance has been obeyed and salary has been paid to the respondent No. 5 from January 1996 to March 2006. During the pendency of contempt application an affidavit was filed stating that the direction that was issued for compliance has been obeyed and salary has been paid to the respondent No. 5 from January 1996 to March 2006. It was, however, indicated therein that since an opportunity had been granted to take action against the respondent No. 5, the Principal of the institution who is the appointing authority in terms of the regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 sent a communication to the District Inspector of Schools terminating the services of the respondent No. 5 on account of unauthorized absence. This communication dated 15.4.2006 was treated to be a termination order. The District Inspector of Schools is stated to have approved the same on 11.7.2006. 5. The respondent No. 5 took a plea that he was not aware of any such intervening proceedings and on coming to know of the same on 23.8.2012 after the contempt application was disposed off, he filed Writ Petition No. 5564(S/S) of 2012 that has given rise to the present appeal. A prayer has been made in the writ petition for the quashing of the said termination order and approval order of the District Inspector of Schools. 6. It is evident that no interim order was passed in the writ petition at the stage of admission. It is thereafter that the impugned interim order dated 23.3.2017 has been passed, after the case was heard on 7.3.2017 and the matter was again fixed for 27.3.2012. It is informed at the Bar that no orders were passed and the case has been adjourned. The petition is not disposed off, yet a direction has been given to the appellant to take action and to pass appropriate orders with regard to salary and functioning of the respondent No. 5. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant Sri Jaiswal submits that once the order of termination and approval was under challenge, then in that event, firstly the termination order having not been assailed before the appropriate appellate forum that is the Committee of Management, the approval given by the District Inspector of Schools was invalid. Consequently the writ petition could not be entertained when it was filed in 2012 assailing the order of 2006 at such a belated stage. Consequently the writ petition could not be entertained when it was filed in 2012 assailing the order of 2006 at such a belated stage. Without setting aside the order of 2006, the compulsion under the impugned order to pass orders and to pay salary was unjustified. Thirdly it is submitted that the learned Single Judge could have very conveniently disposed off the entire matter itself without passing any interim directions compelling the appellant to extend the benefits to the respondent No. 5. 8. Controverting the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 submits that the impugned order of termination and approval were both invalid as the allegations of unauthorized absence were not proved and were simply assumed. He submits that the said assumption was not preceded by any proper inquiry nor the charge of unauthorized absence was proved in a regular inquiry and in such circumstances the orders of dismissal and then approval by the District Inspector of Schools are both invalid and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. In such circumstances the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in compelling the appellant from allowing the respondent No. 5 to function and receive salary. 9. Learned Standing Counsel contends that so long as the order of District Inspector of Schools is in existence the same without being set aside or interfered with cannot be a ground to pay salary to the respondent No. 5 from the State exchequer. 10. We have considered the submissions raised and we also find that the writ petition itself having been filed and the parties being represented could have been disposed off finally on the basis of the record that was available. 11. Even otherwise if salary was to be paid then some prima facie reasons ought to have been recorded for the purpose of extending the benefit of salary. We do not find any such recital in the impugned order. 12. In the aforesaid background it will be appropriate that the entire matter is disposed off finally by the learned Single Judge and for that we request the learned Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition finally as expeditiously as possible preferably by the next date fixed so that the compulsion created under the impugned order on the appellant may be complied with if required in the event the writ petition finally deserves to be allowed. 13. 13. The appeal is accordingly disposed Off with the aforesaid observations.