JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has filed present appeal under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ('Cr.P.C.', for short) against the judgment and order dated 23.03.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Ahmedabad Rural, Ahmedabad in N.D.P.S. No. 3 of 2004 whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad was pleased to convict the original accused No. 1 - Abdulrehman Asrafkhan Pathan for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c) read with Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ('NDPS Act', for short) and sentenced him to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1/- lakh and in default of payment of fine ordered him to undergo one month further simple imprisonment. However, the learned sessions judge was pleased to acquit the rest of the original accused Nos. 2,3 and 4 which is the subject matter of this Criminal Appeal. 2. The brief facts of the case of prosecution is that Police Inspector is a complainant who lodged the complaint on 06.10.2003 before the District Superintendent of Prohibition by asserting that on 06.10.2003 at about 1600 hrs, an information came to be received through Assistant Sub Inspector Shri Dilipsinh and Manusinh that three persons from State of Madhya Pradesh were to come by Maruti Van having registration No. RJ-09-C-2611 with contraband articles in the form of Brown Sugar. As per the say of the complainant this contraband article in the form of Brown Sugar was to be brought near Surbhi Park Society near Raj Kirana Store at Vastral Road area where the same was to be handed over to one Rajkumar @ Raju @ Chhabilal Bhanvarlal, who is residing in Surbhi Society. On receipt of said information, the same was noted down in secrete register maintained by office and after recording the said secrete information a written report came to be prepared and handed over to Superior Authority Shri U.H. Ladva, a Director of Prohibition department and thereafter a preparation for raid was undertaken by calling two panch witnesses who came at 1750 hrs in which time the preliminary panchnama was executed at police station and subsequent thereto in the Government vehicle the raiding party came near Raj Kirana Stores at Vastral Road. It is further the case of the prosecution that around 1900 hrs, as per the secrete information, Maruti Van stopped at Raj Kirana Stores wherein three persons found sitting inside the Van, one person besides the driver of the van and on the back seat of the driver. At that point of time, Rajkumar @ Raju from Surbhi Park society came out and went towards said Maruti Van. At that time raid was executed by the raiding party wherein plastic bag container was found in packed condition containing contraband powder in hand of one of the persons. At that point of time, an inquiry was made to which all persons disclosed their names as Abdulrehman Asrafkhan Pathan, Jakirhusen Munnekhan Mevati, Jakirkhan Gafarkhan Pathan and Rajkumar @ Raju @ Chhabilal Bhanvarlal Jain. Thereafter, Shri U.H. Ladva introduced himself as Director of Prohibition Department and District Gazetted Officer, the police personnel as well as panchas. Thereafter the steps which were required to be taken at the spot were taken by the raiding party wherein from both the hands of accused Abdulrehman Asrafkhan Pathan plastic bags containing brown sugar powder was found along with the currency notes and mobile phone made of Nokia company. All these articles were recovered for the purpose of investigation. The other persons accompanied viz. Jakirhusen Munnekhan Mevati and Jakirkhan Gafarkhan Pathan were also searched but nothing incriminating material was found from them and similar is the case with respect of Rajkumar @ Raju @ Chhabilal Bhanvarlal Jain from whom also except mobile phone made of Panasonic company no other material was found. Resultantly, the accused persons who possessed Maruti Van also came to be seized along with other material. 2.1 It is further the case of the prosecution that seized muddamal brown sugar was analyzed at the spot itself since Scientific Officer Shri M.H. Pathak was very much available and the weight was also executed of the said substance as one witness Ratanlal Nanalal Soni was also available on the spot who weighed the muddamal which was found to be 792 grm and without plastic bag it was found to be 790 grm. Out of the said substance, for the purpose of sending for analysis before the Forensic Science Laboratory Officer, the sample was collected, reserved and by giving left out substance as marked - A, the muddamal was sealed as per the requirement and the accused persons came to be arrested officially at 2300 hrs. The market value of the said substance, which is seized, was found to be of Rs. 79 lakhs. Resultantly, the Police Inspector Incharge Mr. M.G. Rabari became complainant which complaint came to be registered before the Police Station and registered as Prohibition Crime Register No. 1410 of 2003 under the provisions of Section 8(C), 22 and 29 of the NDPS Act. This crime which has been registered came to be investigated by Police Inspector Shri H.M. Kundliya and during the course of investigation since the adequate material came to be found a report was submitted in the form of charge-sheet on 03.01.2004 under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. 2.2 The record further reveals that in view of Section 207 of Cr.P.C., the relevant papers of investigation were supplied to the accused persons but since the offence was triable by the Court of sessions, in exercise of powers under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., vide order dated 16.01.2004 the case was committed to the Court of Sessions at Ahmedabad where it was registered as NDPS Case No. 03 of 2004 for onward adjudication. Vide Exh. 7 a specific charge came to be framed against the respondents accused on 02.11.2004. The same was read over to the respondents accused whereby the plea came to be recorded of the respondents accused vide Exhs. 8, 9, 10 and 11. Since the offence was denied to have been committed by the respondents accused the case was put up for further hearing wherein the prosecution has been given a chance of proving the case against the respondents accused by leading evidence which came to be led in the form of ocular as well as documentary evidence in the following manner. ORAL EVIDENCE:- Prosecution Witness Number Name of Prosecution Witnesses Exh. ORAL EVIDENCE:- Prosecution Witness Number Name of Prosecution Witnesses Exh. 1 Mahadevbhai Govabhai Rabari P.I. Complainant 13 2 Dilipsinh Jagatsinh Chavda – ASI 52 3 Maheshbhai Jethabhai Rathod – ASI (Crime Writer Head) 67 4 Khatubhai Jethabhai Solanki – ASI – PSO 74 5 Yuvraj Honnosha Ladva – District Director Raiding Party 77 6 Himmatlal Mohyanlal Kundaliya – I.O. 85 7 Narendrakumar Manilal Patel – Panch Witness 46 8 Ratanlal Nanalal Soni – Soni (Weighing muddamal) 73 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:- Sr. No. Particulars of Documentary Evidence Exh. 1 Letter written by PI Shri Rabari 23 2 FIR 24 3 Panchnama regarding recovery of muddamal and arrest of the accused 47 4 Seizure Memo - accused No. 1 48 5 Seizure Memo - accused No. 2 49 6 Seizure Memo - accused No. 3 50 7 Seizure Memo - accused No. 4 51 8 Offer letter to accused No. 1 as per Section 50 52 9 Offer letter to accused No. 2 as per Section 50 53 10 Offer letter to accused No. 3 as per Section 50 54 11 Offer letter to accused No. 4 as per Section 50 55 12 Punch Slip (article No. 1) 56 13 Punch Slip (article No. 2) 57 14 Punch Slip (article No. 3) 58 15 Receipt of muddamal by FSL 68 16 FSL Letter 69 17 Opinion of Scientific Officer 70 18 Receipt regarding weighing of muddamal 8 19 Letter written regarding arrest of accused and recovery of muddamal to Deputy Commissioner Prohibition, Ahmedabad Division 79 20 Yadi written to FSL Officer (appended therewith the opinion of FSL Officer) 80 21 Muddamal Ravangi Note 81 2.3 It appears further that after leading the evidence the closer pursis has been given at Exh. 88 by the prosecution whereupon the further statements came to be recorded of respondents accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which also they have reiterated denial of commission of offence by them and claimed to be tried. A case was then put up for final disposal wherein the issues came to be framed and final adjudication has been taken place. Upon examination of the entire record and upon consideration of the relevant material the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Ahmedabad Rural, Ahmedabad passed the judgment and order dated 23.03.2006 wherein the original accused No. 1 viz. Upon examination of the entire record and upon consideration of the relevant material the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Ahmedabad Rural, Ahmedabad passed the judgment and order dated 23.03.2006 wherein the original accused No. 1 viz. Abdulrehman Asrafkhan Pathan was held to be guilty of an offence for which they have been committed and inflicted punishment of ten years of rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1/- lakh and in default of making payment of fine was ordered to undergo further simple imprisonment of one year. So far the rest of the accused are concerned viz. original accused No. 2 - Jakirhusen Munnekhan Mevati, original accused No. 3 - Jakirkhan Gafarkhan Pathan and original accused No. 4 - Rajkumar @ Raju @ Chhabilal Bhanvarlal Jain were acquitted and were ordered to be released by issuing release warrant. So far as muddamal substance is concerned, the same was ordered to be disposed of in view of the guidelines prescribed by Government and with respect to other articles i.e. mobile phone belonging to original accused No. 4 on him being acquitted ordered to be handed over back after examining the ownership. So far as mobile made of Nokia company is concerned, which was belonging to accused No. 1, the same was ordered to be confiscated to the State and along with that Maruti Van bearing Registration No. RJ-09-C-2011 since nobody claimed ownership, was also ordered to be confiscated to the State along with cash amount of Rs. 2500/- which was directed to be paid. By virtue of this judgment and order dated 23.03.2006, the case i.e. NDPS Case No. 03 of 2004 came to be disposed of which order is assailed by the State herein in present Criminal Appeal being brought before the Court under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. The appeal appears to have been admitted in the month of January, 2008 which has now come up for final hearing before this Court. 3. Ms. Hansa Punani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has vehemently contended that the learned judge has seriously erred in law in coming to the conclusion that other respondents accused i.e. original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are not held guilty of offence and therefore qua that order of acquittal the State has filed appeal and therefore the error committed by the learned judge is required to be granted. 2, 3 and 4 are not held guilty of offence and therefore qua that order of acquittal the State has filed appeal and therefore the error committed by the learned judge is required to be granted. It has been clarified by learned APP that present appeal has been filed against basically respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 who are original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The State has not filed any appeal so far as original accused No. 1 is concerned who was sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment. Ms. Punani, learned APP has further contended that though there is an adequate material very much available and led by the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the learned judge, without appreciating the same in its proper perspective, has convicted only the original accused No. 1 and wrongly given the benefit of doubt to the original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and therefore this exercise of jurisdiction by learned judge since suffers from vice of serious non-application of mind, the order in question is required to be modified. Ms. Punani, learned APP Has further submitted that learned judge ought to have appreciated that for the purpose of proving the case against the respondents accused proper procedure which is contemplated under statutory provisions is complied with and not only that the mandatory requirement which is envisaged under the provisions have been scrupulously observed. Sections 42 as well as section 50 of the NDPS Act have also been complied with which clearly indicates the care and caution adopted by the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that has not been appreciated in its proper perspective and therefore the very exercise of jurisdiction is required to be called for in question and therefore the appeal came to be filed by the State. Ms. Punani, learned APP has further submitted that there appears to be a clear illegality in passing the order inasmuch as the same set of evidence for which the learned judge has convicted the accused No. 1 whereas with respect to original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 a different view is adopted on the basis of very same material which exercise is uncalled for which requires to be corrected. Ms. 2, 3 and 4 a different view is adopted on the basis of very same material which exercise is uncalled for which requires to be corrected. Ms. Punani, learned APP has further contended that a sizeable amount of brown sugar came to be collected, seized from the respondents accused since they were found in conscious possession as all were together present in or nearby Maruti Van. This circumstance itself was sufficient enough to hold all the accused persons responsible for commission of crime and therefore the deviation which has taken place insofar it relates to original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are concerned the same being not germane to law requires to be corrected. The learned judge, as per the say of Ms. Punani, learned APP, has committed serious error in evaluating the evidence on record but has also not assigned cogent reasons while substantiating the order of acquittal and therefore this being a clear example of error of exercise of jurisdiction the same is required to be corrected by passing the appropriate order. Ms. Punani, learned APP has further submitted that raid was carried out with proper procedure followed by authorised officer District Gazetted Officer who was also present for the purpose of analysing the substance at the spot. One witness was very much kept and the panchas have been kept ready so that proper execution of panchnamas can take place and from the testimony of these witnesses it is clearly reflecting that prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore in such a situation when testimony is consistently observing and pointing finger towards other accused as well there was hardly any justifiable reason to acquit the original accused respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 for granting benefit of doubt and therefore that part of the judgment being erroneous and perverse required to be corrected. Ms. Therefore in such a situation when testimony is consistently observing and pointing finger towards other accused as well there was hardly any justifiable reason to acquit the original accused respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 for granting benefit of doubt and therefore that part of the judgment being erroneous and perverse required to be corrected. Ms. Punani, learned APP with a view to substantiate her contention has taken us through the testimony of several witnesses who have been examined by prosecution as also drawn our attention to specific charge for which entire trial has been conducted and not only it was contended that error is committed but has also conveyed and submitted that the explanation has not come forward even from further further statement of respondents accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. This being position prevailing on record it was obligatory on the part of learned judge to appreciate the evidence in true perspective. 3.1 Ms. Punani, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further submitted that even from testimony of Prosecution Witness No. 1 viz. Mahadevbhai Govabhai Rabari at Exh. 13 and other witnesses' testimonies, the case of Section 8(c), 22 and 29 of the NDPS Act is established and therefore there was no justifiable reason available to take a different view and therefore the order since resulted in miscarriage of justice frustrating the very object for which Act is enacted, the said order being not sustainable in eye of law is required to be corrected. Ms. Punani, learned APP has further submitted that the conclusion of innocence which has been arrived at insofar as original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is concerned, the same is not cogent enough to ultimate justify the outcome and therefore the order of acquittal requires to be quashed and set aside and for that purpose she has requested the Court to allow the appeal filed by the State. 4. 2, 3 and 4 is concerned, the same is not cogent enough to ultimate justify the outcome and therefore the order of acquittal requires to be quashed and set aside and for that purpose she has requested the Court to allow the appeal filed by the State. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, learned advocates appearing for the opponents have taken up the stand in the proceedings which is visible from the record of the case that respondents accused No. 2, 3 and 4 having not been found to be in conscious possession of the substance and furthermore there is no justifiable material emerging from record of the case to hold them guilty and therefore since the prosecution has not established the guilty of the respondents accused i.e. original respondents accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the order of acquittal qua them beyond reasonable doubt the order in question is perfectly justified and therefore a stand is taken reflecting from the record that case has not been established. It has also been reflected from the record that whatever was found was found from original accused No. 1 who was in physical and conscious possession of contraband substance and therefore since State has rightly chosen not to file an appeal against respondents accused who came to be convicted no case is made out by the State so far as accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are concerned. A proper justification is very much reflecting from order on record passed by the learned judge and therefore this being the position, it is desirable in the interest of justice not to undone the order of acquittal which has already been passed in respect of original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4. It is also contended that appellate jurisdiction is not that much wide enough to take different view altogether when plausible view on appreciation of evidence is reflecting and therefore it has been contended that looking to the scope of appellate jurisdiction even if there is another view is possible the same cannot be substituted unless that possible view can be the only which can be taken and therefore learned advocate have contended that this is not such circumstance available on case on hand. There is hardly any justifiable reason to entertain the appeal filed by the State. 5. There is hardly any justifiable reason to entertain the appeal filed by the State. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the State and having gone through the material on record in detail and having perused the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial judge some of the issues which are dealt with by the learned trial judge are justified from the record of the case. We have noticed that substance which has been seized more particularly from the original accused No. 1 had been analysed and FSL analysis report is very much part of record at Exh. 70 which has been proved and the substance which has been found is a contraband material brown sugar to the extent of 790 grm. In addition thereto it is also revealed from the record that muddamal which has been seized from original accused No. 1 had been kept in the safe custody in a sealed position and the respondent accused has not raised any controversy with regard to substance found to be brown sugar and therefore the case of the prosecution has clearly established that muddamal which has been seized is a contraband material in the form of crude heroin which is popularly known as brown sugar. The evidence on record has further revealed that conscious possession which has been found from the record is that of original accused No. 1 and not of other accused persons and there was no justifiable material found to hold responsible other accused persons except original accused No. 1 and therefore in the absence of any cogent material qua them it appears that the trial Court has passed an appropriate order. The further examination of evidence on record in co-relation with the findings which has been arrived at by learned trial judge. It is also revealing that statutory provisions which are required to be complied with strictly particularly the provisions of section 42 as well as section 50 appears to have been observed by the prosecution and that has been substantiated by the testimony of witnesses who have been examined to prove the case. The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 3 viz. Dilipsinh Jagatsinh Chavda, at Exh. The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 3 viz. Dilipsinh Jagatsinh Chavda, at Exh. 62 who had been a part of secrete information along with Manusinh Jamadar and looking to his evidence there was hardly any circumstance not to believe the case of prosecution simply because another witness Manusinh Jamadar is not examined. The fact reveals that the secrete information was typed out, sent immediately to the higher authority as per the requirement of Section 42 and therefore the learned judge appears to have rightly observed that the statutory requirement of Sections 42 and 43 have been complied with. 5.1 It appears from the record further that as per the charge which has been framed the allegation is that accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 jointly came to handover brown sugar to accused No. 4 and therefore the case of the prosecution is that the transaction between the accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 is about the sale and purchase by accused No. 4 the said contraband article. Since the information was very much available well in advance and the procedure having been complied with Section 50 of the Act is to be ascertained whether observed or not which circumstances appears to have been rightly analysed by the trial court. The entire evidence on record has been examined and it has been noticed that Section 50 procedure is very much complied with and therefore the point of consideration about compliance of procedure is dealt with by learned judge. Similarly, after arrest of the accused person, a report also came to be prepared vide Exh. 75 which is in consonance with the Section 52 and 53 of the Act as well. From the overall material on record, the learned trial judge has clearly come to the conclusion that manner in which procedure is undertaken is perfectly in consonance with the statutory requirement of provisions of Sections 41, 42 and 50 as other provisions as well. The further examination of record is that to some extent the prosecution has not taken care of examining Manusinh, the another person who received secrete information and though another FSL Officer Shri Pathak was very much present appears to have not been examined, even the Head Constable Natubhai who went to call FSL Officer as well as Prohibition Sub-Inspector Shri Rathod has not been examined. However, these infirmities are not infirmities which can result into miscarriage of justice. The State has preferred an appeal only to the extent of examination of issue whether accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have rightly been acquitted and from that context the evidence with respect to their abetting the offence has to be sufficient enough to hold them responsible. The learned trial judge has examined the entire evidence collectively and specifically found that so far other accused persons i.e. Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are concerned, the prosecution not led any evidence to indicate that they were confined with original accused No. 1 in commission of crime. In addition thereto even conscious possession has also not been found from these accused persons and therefore simply because their presence is found cannot be said to be sufficient evidence to connect them with serious offence of NDPS Act and therefore, when substantially nothing has been found from original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 the benefit must be leaned in favour of accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 as has been rightly found by the learned trial judge. There appears to be no other distinguishable material which can justify them holding guilty of offence and therefore in the absence of any such circumstance from the record we are unable to exercise our discretion to reverse the order of acquittal more particularly when there is no evidence to connected accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 with the crime. Even the evidence does not reflect any exchange of substance in between these accused persons and there is no evidence qua that also and therefore the benefit appears to have been rightly given and extended to them. We have gone through in detail the reasons which are assigned by learned trial judge and even the prosecution has not led any evidence that there is any such cash amount regarding the transaction, seized from the accused No. 4 which can justify that he was the purchaser of substance which has been seized from the respondents accused. The overall comprehensive analysis of evidence has yielded the position in which it appears that original accused Nos. The overall comprehensive analysis of evidence has yielded the position in which it appears that original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have rightly been granted benefit of doubt and since the possession of contraband material is found specifically from original accused No. 1 Abdulrehman Asrafkhan Pathan qua that there appears to be material to justify the order which has been passed by the learned trial judge more particularly when the statutory requirement is maintained and observed by the investigating authority and therefore on overall comprehensive analysis of the evidence it is quite possible that reasons which are assigned by the learned judge are plausible views from the evidence on record and therefore keeping the scope of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an order of acquittal so far as accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are concerned, we are of the considered view that the view expressed by the learned judge is not possible to be substituted. So far as accused No. 1 is concerned, since there is no challenge about his conviction in the present proceedings, we find that State appeal qua original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is not possible to be accepted and hence the same deserves to be dismissed. 6. While coming to this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact about scope of appellate jurisdiction which clearly requires that there must be a legal infirmity or perversity to be reflected from the bare reading of the judgment which can be said to have resulted in miscarriage of justice and since that element is not reflecting from the order we are unable to exercise our jurisdiction to reverse the order of acquittal. Few of the decisions are reproduced hereinafter as the Court has taken the assistance of the same. "In case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: 55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. 30 and 31. In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: 10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld. The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "21. The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." In the decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of Raja & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 506 , the Apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "25. Vis-à-vis the scope of interference with a judgment of acquittal, this Court in Sunil Kumar Shabukumar Gupta (Dr.) (supra) echoed the hallowed proposition that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not ordinarily interfere therewith though its view may appear to be the more probable one. While emphasizing that the trial court has the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and is thus the best judge of their credibility, it was held that every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved and that his presumption of innocence gets reinforced with his acquittal by the trial court's verdict. While emphasizing that the trial court has the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and is thus the best judge of their credibility, it was held that every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved and that his presumption of innocence gets reinforced with his acquittal by the trial court's verdict. It was reiterated that only in exceptionable cases and under compelling circumstances, where the judgement of acquittal is found to be perverse i.e. if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant materials or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material and are against the weight of evidence or are so outrageously in defiance of logic so as to suffer from the vice of irrationality, that interference by the appellate court would be called for. 26. That the appellate court is under an obligation to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then to decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference was underlined by this Court in Shyamal Saha (supra). It was emphasized that the appellate court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial court and that it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any and significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the trial court." 7. The aforesaid provisions of law and our comprehensive analysis to the evidence on record in co-relation to the conclusions and the reasons assigned by the trial judge, we are unable to exercise our appellate jurisdiction to dislodge the findings arrived at by trial judge more particularly when the view expressed by trial judge is plausible view on the basis of evidence on record. Therefore we find that the State Appeal requires to be dismissed being merit less. 8. The present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 23.03.2006 passed in NDPS Case No. 3 of 2004 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Ahmedabad Rural, Ahmedabad is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith.