Jashvantbhai Dhanjibhai Parmark v. State of Gujarat
2017-05-02
R.P.DHOLARIA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : R.P. Dholaria, J. 1. The appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment and order of conviction dated 21/09/2007 rendered by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Narmada at Rajpipla in Special Corruption Case No. 11 of 2006 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to pay fine, to undergo one month rigorous imprisonment. The appellant has been also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to pay fine, to undergo one month rigorous imprisonment. It is also ordered to run both the sentences concurrently. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that in the year 1995, certain buildings and agriculture lands of village Moti Bhamri were acquired for Karjan Pond Scheme and thereby the Government had decided to give compensation to the persons whose residential buildings and agricultural lands were acquired for the said purpose. After considering necessary price, 14 persons were decided to be given cheques in the month of July, 1992 by the Deputy Executive Engineer, Sub Division 31. Out of those 14 persons, 13 persons were duly given their cheques in the month of July but one Bachiben, widow of one Shri Chaturbhai Mahdubhai who is resident of village Moti Bhamri had complained that the appellant has not given her cheque though Rs. 10,000/- were sanctioned by the Government and demanded bribe of Rs. 5,000/- which was scaled down to Rs. 2,000/- for getting the said cheque. It was also agreed that on 16/09/1992, between 15:00 hours and 18:00 hours, Bachiben should give that amount of Rs. 2,000/-. Bachiben had told the complainant Kalamsingh Mansingh Vasava that she is not willing to pay such bribe. Therefore, the complainant Kalamsingh, on 15/09/1992, at about 15:45 hours, lodged the complaint before ACB Bharuch. Accordingly, a trap was arranged and in the trap, the appellant-accused was caught red handed accepting bribe money and, thereby the appellant-accused committed the offence as alleged.
Bachiben had told the complainant Kalamsingh Mansingh Vasava that she is not willing to pay such bribe. Therefore, the complainant Kalamsingh, on 15/09/1992, at about 15:45 hours, lodged the complaint before ACB Bharuch. Accordingly, a trap was arranged and in the trap, the appellant-accused was caught red handed accepting bribe money and, thereby the appellant-accused committed the offence as alleged. Hence, a complaint came to be lodged against the appellant-accused. 3. In pursuance of the complaint, the Investigating Officer carried out the investigation and filed the charge-sheet against the appellant accused. The charge was framed against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 3.1 In order to bring home the guilt, the prosecution has examined several witnesses and also produced several documentary evidences. 3.2 At the end of the trial, after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and hearing the arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the defence, learned trial court delivered the judgment and order, as stated above. 4. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant has preferred the aforesaid Criminal Appeal before this Court. 5. By way of preferring the present appeal, the appellant has mainly contended that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record and wrongly recorded the order of conviction. It is further contended that learned trial Judge has not appreciated the evidence on record in its proper perspective and in fact, there was no appreciation of evidence so far and hence, the impugned judgment and order of conviction is required to be reversed as such. 6. Mr. Apurva Kapadia, learned advocate for the appellant has taken this Court through the evidence of material witnesses and he has argued that the complainant PW-1 Kalamsingh himself has disowned his complaint and he was declared hostile and even during the course of recording his evidence, he went to the extent that he had not lodged any complaint before the ACB and the accused had not demanded any amount of illegal gratification and thereby he had not at all supported the case of the prosecution. He has also argued that PW-4 Bachiben, on whose account, the aforesaid complaint came to be lodged, had also not supported the case of the prosecution and she was also declared hostile.
He has also argued that PW-4 Bachiben, on whose account, the aforesaid complaint came to be lodged, had also not supported the case of the prosecution and she was also declared hostile. Consequently, therefore, the evidence of shadow witness, Narsinhbhai Parmar, PW-7 leads no further the case of the prosecution. He has also argued that as per his deposition even at the time of trap, the complainant voluntarily told the accused that as agreed previously he had brought Rs. 2,000/- and thereafter he handed over the same to the accused. Thus, no clear sort of demand by the accused from the complainant is forthcoming and thereby the prosecution miserably failed to establish the demand and acceptance. Learned advocate for the appellant has further argued that in absence of establishment of vital ingredients like demand and acceptance, even though recovery came to be effected from the accused, the same renders meaningless. Therefore, he has urged this Court to allow the present appeal and set aside the judgment and order of conviction. 7. On the other hand, Mr. K.L. Pandya, learned APP has supported the judgment rendered by the learned Special Judge and has argued that since the vital ingredients are already getting established from the evidence of panchnama as well as from the depositions of the Investigating Official Mr. Barot and therefore, the learned Special Judge has rightly recorded that the case stands proved against the appellant-accused and thereby rightly convicted the accused. Learned APP has further argued that the learned Special Judge has recorded ample reasons for arriving at the findings and the same are based upon the evidence available on record and therefore, this Court may not disturb the same. 8. This Court has heard Mr. Apurva Kapadia, learned advocate for the appellant and Mr. K.L. Pandya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. 9. This Court has minutely gone through the impugned judgment rendered by learned trial Court as well as the evidence on record in the nature of paper book. As per the prosecution version, the accused was serving as Deputy Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Karjan whereas the complainant was resident of village Bhadam. In the project of Karjan Pond Scheme, the agriculture lands as well as houses of some of the villagers were to be submerged and due to which the process of giving compensation was going on.
As per the prosecution version, the accused was serving as Deputy Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Karjan whereas the complainant was resident of village Bhadam. In the project of Karjan Pond Scheme, the agriculture lands as well as houses of some of the villagers were to be submerged and due to which the process of giving compensation was going on. However, no compensation was given to Bachiben, due to which the complainant met the accused on 15/09/1992 and at that time, the accused initially demanded Rs. 5,000/- which was scaled down to Rs. 2,000/- for payment of compensation and handing over the cheque of the amount of compensation. As Bachiben was not willing to pay the bribe, PW-1 Kalamsingh Vasava lodged the complaint before the ACB. Accordingly, a trap was held on 16/09/1992 and in the trap, the accused was caught red handed along with the tainted currency notes of Rs. 2,000/- and thereby the appellant-accused committed offence punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 10. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to some decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court. In the case of A. Subair vs. State of Kerala reported in (2009) 6 SCC 587 , while dwelling on the purport of the statutory prescription of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled that the prosecution has to prove the charge thereunder beyond reasonable doubt like any other criminal offence and that the accused should be considered to be innocent till it is established otherwise by proper proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are vital ingredients necessary to be proved to record a conviction. 11. In the case of State of Kerala and another vs. C.P. Rao reported in (2011) 6 SCC 450 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, reiterating its earlier dictum, vis-à-vis the same offences, held that mere recovery by itself, would not prove the charge against the accused and in absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot be sustained. 12.
12. In a recent enunciation by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to discern the imperative pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 1837, in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Sections 7 as well as 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Section 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasized, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. 13. In reiteration of the golden principle which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406 had held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the domain of "must be" true in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjecture. It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. 14.
It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. 14. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder. 15. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. 16. In the present case, this Court is required to scrutinize the evidence to ascertain whether there is proper, reliable and cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt to confirm the judgment and sentence awarded by learned trial Court. If there is no such evidence on record, in that event, the conviction cannot be sustained as the onus lies on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 17. PW-1 Kalamsingh Mansingh Vasava who is the complainant has deposed that the agriculture lands as well as houses of his village were to be submerged in view of construction of Karjan Pond Scheme and therefore, process of compensating the persons whose lands and houses are submerged was going on and that procedure was undertaken by the accused. He has deposed that one of the claimant for getting compensation was Bachiben and she is resident of his village. He has deposed that as her house was going to be submerged and she was about to receive Rs. 8,000/- as compensation and the same amount was received by her on 23/09/1992 and she received the cheque also on the same day. However, he has denied that he ever met the accused on 15/09/1992 and even he has disowned the fact of lodging complaint before the ACB and he has gone to the extent that he has merely signed over the complaint.
However, he has denied that he ever met the accused on 15/09/1992 and even he has disowned the fact of lodging complaint before the ACB and he has gone to the extent that he has merely signed over the complaint. He was declared hostile and thereafter extensive cross examination was carried out by the learned APP but he has disowned the fact of previous statement made in the complaint as well as his statement before the police and he did not at all support the case of the prosecution. In the cross examination, he has admitted that instead of 23/09/1992, the cheque was received on 23/07/1992. He has also admitted that along with her cheque, in all 14 persons had received the cheque on that day. He has admitted that by mistake he has stated that the cheque was received on 23/09/1992. He has also admitted that due to mistake he lodged the complaint and for which he has sent an affidavit to various authorities several times. 18. PW-4 Bachiben Chaturbhai has deposed that her husband expired in the year 1991. She has deposed that her house as well as other 14 houses were to be submerged in the project of Karjan Pond Scheme. She has deposed that proceedings for giving compensation was going on. She has further deposed that she did not know the accused and even did not know the complainant and she was declared hostile. Thereafter extensive cross examination was carried out but she has not at all supported the case of the prosecution. 19. PW-7 Narsinhbhai Desaibhai Parmar has deposed that he was shadow panch requisitioned by the trapping party. He has deposed that at that time, he was serving as Clerk in the office of Mamlatdar and he was directed to act as shadow panch. He has deposed that he was made to understand as to how the trap is to be carried out. He has deposed that on the day of trap i.e. on 16/09/1992, he proceeded along with the complainant and reached the office of the accused and thereafter they went to the house of the accused. He has deposed that at that time, the complainant asked the accused as regard cheque of Bachiben and also the complainant told that he had brought Rs.
He has deposed that at that time, the complainant asked the accused as regard cheque of Bachiben and also the complainant told that he had brought Rs. 2,000/- as previously agreed and thereafter the complainant handed over the said money to the accused which the accused accepted and put into his pocket of shirt on the left side and thereafter the complainant gave pre arranged signal due to which other members of raiding party arrived and search and seizure procedure was carried out. He has deposed that test of ultra violet lamp was found to be positive. In the cross examination, he has admitted that he had not stated anything before the police that he had brought Rs. 2,000/- as previously agreed. 20. The prosecution has examined several other witnesses, panchas as well as police officials. Since the complainant and co-complainant disowned the complaint, therefore, their evidence is not detailed herein. 21. On overall analysis of the evidence on record, the complainant who had indisputably lodged the complaint before the ACB for not handing over the cheque of the amount of compensation payable to PW-4 Bachiben had not supported the case of the prosecution. Indisputably neither PW-4 Bachiben nor PW-1 the complainant Kalamsingh had supported the case of the prosecution. Even aforesaid both the witnesses have disowned their complaint as well as previous statements and even they have refused the fact of lodging of any such complaint before the police. In that view of the matter, so far as proving vital aspects like demand and acceptance, no evidence is available on record as the complainant has disowned the complaint itself. Consequently, therefore, the complaint which came to be brought on record vide Exh. 8 no more survive on record. So far as the instant demand is concerned, only decisive evidence can be from the mouth of the complainant who is the right person against whom the accused had demanded and in pursuance of such demand, he handed over the amount of illegal gratification to the accused. Since, he had disowned the complaint, entire narration made in the complaint goes away from the record.
Since, he had disowned the complaint, entire narration made in the complaint goes away from the record. In absence of the complaint as well as oral evidence of the complainant, though shadow witness PW-7 deposed before the Court that upon reaching the house of the accused, the complainant told the accused that he had brought the money as agreed and handed over to him and the accused accepted the same leads no further the case of the prosecution. As from the aforesaid, nothing is clearly spelling out that the complainant had brought the money against the demand of illegal gratification. As such this fact can only be established from the contents of the complaint as well as from the oral evidence of the complainant against whom the accused had raised such demand. Therefore, in absence of such evidence, the evidence of panch is also not leading any further the case of the prosecution and the prosecution miserably failed to establish the vital ingredients like demand and acceptance. Even otherwise also the case of the prosecution is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Purushotham vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2015) 3 SCC 247 . 22. As such in the present appeal, this Court is required to scrutinize the evidence to ascertain whether there is proper, reliable and cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt to confirm the judgment and sentence awarded by learned trial court. If there is no such evidence on record, in that event, the conviction cannot be sustained as the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, in view of the aforesaid nature of evidence, it is clear that there is no clinching cogent and reliable evidence beyond reasonable doubt to confirm the conviction and therefore as a result, the learned trial court has committed error in relying upon the version put forth by the prosecution. This Court has also gone through the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of (i) P. Satyanarayan Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2016) 1 SCC (Cri.) 11, (ii) Selvaraj Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19 and (iii) Krishan Chander Vs. State of Delhi, reported in AIR 2016 SC 299.
State of Karnataka, reported in (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19 and (iii) Krishan Chander Vs. State of Delhi, reported in AIR 2016 SC 299. In view of settled position as emerging from the aforesaid decisions, in absence of specific and clinching evidence to prove all such acts by the accused, conviction recorded by learned trial Judge is not sustainable. 23. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order of conviction dated 21/09/2007 rendered by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Narmada at Rajpipla in Special Corruption Case No. 11 of 2006 is quashed and set aside. The appellant-accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. R & P be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith. Fine, if any paid, shall be refunded. Appeal Allowed