JUDGMENT : Sandeep Mehta, J. 1. These two writ petitions arise out of two separate appellate judgments of the Rent Appellate Tribunal passed against a common judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal, Udaipur and are thus hereby being decided together. 2. The case has a chequered long standing history. Thus, detailed facts relevant and essential for deciding the lis are chronicled herein below for sake of ready reference. 3. Plaintiff Moti Lal Minda Foundation (for short ‘petitioner trust’) owns a commercial property situated on the main road from Hathi Pole to Chetak Marg, Outside Bedla House, Opposite SBBJ Bank, Chetak Circle, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit premises’). 4. Late Shri Mahaveer Prasad Minda, the managing trustee of the petitioner trust, let out the suit premises to a registered partnership firm in the name and style of M/s. Singhvi Engineers (for short ‘respondent tenant’) having two partners namely, Narendra Singhvi and Subhash Singhvi. A lease deed was executed interse between the parties for a period of eleven months at the rate of Rs.30,000/- per month with the stipulation that the rent shall be increased from time to time. 5. The tenant firm stopped paying rent to the plaintiff trust from the month of September, 2006 onwards upon which, a notice for paying arrears of rent as well as for vacating the premises was served by the plaintiff trust upon the tenant firm through its counsel on 19.1.2010. Despite receiving notice, the respondent tenant failed to make payment of rent upon which, a suit for eviction under the provisions of Rent Control Act was filed by the petitioner trust through its managing trustee Ms. Leela Minda before the Rent Control Tribunal, Udaipur on 22.3.2010 impleading the respondent firm and its partners as defendants. Relief of eviction as well as recovery of due rent to the tune of Rs.17,43,750/- with interest was sought by the petitioner trust in the suit. During pendency of the suit, Ms.Leela Minda fell ill and thus, Ms. Mani Karwa was authorised to continue/pursue the suit on her behalf. Subsequently, Ms. Leela Minda passed away on which, Ms. Mani Karwa was appointed as managing trustee of the trust and an application to transpose her as a plaintiff was moved before the Tribunal and was accepted by the order dated 21.5.2010. (It is noteworthy that the said order was never challenged and attained finality.) 6. Subsequently, Ms. Leela Minda passed away on which, Ms. Mani Karwa was appointed as managing trustee of the trust and an application to transpose her as a plaintiff was moved before the Tribunal and was accepted by the order dated 21.5.2010. (It is noteworthy that the said order was never challenged and attained finality.) 6. The tenants, despite opportunity failed to submit reply/ written statement whereupon their reply was closed. Sh. Narendra Singhvi and Subhash Singhvi approached this Court through writ petition no.11625/2010 being aggrieved by the order of closure of reply. The said writ petition was disposed of on 5.8.2011 giving liberty to the respondent firm to file its reply within a period of one month. In spite of the liberty granted by this Court vide order dated 5.8.2011, written statement/reply was not filed either by the tenant firm or its partners whereupon the Tribunal once again closed the reply vide order dated 14.10.2011. Another writ petition no.11498/2011 was preferred by the partners of the tenant firm namely, Narendra Singhvi and Subhash Singhvi challenging the order dated 14.10.2011. Initially, an interim order staying proceedings of the Tribunal was passed by this Court in the said writ petition. However, after appearance being put in on behalf of the plaintiff trust and the Court being apprised of the correct factual position, the interim stay order dated 14.2.2012 was vacated. On 21.3.2013, this Court directed the respondent tenants to deposit the arrears of due rent and furnish proof thereof. However, neither rent was paid nor proof furnished whereupon, the said writ petition no.11498/2011 was rejected by this Court vide order dated 2.12.2013. Owing to failure of the respondents to put in appearance before the Tribunal, ex-parte order was passed against them on 29.8.2012. However, on an application being filed by Shri Narendra Singhvi, the ex-parte order was recalled on 26.10.2012. The ex-parte order against Subhash Singhvi was recalled on 21.11.2012 at a cost of Rs.200/-. 7. The Tribunal framed the following issues :- 1- D;k izR;FkhZx.k us tuojh] 2007 ls Qjojh] 2010 rd dh vof/k dk fdjk;k vnk ugha dj O;frdze dkfjr fd;k\ 2- D;k izR;FkhZ uEcj 2 tuojh] 2007 ls iwoZ gh Hkkxhnkjh QeZ] eSllZ fla?koh bathfu;lZ ls fjVk;j gksus ds dkj.k fdjk;k jkf’k vnk djus ds fy, nk;h ugha gS\ 8. 7. The Tribunal framed the following issues :- 1- D;k izR;FkhZx.k us tuojh] 2007 ls Qjojh] 2010 rd dh vof/k dk fdjk;k vnk ugha dj O;frdze dkfjr fd;k\ 2- D;k izR;FkhZ uEcj 2 tuojh] 2007 ls iwoZ gh Hkkxhnkjh QeZ] eSllZ fla?koh bathfu;lZ ls fjVk;j gksus ds dkj.k fdjk;k jkf’k vnk djus ds fy, nk;h ugha gS\ 8. In evidence of the plaintiff, Smt.Mani Karwa, the authorised person on behalf of the plaintiff trust, Shanti Lal and B.L. Mantri were examined as PW1, PW2 and PW3 and seventeen documents were exhibited in evidence. 9. Narendra Singhvi filed an application in the Tribunal raising a plea that Subhash Singhvi had long back, ceased to be a partner of the firm M/s. Singhvi Engineers and also raised certain other objections against maintainability of the suit. The said application was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 9.4.2013. Subhash Singhvi also raised the very same objections and his application was also rejected by the Tribunal. Thereafter, the respondents tenants filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC before the Tribunal raising an objection that the suit had been instituted at the instance of the trust which is not covered by the definition of juristic person and the suit, if any, could have been instituted at the instance of all the trustees and should be dismissed. The said application was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 10.7.2013 observing that the matter was at the stage of final hearing and thus, the respondents would be at liberty to raise all their objections at that stage. The respondents defendants challenged the order dated 10.7.2013 by filing a writ petition no.9701/2013 before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 21.11.2013. 10. Even before final arguments could be heard, another application was moved on behalf of Subhash Singhvi before the Tribunal praying for deletion of his name from the array of respondents on the ground that he had retired from the firm on 7.9.2002. The said application was rejected by the Tribunal on 15.5.2013 by a detailed order which was not challenged and has become final. 11. The said application was rejected by the Tribunal on 15.5.2013 by a detailed order which was not challenged and has become final. 11. Not resting satisfied with their repeated abortive attempts to frustrate the proceedings, another application was moved before the Tribunal on behalf of Subhash Singhvi on 29.10.2014 claiming that the suit and copies of documents were not served on him though he had moved an application to that effect on 24.7.2010 ; that firm had not been impleaded as defendant in proper proforma; that he had retired from the firm on 9.7.2002 ; that intimation regarding his retirement from the firm had been given to the plaintiff trust way back in the year 2006 ; and that Ms. Nita Singhvi had been inducted as a partner in the firm in his place and thus, the suit should be dismissed. The Tribunal rejected the said application by a detailed order dated 12.11.2014. 12. The respondents neither filed any written statement nor did they lead any evidence and instead argued the matter before the Tribunal on the basis of the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff. The Tribunal proceeded to allow the suit vide judgment dated 29.11.2014 (Annex.12) and directed eviction of the respondents from the suit premises and also ordered them to make payment of rent/mesne profits to the plaintiff trust. 13. Two separate appeals came to be filed against the judgment dated 29.11.2014 before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Udaipur. Appeal No.1/2015 was filed by Subhash Singhvi in his individual capacity whereas Appeal no.11/2015 was filed by Narendra Singhvi as well as the firm M/s. Singhvi Engineers. The learned Appellate Tribunal framed the following questions for determination in the appeals :- 1- vk;k Jherh ef.k dkjok dks eksrhyky fe.Mk QkmUMs’ku V~LV dh vksj ls vkosnu pykus dk vf/kdkj Fkk\ 2- vk;k vihykFkhZ lqHkk"k fla?koh fdjk;k vnk;xh gsrq la;qDrr% ,oa i`Fkdr% ftEesnkj gS\ 14. Both these points of determination were decided against the plaintiff trust and the appeals were allowed by a common judgment dated 22.4.2015 (Annex.15) which is under challenge by the petitioner trust through these two writ petitions. Writ petition no.8221/2015 has been preferred arraying the firm as well as the partners Narendra Singhvi and Subhash Singhvi as respondents whereas, writ petition no.8222/2015 has been preferred arraying the firm as well as the partner Subhash Singhvi as respondents. 15. Writ petition no.8221/2015 has been preferred arraying the firm as well as the partners Narendra Singhvi and Subhash Singhvi as respondents whereas, writ petition no.8222/2015 has been preferred arraying the firm as well as the partner Subhash Singhvi as respondents. 15. Notices issued by this Court in both the matters were served on the respondents on 24.8.2015. Learned counsel Mr. Sanjay Mathur put in appearance on behalf of the firm and its partner Narendra Singhvi whereas learned counsel Mr. Sandeep Saruparia put in appearance on behalf of Subhash Singhvi. However, despite ample opportunities, the respondents have chosen not to file any formal reply. The matters were taken up by this Court on 7.11.2016, on which date, it was pointed out that not a single penny of rent had been paid by the tenants to the plaintiff trust. On this, Mr. Sanjay Mathur, learned counsel representing the respondent, Narendra Singhvi and the firm sought time to take instructions. However, despite ample time being provided, no endeavour was made by the respondents to make payment of rent to the petitioner trust. Thereupon, arguments were finally heard in both these matters on 1.12.2016 and the matter was closed for judgment. Later on, two sets of written arguments were received from post on behalf of the respondents virtually reiterating the arguments advanced before the Appellate Tribunal. 16. A gist of the contentions raised by the parties to the litigation and the findings recorded thereupon by the Rent Control Tribunal are narrated herein below for the sake of ready reference :- (a) On behalf of the plaintiff trust, it was pleaded that the suit premises had been given on rent to the partnership firm M/s. Singhvi Enterprises. The tenant firm failed to make payment of rent from the month of August, 2006 onwards. Notice of default in payment of rent was forwarded to the firm with specific intimation that rent accrued in excess of four months had not been paid but despite service of notice, payment of rent was not made. Thus, the firm was liable to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent. (b) That the defence raised by Subhash Singhvi regarding having retired from the firm was ex-facie untenable for the reason that no notice of retirement was ever served or published by Subhash Singhvi in terms of Sections 32(3), 45 and 72 of the Partnership Act. (b) That the defence raised by Subhash Singhvi regarding having retired from the firm was ex-facie untenable for the reason that no notice of retirement was ever served or published by Subhash Singhvi in terms of Sections 32(3), 45 and 72 of the Partnership Act. (c) The tenant firm, orally pleaded that Subhash Singhvi had retired from the firm on 7.9.2002 and in his place, Ms. Nita Singhvi had been inducted as a partner in the respondent firm. No sooner Subhash Singhvi retired from the firm, his liability towards the firm came to an end. (d) An argument was advanced on behalf of Shri Narendra Singhvi that notice of the suit was never served upon him. Since Subhash Singhvi had retired, service of notice if any on Subhash Singhvi could not be treated as sufficient because the firm no longer retained character of a partnership firm. Notice of suit was never served on both the existing partners of the firm. As such, the suit was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. (e) Ms. Lila Minda who filed the suit was not having any authorisation and could not have filed the suit on the behalf of the plaintiff trust and thus, the suit was liable to be dismissed. (f) In rejoinder, a plea was raised on behalf of the plaintiff trust that when premises were given on rent, Subhash Singhvi and Narendra Singhvi clearly portrayed themselves to be partners of the firm Singhvi Enterprises. Subhash Singhvi never intimated the plaintiff trust regarding his alleged resignation from the firm and thus, could not escape liability. As per Sections 32 and 72 of the Indian Partnership Act, the retiring partner of a registered partnership firm in order to avoid liability towards the firm is required to issue a public notice which was never done. (g) The Tribunal rejected the objection regarding resignation of Subhash Singhvi from the firm by order dated 15.5.2013 which had never been challenged and thus, this finding had become final and was not liable to be questioned. 17. The Tribunal concluded as below in its judgment dated 29.11.2014 :- (i) The fact regarding the firm M/s. Singhvi Enterprises having taken the suit premises on rent vide lease deed Ex.4 was not in dispute. 17. The Tribunal concluded as below in its judgment dated 29.11.2014 :- (i) The fact regarding the firm M/s. Singhvi Enterprises having taken the suit premises on rent vide lease deed Ex.4 was not in dispute. (ii) The assertion made by the plaintiff trust in the suit regarding the firm not having made the payment of rent since August, 2006 was not denied and was duly proved. The defendants no.1 and 2 neither led evidence nor placed any document on record to establish that rent was paid to the plaintiff trust after that date. No significant cross examination on this aspect was made from the plaintiff’s witness Ms. Mani Karwa. (iii) The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents tenants that they spent a sum of Rs.15 lakhs on the suit premises and the same should be adjusted towards due rent was considered by the Tribunal and referring to the lease deed Ex.4, it was held that the expenditure towards decoration made by the firm in the suit premises was in its own interest and could not be adjusted towards the due rent. (iv) The notice Ex.6 issued by the plaintiff trust to the respondent firm was duly served. The Tribunal went on to hold that though the notice was issued in reference to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act whereas the suit was filed under the Rent Control Act, 2001 but the error in mentioning the provision of law in the notice was considered to be inconsequential as the notice contained all the necessary ingredients required under Section 9(a) of the Rent Control Act. (v) Despite receipt of notice, the respondents tenants failed to make payment of rent to the trust and thus, were treated to be in default. (vi) The argument regarding of liability of Subhash Singhvi having ceased on account of his resignation was repelled in light of Sections 32 and 72 of Indian Partnership Act with the finding that no public notice as required under Section 72 of the Partnership Act was ever issued by Subhash Singhvi and accordingly, he too was held responsible for the liability of the firm. (vii) The Tribunal further went on to hold that as Ms. Nita Singhvi claimed to be the current partner of the firm, she too was liable for the acts of the firm. 18. (vii) The Tribunal further went on to hold that as Ms. Nita Singhvi claimed to be the current partner of the firm, she too was liable for the acts of the firm. 18. On going through these findings recorded by the Tribunal in the judgment dated 29.11.2014, it is evident that both the issues for determination were decided by the Tribunal against the respondents tenants. However, the specific objection of the tenants regarding Ms. Mani Karwa not being authorised to file the suit was not adverted to by the Tribunal in its judgment. Be that as it may. The Tribunal held that the respondents by failing to make payment of rent to the plaintiff from September, 2006 till the decision of the suit were defaulters within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act and accordingly, decreed the suit vide judgment dated 29.11.2014 directing eviction of the respondents tenants from the suit premises and also holding them liable to make payment of due rent and mesne profits till the actual date of handing over of vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff trust. 19. As stated above, two separate appeals came to be filed against the judgment dated 29.11.2014 before the Appellate Rent Tribunal and virtually the same arguments which were raised before the Rent Tribunal were advanced on behalf of the respondents tenants in appeals. An additional plea was raised before the Appellate Tribunal through an application under Section 151 CPC regarding deficit court fees having been furnished by the plaintiff which was turned down by the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate tribunal went on to allow the appeals by judgment dated 22.4.2015. 20. The entire edifice of the Appellate Tribunal’s judgment whilst allowing the appeals of the respondents was based on the foundation that Ms. Mani Karwa was not authorised to prosecute the suit. The issue regarding Subhash Singhvi having retired and not being responsible for the firm’s liabilities was also decided in his favour and against the plaintiff. The Appellate Tribunal, for reaching to the above conclusion held that neither Ms. Leela Minda was authorised by the trust to file the suit nor Ms. Mani Karwa was authorised to be transposed as a plaintiff therein. It was further held that the resolution whereby Ms. The Appellate Tribunal, for reaching to the above conclusion held that neither Ms. Leela Minda was authorised by the trust to file the suit nor Ms. Mani Karwa was authorised to be transposed as a plaintiff therein. It was further held that the resolution whereby Ms. Mani Karwa was introduced as a trustee in the plaintiff trust was not proved and thus, she was not entitled to continue with the suit as she was not covered by the definition of ‘landlord’. 21. Recording findings on these two questions of determination in favour of the respondents tenants, the Appellate Tribunal proceeded to allow the appeals and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Rent Tribunal. As a consequence, these two writ petitions came to be instituted before this Court by the plaintiff trust. 22. Heard learned senior counsel Shri Rajesh Joshi appearing on behalf of the petitioner trust and Sarva Shri Sanjay Mathur and Sandeep Saruparia representing the respondents and perused the written arguments received on behalf of the respondents from post. 23. Shri Joshi reiterated the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner plaintiff before the Rent Tribunal and urged that the Appellate Tribunal’s judgment is based on a misreading of facts and suffers from gross perversities and thus should be set aside. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the respondents and the respondents themselves through the written submissions have fervently supported the Appellate Tribunal’s judgment and prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 24. Since the matter involves reversal of findings of facts and law by the first appellate Court, the relevant portions of evidence and facts available on record are required to be considered. 25. The finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal regarding Subhash Singhvi having retired from the tenant firm M/s. Singhvi Engineers and thus, not being liable for the affairs of the firm is taken up first. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that neither the respondent firm nor Subhash Singhvi in his own capacity, filed any reply/written statement in response to the notice of the suit for eviction. No witness was examined on behalf of the respondent tenant. Thus, whatever contentions were advanced before both the forums on behalf of the tenant firm and Subhash Singhvi were based on oral assertions and the evidence of the plaintiff and nothing beyond that. No witness was examined on behalf of the respondent tenant. Thus, whatever contentions were advanced before both the forums on behalf of the tenant firm and Subhash Singhvi were based on oral assertions and the evidence of the plaintiff and nothing beyond that. The entire cross examination conducted on behalf of the respondents from the plaintiff’s witness Ms.Mani Karwa is reproduced herein below for the sake of ready reference :- ftjg tfj, Jh ujsUnz fla?koh %& eSa ^eksrh yky eh.Mk Qkm.Ms’ku dh eSausftax V~LVh ds ukrs c;ku ns jgh gwWaA eksrh yky eh.Mk Qkm.Ms’ku ds vU; eSEcj vthr eh.Mk] vapuk eh.Mk] eqDrk tSu gSA ;g lgh gS fd eksrh yky eh.Mk V~LV nsoLFkku foHkkx ls jftLV~MZ ugha gSA ysfdu lc jftLV~kj vkWfQl ls jftLVMZ gS] D;ksafd ;g Qsesyh V~LV gSA eksrh yky eh.Mk Qkm.Ms’ku us ifjlj dks eSllZ fla?koh baftfu;lZ dks fdjk;s ij fn;kA ftl le; ifjlj fdjk;s ij fn;k Fkk ml le; eSllZ fla?koh baftfu;lZ ds Hkkxhnkj ujsUnz fla?koh o lqHkk"k fla?koh FksA ;g nkok eSllZ fla?koh baft0 ds f[kykQ fd;k gSA eq>s tkudkjh ugha gS fd tc nkok fd;k rc eS0 fla?koh baft0 ds Hkkxhnkj dkSu&dkSu FksA esjh tkudkjh esa ugha gS fd eS0 fla?koh baft0 ds orZeku esa dkSu&dkSu ikVZuj gSaA esjs dks /;ku ugha fd jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; esa ‘kiFk&i= is’k fd;k ;k ughaA eksrh yky eh.Mk Qkm.Ms’ku V~LV esa fdjk;s dh jde pSd ls ysrs FksA ;g eq>s ;kn ugha fd dHkh&dHkh uxn jkf’k yh gksA fdjk;s dh jde ysus ds ckn jlhn nh tkrh gksxhA ;g dguk xyr gS fd ifjlj dh ewyHkwr lqfo/kk cUn dj j[kh gksA ;g lgh gS fd ikfdZax ,fj;s ij gekjk rkyk yxk gqvk gSA vt [kqn dgk fd ikfdZax LFky fdjk;snkjh esa ‘kkfey ugha gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd VkW;ysV ds eSaus rkyk yxk j[kk gksA vt [kqn dgk& VkW;ysV fdjk;snkjh esa ugha gSA ;g eq>s /;ku ugha fd izkFkhZ V~LV dks vk;jd NwV dk izek.k&i= feyk gqvk gksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd izkFkhZ laLFkk dks bUde VSDl foHkkx ls NwV dk izek.k&i= izkIr djus ij gh fdjk;k ysus dk vf/kdkj gksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd fla?koh baft0 us ifjlj ij iUnzg yk[k :i;s [kpZ fd;s gksA ;g lgh gS fd fla?koh baft0 }kjk iwjk Msdksjs’ku dkWap dk] cqMu odZ] Nr dk dke] lEiw.kZ ih0vks0ih0 dk dke fla?koh baft0 }kjk mlds Lo;a ds [kpsZ ls fd;k x;k gSA ftldk Hkqxrku izkFkhZ us ugha fd;k gSA vt [kqn dgk fd bldk Hkqxrku gesa djuk gh ugha FkkA ;g dguk xyr gS fd fla?koh baft0 dks [kpsZ dk iquZHkqxrku djus dk oknk fd;kA izkFkhZ V~LV dk ykbZV dusD’ku fdlds uke ls gS ;g eq>s /;ku ugha gSA izkFkhZ laLFkk dh eSa eSausftax V~LVh gksus ds ukrs fd;k x;k nkok gSA ikoj vkWQ vVksZuh ugha gS ysfdu V~LV dk nkok djus ds vf/kdkj dk izLrko esjs i{k esa fd;k gqvk gS blfy, nkok fd;k gSA V~LV dk izLrko jftLVMZ ugha gSA D;ksafd bldh vko’;drk ugha gSA nkok izkFkhZ V~LV us fd;k gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd le; lhek lekIr gksus ds ckn ;g nkok nk;j fd;kA fookfnr LFky ds vkl&ikl dksbZ ikfdZax LFky gS gh ugha cfYd mij p<+us dk flf<+;ksa dk LFky gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd vizkFkhZ }kjk ikfdZax dk rkyk] VkW;ysV dk rkyk ,oa ikuh dh lqfo/kk pkyw djus ds fy, dgk x;k o fyf[kr esa Hkh dgk x;kA ;g lgh gS fd V~;wcosy ds vykok iwjs ifjlj esa ikuh dh lqfo/kk dk dksbZ L=ksr ugha gSA eSa ;g ugha crk ldrh fd mijksDr vlqfo/kk ls vizkFkhZ dks dksbZ uqdlku gqvk gksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd ewyHkwr ikuh dh lqfo/kk ds fy, uksfVl fn;k gksA vizkFkhZ ls fdjk;s dh jkf’k izkFkhZ us pSd ls izkIr dh gS uxn izkIr ugha dhA fdlds dh] jkf’k ysus equhe th tkrs FksA vt [kqn dgk& 2006 flrEcj ls fdjk;k dh jkf’k ugha ns jgk gSA 2006 ls iwoZ fdjk;s dh jkf’k i`Fohjkt ys tkrs FksA ;g lgh gS fd ifjlj fookfnr ds mij ifjlj [kkyh iM+k gqvk gSA esjh vko’;drk dk nkok ugha gS] fdjk, dk nkok gSA uksV%& vnkyr le; rax gksus ls xokg ds c;ku fjtoZ j[ks x;sA yxkrkj iqu% ‘kiFk fnykbZ xbZ ftjg vf/koDrk izR;FkhZ %& ;g esjh tkudkjh esa ugha gS fd fdjk,’kqnk ifjlj tc fdjk;s nh Fkh rc mldh ok;fjax tyh gqbZ FkhA ;g esjs tkudkjh esa ugha gS fd mldks nqjLr djkus dk Hkqxrku eSllZ fla?koh bathfu;lZ }kjk fd;k x;k gksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd fla?koh eSllZ dks Hkqxrku dk rhu yk[k :i;k fn;k tk;sxkA eq>s ugha irk fd tc fla?koh eSllZ dks fdjk;s ij ifjlj fn;k x;k rc ml ij ‘kks:e cuk gksA vt [kqn dgk fd ‘kVu yxs gq, gSaA ;g esjh tkudkjh esa ugha gS fd fla?koh bathfu;lZ }kjk vius [kpsZ ij gkbZ DokfyVh ds ‘kks:e Xykl yxk, x, FksA eSaus fla?koh ‘kks:e dk /;ku ls fujh{k.k ugha fd;kA ;g dguk xyr gS fd esjs }kjk ‘kks:e ds fuekZ.k djus ds fy, fla?koh eSllZ dks nks yk[k dk Hkqxrku fd;k x;k gksA eq>s ugha irk fd fla?koh eSllZ ds }kjk iwjk lkS izfr’kr [kpkZ muds }kjk ogu fd;k x;kA ;g dguk xyr gS fd oqMu flfyax dk [kpkZ vizkFkhZ us fd;k gks vkSj dqN ydM+h dk Hkqxrku esjs }kjk vizkFkhZ dks ckn esa djk;k tkus gsrq dgk x;k gksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd vizkFkhZ dks ikfdZax Vk;ysV vkSj ikuh dh lqfo/kk igys miyC/k djk j[kh gks vkSj ckn esa cUn dj fn;k gksA vt [kqn dgk fd fdjk;k fpV~Bh esa vizkFkhZ dks ;g lqfo/kk,Wa nh gh ugha FkhA js.Vy MhM tqykbZ 2001 esa cuh FkhA blds igys js.Vy MhM cuh gks rks eq>s /;ku ugha gSA eq>s ;g /;ku ugha gS fd fnukad tqykbZ 2001 ds ckn dksbZ js.Vy MhM cuh gks rksA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eksrhyky fe.Mk vkt vfLrRo esa ugha gSA ;g eq>s /;ku ugha gS fd fdjk;k fpV~Bh izkFkhZ us cuokbZ vFkok vizkFkhZ us cuokbZA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eksrh yky fe.Mk Qkm.Ms’ku V~LV dh reke lEifRr jkT; ljdkj dh gksA iqu% ijh{k.k%& fuy uksV%& ftjg }kjk izR;FkhZ la0 2 -----------izR;FkhZ la0 2 lqHkk"k fla?koh mifLFkr gS oks xokg ls ftjg ugha djuk pkgrs gSa rFkk mudh ftjg dk volj cUn fd;k tkrk gSA 26. On going through the above part of evidence of Ms. Mani Karwa, it is apparent that Subhash Singhvi who sought a reprieve from the proceedings on ground of having resigned from the firm, did not cross examine the witness at all. No specific suggestion was given to the witness in the entire cross examination that Subhash Singhvi had resigned from the firm and that Ms. Neeta Singhvi had joined as a partner in his place. Seen in light of cross examination of Ms. Mani Karwa, it is evident that neither any document proving resignation of Subhash Singhvi from the partnership firm Singhvi Engineers was put to her in cross examination nor was any suggestion to this effect given. The learned Appellate Tribunal, recorded its conclusions regarding retirement of Subhash Singhvi from the firm Singhvi Engineers at paras no.18 and 19 of its judgment. However, the very foundation of such findings is totally lacking from record. As discussed above, no reply to the application for eviction was filed either by the respondent firm or by Subhash Singhvi. No cross examination was made from the plaintiff’s witness Ms. Mani Karwa on behalf of Subhash Singhvi. 27. Subhash Singhvi filed an application dated 12.4.2013 before the Tribunal claiming that he had retired from the firm Singhvi Engineers on 7.9.2002 and the consequent alteration in the constitution of the firm had been accepted by Registrar of Firms. However, certificate issued by the Registrar of Firms to this effect was claimed to have been misplaced and was never brought on record by way of appropriate proof. The certificate even if lost, could always be proved by procuring a certified copy from the Registrar of Firms. 28. Thus, the assertion made by Subhash Singhvi regarding his resignation from the firm at the relevant point of time is purely conjectural and nothing but a figment of imagination. 29. The second finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal for setting aside the judgment passed by the Rent Tribunal was that Ms. Lila Minda was never authorised to file the suit nor could Ms. Mani Karwa have been appointed as a managing trustee of the plaintiff trust because she was never even inducted as a trustee and thus, she could not continue the suit in that capacity after death of Smt. Lila Devi. Lila Minda was never authorised to file the suit nor could Ms. Mani Karwa have been appointed as a managing trustee of the plaintiff trust because she was never even inducted as a trustee and thus, she could not continue the suit in that capacity after death of Smt. Lila Devi. In this regard, it is imperative to note here that the resolution dated 19.5.2010 whereby, the trust appointed Ms. Mani Karwa as its managing trustee was placed on the record of the Tribunal on 21.5.2010. The said resolution was proved by Ms.Mani Karwa in her evidence as Ex.3. Adverting to the cross examination of Ms. Mani Karwa reproduced herein above, it is evident that not even a faintest of suggestion was given to the witness that she was not or could not have been appointed as a managing trustee of the trust because she was never inducted as a trustee. The entire edifice of the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal on the first question framed by it for determination was that the resolution to induct Ms.Mani Karwa as a managing trustee in the trust as well as the resolution whereby, she was authorised to prosecute the suit were not proved and, therefore, she had no locus to prosecute the suit in capacity of the plaintiff. Burden to prove this fact was on the respondents tenants and if at all, they were to be allowed to raise such a plea, they were first required to take an objection in this regard by filing a reply/written statement to the application for eviction where after the Tribunal could have been called upon to frame a pertinent issue on this question. As stated above, the respondents neither filed reply to the suit nor led any evidence and consequently, they were precluded from raising such an objection in the proceedings. There was no justification for the appellate Tribunal to sustain this objection without specific pleadings having been taken and with evidence being led by the tenants defendants. For the sake of repetition, it may be again noted that as no suggestion to this effect was given to Ms. Mani Karwa in her cross examination, the advantage thereof could not have been given to the respondents tenants. Law is well settled that a fact not put to a party in evidence cannot be used against him/her. As no suggestion was ever given to Ms. Mani Karwa in her cross examination, the advantage thereof could not have been given to the respondents tenants. Law is well settled that a fact not put to a party in evidence cannot be used against him/her. As no suggestion was ever given to Ms. Mani Karwa in her cross examination questioning the mode of her induction as a trustee in the plaintiff trust or her appointment as a managing trustee, there was no occasion for her to explain the same. 30. There is another aspect to this issue. 31. The term landlord is defined in Section 3(iii) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act. This Court in the case of Guru Bux Singh v. Khem Singh (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 226/1999), considered in detail definition of landlord and held as below :- 18. The definition of landlord contained in Section 3(iii) of the Act reads thus :- 3. (iii) landlord means any persons who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver or any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant; it includes a tenant in relation to a sub-tenant. It would be seen from the above definition that it is not only the person, who for the time being is receiving the rent, but evena person ‘who is entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver,’ is included in the definition of landlord. The expression entitled to receive the rent in the aforesaid definition signify that the transfer of interest of the landlord in favour of any other person is not prohibited, as a transferee of the lessor is entitled to collect rent in terms of the lease as of right and becomes a landlord under Section 3(iii) of the Act. Tenant cannot dispute the right of the transferee landlord to maintain an eviction petition under the Act or to claim rent. Hence, in the case of a valid transfer of premises by the lessor by way of sale, as the transferee would be entitled to receive the rent of the premises, he would fall within the definition of landlord. 32. Tenant cannot dispute the right of the transferee landlord to maintain an eviction petition under the Act or to claim rent. Hence, in the case of a valid transfer of premises by the lessor by way of sale, as the transferee would be entitled to receive the rent of the premises, he would fall within the definition of landlord. 32. Seen in light of ratio of the above judgment, this Court has no hesitation in holding that Ms. Mani Karwa was indisputably the landlord of the suit premises and as such, the respondents tenants had no locus to question her capacity as a plaintiff in the suit seeking their eviction from the rental premises. 33. It is admitted that the tenants, despite receiving the mandatory notice are not making payment of rent to the landlord since the year 2006. As such, the Rent Tribunal was perfectly justified in allowing the suit and directing their eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. The findings recorded by the learned Appellate Tribunal in its judgment for setting aside the well reasoned and sound judgment rendered by the Rent Tribunal are totally perverse and hollow as the same are based on no evidence/material whatsoever. The judgment passed by the Appellate Tribunal suffers from gross illegality and perversity on the face of the record and cannot be sustained. 34. As a consequence of the above discussion, both the writ petitions deserve acceptance and are hereby allowed. The judgment dated 22.4.2015 (Annex.15) passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal, Udaipur is hereby quashed and set aside and consequently the judgment dated 29.11.2014 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Udaipur is restored. 35. The respondents shall make payment of entire due rent and mesne profits and shall also hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff trust within a period of two months from today. Failure to do so would entitle the plaintiff trust to seek summary eviction of the respondents and also to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. No order as to cost. Copy of this order be placed in both the files.