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2017 DIGILAW 922 (GAU)

National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Moon Ali (MD)

2017-07-14

MIR ALFAZ ALI

body2017
JUDGMENT & ORDER : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. Heard Sri S.S. Sarma, learned Sr counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. Dutta learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This is an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act read with Section 173(1) proviso of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 filed by the petitioner praying for condonation of delay of 199 days, in preferring appeal against the award dated 13.10.2015 passed in MAC Case No. 142/2009 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Golaghat. 3. The reasons for condonation of delay has been stated in paragraph-4 of the petition, which is reproduced below: "4. That the petitioner states that papers had to be collected from the advocate to Divisional Office and than to Regional Office, which took time and in view of huge amount involved, opinion of a senior advocate was required to be obtained and after obtaining the opinion regard preferring an appeal the files were send to Head Office at Chennai for seeking the permission to prefer an appeal and only after receipt of permission to prefer an appeal and all these took time and on doing so, the normal period of time to file an appeal expired and papers were ultimately sent to advocate on 26.07.2016 to file the appeal by engaging the senior advocate and he took some more time to finalise and settle the memo of appeal, stay petition etc and thereafter appeal could be filed only on 02.08.2016 and by that time delay of 199 days had occurred. This is required to be condoned. 4. The respondent by filing a counter affidavit resisted the petition contending that no sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay and therefore, prayed for dismissal of the petition 5. Section 173 (1) of the Motor Vehicle Act provides that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may prefer an appeal within 90 days from the date of the award subject to the provision of sub-section (2). Proviso to Section 173 (1) lays down that Court may entertain an appeal after expiry of the period of 90 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring an appeal in time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also provides that for filing any appeal or application beyond the period prescribed by statute, the party seeking indulgence for filing such petition/application/appeal etc. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also provides that for filing any appeal or application beyond the period prescribed by statute, the party seeking indulgence for filing such petition/application/appeal etc. beyond the prescribed period of time has to satisfy the Court that there is sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application within the time prescribed for the same. Though sufficient cause has not been defined, the expression "prevented by sufficient cause" appearing in the proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act clearly indicates that the sufficient cause must be one, which is beyond control of the parties. Therefore, any and every cause shown for the sake of showing a cause cannot be considered as sufficient cause. No doubt, the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction. Liberal construction does not necessarily mean that even if the party wanting to invoke the jurisdiction of condonation of delay is guilty of inaction or negligence, delay has to be condoned under the garb of liberal construction. Therefore, liberal construction in the context of condonation of delay is obviously hedged by the condition that there should be no negligence or inaction or want of bona-fide imputable to the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction. 6. It should also to be borne in mind that there cannot be any specific yard stick of the liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and it will always depend on the facts of each particular case. The Motor Vehicle Act is a social welfare legislation and the provision for compensation made under Motor Vehicle Act is a beneficial provision for the victim, who sustained bodily injury or the kith and kin of the victim, who died in motor vehicle accident. Compensation is to be paid to such victim of accident expeditiously without delay. Therefore, in my considered view, while giving a liberal interpretation to the expression 'sufficient cause' particularly in case of delay in filing appeal by the Insurance Company against the award granted by the Tribunal, Court cannot afford to turn a blind eye towards the victim, who has been in need of compensation at the earliest. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including state or its instrumentality as litigant are accorded same treatment. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including state or its instrumentality as litigant are accorded same treatment. As law shelters every one under the same light, the Insurance Company or the corporate body is not entitled to a greater indulgence in respect of condonation of delay than a private person. Rather, the officials of the insurance company entrusted with the public responsibility are expected to act with much diligence 7. In paragraph-4 of the petition as reproduced hereinabove, simply omnibus statement has been made in a very casual manner, that for collection of papers from the advocate by the Divisional and Regional office, interdepartmental consultation and obtaining legal opinion, as well as preparation of memo of appeal, stay petition etc. required time. Nothing has been stated specifically, as to what papers were collected or how much time was required for interdepartmental consultation or why such consultation could not be completed within the time allowed by the statute for preferring appeal. Above casual explanation therefore, is not only incapable of showing any "sufficient cause" entitling the appellant to any indulgence for filling the appeal after an inordinate delay of more than six months, but clearly demonstrates the sheer negligence, inaction and complete lack of seriousness on the part of the appellant Insurance Company. 8. The Apex Court in the case of Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 , where a Government Department was the appellant, observed that the claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of note making, file pushing etc. cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. In para-29 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has held as under: "29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few." 9. In the above facts and circumstances, I am constraint to hold that the casual explanation as discussed here in before, can by no amount of liberal construction be accepted as "sufficient cause" for condoning the inordinate delay of 199 days in preferring the appeal and therefore, I am left with no other option but to reject the petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed and the IA stands disposed of. Appellant is at liberty to withdraw the statutory deposit.