JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. By way of this appeal, the appellants original petitioners have challenged the judgment and order dated 10.05.2005 of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge confirming the order of Board of Revenue as well as the original authority, which dismissed the suit filed by the petitioners. 2. Counsel for the appellants has contended that the learned Single Judge has travelled beyond the scope of writ petition and the Board of Revenue while considering the case has not considered the findings which has been arrived at by Revenue Appellate Authority while decreeing the suit in favour of original petitioners. He has contended that the mortgage which was done in Samvat year 2002 (relevant year 1945). He has contended that the mortgage which was done in Samvat year 2002 (relevant year 1945). The Revenue Appellate Authority while considering the case of the present appellants has observed as under : **6- geus mHk; i{k dh cgl ,oe~ fjdkMZ ij xkSj fd;kA tgka rd [kljk la0 441 ds lEcU/k esa fookn;d la[;k 2 dk iz'u gS blds lEcU/k esa fj;klr cwUnh dk jftLVMZ nLrkostksa i`"Bksa esa is'k gqvk gS vksj izR;sd i`"B ij LVkEi vkSj dzekad vafdr gSA jftLV~h djus okys vf/kdkjh dk iztsUVs'ku o i{kdkjku dks vaxwBk fu'kkuh ekStwn gSA blesa [k0 la0 441 dk Li"Vr;k ftdz gSA bl izdkj bl nLrkost ds gksrs gq, fon~oku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us ;g ekuus ls bUdkj fd;k gS fd fxWQ~V~ lkfcr ugha gS mfpr ugha gSA oSls Hkh nkudrkZ oknh dh ekrk Fkh vkSj ftldh e`R;q gks pqdh gS blfy;s Hkh oknh gh mldk mRrjkf/kdkj curk FkkA bl izdkj ;g dkuwu ,oe~ rF;ksa nksuksa dh Hkwy gSA ;g rudh cgd oknh vih0 iSly gksuh pkfg;s FkhA tgka rd jgu dk iz'u gS blds lEc/k esa fookn;d la[;kA ,oe~ 3 esa fonoku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us ;gh ekuk gS fd jgu lkfcr ugha gSA oknh vih0 dk nkos ds vuqlkj izFke jgu lEor~ 1981 vkSj f}rh; jgu lEor 2002 gksuk vafdr fd;k x;k gSA ;g Bhd gS fd blds lEcU/k esa fyf[kr lk{; is'k ugha gSA oknh vih0 dk ;g dguk gS fd fyf[kr nLrkost izfroknh jsLiks0 ds ikl gS ;g mlus is'k ugha fd;k gSA fon~oku vfHkHkk"kd vih0 us gekjk /;ku HkwriwoZ fj;klr cwUnh ds dkuwu eky dh /kkjk 42 dh vkSj vkdf"kZr fd;k gS mlds vuqlkj ml fj;klr esa Hkw&izcU/k ds bUnzkt vafre bUnzkt ekus tkrs Fks vkSj fdlh U;k;ky; esa mudh pquksrh ugha nh tk ldrh FkhA dkuwu ds bl izko/kku ds vuqlkj tc Hkw&izcU/k fjdkMZ lu~ 1991 vkSj mlds ckn bZ0 l 2] 3] 4 ,oe~ 5 izfroknh jsLiks0 ds ;gka jgu j[kuk vafdr gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa izfroknh jsLiks0 ,MolZ ,.M gksLVkbZy its'ku dk ykHk ugha ys ldrk gSA HkwriwoZ fj;klrksa ds vyx vyx dkuwu Fks ftu ds rgr Hkw&izcU/k ds fjdkMZ gh QkbZuy tkus tkrs FksA blfy;s dkuwu eky cwUnh ds vuqlkj Hkw&izcU/k ds bUnzkt ds vk/kkj ij izfroknh jsLiks0 ds ;gka fooknxzLr Hkwfe jgu gksuk lkfcr gSA ;g Bhd gS fd oknh dks xokgku us viuh ekSf[kd lk{; esa lgh vof/k ugha crkbZ gS ijUrq blls jgu dk rF; lkfcr ugha gksrk gS ,slk ekuuk xyr gSA tc jgu lkfcr gS rks dsoy ;gh ns[kuk gS fd nkok nk;j gksus dks fnukad dks D;k jgu lcfyLV djrk Fkk ;k ugha blds lEcU/k esa nLrkostksa lk{; dsoy oknh vih0 dh vksj ls is'k gqvk gS izfroknh jsLiksa0 dh vksj ls 100 o"kZ ds dCts ds lEcU/k esa dksbZ nLrkostksa lk{; izLrqr ugha gqbZ gSA izfroknh jsLiks0 Lo;a 'gknr esa ugha vk;k gSA izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij vih0 /kwyhyky }kjk fooknxzLr vkjkth jgu j[kuk eku fy;k gS rks Hkh /kwyhyky dh e`R;w lEor~ 1970 esa gksuk lk{; esa vk;k gSA jgu dks vf/kdre e;kn 60 o"kZ dh ekuh tkrh Fkh vkSj mlds ckn 12 o"kZ vkSj tksMus ij 72 o"kZ dh vof/k rd nkok nk;j gks tkuk pkfg;s FkkA nkok lu~ 1903 esa nk;j gqvk gS tcfd la0 2020 rd dsoy 44 o"kZ gksrs gSA vkj0Vh0,DV 1955 esa jgu dh vof/k 20 o"kZ rd fd;s tkus dk la'kks/ku fnukad 05-04-1961 dks lekIr gks tkrh Fkh mlds ckn nkok 12 o"kZ ds Hkhrj yk;k tk ldrk FkkA vr% nkok vof/k e/; gSA vr% v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us vkjkth dk jgu gksuk ugha ekudj foijhr dCts ds vk/kkj ij fMdzh iznku dh gS og dkuwu ,oe~ rF;ksa nksuksa ds foijhr gksus ls fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vih0 dh vkifRr;ka mfpr izrhr gksrh gSA 7- ifj.kke Lo:i ;g iqujkosnu Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; ,oe~ fMdzh fnukad 03-09-1977 fujLr fd;s tkdj oknh vih0 dk ckn Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA izfroknhx.k jsLiks0 dks fooknxzLr vkjkth [k0 l0a 441 jdck 3 ch?kk 4 fcLok ,oe~ 442 jdck 3 ch?kk 8 fcLok fLFkr xzke vUFkMk ls csn[ky fd;k tkdj dCtk oknh vih0 ds fn;s tkus dh fMdzh iznku dh tkrh gSA mHk; i{k viuk viuk [kpkZ ogu djsaxsA** 3. However, the Board of Revenue while considering the case has misread the evidence and has wrongly allowed the appeal of the present respondents and contended that the observations made by the Board of Revenue and the learned Single Judge are required to be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the First Appellate Authority is required to be allowed. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in the case of Kolathoor Variath and Anr. v. Pairaprakottoth Cheriya Kumhahammad Haji AIR 1974 SC 689 wherein it has been held as under: "3. Where a plaintiff cannot regain possession on the basis of an oral mortgage as it cannot be proved in a court of law for want of registration, it is open to him to recover possession on the strength of his title. (See Ma Kyi v. Maung Thon, AIR 1935 Rang 230 at p. 232 (FB) and Hansia v. Bakhtawarmal, AIR 1958 Raj 102 at p. 106.) Luckily for them, the appellants did not base their suit solely on the oral mortgage. They also founded their claim on their title. Notice the relief A (1) in the plaint : "That in case the Court is of opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitle to sue on the strength of mortgage as there is n o mortgage deed in respect of the properties the plaintiffs are entitled to sue on the strength of the title of their Tavazhi and hence the Court may be pleased to decree the suit ordering the defendant to surrender the properties to the 1st plaintiff, with the past and future mesne profits relinquishing all the rights of the defendant. In paragraph 1 of the plaint they set up their title to the did puted land. In paragraph 4 of his written statement the respondent says that he is not a mortgagee but a tenant and has Kudiayma rights in the land. So far from denying their title, he has impliedly admitted that they are the owners of the land. Again, he has not claimed ownership of the land by virtue of adverse possession. He simply claims permissive possession as a tenant under them. In the result, they are entitled to regain possession on the strength of their title unless he is held to be or to have become under any Kerala land reform measure a tenant." 4. Again, he has not claimed ownership of the land by virtue of adverse possession. He simply claims permissive possession as a tenant under them. In the result, they are entitled to regain possession on the strength of their title unless he is held to be or to have become under any Kerala land reform measure a tenant." 4. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents has supported the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the Board of Revenue and contended that while considering the case of the appellants, the Board of Revenue has observed as under : "6. Issues No. 1 & 3 are important, which deals that whether the land was mortgaged with the defendant in 1981 and whether it was renewed in Samvat year 2002 by taking Rs. 190/- more from the defendant. The Asst. Collector has dealt to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed with this issue in detail and has rightly came to give any definite date, day and year of the mortgage and the terms of the same. When according to plaintiff the mortgage was for Rs.290/- then according to sect. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, it could only b3e through a registered deed. No deed of whatsoever kind has been produced by the plaintiff. He solely rely on the entries of the Jamabandi. The Board in 1986 RRD 42 head not (c) & (D) has held that (c) Mortgage Deed, not registered though required to be registered in law-ptff, entered as mortgagor and defendant as mortageee in Khasra Bandobast of Samvat 2000 and 2001 and Khasra of Samvat 2006-Held, entries in revenue record neither created a mortgage, nor sufficient to establish a mortgage when document, required registration. Note (D) Rajasthan Tenancy Act Sections 88, 188 & 183- In Suit for declaration and Permanent Injunction and in alternative for ejectment, Plaintiff alleged that suit land, mortgaged with defendant in Samvat 1988 by unregistered deed for Rs.100/- and after expiry of period of 24 years, defendant delivered possession in Samvat 2012 and plaintiff cultivated in Samvat, 2013-Suit, dismissed by lower courts holding that factumo of mortgage, not proved and secondary evidence, inadmissible to prove unregistered document- Case, alleged in plaint, failed and plaintiffs, not entitled to decree for ejectment-Revenue Record of St. 1988 or prior to that, not produced to show that plaintiff was ever in possession-Plaintiff had to stand on his own legs to succeed in his case-Starting year of defendants, possession not established and in its absence it could not be held that after expiry of 12 years period, relationship of parties became that of mortgagor and mortgagee by prescription-Finding of fact by lower courts that defendant was in possession prior to Samvat 1988 not interfered. 7. The document filed by Plaintiff Ex-I gift deed of Khasra Number 441 does not find mention about the mortgage, which is made in favour of plaintiff. Other documents Ex.2, 3, 4 and 5 are Jamabandies of Samvat year 1991 and Parcha of 1991 and Jamabandies of Samvat year 2017 to 2020, in which the plaintiffs are recorded as mortgagor and the defendant as mortgagee. This entry is not sufficient to prove the factom of mortgage and the revenue record cannot be made to prove the terms & Period. The Revenue Appellate Security has decreed the suit on the assumption that after coming into force of Rajasthan Tenancy Act the period of redumption of mortgage, made prior to the Act was 20 years, but the date cannot be fixed in absence of any direct evidence from plaintiffs side that the mortgage was ever made." 5. Learned counsel for the respondents has further contended that after considering the evidence on record, the Board of Revenue has rightly set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority Kota dated 22.03.1980 and restored the judgment and decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Bundi dated 03.09.1977. 6. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties. 7. Considering the evidence on record, the entries which were entered about possession which was found with the original defendant, the first appellate authority while considering the case has rightly dismissed the suit preferred by the present appellants the Revenue Appellate Authority while considering the case of the parties has wrongly interpreted the mortgage and has wrongly decreed the suit. 7. Considering the evidence on record, the entries which were entered about possession which was found with the original defendant, the first appellate authority while considering the case has rightly dismissed the suit preferred by the present appellants the Revenue Appellate Authority while considering the case of the parties has wrongly interpreted the mortgage and has wrongly decreed the suit. However, the Board of Revenue in para 6 & 7 has put correct position of law which has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge which reads as under : "Having heard the arguments and counter arguments of the counsel for the parties and after perusing the judgment and orders of the Courts below, it is extremely difficult to accept the plea of the plaintiff-petitioners that the land had been mortgaged by them to the defendant-respondents although they claimed to be in actual physical possession of the land in question. In the first place, the land had vested in the State at the time of abolition of Zamindari and therefore, the land which had vested in the State and stood in the name of the defendant-respondents obviously could not have been mortgaged by the plaintiff-petitioner as that right vested in the State. Therefore, the very basis that the land was mortgaged by the plaintiff-petitioners to the defendant-respondents appears to have no basis. Besides this the entire claim of the plaintiff-petitioners having been based on the entries in the revenue record which was not existing at the time of vesting of the land in the State but emergd much later the plea set up by the plaintiff-petitioners that the land belonged to them and was mortgaged to the defendant-respondents do not appear to be correct in any manner. In fact the plaintiff-petitioners appear to have missed that Khatedari right in essence is a right to cultivate the land which belongs to the State for which revenue also is being paid to the State and a Khatedar is not an absolute owner of the land as if he was a title holder of the land in question. In fact the plaintiff-petitioners appear to have missed that Khatedari right in essence is a right to cultivate the land which belongs to the State for which revenue also is being paid to the State and a Khatedar is not an absolute owner of the land as if he was a title holder of the land in question. Anyone who is cultivating the land and is in occupation of the land obviously has the right to claim Khatedari rights which the defendant-respondents has claimed for the last 100 years, but even if this aspect were to be ignored by this Court, the fact remains that the story set up by the plaintiff-petitioners that they had mortgaged the land in the year 1924 (as per english calendar year), the suit for redemption of mortgage which was filed in the year 1963 was hopelessly time barred. In fact the plaintiff-petitioners must have realised this and therefore, they claim to have executed a second mortgage in the year 1981 which document also is not on record. It is thus obvious that there is not even an iota of evidence in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners regarding their plea of mortgage of the land in question to the defendant-respondents and they have based their claim only on the basis of revenue entries incorporated much later. It is well settled that revenue entries at the most is a presumption of title in favour of the person in whose name the entries stand, but this could be presumed in favour of the person provided he could prove absolute title to the land in question by other cogent or reliable evidence also. Curiously the plaintiff-petitioners were also claiming Khatedari rights but in what capacity is not clear nor it could be established whether a khatedar can mortgage the land to another person. Mr. Meharishi has contended that the right vests in a khatedar to execute a mortgage which cannot be accepted as the correct legal position is that a khatedar although can claim the right to cultivate the land, he at the most can confer the right in favour of a sub tenant to cultivate the land. But whether he can also mortgage the land in favour of a third party as if he were an absolute owner of the land in question cannot be accepted as the settled position of law. But whether he can also mortgage the land in favour of a third party as if he were an absolute owner of the land in question cannot be accepted as the settled position of law. However in the instant matter it is not necessary to enter into this question since this matter is limited to the controversy whether the revenue appellate authority who had allowed the appeal in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners merely on the basis of the entries made in the revenue record subsequently ignoring the plea that even if the case of execution of mortgage deed in favour of the respondents were to be accepted as correct, the same could not have been allowed to be redeemed almost after 30 years of its execution. The Board of Revenue therefore, appears to be justified in setting aside, the judgment and order of the Revenue Appellate Authority and restoring the order of the Additional Collector No.1, Bundi Who had been pleased to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff-petitioners. The order of the Board of Revenue thus stands confirmed and the writ petition challenging the same is dismissed, but without any order as to costs." 8. In our considered opinion, the view taken by the Board of Revenue as well as the learned Single Judge is required to be affirmed. The original suit which was decreed by the Appellate Authority is rightly dismissed by the Second Appellate Authority and this Court. 9. The appeal being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed.