JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this appeal the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the learned Single Judged dated 05.07.2016 whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. 2. The facts of the case are that respondent workman was appointed with the petitioner trust on daily wages. He was relieved by the trust, therefore he raised an industrial dispute which came to be dismissed which was challenged by way of the petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge holding as under:- “The writ petition filed by the petitioner in challenge to the award aforesaid has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the impugned order dated 18.04.2012 with the following observations:- “It is a case where so far as the petitioner workman is concerned, he came with a plea of termination of services and alternatively plea was taken that if he absented from duties then termination should no have been effected without holding an enquiry. It is alleged that both the issues have not been considered by the court below. The perusal of the statement of claim reveals that so far as petitioner is concerned, he came up with a specific plea regarding termination of services despite of completion of more than 240 days. It was in alternative taken that allegation of absence cannot result in termination unless an enquiry is held. The last plea was taken in reference to the plea taken by the respondents for self abandonment. From the facts aforesaid facts, it is petitioner who was under obligation to first make out his case by leading evidence as it was his statements of claim. The plea that petitioner was terminated in violation of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act should have been proved by adducing evidence regarding completion of 240 days service. Learned counsel for petitioner fairly conceded that no documents were summoned or produced to prove working of 240 days prior to alleged termination or abandonment of service. In the background aforesaid, the plea taken by petitioner regarding termination in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial disputes Act remains without substance. The questions now comes as to whether burden can be shifted on the respondent employer to prove his case even if the petitioner failed to produce evidence in support of his case. The law on the aforesaid issue is quite settled. The questions now comes as to whether burden can be shifted on the respondent employer to prove his case even if the petitioner failed to produce evidence in support of his case. The law on the aforesaid issue is quite settled. It is the petitioner who had approached the Court, thus was under obligation to prove his case and the burden is shifted on the management to prove their case after that. In the present matter, petitioner failed to prove his case regarding termination in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus question of shifting burden to indicate self abandonment does not arise as the issue aforesaid get relevance in defence of the employer and which comes only when workman proves his case. The aforesaid issue can be viewed from the other angle in as much if the plea of self abandonment could not be proved then it becomes a case of termination and in that case it needs to be proved in violation of law. The termination becomes illegal only if it is in violation of the provisions of law. To prove the aforesaid, burden lies on the petitioner, who failed to discharge his burden by adducing evidence. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, the first argument raised by the counsel for petitioner cannot be accepted. The second issue is regarding punitive action by the respondent. It is stated that the plea of self abandonment presupposes an enquiry in disciplinary side. The order of termination without enquiry becomes illegal. The second plea raised by the counsel is in contradiction of first plea. It is taken to be a case of self abandonment, no enquiry is required as termination has not been effected on account absence rather it was a self abandonment of service by the petitioner. An enquiry is required if termination is on the allegation of absence. There exists vast difference between absence and self abandonment. Taking note of aforesaid, even second ground urged by counsel for petitioner is not worth acceptance. Other than the aforesaid, no issue has been raised to challenge the award.” 3. However, this court in D.B. SAW No. 985/2012 after considering the evidence on record has remanded the matter to the labour Court for reconsideration of evidence on record. Taking note of aforesaid, even second ground urged by counsel for petitioner is not worth acceptance. Other than the aforesaid, no issue has been raised to challenge the award.” 3. However, this court in D.B. SAW No. 985/2012 after considering the evidence on record has remanded the matter to the labour Court for reconsideration of evidence on record. The Division Bench observed as under:- “We have gone through the long-drawn paragraph 7 of the award impugned, wherein the Labour Court appears to have made repeated reference to the stand of the respective parties. However, therein, the requisite specific findings on the relevant matters-in issue are not discernible. Even the basis on which the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the appellant-workman failed to show his working for 240 days is not clear. The working of the appellant-workman at least from 10.07.1997 to 31.07.1999 is not denied even by the respondent-employer. Though, as noticed, the Payment of Wages Authority has found him entitled to the wages for the months of August and September 1999 also but, if this aspect is left aside for a moment, even on the admitted case of the respondent-employer, it is difficult to find as to on what basis, the Labour Court returned the finding of non-completion of 240 days in this matter. Mere want of documentary evidence could not have been taken conclusive in this case before examining other facts and factors available on record.” 4. After considering the evidence and cross-examination on remand, the Labour Court has allowed the claim of the workman and reinstated him with full back wages and writ petition against the same was dismissed. 5. Counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge has wrongly dismissed the petition as the same learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition of the same employee and there are contradictory findings which have come on record in earlier and this time. Therefore, he contended that even if the respondent workman has attained the age of superannuation in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Gopinath Sharma and anr. (2006) 6 SCC 221 ; Union of India v. Anup Kumar Roy (2006) 6 SCC 236 and State of M.P. & ors. Therefore, he contended that even if the respondent workman has attained the age of superannuation in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Gopinath Sharma and anr. (2006) 6 SCC 221 ; Union of India v. Anup Kumar Roy (2006) 6 SCC 236 and State of M.P. & ors. v. Arjun Lal Rajak (2006) 2 SCC 711 , the principle of “no work no pay” will apply and for back wages the appeal deserves to be allowed. 6. We have heard Mr. Manoj Goyal counsel for the appellant. 7. Taking into the consideration the fact that petitioner was unheard and was deprived of his livelihood and has attained the age of superannuation in that view of the matter instead of issuing notice and other things the compensation will be substituted in terms of back wages. 8. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge just and proper. If the respondent has already attained the age of superannuation, it will be open for them to comply with the legal provision and however, if reinstatement is not possible it will be open for them to follow the law and grant retiral dues as if he was in service with the directions issued by the labour Court and confirmed by the Learned Single Judge Hence the appeal is devoid of merit and stands dismissed.