JUDGMENT : ARIJIT BANERJEE, J. 1. The facts of the case culminating in this Second Appeal are briefly as follows. One Binoy Krishna Pramanick (defendant No. 1 in the suit) was the owner of premises No. 84 Surya Sen Street, Calcutta. One Raghunath Dubey (the original plaintiff) was a tenant in respect of a coal shop at the said premises, measuring about 1 cottah 3 chittaks at a monthly rent of Rs. 8/-, which in course of time was increased to Rs. 30/-. Raghunath filed a suit against Binoy and one Sunil Kumar Biswas being Title Suit No. 95 of 1979 before the Learned Munsif, 4th Court, Sealdah. Raghunath's case was that Binoy through Sunil who acted as the broker, had entered into an agreement for sale of the said shop room of which Raghunath was a tenant for a sum of Rs. 7125/- (calculated @ Rs. 6000/- per cottah). Raghunath claimed specific performance of such agreement. The present appellant was added as the defendant No. 3 in the suit in view of his claim that a sale deed dated 16 February, 1981 (Exhibit-C) had been executed by Binoy in which Sunil was a confirming party, in his favour in respect of the same shop room which was the subject matter of the suit. The learned Munsif by his judgment and order dated 23 July, 1988 passed a decree for specific performance in favour of Raghunath. The learned Court also observed that the sale deed executed by Binoy in favour of the present appellant (hereinafter called 'Biswanath') is collusive and void. 2. Biswanath preferred an appeal from the said decree of the trial Court being Title Appeal No. 330 of 1988. It appears that during the pendency of the appeal Raghunath died and his legal heirs being the present respondent Nos. 1 to 4 were brought on record. By its judgment and order dated 20 February, 1995, the Learned First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Hence, this Second Appeal by Biswanth. 3. By an order dated 10 April, 2012 a learned Judge of this Court admitted this second appeal and formulated the following questions of law to be decided in the appeal. "(i) Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court erred in not holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that there was any agreement for sale between the parties concerned. 3. By an order dated 10 April, 2012 a learned Judge of this Court admitted this second appeal and formulated the following questions of law to be decided in the appeal. "(i) Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court erred in not holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that there was any agreement for sale between the parties concerned. (ii) Whether or not the Learned Lower Appellate Court erred in not holding that the plaintiff cannot succeed merely on the weakness, if any, in the defendant's case but the plaintiff has to prove his own case for succeeding in the suit. (iii) Whether or not the learned Lower Appellate Court should have held considering the materials on record that there was no existence of any agreement for sale in between the parties concerned. (iv) Whether or not the Learned Lower Appellate Court was right in drawing adverse presumption against the defendants in the facts and circumstances of the Instant case." Contention of the appellant:- 4. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that even though both the lower Courts came to the same finding of fact, that per se, is no bar to setting aside the concurrent finding of facts since such finding is perverse. Such finding is based on uncorroborated evidence and on conjectures and surmises. In this connection learned Counsel relied on the following decisions:- (i) Sebastiao Luis Fernandas (dead) through LRs v. K. V.P. Shastri (dead) through LRs, (2013)15 SCC 161 , paras 34-37. (ii) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Bajrang Lal, (2014) 4 SCC 693 , paras 19 and 20: (2014)3 WBLR (SC) 354. (iii) Padmakumari v. Dasayyan, (2016)1 WBLR (SC) 87, paras 16-20. 5. Learned Counsel then submitted that there was no binding contract between Raghunath and Binoy. Hence, the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act are not attracted. In this connection he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1 , paras 8, 11, 16 and 17. 6. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that the learned Courts below drew adverse presumption against Binoy on the ground that in spite of filing written statement, he did not adduce oral evidence in support of his case to controvert the case of Raghunath. 6. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that the learned Courts below drew adverse presumption against Binoy on the ground that in spite of filing written statement, he did not adduce oral evidence in support of his case to controvert the case of Raghunath. On the basis of such adverse presumption, decree was passed in favour of Raghunath. This is not permissible. On the basis of weakness of the defence case, the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree. The Court is bound to consider the pleadings of the parties and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case irrespective of the weakness in the defence case. In this connection, learned Counsel relied on the decision in the case of Alson Motors v. Sh. Rajesh Kumar, AIR 1993 J & K 12, paras 5 and 6, in support of his submission that the Court has to consider as to whether or not the plaintiff has been able to prove his case, learned Counsel relied on the following decisions:- (i) Ramnivas Vyas v. H. Shinivasa Bhati, (2013)15 SCC 198, paras 10, 20 and 39. (ii) Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, AIR 1999 SC 3381 , paras 2, 8, 10, 29, 40 and 43 : 2000 WBLR (SC) 52. 7. Mr. Bhattacharya then submitted that the Court is not expected to pass a judgment even ex parte where the defendant does not appear without considering the plaintiff's case in proper perspective in full. In this connection he relied on the decisions in the cases of C.N. Ramappa Gowda v. C.C. Chandregowda (dead) by LRs., (2012) 3 WBLR (SC) 366, paras 15 and 17, State of J&K v. Hindustan Forest Co., (2006) 12 SCC 198 , para 10 and J.M. Panchal v. Mishra Sudha Mishra, AIR 2011 SC 2344 , paras 21 and 22. 8. Learned Counsel then submitted that the onus of proof cannot be shifted to the defendant. He relied on a decision in the case of Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 955 , paras 5 and 7. He submitted that in Ext. 8 which is the basis of passing the decree, there is no description of property, sale price is not mentioned, it is not mentioned whether any part payment towards the sale consideration was being made and nor is there any schedule of the property to be sold. He submitted that in Ext. 8 which is the basis of passing the decree, there is no description of property, sale price is not mentioned, it is not mentioned whether any part payment towards the sale consideration was being made and nor is there any schedule of the property to be sold. Since the property to be sold is not identified in Ext. 8, the Court could not have passed a decree for specific performance of such alleged agreement. Moreover, Raghunath's lawyer's letter dated 27 January, 1979 (Ext. 1) relates only to a demand for execution of agreement for sale and does not contain demand for execution of the deed of sale. In this connection, learned Counsel relied on the following decisions:- (i) Sanwarmal Goenka v. Soumyendra Chandra Gooptu, AIR 1981 Cal 37 , paras 16-19 and 24. (ii) Vimlesh Kumari Kulshrestha v. Sambhajirao, (2008)5 SCC 58 , para 24. (iii) Shanker Singh v. Narinder Singh, (2014)16 SCC 662 , paras 26 and 27. 9. Mr. Bhattacharya then referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramnivas Vyas v. H. Srinivasa Bhati, (2013) 15 SCC 198, paras 9, 10, 20 and 39 and submitted that in that decision the Apex Court has explained as to how a suit for specific performance is required to be proved. In the present case, Raghunath could not establish any concluded contract and hence, the decree is completely illegal. 10. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that the principle of lis pendens does not apply to the facts of the present case since there was no lawful agreement between Raghunath and Binoy. Now, that the decree has been executed during pendency of the appeal, the appellant is entitled to pray for cancellation of the deed of sale executed by the legal heirs of Binoy in favour of the legal heirs of Raghunath. On the point of lis pendens, learned Counsel relied on the following decisions:- (i) Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy, (2006)13 SCC 608, para 12. (ii) Seenivasan v. Peter Jebaraj, (2008)12 SCC 316 , paras 11 and 16. (iii) Hemanta Mondal v. Sri Ganesh Chandra Naskar, (2016)1 WBLR (SC) 1, paras 15 and 16. 11. Mr. Bhattacharya then submitted that the plaintiff disclosed no document to show that Sunil was authorized by Binoy to enter into an agreement for sale of the suit property to Raghunath. (iii) Hemanta Mondal v. Sri Ganesh Chandra Naskar, (2016)1 WBLR (SC) 1, paras 15 and 16. 11. Mr. Bhattacharya then submitted that the plaintiff disclosed no document to show that Sunil was authorized by Binoy to enter into an agreement for sale of the suit property to Raghunath. There is nothing on record to show that Sunil acted as the agent of Binoy or that Sunil had such authority. He may have signed as confirming party on conveyances executed by Binoy in favour of other parties in respect of other portions of the property in question but that per se would not establish that Sunil had the power or the authority to enter into an agreement for sale of the suit property with Raghunath. Ext. 8 cannot be taken to be a contract for sale of the suit property to Raghunath. 12. Mr. Bhattacharya finally submitted that the sale deed dated 18 April, 1996 executed by the legal heirs of Binoy in favour of Keshab Dubey is vitiated by fraud. Keshab is only one of the legal heirs of Raghunath. The deed has been executed knowing fully well that this Second Appeal is pending and as such is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Both the decree and sale deed are liable to be set aside and the Appellate Court can pass such an order in exercise of its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC. In this connection, learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694, paras 24 and 25. Contention of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4.:- 13. Appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, Mr. S.P. Sarkar, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the only question in this Second Appeal is whether or not there was an agreement for sale of the suit property by and between Binoy and Raghunath. Admittedly, Raghunath was a tenant in respect of a coal shop at the premises in question. There were three other tenants in the adjoining shop rooms at the said premises, namely, Panchu Singh, Sudhir Saha and Sachindra Kumar Saha who also occupied similar rooms at modest rent. Binoy held out Sunil as his sole agent in dealing with the said tenants. There were three other tenants in the adjoining shop rooms at the said premises, namely, Panchu Singh, Sudhir Saha and Sachindra Kumar Saha who also occupied similar rooms at modest rent. Binoy held out Sunil as his sole agent in dealing with the said tenants. Sunil approached all the four tenants including Raghunath with an offer to sell to them their respective tenanted portions at the rate of Rs. 6,000/- per cottah. Raghunath agreed to purchase his shop room and agreed to pay a total sum of Rs. 7125/- for land measuring about 1 cottah 3 chittacks. As a token of his willingness, he paid a sum of Rs. 100/- to Sunil. Thereafter, Binoy evinced an intention not to go ahead with the deal despite demands being made by Raghunath. Hence, Raghunath was compelled to file the specific performance suit. Binoy did not go to the witness box to give evidence. The trial Court passed a decree after full analysis of evidence, both oral and documentary. The First Appellate Court affirmed the decree by a reasoned judgment. 14. Whether or not a document is an agreement is a question of law. It is a question of construction of the document in the light of the conduct of the parties in executing the document and the surrounding circumstances. The Court will have to examine the entire phenomenon. Learned Counsel referred to a decision of the English Court of Appeal in the case of Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd., (1981)3 All ER 577, wherein Lord Denning MR observed that a document has to be construed having regard to the surrounding circumstances, the entire factual matrix, the conduct of the parties and the entire course of dealing. 15. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that in the facts of the present case, the receipt of Rs. 100/- (Ext. 8) by itself without more surely cannot be conclusive either way. However, one must appreciate the humble circumstances in which the parties are placed and the miniscule scale and character of the property. It is not to be expected that the parties in such a situation would be guided by legal experts to produce a sound and sophisticated agreement for sale. 16. Further it is of little consequence that Binoy himself did not strike the deal with Raghunath but Sunil did it on his behalf. It is not to be expected that the parties in such a situation would be guided by legal experts to produce a sound and sophisticated agreement for sale. 16. Further it is of little consequence that Binoy himself did not strike the deal with Raghunath but Sunil did it on his behalf. The same is not impermissible in law. It is significant that in three conveyances including the one purportedly executed between Binoy and the appellant, Sunil is a confirming party (Ext. C). This shows that both in the matters of negotiation for sale and execution of conveyance, Sunil was at the forefront and acted at the behest of Binoy. 17. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that the fact that Binoy did not go to the witness box also supports Raghunath's case by opening up the scope for adverse inference against him. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999)3 SCC 573 : 1999 WBLR (SC) 340, paras 17, 18 and 19. Non-reply by Binoy to Raghunath's Advocate's letter dated 29 July, 1979 (Ext. 1) calling upon Binoy to complete the deal also should be construed as admission of Raghunath's case by Binoy. 18. Learned Counsel submitted that in view of the decree passed in the present suit, the conveyance dated 16 February, 1981 (Ext. C) executed in favour of the present appellant cannot stand. The same is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. Learned Senior Counsel relied on Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and on an Apex Court decision in the case of Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (Dead) Through LRs, (2008) 5 SCC 796 , paras 7 to 9. 19. The contention of the appellant that he purchased the suit property from Binoy without notice of Raghunath's suit, is incorrect and is falsified from the purported deed of sale executed by Binoy in favour of the appellant, the recital whereof refers to the suit instituted by Raghunath against Binoy. 20. Mr. Sarkar finally submitted that in view of the fact that the decree has been satisfied and conveyance has been executed in favour of Keshab Dubey by the legal heirs of Binoy, the entire arguments of the appellant become academic and the appeal ought to be dismissed. In this connection, Mr. 20. Mr. Sarkar finally submitted that in view of the fact that the decree has been satisfied and conveyance has been executed in favour of Keshab Dubey by the legal heirs of Binoy, the entire arguments of the appellant become academic and the appeal ought to be dismissed. In this connection, Mr. Sarkar relied on a decision of the Lower Burma Chief Court in the case of Maung Po Kyin v. C.T.M.R.M. Anamalay Chatty, 1911 IC 452. Court View:- 21. Before addressing the questions of law formulated by this Court at the time of admitting the Second Appeal, I would like to briefly dilate on the scope of a Second Appeal. It is more or less settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to interfere with the judgments of the Court's below, is confined to hearing the parties on substantial questions of law. Interference with finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence. (Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das (Dead) through LRs, (1999) 7 SCC 303 ). In Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000)3 SCC 708 : 2000 WBLR (SC) 307, the Apex Court reiterated that under Section 100 of the CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a Second Appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. Such observation was extracted with approval in the judgment in the case of CA Sulaiman v. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee, (2006)6 SCC 392 . In Sheet Chand v. Prakash Chand, AIR 1998 SC 3063 , the Apex Court held that the concurrent findings of the Lower Courts in an eviction suit that the need of the landlord was not bona fide was based on proper appreciation of evidence and interference by the High Court in Second Appeal was not proper. It was further observed that the existence of a 'substantial question of law' is the sina qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under the provisions of Section 100 of the CPC as amended in 1976. It was further observed that the existence of a 'substantial question of law' is the sina qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under the provisions of Section 100 of the CPC as amended in 1976. The Apex Court held that the High Court unjustifiably interfered with pure questions of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 and it was not proper for the High Court to have reversed the concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 : 1999 WBLR (SC) 426 the Apex Court observed that concurrent findings of facts however erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the CPC. It is not within the domain of the High Court under Section 100 to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact, being the First Appellate Court. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, the one drawn by the Lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court in Second Appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the Lower Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 22. However, there are also decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court to the effect that concurrent findings of the learned trial Court and the First Appellate Court by the High Court in Second Appeal is justified when the findings of fact are perverse. In Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (dead) through LRs (supra), the Apex Court upheld the intervention by the High Court in Second Appeal when concurrent findings of the Court's below were based on wrong assumption of facts, non-appreciation of pleadings and evidence on record and wrong placing of burden of proof on the defendant instead of on the plaintiff. In Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (dead) through LRs (supra), the Apex Court upheld the intervention by the High Court in Second Appeal when concurrent findings of the Court's below were based on wrong assumption of facts, non-appreciation of pleadings and evidence on record and wrong placing of burden of proof on the defendant instead of on the plaintiff. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Apex Court held that in exceptional circumstances a Second Appeal can be entertained on pure questions of fact and there is no prohibition for the High Court to entertain the Second Appeal on a question of fact where factual findings are found to be perverse. 23. Majority of the decision of the Apex Court are to the effect that while exercising second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC the High Court cannot re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence even if it appears to the High Court that the Lower Courts fell in gross error in assessing the evidence on record. Finding of fact is not open to challenge even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably wrong. It is not for the High Court to consider the question of sufficiency of evidence. However, findings of fact may be interfered with in a Second Appeal where there is no evidence at all in support of the finding; where the finding of fact has been arrived at by ignoring important and relevant evidence having considerable bearing on the issue or by taking into consideration completely irrelevant facts; where the point for determination is one of mixed question of law and facts; where the issue involved is construction of a document which is the foundation of the rights of the parties; where the finding of fact has been arrived at on the basis of inadmissible evidence; and, where finding of fact by the Courts below is a result of wrong placing of onus of proof. 24. Keeping the above principles of law in mind let me first take up the first and third questions for consideration i.e. whether or not the Learned First Appellate Court should have held that there was no existence of any agreement for sale and the plaintiff had failed to prove that there was an agreement for sale? 25. I have carefully gone through the judgments of the learned trial Court and the First Appellate Court. 25. I have carefully gone through the judgments of the learned trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The learned trial Court has delivered a detailed reasoned judgment in support of passing the decree of specific performance in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Judge has analysed the evidence on record and has carefully considered the documents on record which were marked as exhibits. After a meticulous analysis, the learned Judge came to a conclusion that Exhibit 8 was an overwhelming evidence in support of the existence of an agreement of sale of the suit property between Raghunath and Binoy. I have gone through the evidence on record and the exhibits. Exhibit 8 surely cannot be said to be a prototype agreement for sale of property. However, as observed by Lord Denning M.R. in the case of Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd. (supra), relied upon by Mr. Sarkar, a document has to be construed having regard to the surrounding circumstances, the entire factual matrix, the conduct of the parties and the entire course of dealing between the parties. Given the nature of the suit property and the value of the transaction, it would be too much to expect the parties i.e. Binoy and Raghunath to execute a well-drafted and sophisticated agreement for sale. Exhibit 8 which is a document in Bengali language is to the following effect; 'I Sri Sunil Biswas have received Rs. 100 from Raghunath Dubey, in some months this money shall be deducted from the sum of money.' The wordings suggest that the money was received by Sunil from Raghunath as advance towards some transaction and it is the specific case of the plaintiff that the sum of Rs. 100/- received by Sunil on behalf of Binoy from Raghunath was towards the advance for the sale of the suit property to Raghunath. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 did not come forward to depose in support of their case that the said sum of money was received by Sunil by way of simple loan. Further the wordings of Exhibit 8 would not suggest that any loan transaction was involved. 26. Admittedly, Sunil was the confirming party in other conveyances executed by Binoy in favour of other parties in occupation of other shop rooms in the building in question including the conveyance executed in favour of Biswanath. Further the wordings of Exhibit 8 would not suggest that any loan transaction was involved. 26. Admittedly, Sunil was the confirming party in other conveyances executed by Binoy in favour of other parties in occupation of other shop rooms in the building in question including the conveyance executed in favour of Biswanath. It may reasonably be inferred that Sunil was acting on behalf of Binoy and was authorised to do so. 27. I am unable to hold that the finding of the learned Trial Judge that there was an agreement for sale between Raghunath and Binoy, is based on no evidence or on completely wrong appreciation of the evidence on record or on wrong assumption of facts or is otherwise perverse in law. Upon scanning the evidence on record I am of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Judge is definitely a probable conclusion which does not warrant interference in a Second Appeal even if I were of a different opinion, which I am not. Hence, i am of the view that the first and third questions must be decided against the plaintiff i.e. Biswanath. The learned First Appellate Court did not commit any error in upholding the finding of the learned trial Court to the effect that the plaintiff has been able to prove the existence of an enforceable agreement for sale. 28. As regards the second question, i.e. whether the First Appellate Court should have held that the plaintiff has to prove his own case and cannot succeed merely on the basis of weakness in the defendant's case, in my opinion, as a proposition of law it must be accepted that the plaintiff must prove his claim by adducing cogent evidence irrespective of whether or not the defendant appears to contest such claim and irrespective of the strength of the defence pleaded by the defendant in the event the defendant appears to defend the suit. However, in the present case, it cannot be said that the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff only on the basis of the weakness in the defendant's case. After considering the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, and after discussing the judicial decisions cited before him, the learned Trial Judge was of the considered opinion that the genuineness of Exhibit 8 cannot be doubted and the same is binding on the defendant No. 1. After considering the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, and after discussing the judicial decisions cited before him, the learned Trial Judge was of the considered opinion that the genuineness of Exhibit 8 cannot be doubted and the same is binding on the defendant No. 1. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff has been able to prove his case. It is not that the decree was passed on the basis that the defendants were unable to disprove their case which might have vitiated the judgment and decree by reason of wrong placing of onus of proof on the defendants. The learned First Appellate Court also discussed and analysed the evidence on record and did not affirm the learned trial Court's judgment and decree mechanically or only on the basis of loopholes in the defendant's case or on adverse presumption. Hence, this question is also answered against the appellant. 29. As regards the last question as to whether or not the learned First Appellate Court was right in drawing adverse presumption against the defendants in the facts and circumstances of the case, to my mind, the question must be answered in the affirmative i.e., the Court was right in doing so. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed written statements but did not adduce any oral evidence to prove the case made out in their written statements. Admittedly, the defendant No. 1 did not give a reply to the legal notice sent on behalf of the original plaintiff. The First Appellate Court recorded that Exhibit 8 remains unchallenged by reason of withholding the proper and best evidence by the defendants. The evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant No. 3 was of no value since the constituted attorney of the defendant No. 3 deposed on his behalf who had no personal knowledge regarding the subject matter of the suit. 30. Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act provides that the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be un-favourable to the person who withholds it. In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao (supra), the Apex Court at paragraph 17 of the judgment observed as follows:- "17. 30. Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act provides that the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be un-favourable to the person who withholds it. In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao (supra), the Apex Court at paragraph 17 of the judgment observed as follows:- "17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. AIR 1927 PC 230 . This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and Ors. AIR 1930 Lahore 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR 1931 Bombay 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat, AIR 1970 MP 225 , also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh's case (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath and Anr., AIR 1971 ALL 29 , held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand and Ors. AIR 1974 P&H 7 , drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness box." 31. Hence, in my view, the learned trial Court or the learned First Appellate Court committed no error of law in drawing adverse inference against the defendants and in my considered opinion, the same was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, as would appear from the judgments of the Lower Courts, the same were not passed merely on the basis of adverse inference but also after taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. 32. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly against the appellant. Hence, this Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. 32. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly against the appellant. Hence, this Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.