JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29.06.2016 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal ("KAT" for short) in Application No.8096/2015 (Annexure-'A'). 3. By the impugned order, the KAT has modified the order passed by the first respondent directing removal of the petitioner from service and has reduced the punishment to compulsory retirement under Rule 8(vi) of Karnataka Civil Services (CC & A) Rules and further directed the first respondent to take further action in the matter within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 4. The petitioner was working as Village Accountant at Hemmige village Circle in T. Narasipura Taluk, Mysuru District under respondent No.1 at the relevant point of time. A disciplinary enquiry was initiated against the petitioner on the charge that in connection with the transfer of khata, the petitioner demanded Rs.10,000/- from the applicant Smt. Honnamma and after discussion, reduced it to Rs.3,000/- and received a sum of Rs.500/- as advance and later on 6.08.2003, received the remaining bribe amount of Rs.2,500/- and thereby failed to maintain honesty and behaved in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and thus committed misconduct in violation of Rule (3)(1)(i) and (iii) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1966. 5. The enquiry was entrusted to Upalokayukta. The Upalokayukta nominated the Additional Registrar of Enquiries-4 to conduct the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. On completing the enquiry, he submitted a report on 5.2.2015 holding the charge of misconduct as proved. The Government issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner calling for his written explanation and after considering the explanation, by order dated 8.10.2015 imposed the punishment of removal of the petitioner from service. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the KAT and the KAT by the impugned order dated 29.06.2016 while confirming the findings of the Enquiry Officer, reduced the punishment of removal from service to that of compulsory retirement as per Rule 8(vi) of Karnataka Civil Services (CC & A) Rules. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the KAT and the KAT by the impugned order dated 29.06.2016 while confirming the findings of the Enquiry Officer, reduced the punishment of removal from service to that of compulsory retirement as per Rule 8(vi) of Karnataka Civil Services (CC & A) Rules. 6. In the course of the argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following grounds assailing the impugned order namely, (i) A criminal case was registered against the petitioner on the same set of facts and after trial, the petitioner was acquitted by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge at Mysuru as per judgment dated 26.06.2010 in Spl. Case No.127/2004. The KAT failed to consider the acquittal order passed in favour of the petitioner; (ii) The complainant Smt. Honnamma was not examined by the respondent No.2 in proof of the alleged demand and payment of bribe, hence, the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as affirmed by the KAT is illegal and not based on any evidence. In support of this argument, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of N. Sunkanna vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2015 AIR SCW 6764; (iii) The KAT has failed to take note of the irregularity in the procedure followed in the departmental enquiry in as much as the material witnesses namely the complainant and his brother who are alleged to be present during the alleged trap were not examined and therefore, the KAT ought not to have confirmed the findings of the Enquiry Officer; (iv) The Enquiry Officer as well as the KAT failed to consider that the file relating to the change of khata was not pending with the petitioner as on the date of the alleged trap and therefore, the petitioner was not in a position to do any official favour to the complainant. This aspect has not been considered by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the KAT. (v) The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing the petitioner from service is arbitrary, capricious and suffers from non-application of mind and non-consideration of the materials on record. 7. On examining the record in the light of the decision relied on by the learned counsel, we do not find any merit in the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. On examining the record in the light of the decision relied on by the learned counsel, we do not find any merit in the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In so far as the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has failed to consider the acquittal of the petitioner from criminal charge is concerned, suffice it to note that the question as to whether the acquittal of an employee in the criminal case precludes the Disciplinary Authority from taking action as per service rules on the same charge made against him in the criminal case has been set at rest by the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajith Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2005) 7 SCC 764 wherein it is laid down as under: "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside." (Emphasis supplied) 8. In so far as the other contentions urged by the petitioner is concerned, a reading of the enquiry report and the impugned order of the KAT reveals that as on the date of examination of witnesses, the complainant Smt. Honnamma was dead and therefore, the Presenting Officer could not examine her before the Enquiry Officer. Even otherwise, non-examination of the complainant cannot be a ground to hold that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is not based on any legal evidence. A reading of the Enquiry Report discloses that PW.1 and PW.2 the panch witness and the shadow witness were examined before the Enquiry Officer and PW.2 has categorically stated in his evidence that when he went inside the house of the petitioner along with the complainant, the petitioner asked the complainant as to whether she had brought the money demanded by him and when the complainant answered in the affirmative and paid the tainted money, the petitioner counted them and put them on the table. This evidence coupled with the contents of the panchanamas prepared contemporaneously is sufficient to prove the factum of demand and acceptance of the bribe money by the petitioner. There is no proposition of law that the factum of demand has to be proved only through the direct evidence of the complainant. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that for want of examination of the complainant the factum of demand and acceptance of bribe has not been proved by the respondent No.2 cannot be accepted. For the said reason, the principle enunciated in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case. 9. For the said reason, the principle enunciated in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case. 9. Likewise, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not in a position to do any official favour to the complainant also cannot be accepted in view of the positive finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer that until the date of trap, the khata was not issued to the complainant. In this regard, it is noted in the impugned orders that PW.1 and PW.2 have admitted in their evidence that the complainant/applicant was not knowing that the khata has been changed in her name as on that date. Therefore, even this ground is not available to the petitioner. 10. It is trite law that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a departmental enquiry. In the instant case, on perusal of the material on record, we find that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are based on acceptable evidence. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order suffers from basic error of law and facts as sought to be made out. Even though the petitioner has taken up a contention that the Enquiry Officer has failed to follow the due procedure, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any infraction or violation of procedure either in conducting the enquiry or in affording suitable opportunity to the petitioner to substantiate his defence. On the other hand, the impugned order reveals that inspite of proof of delinquency of the petitioner, the KAT has chosen to reduce the punishment on the ground that the petitioner has put in more than 25 years of regular service and is in the verge of retirement. Under the said circumstances, we do not find any reason to admit the petition. Hence, the petition is dismissed at the stage of admission.