JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. 1. The plaintiffs instituted a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, executed inter se them with deceased Shri Kiranender Singh and defendants No. 3, 4 & 5. Defendants No. 3 to 5 instituted an application cast under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, CPC, whereby they sought for the rejection of the plaint, on the ground of the plaintiffs' suit being barred by limitation. For determining the tenacity of the aforesaid espousal reared by codefendants No. 3 to 5 in respect of the plaintiffs' suit being barred by limitation, it is of utmost importance to allude to the apposite provisions cast in the Limitation Act, for therefrom gauging the period of limitation prescribed therein in respect of institution of a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell. The Relevant provisions engrafted in Article 54 of the Limitation Act read as under:- Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 54. For specific performance of a contract. Three years The date fixed for performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 2. Apparently, a perusal of the agreement to sell discloses that time was not the essence of the contract, rather the apposite deed of conveyance was to be executed on the requisite permission being obtained by the plaintiffs from the H.P. Government, given the factum of the plaintiff being evidently a non agriculturist. However, uncontrovertedly, the requisite permission has not been obtained by the plaintiffs from the Government of Himachal Pradesh, yet non obtaining of the requisite permission by the plaintiffs would not entail the ill consequence of their suit suffering dismissal, as in the event of this Court assumingly proceeding to decree their suit, the obtaining of the requisite permission by the plaintiff may be made a condition precedent for a decree, as may come to be pronounced by this Court, hence, taking conclusive binding force. Dehors the above, with the relevant agreement to sell not pronouncing therein of time being the essence of the contract, thereupon, for the plaintiffs' suit to fall within limitation, enjoined them to establish that they had, since the apposite refusal made by the defendants concerned or since the latter's overtly breaching its conditions, hence, promptly thereafter instituted the suit in respect of relief for specific performance of the relevant agreement to sell. The relevant breaches on the part of the defendants or their refusal to execute, in pursuance of the agreement to sell, a registered deed of conveyance with the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property, imminently, occurred on the plaintiffs' discovering that in respect of the suit property, the defendants concerned prior thereto had executed two agreements to sell with vendees contradistinct than them. Also the vendees in the agreements to sell executed prior to the execution of an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs herein by the defendants, have evidently instituted Civil Suit No. 14 of 2010 and Civil Suit No. 15 of 2010, wherein they have claimed a decree of specific performance in respects thereof being pronounced. In both the aforesaid Civil Suit No. 14 of 2010 and Civil Suit No. 15 of 2010, the plaintiffs instituted an application under the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC, for seeking their impleadment therein in the array of co-defendants, yet the aforesaid applications stood dismissed on 9.4.2013, whereafter they in prompt sequel thereto instituted the instant suit on 19.05.2014. Since, no evidence is adduced on record demonstrative of the plaintiffs despite holding knowledge in respect of the defendants concerned prior to the execution of the agreement to sell in respect of suit property with them, theirs yet executing agreements with the defendants concerned, absence whereof, constrains this Court to conclude that may be prima facie they along with vendees in the previously executed agreements, have a good ground for competing with them qua theirs holding a superior right vis-a-vis them, for claiming a decree for specific performance of contract in respect of the agreement to sell at hand. The extant agreement to sell has to withstand the test of law along with the prior thereto agreements to sell, executed by the defendants with the vendees therein, thereupon, it is unbefitting to non suit the plaintiffs only on the ground of their suit being purportedly barred by limitation, emphatically when the commencement of the apposite period of limitation hereat is to be computed from the date of refusal of the defendants concerned to execute the deed of conveyance with him, refusal whereof is to be guaged from the defendants concerned suppressing from them the factum of prior to the execution of the extant agreement to sell with the plaintiffs, theirs also executing agreements to sell with other vendees, factum whereof apparently came to light on the previous vendees of the defendants concerned instituting Civil Suit No. 15 of 2010 and Civil Suit No. 14 of 2010, driving hence, the plaintiffs to institute applications therein cast under the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC, applications whereof stood dismissed on 9.4.2013, rendering hence the date of institution of the applications besides the date of any dis-affirmative pronouncement recorded thereon, rather, constituting the enlivened awakenings of the plaintiffs in respect of the explicit refusal of the defendants concerned, to execute with them the deed of conveyance in respect of the suit property, besides therefrom the commencement of the period of limitation is to be gauged. Reiteratedly, the plaintiffs' suit falls within limitation. Preeminently, the rejection of the instant application would facilitate this Court to pronounce upon the competing validities of the extant agreement to sell vis-a-vis the prior thereto executed agreements to sell, thereupon too also it would be sagacious to dismiss the instant application. 3. For the foregoing reasons, the instant application is dismissed being devoid of any merit. No costs.