I. S. Maheshkumar Menon v. Labour Court, Ernakulam
2017-06-27
A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The petitioner has approached this Court challenging Ext.P1 preliminary order passed by the 1st respondent, Labour Court, Ernakulam, holding a reference made by the Government, with regard to the legality of the dismissal of the petitioner and the consequential reliefs to which he was entitled, to be belated and, therefore, unsustainable in law. The brief facts necessary for a disposal of the writ petition is as follows: The petitioner was an employee of the 2nd respondent. While continuing in the employment of the 2nd respondent, he was charge sheeted on 12.01.1994. After considering the explanation dated 27.01.1994 submitted to the said charge sheet, the petitioner was served with an additional charge sheet by the employer on 29.06.1994. The petitioner replied to the said additional charge sheet on 07.07.1994. Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed, who posted the enquiry to 06.08.1994. Despite notices issued to the petitioner, he did not appear at the enquiry proceedings, and hence, the proceedings were carried on ex parte. Documents Exts.M1 to M13 were marked on behalf of the management, and after considering the evidence on record, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 29.11.1994 finding the petitioner guilty of the charges alleged against him in the charge sheets issued to him. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 14.12.1994 was issued to the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why the findings in the enquiry report should not be accepted, and a punishment as proposed imposed on him. The proposed punishment was that of termination from service. Inasmuch as the petitioner did not submit any reply to the said show cause notice, and the petitioner refrained from attending work from 05.01.1995, the 2nd respondent passed an order dated 14.02.1995 dismissing the petitioner from service. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had approached the Labour Court by filing C.P.No.4 of 1995 claiming wages which, according to the petitioner, had been withheld by the 2nd respondent. In the counter affidavit filed to the said C.P filed by the petitioner, the 2nd respondent management referred to the dismissal of the petitioner from service with effect from 14.02.1995. It would appear that, the claim petition of the petitioner was eventually settled by payment of an amount of Rs.8,637/- to the petitioner as evidenced from Ext.P6 order.
In the counter affidavit filed to the said C.P filed by the petitioner, the 2nd respondent management referred to the dismissal of the petitioner from service with effect from 14.02.1995. It would appear that, the claim petition of the petitioner was eventually settled by payment of an amount of Rs.8,637/- to the petitioner as evidenced from Ext.P6 order. The petitioner, thereafter, for the first time raised an industrial dispute by filing a complaint dated 24.03.2005, more than 10 years after the date of dismissal from service. A conciliation was attempted on the said complaint, and on failure of the conciliation proceedings, a failure report was sent to the Government and, on receipt of the said report, the Government referred the industrial dispute for adjudication to the 1st respondent Labour Court. The Industrial Dispute was numbered as I.D.No.28 of 2006. In the said industrial dispute, a written statement was filed by the management, wherein one of the contentions raised was that the industrial dispute was raised belatedly, almost 10 years after the date of dismissal of the petitioner from service. Although a rejoinder was filed by the petitioner, the Labour Court went into the issue of delay and found, based on the evidence before it, that the reference itself was highly belated, and therefore, not sustainable in law. Thereafter, although the Labour Court went in to the issue as to whether the petitioner was a workman for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the I.D Act') and found that the petitioner would qualify to be a workman under the I.D. Act, in view of the earlier finding that the industrial dispute itself was highly belated, the reference by the State Government was found to be not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the order passed by the Labour Court on the reference of the Government was to the effect that the reference itself could not be decided since it was not sustainable in law being belated. In the writ petition, Ext.P1 order of the Labour Court is impugned, inter alia, on the contention that, as per the provisions of Section 10 1(c) of the I.D Act, where a reference was made to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government, the Labour Court was obliged to consider the reference on merits and pass an award on the reference made by the appropriate Government.
With specific reference to Ext.P1 order, it is stated that the Labour Court erred in refusing to consider the reference on the ground of delay since, under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court had in the decision reported in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. And Another [1999 LAB.I.C.1435], found that a workman could not be deprived of his benefits under the I.D. Act solely on the ground of delay in approaching the adjudicating authority. 2. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as also the learned Standing counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent Management. 3. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made across the bar, I find from Ext.P1 preliminary order passed by the 1st respondent Labour Court that, the Labour Court took note of the fact that in the enquiry proceedings, which ultimately culminated in an order of dismissal of the petitioner with effect from 14.02.1995, the petitioner had abstained from participation in the said proceedings. The Labour Court went through the enquiry file that was produced before it by the management, and found that several notices had been sent to the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer, but the same were refused by the petitioner. Thereafter, although a detailed rejoinder was filed by the petitioner, the contention of the management that he was served with a charge sheet dated 12.01.1994, and a subsequent charge sheet dated 29.06.1994 and a show cause notice dated 14.12.1994, informing him of the proposal for a punishment, were not disputed by him, and that it was only after receiving these notices that the petitioner had filed the claim petition (C.P.No.4 of 1995) before the Labour Court. The Labour Court also found, from the records produced by the management, that the petitioner had willfully refused to accept notices sent by the management, and the endorsements on the covers in which the notices were sent, proved that he had even refused to receive the intimation from the postman, and all the notices were returned, after keeping it for the required period for acceptance by the workman, after intimation. The Labour Court therefore, found that the factual circumstances in the case led to the inescapable conclusion that the reference itself was highly belated, and therefore, was not sustainable in law.
The Labour Court therefore, found that the factual circumstances in the case led to the inescapable conclusion that the reference itself was highly belated, and therefore, was not sustainable in law. In this connection, I also note that, it was the specific case of the 2nd respondent management before the Labour Court, that the Enquiry Officer, who had conducted the enquiry had since passed away, and therefore, none of the documents which were essential to be marked through the Enquiry Officer, could be marked in any proceedings for adjudication of the dispute referred to the Labour Court by the State Government. I also take note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Ram Singh and Another [2008 (17) SCC 627] as also State of Karnataka and Another v. Ravikumar [ (2009) 13 SCC 746 ], which state that although a delay by itself cannot be a sufficient reason to reject an industrial dispute, the delay cannot be unreasonable. The reason for diligence and promptness lies in the fact that the record pertaining to an employee might have been destroyed and it would be difficult to obtain witnesses, who would be competent to give evidence many years later, if the Labour Court wishes to hold a further enquiry in the matter. This rationale appears to be squarely applicable in the instant case where, as already noted, any attempt at adjudicating the legality of the enquiry, that was already conducted against the petitioner, would necessitate a cross -examination of the Enquiry Officer, who expired during the period of eight years that it took for the petitioner to approach the adjudicating authority for adjudication of the industrial dispute. I am therefore, not persuaded to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, based on the decisions of the Supreme Court in [1999 LAB.I.C 1435] supra, that the delay by itself cannot be a reason for rejecting the reference. Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal, in my opinion, does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, nor is it one that is passed without considering the evidence on record.
Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal, in my opinion, does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, nor is it one that is passed without considering the evidence on record. On the contrary, I find that the ratio of the decision in [2008 (17) SCC 627] squarely applies to the case at hand and for the said reason, I am of the view that, Ext.P1 order does not call for any interference by this Court in these proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Resultantly, the writ petition in its challenge against Ext.P1 order fails and is accordingly dismissed.