JUDGMENT Hon’ble Attau Rahman Masoodi, J.—These two civil revisions have come to be filed against two separate orders dated 26.3.2015 passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal/Fast Track Court No. 2, Raebareli in MACP No. 104/2012 and MACP No. 49/2012 whereby applications filed by the revisionist (insurance company) for summoning the driver, investigating officer and owner in relation to the two accidents in question, on the ground that previous applications filed in the respective cases with the same prayer were rejected by order dated 18.11.2013 hence the second application for the same cause would not lie. 2. Accidental claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are registered before the Tribunal either under Section 166 or 163-A of the Act. There is yet another category of cases i.e. ‘hit and run’ which are regulated under Section 161 of the Act. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also provides a mechanism for registration of accidental cases under Section 158 (6) read with Section 166 (4). The scope of registration of cases on the basis of reports forwarded under Section-158 (6) of the Act came to be considered by the Apex Court in the case of Jai Prakash v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, (2010) 2 SCC 607 , wherein necessary guidelines have been issued to the police authorities so as to carry out the mandate of law. 3. For the present, this Court is dealing with two cases filed under Section 166(1)) instituted by two identified claimants against owner and driver of vehicle No. UP33 T 4802, besides the appellant i.e. insurer, who are impleaded as opposite parties. Section 166 of the Act for ready reference is reproduced below: “166. 3. For the present, this Court is dealing with two cases filed under Section 166(1)) instituted by two identified claimants against owner and driver of vehicle No. UP33 T 4802, besides the appellant i.e. insurer, who are impleaded as opposite parties. Section 166 of the Act for ready reference is reproduced below: “166. Application for compensation.— (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made— (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. (3) [omitted by Act 53 of 1994] (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” 4. During pendency of the two claims before the Tribunal, as the impugned orders reveal, applications for summoning the investigating officer, driver and owner were rejected on 18.11.2013. During pendency of the two claims before the Tribunal, as the impugned orders reveal, applications for summoning the investigating officer, driver and owner were rejected on 18.11.2013. Prima facie, summoning of the driver and owner of the vehicle who are party to the proceedings may not be necessary for the reason that they shall be responsible to pay, if they fail to appear in response to notice but if the claimants prove that all the documents of valid transport were possessed by the owner and driver, the liability would shift on the insurer. Relevance of summoning a witness lies at the discretion of the Tribunal looking to the evidence led and relied upon by a party to the proceeding. Once the claimant has exhibited evidence, the opposite parties have a right to disprove the same as per the procedure prescribed under law. 5. On a projection by the revisionist (Insurance Company) that a large number of fraudulent cases are being filed, an order was passed by this Court on 16.9.2015 in civil revision No. 49/2015 recording the need for investigation of such cases by some agency like CBI. Thereafter, by order dated 7.10.2015, the investigation was entrusted to the State Investigation Team (SIT). The matter went to the Apex Court in SLP (C) No. 23265/2016 with reference to the order passed on 7.10.2015, wherein notices have been issued by the Apex Court to the concerned authorities of all the States by order dated 5.1.2017. The Apex Court order takes cognizance of the larger public interest. 6. Nurturing of fraudulent cases is an aspect of the matter that deserves consideration while exercise of jurisdiction in larger public interest. However, right of individual claimants to get compensation can also not be lost sight of, where specific claims are agitated before the competent forum constituted under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The proceedings before the competent forum have not to be brought to a halt on account of investigative measures that may be warranted on the basis of information collected by the revisionist or any investigating agency. 7. The proceedings before the competent forum have not to be brought to a halt on account of investigative measures that may be warranted on the basis of information collected by the revisionist or any investigating agency. 7. Looking to the object of welfare legislation, these two revisions were proceeded with insofar as individual claims are concerned and for that limited purpose, validity of the impugned orders dated 26.3.2015 has been attempted to be adjudged separately by this order in the light of following issue framed by this Court in its order dated 7.2.2017 which reads as under: “(ii) Whether pending discovery of information by the Special Investigating Team, the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act i.e. under Section 166 or 163-A are to be deferred and brought to a halt on account of an investigation which may relate even to a pending case as is the situation at hand and the directions issued by the Apex Court in the case of Jai Prakash reported in (2010) 2 SCC 60 read with the Apex Court order dated 13.5.2016 passed in SLP No. 118 01-11804/2005 are to be put on hold.” 8. It is well-settled that the proceedings before the Tribunals are summary in nature and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has a limited application. Insofar as recording of evidence is concerned, Section-169 of the Act read with Rule 212 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998, provide as to the manner in which evidence is to be recorded by the Tribunal. Section-169 of the Act and Rule 212 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 are reproduced hereunder: “169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.— (1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.” “212. Method of recording evidence.—The Claims Tribunal shall, as examination of a party or a witness proceeds, make a brief memorandum of the substance of what is deposed and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Claims Tribunal and shall form apart of the record: Provided that the evidence of any medical witness shall, as nearly as may be, be taken down word for word : Provided further that where the claims tribunal is unable to make a memorandum it shall cause the reason of such inability to be recorded and shall cause the memorandum to be made in writing from its dictation.” 9. While dealing with the procedure as to the manner of recording evidence, filing of examination in chief on affidavits also came up before this Court for consideration and the issue stands settled in a Full Bench judgement of this Court rendered in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Pushpa Devi and others, 2016(11) ADJ (LB) (FB). 10. Now coming to the issue of summoning the owner, driver and investigating officer, it may be relevant to note that both the claim petitions have come to be filed after filing of the charge-sheet. The Tribunal in its order dated 18.11.2013 clearly records that necessary documents i.e. charge-sheet, F.I.R. and site plan have been brought on record by the claimants. 11. The Tribunal in its order dated 18.11.2013 clearly records that necessary documents i.e. charge-sheet, F.I.R. and site plan have been brought on record by the claimants. 11. Insofar as the police reports are concerned, they form a relevant consideration by the Tribunal under Section 158 (6) of Motor Vehicles Act, which reads as under: “Section 158(6)—As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and Insurer.” 12. A police report drawn under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. or 157 Cr.P.C. may be referred by the police within 30 days for information to the Tribunal so as to register a claim under Section 166(4). The relevance of summoning Investigating Officer may arise if a charge-sheet filed in the case disclosing evidence is placed reliance upon by the claimant for being proved in a claim filed under Section 166(1) of the Act but where independent evidence other than charge-sheet is the basis of claim, the summoning of such officers may not be necessary and the Tribunals in that situation have to focus on other evidence led by a claimant so as to adjudicate the rights involved. Once the evidence relied upon is filed, all the opposite parties including Insurance company have a right to disprove the evidence or cross-examine the witnesses relied upon. 13. Once the evidence relied upon is filed, all the opposite parties including Insurance company have a right to disprove the evidence or cross-examine the witnesses relied upon. 13. In the instant case, the order dated 18.11.2013 which has remained unchallenged as well as the impugned order dated 26.3.3015 whereby subsequent applications were rejected by the Tribunal do not indicate the stage of proceedings, therefore, rejection of a request made by the revisionist at a point of time when the evidence led by the claimants was not being recorded so as to prove the case, a situation warranting summoning of the persons mentioned in the application in relation to the evidence filed by the claimants, in my considered opinion, had not arisen. A prayer, however, can be made so as to defend one’s case at an appropriate stage when the case is attempted to be proved on the basis of FIR or any witness named in the charge-sheet or a document mentioned therein. 14. It is made clear that it shall be open to the revisionist to press his prayer for summoning of any witness who being relevant to prove the claim is relied upon by the claimant and in that event the impugned order shall not come in the way of his prayer so made. 15. It is worthwhile to note that during pendency of these revisions, F.I.Rs. have come to be lodged by Special Investigation Team (SIT) not only against the claimants but also against the driver, lawyer as well as the owner of the vehicle. The investigation arising as a result of such an F.I.R. shall remain unaffected but the Tribunal shall proceed on the strength of evidence led by the claimants and in case the claims are found genuine, the Tribunal shall decide the claim petitions in accordance with law. 16. At this stage a note of caution is struck that the Tribunal shall adhere to the measures that are necessary to explore truthfulness of the claims and shall not be influenced by any extraneous material. The Tribunals are the Courts of first instance and the proceedings before such a forum cannot be put to a halt on account of any suspicion or registration of a criminal case by the Special Investigation Team. The Tribunals are the Courts of first instance and the proceedings before such a forum cannot be put to a halt on account of any suspicion or registration of a criminal case by the Special Investigation Team. The Tribunals are bound to proceed on the basis of evidence led by the parties for which an opportunity to defend must be afforded to the affected party. 17. It is informed that owner of the vehicle has died, therefore, necessary steps be taken by respondent-claimants in the pending proceedings before the Tribunal. Notice to legal representatives of the owner in the present proceedings is thus dispensed with. None has represented the drivers despite service. The Tribunal shall make an earnest effort to conclude the proceedings not later than a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is filed. 18. Be it noted that even withdrawal of claim petitions by any claimant before the Tribunal may not affect the ongoing investigation as has been launched on the basis of F.I.Rs. lodged by SIT. 19. This Court has already recorded above that the prayer for summoning any witness relied upon by a party shall remain open and the Tribunal shall ensure that opportunity is granted to the other party in this regard. This arrangement for the present would meet the ends of justice and accordingly the impugned orders dated 26.3.2015 stand modified. 20. Both the revisions are accordingly disposed of. 21. Having decided the pending revisions in the manner stated above, the Court proceeds to advert to the other three questions framed in its order dated 7.2.2017 which read as under: (i) Whether this Court in view of order passed by the Apex Court on 5.1.2017 is seized of the matter completely to issue any direction to Special Investigating Team as regards the fake and fraudulent cases; (iii) Whether the public interest aspect of the matter as dealt with by this Court in the earlier orders needs to be pursued further once the Apex Court has already taken cognizance of the matter by order dated 5.1.2017; and (iv) Whether the revision itself is maintainable within the scope of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 22. 22. Insofar as the dimension of larger public interest as regards lodging of fraudulent cases is concerned, it is to be noted that the category of ‘hit and run’ cases is provided to be dealt with independently and for this purpose the entire fund is maintained by a single insurance company notified by the State. The consolidated fund is pooled by all the companies dealing in insurance business. The pecuniary liability in respect of this category of cases at present is met with by New India Insurance Company as pointed out by the revisionist. 23. The cases registered under Section 163-A and 166 of the Act are to be decided by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals having regard to the evidence filed by the parties. The question of fraud is always open to be raised in a pending claim which the Tribunal is bound to consider in the light of evidence filed by a party. The existing remedial forum is bound to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that general faith of litigating parties remains intact. Bringing the remedial mechanism of Tribunals to a halt on the basis of a report or FIR lodged by the SIT, in my humble view, would defeat the very purpose of welfare legislation. Thus, request of the revisionist to defer the proceedings before the Tribunal cannot be accepted insofar as the controversy at hand is concerned. The reports submitted before this Court have an element of public interest and such a nature of dispute may not be cognizable by a Single Judge Bench of this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Even the maintainability of the revision itself is questionable. 24. Be that as it may, the Apex Court has already taken cognizance of the aspect of larger public interest of the matter by passing an order on 5.1.2017 and looking to the Full Bench judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Singh @ Sonu v. State of U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 42, a matter not cognizable by a Bench as per the roster issued by Hon’ble the Chief Justice, ought to be dealt with before the Bench to which such jurisdiction is notified. Hence all the reports and information collected by the investigation agency for the purposes of issuing general directions may be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for being dealt with by the Bench having competent jurisdiction. Hence all the reports and information collected by the investigation agency for the purposes of issuing general directions may be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for being dealt with by the Bench having competent jurisdiction. 25. On the question of maintainability of civil revision under Section 115 CPC against the interlocutory orders passed by the Tribunals, conflicting views have emerged on this aspect of the matter. 26. The Full Bench judgment rendered by this Court on 7.5.1997 in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Shushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40, has opined that the motor accidents claims tribunals which deal with the disputes of civil nature are to be treated as Civil Courts. Hence the remedy of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is opined to be available before the High Court to assail interlocutory orders passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. It is further observed that Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not be attracted in such a situation to correct the revisable orders passed by the Tribunals. 27. A contrary view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manju and others, 2007(4) ADJ 101 (DB), which relies upon the subsequent Apex Court judgements as well as the Five-Judges Bench of Karnataka High Court i.e. Union of India v. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. and others, AIR 2004 Karnataka 1 and it was opined that in absence of an enabling provision in the Special Act, the application of the principles underlying CPC would not ipso facor mean that the remedy of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC before this Court would be available against the orders passed by Motor /Accident Claims Tribunals beyond what is provided under Section 173 of the Act. The view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court having taken into consideration the subsequent position of law was opined to be a good law in the case of Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh and another (Civil Revision No. 120 of 2016) and a similar view was expressed by the Single Judge in the case of Prabhakar Tiwari v. Shiv Ram and others, 2016 (34) LCD 2316. 28. 28. In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Lajwati, when another matter came up before this Court as to the applicability of the Full Bench judgment rendered in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Sushma Devi (supra), it has been held that the Full Bench judgement would hold the field and the view expressed by the Division Bench as well as in the Single Judge judgements (supra) being of lesser quorum may not be construed to hold the field under the doctrine of binding precedent. 29. While arguing this revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, learned Counsel for the revisionist placed reliance upon the judgement of learned Single Judge rendered in Civil Revision No. 115 of 2015 (U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Lajwati) which has opined the Full Bench view taken in the case of Kamla Yadav (supra) to be a good law and the contrary view expressed by the Division Bench as well as in the judgements of Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh and another rendered in Civil Revision No. 120 of 2016 and in Prabhakar Tiwari v. Shiv Ram and others (supra) is thus obliterated. In order to settle the conflicting views, it would be appropriate that the issue is revisited in the light of correct position of law. The mandate of the Apex Court clearly signifies that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals are not subordinate-Courts within the meaning of Section 3 CPC, as such the exercise of power under Section 115 CPC in absence of an enabling provision under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would not be available to this Court. 30. Once the revisional jurisdiction of High Court is restricted to the proceedings before the sub-ordinate Civil Courts, then to import such powers in relation to the orders passed by the Tribunals while dealing with the claims proceeding under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 may or may not be available to this Court, in my humble view, requires reconsideration. 31. 30. Once the revisional jurisdiction of High Court is restricted to the proceedings before the sub-ordinate Civil Courts, then to import such powers in relation to the orders passed by the Tribunals while dealing with the claims proceeding under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 may or may not be available to this Court, in my humble view, requires reconsideration. 31. In the background stated above and to settle the position, the following questions are framed for reference to the Larger Bench/Full Bench: “(i) Whether in absence of an enabling provision, the Full Bench judgement in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Shushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40, would hold the field in contradiction to the Apex Court judgements relied upon in the Division Bench judgement rendered in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manju and others, 2007 (2) AWC 1927 ; and as to whether the view taken by this Court in the case of Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh and another (Civil Revision No. 102 of 2016) and similar view expressed in Prabhakar Tiwari v. Shiv Ram was rightly obliterated by the learned Single Judge in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Lajwati by holding that the Full Bench view taken in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Sushma Devi would alone be applicable and followed. (ii) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by this Court in absence of an enabling provision under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is permissible treating the Tribunal to be a sub-ordinate Court within the meaning of Section 3 CPC”. Lay the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for necessary orders/nomination.