ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the sole respondent. 2. The appellant is aggrieved by the ex-parte Judgment and Decree dated 8th of July, 2016, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi, in Original Suit (Guardianship) Case No. 65 of 2015, whereby in an ex-parte proceeding against the present appellant, she has been directed to hand over the custody of the minor child to her husband, who is respondent in the present case. 3. The facts of the case, as detailed in the impugned Judgment lie in a short compass. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 4.5.2001 at Adra, District-Purulia, in the State of West Bengal and out of the wedlock, a male child Prem Mishra @ Anit Kumar was born to them on 21.7.2007 in a hospital at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar. According to the respondents' case, prior to that, the appellant, who was opposite party in the Original Suit in the Court below, had deserted him and returned herself from his society in the month of January, 2017, and the respondent, who was petitioner in the original suit, tried to bring the appellant as well as the minor son to his house, at Ranchi, but all his efforts went in vain. Thereafter the respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for restitution of conjugal rights. It is the case of the respondent that he used to visit Sultanganj within the State of Bihar, where his wife and his son were residing along with her parents, where he saw his son growing neglected and uncared in very awkward, adverse, inconducive and deplorable conditions and accordingly, the suit was filed for custody of the child in the Court of learned Principal Judge, Family Court, at Ranchi. 4. The case was fixed for ex-parte hearing on 20.1.2016 and examining the witnesses, adduced on behalf of the present respondent in the Court below, the impugned ex-parte Judgment was passed, directing the wife to hand over the custody of the child to the present respondent. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 5. The case was fixed for ex-parte hearing on 20.1.2016 and examining the witnesses, adduced on behalf of the present respondent in the Court below, the impugned ex-parte Judgment was passed, directing the wife to hand over the custody of the child to the present respondent. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondent, inasmuch as, admittedly after the marriage, the appellant had left the society of her husband in the Month of January 2007, and the child was born on 21.7.2007 at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar, and thereafter, the child and wife never came to Ranchi. As such, the place of ordinary residence of the child was at Sultanganj in the District of Bhagalpur within the State of Bihar, where the appellant is residing with her minor son at her parents’ place. Learned counsel has, accordingly, submitted that according to Section 9(1) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, the Court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, filed by the husband, and accordingly, the Judgment and Decree, passed by the Court below, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has opposed the prayer and has submitted that simply due to the fact that the son is living with his mother at Sultanganj, in the District of Bhagalpur within the State of Bihar, shall not make that place the ordinary residence of the child. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the child was conceived at Ranchi and the father being the natural guardian of the child is residing at Ranchi and, accordingly, the ordinary residence of the child shall be at Ranchi, irrespective of the fact that the child has never visited Ranchi, and accordingly, the Court below had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondent. 7. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ruchi Majoo Vrs. Sanjeev Majoo, reported in (2011) 6 SCC 479 , wherein the law has been laid down as follows:- “23. 7. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ruchi Majoo Vrs. Sanjeev Majoo, reported in (2011) 6 SCC 479 , wherein the law has been laid down as follows:- “23. Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 makes a specific provision as regards the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a claim for grant of custody of a minor. While subsection (1) of Section 9 identifies the court competent to pass an order for the custody of the person of the minor, sub-sections (2) and (3) thereof deal with courts that can be approached for guardianship of the property owned by the minor. Section 9(1) alone is, therefore, relevant for our purpose. It says: - “9. Court having jurisdiction to entertain application.—(1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.” 24. It is evident from a bare reading of the above that the solitary test for determining the jurisdiction of the court under Section 9 of the Act is the “ordinary residence” of the minor. The expression used is “where the minor ordinarily resides”. Now whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a question of intention which in turn is a question of fact. It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted it can never be a pure question of law, capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy. *** *** *** 31. It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted it can never be a pure question of law, capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy. *** *** *** 31. Reference may be made to Bhagyalakshmi v. K. Narayana Rao, Aparna Banerjee v. Tapan Banerjee, Ram Sarup v. Chimman Lal, Vimla Devi v. Maya Devi1 and Giovanni Marco Muzzu (Dr.), In re, in which the High Courts have dealt with the meaning and purport of the expressions like “ordinary resident” and “ordinarily resides” and taken the view that the question whether one is ordinarily residing at a given place depends so much on the intention to make that place one’s ordinary abode.” Placing reliance on this decision, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that answer to the question whether one is ordinarily residing at the given place, depends so much on intention to make that place one’s ordinary abode. It is also submitted that simply because the fact that the child is forcibly kept at Sultanganj in the District of Bhagalpur within the State of Bihar shall not make that place, the ordinary residence of the child, rather ordinary residence of the child shall be at Ranchi, where the father and natural guardian of the child is residing. Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that the Court below had the jurisdiction to entertain the application. 8. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, we are unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. Admittedly, according to the case of the respondent the wife had deserted the respondent in the month January, 2007, thereafter the child was born in a hospital at Bhagalpur on 21.7.2007. According to the case of the respondent himself, the child is continuously residing with his mother at Sultanganj in the District of Bhagalpur within the State of Bihar. There is no averment in the application, filed by the respondent in the Court below, which has been brought on record by way of counter affidavit filed by the respondent, to show that the child and the mother ever came to Ranchi and resided at Ranchi. 9. There is no averment in the application, filed by the respondent in the Court below, which has been brought on record by way of counter affidavit filed by the respondent, to show that the child and the mother ever came to Ranchi and resided at Ranchi. 9. In that view of the matter, the ordinary residence of the child shall be at Sultanganj in the District of Bhagalpur within the State of Bihar, where the child is continuously residing with his mother. We are of the considered view that the suit for custody of the child was clearly barred under Section 9(1) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 in the Court at Ranchi and the Court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondent. As such, the impugned Judgment directing the appellant to hand over the custody of the minor child to her husband, is wholly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 10. Accordingly, the ex-parte Judgment and Decree dated 8th of July, 2016, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi, in Original Suit (Guardianship) Case No. 65 of 2015, are hereby, set aside. Consequently, this appeal stands allowed. Appeal allowed