Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The plaintiffs are the appellants, who after having lost in both the learned Courts have filed this Regular Second Appeal assailing therein the judgments and decrees so passed against them. 2. The brief facts of the case are that plaintiff No.1 entered into an agreement with defendant No.1 on 17.04.2011 for purchase of land measuring 159.80 square metres, bearing Khasra Nos. 692 and 693, situate at Fingask Estate near Kali Bari Temple, Shimla, for a consideration of Rs.7,00,000/-. As per the agreement, the plaintiff issued a cheque No.669255 dated 21.04.2011, amounting to Rs.1,00,000/-, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Shimla, towards part payment, while the remaining sale consideration was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed before the Sub Registrar, Shimla. The sale deed in terms of the agreement was to be executed within a period of two months. However, when defendant No.1 on 09.06.2011 presented the cheque for encashment, the same was dishonoured on the ground of ‘insufficient funds’. Plaintiff No.1 thereafter issued a legal notice to defendant No.1 accusing him of adopting delaying tactics and requested him to execute the sale deed after receiving the balance amount of sale consideration before the Sub Registrar. At the same time, defendant No.1 got issued a legal notice bringing to the notice of plaintiff No.1 that the cheque had been dishonoured. It is thereafter that the plaintiff No.1 sent a demand draft bearing No.453826 dated 21.06.2011 for Rs.1,00,000/- and asked defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. It is alleged that the plaintiff No.1 kept on waiting for the response of defendant No.1 and later learnt that defendant No.1 had already executed sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 on 13.07.2011 which according to him was null and void and not binding upon his rights. It is further pleaded that as per the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell, plaintiff No.1 was free to buy land in the name of any person and plaintiff No.2, who is the wife of plaintiff No.1 was an agriculturist of Himachal Pradesh and as such sale deed was to be executed in her favour. On the basis of such allegations, the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of agreement, declaration and also sought permanent prohibitory injunction. 3. On the basis of such allegations, the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of agreement, declaration and also sought permanent prohibitory injunction. 3. When put to notice, the defendants contested the suit by filing separate written statements wherein defendant No.1 took preliminary objection that the suit was bad for mis-joinder of parties as plaintiff No.2 had nothing to do with the alleged transaction and as regards plaintiff No.1, he was not entitled to purchase the land in question. Preliminary objections regarding valuation, court fee, jurisdiction and cause of action were taken. On merits, the suit was contested on the ground that a formal writing was executed and post dated cheque of Rs.1,00,000/- was issued in favour of defendant No.1 towards consideration. However, the cheque when presented as per the direction of plaintiff No.1 came to be dishonoured on account of ‘insufficient funds’. Therefore, the plaintiff No.1 himself had frustrated the contract. 4. Defendant No.2, on the other hand, filed a separate written statement raising therein various preliminary objections regarding estoppel, cause of action, maintainability, non-joinder of necessary parties, valuation etc. On merits, it was averred that the replying defendant had purchased the suit land through a registered sale deed on 13.07.2011 for valuable consideration of Rs.10,29,000/-. It was specifically averred that before purchasing the suit land due inquiries were made and as such the plea of bonafide purchaser for consideration was raised by this defendant. 5. Plaintiffs filed replications to the written statements denying the averments contained therein and reasserted the averments contained in the plaint. 6. On 21.07.2012, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court:- “1. Whether defendant No.1 had entered into an agreement to sell dated 17.04.2011 with plaintiff No.1 and thereby he had agreed to sell the suit land in his favour for total consideration of Rs.7 lacs out of which, he had paid Rs.1,00,000/- by way of cheque, as alleged? OPP. 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, whether after the execution of aforementioned agreement, the defendant No.1 had failed to discharge his obligation undertaken by him vide aforementioned agreement despite of the fact that plaintiffs had remained ready and willing to execute their part of agreement, as alleged? OPP. 3. OPP. 2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, whether after the execution of aforementioned agreement, the defendant No.1 had failed to discharge his obligation undertaken by him vide aforementioned agreement despite of the fact that plaintiffs had remained ready and willing to execute their part of agreement, as alleged? OPP. 3. If issue No.2 is proved in affirmative, whether subsequent sale deed dated 13.07.2011 executed by defendant No.1 in respect of the suit land in favour of defendant No.2 is liable to be declared null and void, as alleged? OPP. 4. If issue No.3 is proved in affirmative, whether plaintiffs are entitled to decree of specific performance of the aforementioned agreement as alleged? OPP. 5. If issue No.2 and 3 are proved in affirmative, whether plaintiffs are also entitled to relief of perpetual injunction as prayed for? OPP. 6. Whether plaintiff No.1 was not competent to purchase the suit land, as alleged? OPD-1. 7. Whether plaintiff No.1 has not come to court with clean hands as alleged? OPD. 8. Whether plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct from filing the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 9. Whether defendant No.2 is bonafide purchaser for consideration without notice, as alleged, if so, its effect? OPD-2. 10. Relief.” 7. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence and evaluating the same dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. The appeal preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, came to be dismissed by the learned first appellate Court constraining the plaintiffs to file the instant appeal. 8. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, require to be set aside. 9. What is ‘perverse’ was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:- “26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 "8…We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 10. What is ‘perverse’ has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ‘Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- “25….. A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated.” 11. What is ‘perversity’ recently came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- “8. What is ‘perversity’ recently came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- “8. “Perversity” has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect.” 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) “10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent.” 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on re-appreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man’s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man’s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79) “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ‘103. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ‘103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.” The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with.” 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615) “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 ], Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : AIR 1999 SC 677 ], Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC 589 ] and Babu v. State of Kerala[ (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] .)” This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court.” 12. It is settled principle of law that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act provides that the specific performance of contract would not be enforced in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the other side. Language of Section 16(c) clearly stipulates that the “readiness and willingness” has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. Language of Section 16(c) clearly stipulates that the “readiness and willingness” has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. The continuous “readiness and willingness” on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. Right from the date of execution till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing and has always been willing to perform his part of contract. The view that the averments “plaintiff is and has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract” stems out of the principle that the plaint must show the plaintiff’s intention to treat the contract as subsisting. “Readiness and willingness” cannot be treated as a straightjacket formula and have to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. 13. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that the learned Courts below have rejected the claim of the plaintiffs on the ground that even though the agreement/document Ex.PW-1/A/Ex.DA dated 17.04.2011 was executed, however, the cheque issued by plaintiff No.1 stood dishonoured. Therefore, there was no question of its enforcement. It is apt to reproduce para-42 of the judgment of the learned first appellate Court which reads thus:- “42. This fact has not been disputed by the plaintiff No.1, however, he has put forward the plea that the cheque was intentionally deposited late by the defendant No.1. Admittedly the parties have replied to each other by various notices. From the respective stand of the parties, it is clear that the document Ex.PW- 1/A/Ex.DA was executed on 17.04.2011and part payment was made by way of cheque No.669255 dated 21.04.2011. This payment was the condition of the document Ex.PW-1/A which has not been fulfilled by the plaintiff No.1 as it was his bounden duty of plaintiff No.1 to ensure that the cheque given by him as part payment should be honoured as and when the same would be presented for encashment. The very condition of the document Ex.PW-1/A has not been fulfilled by the plaintiff No.1 in this case. Had the plaintiff No.1 been interested to purchase the suit land, then he would have ensured the fact that the post dated cheque must be honoured on its presentation. The very condition of the document Ex.PW-1/A has not been fulfilled by the plaintiff No.1 in this case. Had the plaintiff No.1 been interested to purchase the suit land, then he would have ensured the fact that the post dated cheque must be honoured on its presentation. Situation would have been otherwise, if the factum of payment of Rs.1,00,000/- (One lac) through cheque No.669255 would not have been mentioned in the document Ex.PW-1/A. It has rightly been argued by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs that the payment of earnest money is not the sine-qua-non for entering into agreement to sell. The arguments of Sh.H.S.Rana, Advocate appearing for the appellants would sound only nice, if this condition regarding payment of the token amount has not been mentioned in the document Ex.PW-1/A. Judging the above facts, in the light of settled proposition of law that the decree of specific performance is discretionary in nature which is to be granted on the basis of justice, equity good conscious and fairness to both the parties. Considering the above facts, the document Ex. PW-1/A cannot be said to the agreement to sell.” 14. Ex.PW-1/A reads thus:- “Agreement to sell 1. First party (Seller) Krishan Kumar Gupta S/o late Sh.Harcharan Dass Gupta, R/o 19A Power House Road, Saproon, Solan, do hereby solemnly declare that our Khasra No.692 and 693 Mohal Kali Bari Shimla stands as yes. 2. Second party (Purchaser) Sh.Ved Prakash S/o Sh. Chiranji Lal, Sharma Niwas, near DAV School, Sector-4, New Shimla. The above plot of land bearing Kh.No.693 and 692 measuring 159-80 Sq.meter stands as present. The settlement of this land is in process and in the final stage. The seller and purchaser agreed to purchase this land for an total cash of Rs.7.00 lacs total consideration. The registration charges will be borne 50% & 50%. If this land is further sold to 3rd party the registration charges and other expenditure will be borne by the 3rd party himself. The purchaser has paid a token amount of Rs.1.00 lac vide cheuqe No.669255 dt. 21-4-2011 of Punjab National Bank, Shimla, balance payment will be made at the time of registration within a maximum period of 2 (two) months i.e. Rs.6.00 lacs. If the registration is not done by the purchaser within a period of two months, the advance payment of Rs.1.00 lacs will be forfeited. 21-4-2011 of Punjab National Bank, Shimla, balance payment will be made at the time of registration within a maximum period of 2 (two) months i.e. Rs.6.00 lacs. If the registration is not done by the purchaser within a period of two months, the advance payment of Rs.1.00 lacs will be forfeited. If the registration is not being done by the seller, the same will be got done by the Court with cost. If the purchaser wants to sell this land to 3rd party, the seller has got no objection. After settlement if this plot of land increases or decreases, both the parties will have no objection and the selling amount will remain the same. This agreement is made by us in our full sense and knowledge in presence of under mentioned witnesses at Solan dt. 17-4-2011. -sd/- Ved Parkash. -sd/- (K.K.Gupta) Seller. Witness:- -sd/- Witness:- -sd/- Jagdish Sharma s/o Sh. Paras Ram Sharma, Vill.Nigam Bihar (Anji) Bye Pass Borog, Solan(HP). Sudhanshu Rai 19A Power House Road, Saproon,Solan.” 15. From a close and careful reading of the aforesaid agreement, the intention of the parties can clearly be gathered that defendant No.1 agreed to sell the property only after receipt of the token money which clearly depicts that defendant No.1 had no intention to pass on the property without payment of token money. It was paid by cheque which was dishonoured when sought to be encashed by defendant No.1. Once, the intention of the parties is absolutely clear whereby defendant No.1 did not want to part with his property except after receipt of token sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-, it cannot be said that defendant No.1 had no intention to sell the property in dispute, rather it was plaintiff No.1, who despite having issued the cheque of Rs.1,00,000/- did not ensure that at least the said amount is available in his bank account for at least two months that had been specified in the agreement. 16. It has come on record that even the demand draft of Rs.1,00,000/- which was sent by plaintiff No.1 to defendant No.1 was sent only on 21.06.2011 i.e. after two months of date of writing/agreement dated 17.04.2011. Therefore, neither equities nor law are in favour of plaintiff No.1. 16. It has come on record that even the demand draft of Rs.1,00,000/- which was sent by plaintiff No.1 to defendant No.1 was sent only on 21.06.2011 i.e. after two months of date of writing/agreement dated 17.04.2011. Therefore, neither equities nor law are in favour of plaintiff No.1. Indisputably, the time for payment of prices is not necessarily a sine-qua-non to the completion of the sale if the intention is that the property should pass on registration of the sale deed. However, where a deed clearly mentions that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- has been paid by cheque, but the cheque is dishonoured, this would amount to fraud and would, therefore, be void. 17. Adverting once again to the contents of the agreement, it would be noticed that the time for execution of the sale deed was fixed two months and in case the registration was not so done by the purchaser within a period of two months, the advance payment of Rs.1,00,000/- was to be forfeited and similarly in case the registration was not done by the seller, the same will be got done by the Court. 18. Somewhat, similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padmakumari and others versus Dasayyan and others (2015) 8 SCC 695 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immovable property was dealing with a aspect of plaintiff’s failure to perform his part of contract within the time stipulated in the agreement i.e. to pay balance sale consideration of Rs.63,000/- within nine months from the date of execution of agreement and it was held that such failure disentitled the plaintiff to obtain decree of specific performance. It is apt to reproduce paras 19 and 20 of the aforesaid judgment which read thus:- “19. The said legal contention urged on behalf of defendant Nos. 12 to 15 has been strongly rebutted by learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff contending that the question of payment of balance consideration amount of Rs.63,000/- within nine months would have arisen after the terms and conditions of the contract agreed upon by defendant Nos. 1 to 11 if they had measured the suit schedule property. 12 to 15 has been strongly rebutted by learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff contending that the question of payment of balance consideration amount of Rs.63,000/- within nine months would have arisen after the terms and conditions of the contract agreed upon by defendant Nos. 1 to 11 if they had measured the suit schedule property. They have not discharged their part of the contract stipulated in the agreement to sell, therefore, it is urged by him that time was not the essence of the contract as defendant Nos. 1 to 11 themselves have failed to perform their part of the agreement. 20. The said contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff is unacceptable to us that the question of taking measurement would not arise before the plaintiff perform his part of the contract regarding the balance consideration within the period stipulated in the agreement. Undisputedly, that had not been done by the plaintiff in the instant case within the stipulated time and the notice was issued by the plaintiff only after one year, therefore, the plaintiff has not adhered to the time which is stipulated to pay the balance consideration amount to defendant Nos. 1 to 11 which is very important legal aspect which was required to be considered by the Courts below at the time of determining rights of the parties and pass the impugned judgment. The Courts below have ignored this important aspect of the matter while answering the contentious Issue Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff and granted decree of specific performance in respect of the suit schedule property. The said finding of fact is contrary to the terms and conditions of the agreement, pleadings and the evidence on record. Accordingly, we answer the said issues in favour of defendant Nos. 12 to 15 after setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the High Court.” 19. Even otherwise, the findings recorded by the learned Courts below regarding “readiness and willingness” of the parties to perform their part of obligation are pure findings of fact and cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the instant appeal. (Refer: A.K. Lakshmipathy (D) & Ors. versus Rai Saheb Pannalal H.Lahoti Charitable Trust & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 577 & Janak Dulari Devi & Anr. (Refer: A.K. Lakshmipathy (D) & Ors. versus Rai Saheb Pannalal H.Lahoti Charitable Trust & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 577 & Janak Dulari Devi & Anr. versus Kapildeo Rai & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 2521 ). 20. It is otherwise more than settled that the appellate Court continues to be a final court of fact and law and second appeal to the High Court lies only where there is a substantial question of law. Meaning thereby, the pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before this Court in second appeal. It shall be apt to refer to three Judges Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs (2001) 3 SCC 179 wherein it was observed as follows: “15……The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 21. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: “12. The phrase ‘substantial question of law’, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928 Privy Council 172, the phrase “‘substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co., Ltd., (1962) Supp.3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju, ILR 1952 Madras 264:- “When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.” and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- “The proper test for determining wh ether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 22. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 23. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 24. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.