JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. (Oral)—The petitioner-Corporation being aggrieved by the impugned award dated 7.9.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla in Ref. No.11/2007 has filed the instant petition for setting aside the said award. 2. It is not in dispute that the respondent joined the petitioner-Corporation as a daily wage Chowkidar on 1.8.1987. On 4.8.1995, an office order was issued by the Assistant Manager of the Corporation entrusting Jawala Dass, Driver and the respondent with responsibility of taking care of vehicle No. HIS-1036. In the month of November 1995, the driver, Jawala Dass informed the Assistant Manager regarding swapping of tyres of vehicle No. HIS-1036 with another vehicle No.HP-07- 2517. The respondent is alleged to have worked till 20.10.1995 and thereafter abandoned the job. From November 1995 to January 1996, efforts were made by the Assistant Manager of the Corporation to trace the respondent, but to no avail. Eventually on 12.1.1996, FIR No. 11/96 was registered against the respondent on the ground of theft and misappropriation of the property of the petitioner-Corporation which was entrusted to him. 3. The trial continued till August 2001 and the respondent is said to have remained absent from duty during this period. On 1.8.2011, the respondent finally came to be acquitted by the Court and thereafter on 9.8.2001, the respondent submitted a representation to the petitioner-Corporation requesting therein to reengage him in service on the ground of his acquittal. Such request was repeated vide another representation dated 1.12.2001, but to no avail, constraining the respondent to file O.A. No. 3280/2001 with the State Administrative Tribunal wherein one of the main reliefs was regarding reinstatement on the ground of the aforesaid acquittal. The matter remained pending with the State Administrative Tribunal upto 24.2.2005, on which date the original application was withdrawn on the ground that the State Administrative Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in light of the various pronouncements of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as also this Court. The matter remained pending with the State Administrative Tribunal upto 24.2.2005, on which date the original application was withdrawn on the ground that the State Administrative Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in light of the various pronouncements of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as also this Court. Thereafter, the respondent raised demand notice before the Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer, however on account of failure conciliation proceedings, the following reference was sent to the Labour Court:- "Whether the termination of services of Shri Raj Kumar, s/o Shri Prithi Singh workman by the (1) Managing Director, Himachal Pradesh State Corporation, Vikas Nagar, Block No.1, Kasumpati, Shimla-9 (2) the Divisional Manager, Forest Working Division, Shimla-2 w.e.f. 20.10.1995 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged by the workman is proper & justified ? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation, the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?" 4. Pursuant to such reference, the respondent filed his statement of claims, to which the petitioner filed the reply. The learned Tribunal vide impugned award dated 7.9.2010 directed the reinstatement of the respondent with seniority and continuity in service, but without any back wages. It is against this award, the instant petition has been filed on the grounds- (i) the claim petition was not maintainable as the respondent had himself abandoned the job; (ii) the claim was highly belated and, therefore, the same should have been dismissed at the threshold; and (iii) instead of ordering the reinstatement of the respondent, the learned Tribunal should have awarded a lump sum compensation. 5. The respondent has filed the reply wherein, he has raised preliminary objections regarding the averments made in the petition being misleading. It has been averred that the respondent was though engaged as daily wage Chowkidar on 1.8.1987, however, the contents regarding the absence of the respondent is totally misleading. The petitioner-Corporation itself vide their letter No. SFC/FWD/SML/ESTT/MISC.6035 dated 29.11.2001 has categorically admitted that the services of the petitioner were terminated on 29.10.1995. On merits, the averments made in the preliminary objections have been reiterated and it has further been averred that since the respondent from the very beginning has been falsely implicated in the case, therefore, was rightly acquitted by the Court. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 7. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 7. Adverting to ground No.1, it needs no detailed examination by this Court in view of the letter written by the Divisional Manager of the Corporation dated 29.11.2011, wherein it has been categorically admitted that the respondent had been removed from service vide order dated 20.10.1995. The petitioner-Corporation has not disputed this letter, therefore, it can conveniently be held that it was not the respondent who abandoned the job, but it was the petitioner-Corporation, who in wake of an FIR having been registered against the respondent ordered his removal from service. 8. Insofar as the ground No.2 is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another, 2015(15) SCC 1 and Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board v. Mohan Lal, (2013) 14 SCC 543 . 9. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Marketing Board (2007) 14 SCC 291 has held that the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference made by the State Government and the same is required to be adjudicated upon merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. It was held as under:- "10. In the appeal the main issue which arises for determination is as follows: "Whether the reference of the Petitioner/workman could be rejected on the sole ground of delay when Government itself made reference for adjudication of the issue/ dispute?" 11. In Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Workers AIR 1963 SC 569 it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in dealing with industrial disputes is limited to the points mentioned in Section 10(4). 12. In National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 1 SCC 371 ) it has been held vide para 24 that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10. This is because existence of the industrial dispute is a jurisdictional fact. Absence of such jurisdictional fact results in the invalidation of the reference. This is because existence of the industrial dispute is a jurisdictional fact. Absence of such jurisdictional fact results in the invalidation of the reference. For example, even under the Income Tax Act, 1961 as it stood earlier, the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe escapement of income. This "reason to believe" is a jurisdictional fact, therefore, writ petitions were maintainable in cases where the High found absence of basic facts for reopening the assessment. The industrial Tribunal under Section 10 gets its jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute only upon a reference by the appropriate government. The Industrial Tribunal cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer says that the workman has made a stale claim then the employer must challenge the reference by way of Writ petition and say that since the claim is belated, there was no industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal cannot strike down the reference on this ground. 13. In the present case, the Industrial Tribunal has held that the employer has violated Section 25F. If so, the order of termination is bad in law. It has to be struck down. In the present case, it has been struck down. However, the Tribunal had refused to grant any relief on the ground of delay. The Tribunal has no authority to invalidate the reference, particularly when it has found that the order of termination violates Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 14. In Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board (2001) 6 SCC 222 ) , it has been held, vide para 15, as follows: (SCC p. 228) " 15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case, when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. In this case, when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach its legal culmination." 15. "10. So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of each individual case. 11. However, certain observations made by this Court need to be noted. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty (2000) 2 SCC 455 ) it was noted at paragraph 6 as follows: (SCC pp. 459-60) "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex-facie bad and incompetent." 12. In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 27 ) the position was reiterated as follows: ( SCC pp. 39-40 para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen( AIR 1959 SC 1217 ) , that merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after even reemployment of the most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen (supra) ( AIR 1959 SC 1217 ) , In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others (supra) AIR 2000 SC 839 , a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and others v. Union of India and others (supra) (1993 AIR SCW 2214 , it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily Rated Casual Employees Under P&T Department v. Union of India (supra) ( AIR 1987 SC 2342 ) , the department was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the scheme. On 28-12-1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. We do not think that the appellants deserve to be non suited on the ground of delay." The above position was highlighted recently in Sudamdih Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Workmen (2006) 2 SCC 329 , SCC pp. 334-36, paras 10-12 and Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam v. Sham Lal (2006) 9 SCC 124 . " 10. Similar issue came up before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar (2014) 10 SCC 301 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the Limitation Act has no applicability to the reference made by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute. It was held:- "10. The learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana, Mr. Narender Hooda has vehemently contended that the Labour Court was right in rejecting the reference of the industrial dispute being on the ground that it was barred by limitation by answering the additional issue No. 2 by placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota v. Mohan Lal (2013) 14 SCC 543 wherein this Court has held as under:- (SCC p. 551, para 19) "19. We are clearly of the view that though Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and Anr. v. Gitam Singh (2013) 5 SCC 136 that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed." 11. In our view of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, the reference was made by the State Government to the Labour Court for adjudication of the existing industrial dispute; it has erroneously held it to be barred by limitation. This award was further erroneously affirmed by the High Court, which is bad in law and therefore the same is liable to be set aside. According to Section 10(1) of the Act, the appropriate government ''at any time'' may refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, if it is of the opinion that such an industrial dispute between the workman & the employer exists or is apprehended. Section 10(1) reads as follows: "10. According to Section 10(1) of the Act, the appropriate government ''at any time'' may refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, if it is of the opinion that such an industrial dispute between the workman & the employer exists or is apprehended. Section 10(1) reads as follows: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals: --(1) Where the appropriate government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing- (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication." (emphasis supplied) Thus, it is necessary for us to carefully observe the phrase ''at any time'' used in this section. Therefore, there arises an issue whether the question of limitation is applicable to the reference of the existing industrial dispute that would be made by the State Government either to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for adjudication at the instance of the appellant. 12. This Court in Avon Services Production Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, (1979) 1 SCC 1 , after interpreting the phrases "at any time" rendered in Section 10(1) of the Act, held thus:- (SCC p. 7,para 7) "7.......Section 10(1) enables the appropriate Government to make reference of an industrial dispute which exists or is apprehended at any time to one of the authorities mentioned in the section. How and in what manner or through what machinery the Government is apprised of the dispute is hardly relevant.......The only requirement for taking action under Section 10(1) is that there must be some material before the Government which will enable the appropriate Government to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. How and in what manner or through what machinery the Government is apprised of the dispute is hardly relevant.......The only requirement for taking action under Section 10(1) is that there must be some material before the Government which will enable the appropriate Government to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This is an administrative function of the Government as the expression is understood in contradistinction to judicial or quasi-judicial function." Therefore, it is implicit from the above case that in case of delay in raising the industrial dispute, the appropriate government under Section 10(1) of the Act has the power, to make reference to either Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, if it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended at any time, between the workman and the employer. 13. Further, in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. SEB (2001) 6 SCC 222 , it is held by this Court as under: (SCC p. 228, para 15) "15.There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach its legal culmination." (emphasis supplied) 14. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach its legal culmination." (emphasis supplied) 14. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer. 15. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services and Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra. 16. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services and Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra. 16. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District Manager (2003) 4 SCC 27 , it was held by this Court as follows: (SCC pp. 39-40, para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India 1993 Supp (4) SCC 67 , it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief." (emphasis supplied) 17. In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in S.M. Nilajkar, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer. 18. In Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited (1999) 6 SCC 82 , this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that: (SCC p. 90, para 10) "10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages." (emphasis supplied)" 11. The issue in question was yet again subject matter of the recent decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana and another (2015) 4 SCC 458 and it was held as under:- "14. The issue in question was yet again subject matter of the recent decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana and another (2015) 4 SCC 458 and it was held as under:- "14. On issue No. 3, after adverting to the case of State of Punjab v. Kalidass (1996) 7 SLR 446 wherein the High Court has observed that the workman cannot be allowed to approach the Labour Court after 3 years of termination of his services, upon which reliance placed by the respondent-employer with reference to the said plea the Labour Court has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it is observed by this Court that there is no period of limitation to the proceedings in the Act. 15. Accordingly, Issue No. 3 is answered against the respondent-management. The relevant paragraph from Ajaib Singh''s case (supra) are extracted herein below: (SCC p.90, para 10) "10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages." 12. Further, in case the petitioners were really aggrieved by the reference made on the ground that it was belated and no dispute exists, then the remedy available to them was to challenge the order making reference and if they choose not to do so, it cannot be at this stage questioned the reference as being time barred. Further, in case the petitioners were really aggrieved by the reference made on the ground that it was belated and no dispute exists, then the remedy available to them was to challenge the order making reference and if they choose not to do so, it cannot be at this stage questioned the reference as being time barred. Similar issue came before a learned Division Bench of this Court in H.P. State Forest Corporation v. Presiding Judge, Labour Court, Shimla and another 2012 LLR 770 wherein it was held as follows:- "4. If the employer is aggrieved by the reference being made on the ground that it is belated and no dispute exists then remedy available to the employer is to challenge the order making the reference and if it does not challenge the said order, it can not in reference proceedings claim that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of limitation, delay or laches." 13. In view of the settled proposition of law, no irregularity, illegality or perversity is found in the award passed by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as it has taken into consideration not only the factual aspects, but has also taken into consideration the law on the subject. Once, a reference had been made to it, the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal was bound to decide the reference so made and the same was required to be adjudicated upon merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. 14. That apart, it would be noticed from sequence of events, as set out herein above, that at no stage the respondent was guilty of any delay much less gross delay caused because the respondent after being acquitted vide judgment dated 1.8.2001 had immediately submitted a representation dated 9.8.2001 to the petitioner-Corporation for reengaging him in service on the ground of his acquittal, but the petitioner-Corporation did not take any steps whatsoever on such representation constraining the respondent to file another representation dated 1.12.2001, which too, fell on deaf ears and immediately within 25 days of submitting the second representation, the respondent fled O.A. No.3280/2001 before the learned State Administrative Tribunal. 15. 15. At this stage, it is pertinent to point out that till the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in H.P. Agro Industries Corporation v. Raj Kumar, 2002 (3) SLC 423 , the Tribunal had not only been entertaining, but had been adjudicating the disputes of the workmen, however, it is on account of the foresaid judgment, whereby this Court held that the State Administrative Tribunal is constituted and established under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and had no jurisdiction to entertain, deal and decide an application for protection or enforcement of rights created or liabilities made under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was further held that the remedy available to the aggrieved party was to approach the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, that the workman i.e. the respondent had no other option but to approach the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. 16. It is not in dispute that upon withdrawal of the O.A.No.3280/2001, the respondent immediately raised a demand notice before the Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer and it is on failure of the conciliation proceedings that the reference came to be sent by the appropriate government to the Labour Court. Therefore, at no stage, the respondent can be stated to have been negligent of prosecuting his claim and, as such, in the given facts and circumstances, the claim filed by the respondent cannot be said to be belated. 17. Now, coming to the third ground. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation has vehemently argued that the impugned award passed by the learned Labour Court is contrary to the settled legal position as instead of ordering the reinstatement of the respondent, he should have been awarded compensation. Strong reliance has been placed by him on the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and another v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh and others, (2007) 5 SCC 755 , Incharge Officer and another v. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126 , Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Man Singh, (2012) 1 SCC 558 , Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and another v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136 and Hari Nandan Prasad and another v. Employees I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and another, (2014) 7 SCC 190 . 18. 18. Obviously, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition of law as expounded in the aforesaid judgments, but the moot question is as to whether the law laid down therein can be made applicable to the facts of the instant case. The answer to the same is clearly in negative or else it would amount to permitting the petitioner-Corporation to take advantage of its own wrong. 19. The chronological sequence of events, as narrated above, would clearly go to show that it was the petitioner-Corporation which ordered the removal of the respondent from service consequent upon an FIR being registered against him and despite his being acquitted vide judgment dated 1.8.2001, the petitioner-Corporation did not reinstate him in service. After all, his removal from service was only on account of an FIR being registered against him and not for other counts. Thus, on his acquittal, the petitioner-Corporation had no other option, but to have reinstated the respondent in service and having failed to do so and having driven the respondent to unwarranted and otherwise unavoidable litigation, the petitioner-Corporation cannot be heard to complain that instead of reinstatement the respondent should have been awarded lump sum compensation. CMP No.6354/2017 20. This application has been filed under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 by the respondent-workman claiming therein payment of full wages from the date of the award. 21. It is not in dispute that the Labour Court ordered to reinstate the services of the respondent, but the petitioner-Corporation has failed to do so. It is specifically averred by the respondent that after passing of the impugned award, till date he has not been gainfully employed and has filed an affidavit in support of such allegations. 22. Section 17-B of the Act, reads thus: "17B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts. It is specifically averred by the respondent that after passing of the impugned award, till date he has not been gainfully employed and has filed an affidavit in support of such allegations. 22. Section 17-B of the Act, reads thus: "17B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts. - Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be." 23. Indisputably, the aforesaid provisions have been enacted by the Parliament with a view to give relief to a workman who has been ordered to be reinstated under the award of a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal during the pendency of the proceedings in which the said award is under challenge before the High Court or Supreme Court. The object underlying the provision is to relieve to a certain extent the hardship that is caused to the workman due to delay in the implementation of the award. (Refer: Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel (1999) 2 SCC 106 ). 24. Following the judgment of Kiritikumar''s (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank v. Ghanshyam (2001) 5 SCC 169 has held that Section 17-B provides that where the employer prefers any proceedings against an award directing the reinstatement of any workman, the employer shall be liable to pay to said workman during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme court full wages last drawn by him. Thus, it is obvious that by enacting such provision, the Parliament intended that the workman should get the last drawn wages from the date of the award till the challenge to the award is finally decided. The provision has been enacted so as to prevent the employer from entering into a long drawn battle with the employee i.e. without paying a penny so as to exhaust him and thereby succumb to the illegal demand or enter into unconscionable bargaining with the employee. 25. In Kiritikumar''s case (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme court has held that word "full wages last drawn" must be given plain and material meaning and that they cannot be given any extended meaning as given by the Karnataka High Court in Visveswaraya Iron and Steel Ltd. v. M. Chandrappa (1994) 84 FJR 46 and Bombay High Court in Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Munafkhan (1995) 70 FLR 25. 26. The Karnataka High Court had taken the view that "full wages last drawn" take into their fold the wages drawn on the date of termination of the services plus the yearly increments and the DA to be worked out till the date of the award. 27. Whereas, the Bombay High Court had laid down that the expression "full wages last drawn" means the full wages which the workman was entitled to draw in pursuance of the award and the implementation of which is suspended during the pendency of the proceedings. However, it went further to observe that the proper construction of this section is that the workman is entitled not only to the full wages which the workman would have been entitled to draw but for the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or Supreme Court. He would further be held entitled to every component of wages payable on the date of the award while determining the wages payable to the workman on the date of the award. 28. As observed earlier, the views taken by the Hon''ble Karnataka High Court and Hon''ble Bombay High Court, were not approved by the Hon''ble Supreme court and it was held that the payment which is required to be made by the employer to the workman under Section 17-B is in the nature of subsistence allowance which would not be refundable or recoverable from the workman even if the award is set-aside by the High Court or Supreme Court. It was further held that since the payment is of such a character, Parliament thought it proper to limit it to the extent of the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated and therefore used the expression "full wages last drawn". It shall be apt to reproduce the observations as contained in paras 20, 21 and 22 of the said judgment, which reads thus: "20. The first construction give to the words "full wages last drawn" their plain and material meaning. The second as well as the third construction read something more than their plain and material meaning in this words. In substance these construction read the words "full wages last drawn" as "full wages which would have been drawn". Such an extended meaning to the words "full wages last drawn" does not find support in the language of Section 17-B. Nor can this extended meaning be based on the object underlying the enactment of Section 17-B. 21. As indicated earlier Section 17-B has been enacted by Parliament with a view to give relief to a workman who has been ordered to be reinstated under the award of a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal during the pendency of proceedings in which the said award is under challenge before the High Court or the Supreme Court. The object underlying the provision is to relieve a certain extent the hardship that is caused to the workman due to delay in the implementation to the workman is in the nature of subsistence allowance which would not be refundable or recoverable from the workman even if the award is set aside by the High Court or this Court. Since the payment is of such a character Parliament thought it proper to limit it to the extent of the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated and therefore used the words "full wages last drawn". To read these words to mean wages which would have been drawn by the workman if he had continued in service if the order terminating his services had not passed since it has been by the award of the Labour of Industrial Tribunal, would result in so enlarging the benefit as to comprehend the relief that has been granted under the award that is under challenge. Since the amount is not refundable or recoverable in the even of the award being set aside it would result in the employer being required to give effect to the award during the pendency of the proceeding challenging the award before the High Court or the supreme Court without his being able to recover the said amount in the event of the awarded being set aside. We are unable to constitute the provisions contained in Section 17-B, to cast such a burden on the employer. In our opinion, therefore, the words "full wages last drawn" must be given their plain and material meaning and they cannot be given the extended meaning as given by the Karnataka High Court Visveswarya Iroon & Steel Ltd. [supra] or the Bombay High Court in Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [supra]. 22. Shri Jitendra Sharma has laid emphasis on the word "full" in the expression "full wages last drawn" and has submitted that the said word implies that the last drawn must be the was which the workman would have drawn under the award. We are unable to agree. In our opinion, the expression "full" only emphasis that all the emoluments which are included in "wages" as defined in clause [rr] of section 2 of the Act so as to include in "wages" as referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) are required to be paid. In this context, it may also be mentioned that in Section 17-B Parliament has also used the words "inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under to him any rule". These words indicate that maintenance allowance that is admissible under any rule is required to be paid irrespective of the amount which was actually being paid as maintenance allowance to the workman. But with regard to wages Parliament has used the words "full wages last drawn" indicating that the wages that were actually paid and not the amount that would be payable are required to be paid." 29. Accordingly, the application is allowed and the petitioner-Corporation is directed to pay the wages, as clarified above to the respondent from the date of the impugned award of the learned Labour Court i.e.7.9.2010. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.