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Rajasthan High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 944 (RAJ)

Kishna Ram S/o Sh. Bechra Ram Rebari v. State of Rajasthan, through Public Prosecutor

2017-04-11

P.K.LOHRA

body2017
ORDER : 1. Woes of a hapless acid victim in this case are disheartening. Her cry for justice espoused by sibling (brother) seeks attention of the Court to invoke inherent jurisdiction in the matter. 2. In this misc. petition, petitioner has laid challenge to order dated 8th of April 2015, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhinmal, District Jaisalmer (for short, ‘learned trial Court’). By the order impugned, learned trial Court has declined the joint prayer of petitioner and prosecution to recall victim Ms. Sita for recording her statement by rejecting application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. 3. Ritualistic capitulation of the facts is that petitioner-complainant filed a complaint against second and third respondents castigating them for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The complaint aforesaid eventually culminated into FIR No. 56/2012, registered at Police Station Karda, District Jalore. In the complaint, petitioner has inter-alia alleged that his sister Ms. Sita entered into matrimony two years back. The complaint also unfurls that marriage was solemnized as per Hindu rites and rituals with giving requisite gifts and sufficient dowry to the groom family. As emerges out from the complaint, marital bliss between the spouses eclipsed in a short span of time and soon after marriage serious acrimony developed between couple and the family members of groom. Hurling insinuations against the respondents of subjecting Ms. Sita to cruelty and harassment for unlawful demand of property or valuable security, the petitioner has narrated in the complaint that all sincere attempts made at the behest of his family to streamline the matrimonial relations between spouses went in vain. 4. Castigating respondents for their stubborn and recalcitrant posture, it is also highlighted in the complaint that ill-treatment to Ms. Sita continued by them unabatedly. Later part of the complaint refers to receipt of information by complainant from family members of the respondents about ill-health of Ms. Sita and her hospitalization. While showing his anguish and astonishment on reaching the hospital, complainant has specifically alleged in the complaint that his sister was in a critical condition inasmuch as she was unable to speak properly. Attributing criminal delinquency to the accused respondents for aforesaid offences, the petitioner in the complaint craved for appropriate action against them. 5. Culmination of complaint into FIR facilitated investigation in the matter. During investigation, victim Ms. Attributing criminal delinquency to the accused respondents for aforesaid offences, the petitioner in the complaint craved for appropriate action against them. 5. Culmination of complaint into FIR facilitated investigation in the matter. During investigation, victim Ms. Sita was thoroughly examined by Gastroenterologist & ENT Department of Medical College, Jodhpur. Subsequently, all papers relating to treatment of the victim and aforesaid reports of Gastroenterologist & ENT Department were placed before duly constituted Medical Board by the order of Principal Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Jalore. The Medical Board, in its report dated 24th of August 2012, opined in clear and unequivocal terms that internal organs of victim damaged due to corrosive (acid burn) entered through neck, i.e. orally. The Board further gave its clear opinion that ‘corrosive (acid burn) of victim Ms. Sita is dangerous to her life’. Thus, in these circumstances the police, after completion of investigation, submitted charge-sheet against the respondents for aforesaid offences. 6. When learned trial Court summoned victim Ms. Sita for recording her statement, she was brought before the Court on stretcher and was unable to speak. It is in such compelling circumstances, learned Public Prosecutor made a request to give up her as prosecution witness and counsel for the petitioner also agreed to that suggestion of the Public Prosecutor. Subsequently, statements of other prosecution witnesses are recorded. With progression in trial, victim Ms. Sita’s condition improved slightly and partially she came out of the trauma, hallucinations and psychological disability. Therefore, when the trial was in vouge, realizing victim’s testimony crucial and necessary for the just decision of the case, prosecution and petitioner made an effort in unison to recall/record her statements by laying applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court rejected both the applications with the observation that prosecution has consciously dropped/given up Ms. Sita earlier and petitioner’s counsel has also agreed for the same, now it is not worthwhile to recall her by taking recourse to Section 311 Cr.P.C. 7. Mr. Vineet Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that impugned order is per se vulnerable inasmuch as learned trial Court has not at all cared to examine necessity of victim Ms. Sita’s evidence for just decision of the case. Mr. Mr. Vineet Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that impugned order is per se vulnerable inasmuch as learned trial Court has not at all cared to examine necessity of victim Ms. Sita’s evidence for just decision of the case. Mr. Jain would contend that power of the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is very wide in amplitude which cannot be circumscribed simply on technical pretext viz., dropping/giving up witness earlier by the prosecution. Lastly, learned counsel has urged that learned trial Court in the impugned order has completely eschewed the significance of victim’s evidence on the anvil of alleged criminal delinquency of the accused-respondents, is sufficient to make out a case of abuse of the process of the Court. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. V.S. Rajpurohit, while fully endorsing the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, has prayed for quashing the impugned order. Mr. Rajpurohit submits that offences against women are menace to the society and in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, evidence of victim is essential to the just decision of the case. 9. E.converso, learned counsel for the accused-respondents, Mr. Chaitanya Gahlot, has defended the impugned order. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Gahlot, has made a feeble attempt to persuade the Court not to interfere in the matter precisely by urging that a discretionary order passed by learned trial Court is not liable to be tinkered with in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In the alternative, Mr. Chaitanya Gahlot, learned counsel for the respondents, has sought intervention of the Court for issuing necessary direction to the learned trial Court to expedite trial of the case. 10. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made at Bar and thoroughly scanned the materials available on record. 11. Throwing acids or corrosive substance on women or administering to them, thereby causing death or physical and psychological damages with unfathomable consequences is a matter of grave concern. Vitriolage or other acid attack is an act of intimate terrorism that involves premeditated throwing/administering sulfuric (H2SO4), nitric (HNO3), hydrochloric (HCL) acid or any corrosive substance onto someone with the main intention of disfigurement and destruction of victim’s body and soul. Courts are not expected to be moot spectators in dealing with such social evils more particularly when right of a victim for fair disposition comes to the fore during trial. Courts are not expected to be moot spectators in dealing with such social evils more particularly when right of a victim for fair disposition comes to the fore during trial. The Committee of Criminal Justice Reforms under the Chairmanship of Dr. Retd. Justice V.S. Malimath (formerly, Chief Justice of Kerala High Court) in its Report highlighted with clarity and precision the interest of victims of crime and observed in Para 6.9.1 as infra: “Victims of crime are important players in criminal justice administration both as complainant/informant and as witness for the police/prosecution. Despite the system being heavily dependent on the victim, criminal justice has been concerned with the offender and his interests almost subordinating or disregarding the interest of victim. In Civil Law systems generally, the victims enjoyed better status than in Administration of Criminal Justice” 12. In the instant case, facts are glaring and precisely victim Ms. Sita is allegedly sufferer of cruelty and harassment at the hands of respondents for their unlawful demand of property or valuable security. That apart, the medical condition of the victim is also a cause of grave and serious concern inasmuch as due to consumption of corrosive substance, or acid, her internal organs are substantially damaged. The investigating agency, in such circumstances, has slapped offence under Sections 498A, 406 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC against the respondents. Undeniably, looking to the offences for which the respondents are charged, evidence of victim Ms. Sita is of utmost significance as she being material witness of the case. In absence of her testimony, may be due to default, the prosecution has to fail. Thus, the learned trial Court, while considering the joint prayer of prosecution as well as petitioner, ought to have examined the legislative intent envisaged under Section 311 Cr.P.C. with pragmatic approach rather than purely pedantic and idealistic approach. Section 311 Cr.P.C. clearly envisages that Court shall summon and examine, or recall and re-examine any person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of case. The powers conferred under this section are though discretionary but wide in amplitude on the Court to exercise such powers when exigencies of justice demand. 13. Section 311 Cr.P.C. clearly envisages that Court shall summon and examine, or recall and re-examine any person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of case. The powers conferred under this section are though discretionary but wide in amplitude on the Court to exercise such powers when exigencies of justice demand. 13. This Court, in Chandra Shekar vs. State of Rajasthan, 1992 Cri.L.J. 4039, while considering power of the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to summon material witness, has observed that even after hearing final arguments and case posted for judgment, Court can recall material witness for examination for fair and just decision. The Court held: “So far as the facts of this case are concerned, it cannot be said that the law cited by Shri Chaturvedi has any direct application. In the facts of the case at hand the Investigation Officer has to be examined and he was a very important and material witness, in as much as he was the witness to prove the recovery of blood-stained Bush-shirt. The prosecution had necer given up this witness. It is of Course, true that this witness could not be served despite several opportunities and it is also apparent that the bailable warrants which were sent for service on this police officer to appear as a witness, the report came that his address was not available. In such circumstances, the Court rejected the request of the Additional Public Prosecutor to summon the other two witnesses namely Buniyad AH and Brijmohan, but allowed the request of the Additional Public Prosecutor in respect of Investigation Officer Ghanshyam Dutta. It has to be agreed on all hands and it is a fact which is undeniable that Ghanshyam Dutta was the Investigating Officer and was a material witness for proving recoveries and further that this witness was never given up by the prosecution. Merely because his correct address and whereabouts were not known, his bailable warrants for his appearance as witness in the Court could not be served, could hardly enable the accused to take advantage of that situation and to say that the Court should not have passed the order to send bailable warrants for this witness to record his evidence. Merely because his correct address and whereabouts were not known, his bailable warrants for his appearance as witness in the Court could not be served, could hardly enable the accused to take advantage of that situation and to say that the Court should not have passed the order to send bailable warrants for this witness to record his evidence. 1988 WLN (UC) 367 Rajkaran vs. Jeewan Khan (supra) and the AIR 1991 SC 1346 : 1991 Cri LJ 1521, Mohanlal Shamji Soni vs. Union of India (supra) on which reliance has been placeds by Shri Chaturvedi are the cases which are wholly distinguishable on facts as well as on the question of law in as much as the case at hand is not a case in which any lacuna left by the prosecution is sought to be filled up now. So far as the arguments of Shri Chaturvedi that such order can be passed only suo motu in accordance with the later part of Section 311 Cr.P.C. but could not be passed on an application of the Addl. P.P., it may be at once observed that this submission has no merit in view of the language contained in Section 311 Cr.P.C. itself. Because at the very outset of Section 311 Cr.P.C. i.e. in the earlier part of Section 311 itself, it has been provided that the Court may pass such order at any stage of the trial and it may summon any person as a witness even if it had not summoned earlier, may recall any person already examined. In the case at the hand it has been categorically mentioned by the Additional Sections Judge, Karauli that the transfers of the police officers are usual and the Court was of the opinion that for a just and fair decision of the case, it was necessary to examine the Investigating Officer and it was further observed that without examining the investigation officer, it was not possible to render complete justice in this case. In my opinion, merely because the arguments had been heard in this case and the case at one stage had been posted for judgment is not a ground to limit the scope of passing of the order under Section 311 Cr.P.C. as the Court can pass such orders at any stage. Therefore, it is immaterial if the order has been passed on the application filed by the Addl. Therefore, it is immaterial if the order has been passed on the application filed by the Addl. Public Prosecutor and the Court has not passed the order suo moto.” 14. Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad vs. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110 , made a distinction in lacuna in the prosecution with the fallout of an oversight committed by Public Prosecutor during trial, emphasising planery power of the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to sommon or even recall any witness at any stage of the case, if the Court considers necessary for the just decision of the case. The Court held: "We cannot therefore accept the contention of the appellant as a legal proposition that the Court cannot exercise power of re-summoning any witness if once that power was exercised, nor can the power be whittled down merely on the ground that prosecution discovered latches only when the defence highlighted them during final arguments. The power of the court is plenary to summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the case if the court considers it necessary for a just decision. The steps which the trial court permitted in this case for re-summoning certain witnesses cannot therefore be spurned down nor frowned at. 15. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh & Another vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2004) 4 SCC 158 , Supreme Court has discussed power of the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. read with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 to elicit all necessary materials and play an active role in evidence collecting process which can enable it to arrive at the truth. The Court observed that in making this endeavour, court is not guided by failure of prosecution or defence to produce some evidence which is necessary for a just and proper decision of the case and to uphold the truth. The Court held: “43. The courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something, which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that ultimate objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The court cannot afford to be wishfully or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system, and courts could not also play into the hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness. 44. The power of the court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act is in a way complementary to its power under Section 311 of the Code. The section consists of two parts i.e. (i) giving a discretion to the court to examine the witness at any stage and (ii) the mandatory portion which compels the court to examine a witness if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the court. Though the discretion given to the court is very wide, the very width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohanlal vs. Union of India this Court has observed, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 311, that the very usage of the words such as, “any court”, “at any stage”, or “any enquiry or trial or other proceedings”, “any person” and “any such person” clearly spells out that the section has expressed in the widest-possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, as noted above, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary powers should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow any discretion but obligates and binds the court to take necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case, “essential” to an active and alert mind and not to one which is bent to abandon or abdicate. Object of the section is to enable the court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some evidence which is necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is exercised and the evidence is examined neither to help the prosecution nor the defence, if the court feels that there is necessity to act in terms of Section 311 but only to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is done with an object of getting the evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth.” 16. Supreme Court, in Rajaram Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar, (2013) 14 SCC 461 , once again examined the true purport of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and while laying emphasis on necessity of the evidence of witness for just decision of the case, held: “A conspicuous reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. would show that widest of the powers have been invested with the Courts when it comes to the question of summoning a witness or to recall or re-examine any witness already examined. A reading of the provision shows that the expression "any" has been used as a prefix to "court", "inquiry", "trial", "other proceeding", "person as a witness", "person in attendance though not summoned as a witness", and "person already examined". By using the said expression "any" as a pre-fix to the various expressions mentioned above, it is ultimately stated that all that was required to be satisfied by the Court was only in relation to such evidence that appears to the Court to be essential for the just decision of the case. Section 138 of the Evidence Act, prescribed the order of examination of a witness in the Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act, prescribed the order of examination of a witness in the Court. Order of re-examination is also prescribed calling for such a witness so desired for such re-examination. Therefore, a reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and Section 138 Evidence Act, insofar as it comes to the question of a criminal trial, the order of re-examination at the desire of any person under Section 138, will have to necessarily be in consonance with the prescription contained in Section 311 Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, imperative that the invocation of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and its application in a particular case can be ordered by the Court, only by bearing in mind the object and purport of the said provision, namely, for achieving a just decision of the case as noted by us earlier. The power vested under the said provision is made available to any Court at any stage in any inquiry or trial or other proceeding initiated under the Code for the purpose of summoning any person as a witness or for examining any person in attendance, even though not summoned as witness or to recall or re-examine any person already examined. Insofar as recalling and re-examination of any person already examined, the Court must necessarily consider and ensure that such recall and re-examination of any person, appears in the view of the Court to be essential for the just decision of the case. Therefore, the paramount requirement is just decision and for that purpose the essentiality of a person to be recalled and re-examined has to be ascertained.” 17. In a recent judgment, State of Haryana vs. Ram Mehar & Others, (2016) 8 SCC 762 , Supreme Court has examined the concept of fair trial on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution and observed that fairness of trial in its ambit requires fairness to the accused, victim and the collective at large. The Court held: “The decisions of this Court when analysed appositely clearly convey that the concept of the fair trial is not in the realm of abstraction. It is not a vague idea. It is a concrete phenomenon. It is not rigid and there cannot be any straitjacket formula for applying the same. On occasions it has the necessary flexibility. Therefore, it cannot be attributed or clothed with any kind of rigidity or flexibility in its application. It is not a vague idea. It is a concrete phenomenon. It is not rigid and there cannot be any straitjacket formula for applying the same. On occasions it has the necessary flexibility. Therefore, it cannot be attributed or clothed with any kind of rigidity or flexibility in its application. It is because fair trial in its ambit requires fairness to the accused, the victim and the collective at large. Neither the accused nor the prosecution nor the victim which is a part of the society can claim absolute predominance over the other. Once absolute predominance is recognized, it will have the effect potentiality to bring in an anarchical disorder in the conducting of trial defying established legal norm. There should be passion for doing justice but it must be commanded by reasons and not propelled by any kind of vague instigation. It would be dependent on the fact situation; established norms and recognized principles and eventual appreciation of the factual scenario in entirety. There may be cases which may command compartmentalization but it cannot be stated to be an inflexible rule. Each and every irregularity cannot be imported to the arena of fair trial. There may be situations where injustice to the victim may play a pivotal role. The centripodal purpose is to see that injustice is avoided when the trial is conducted. Simultaneously the concept of fair trial cannot be allowed to such an extent so that the systemic order of conducting a trial in accordance with Cr.P.C. or other enactments get mortgaged to the whims and fancies of the defence or the prosecution. The command of the Code cannot be thrown to winds. In such situation, as has been laid down in many an authority, the courts have significantly an eminent role. A plea of fairness cannot be utilized to build Castles in Spain or permitted to perceive a bright moon in a sunny afternoon. It cannot be acquiesced to create an organic disorder in the system. It cannot be acceded to manure a fertile mind to usher in the nemesis of the concept of trial as such.” 18. A plea of fairness cannot be utilized to build Castles in Spain or permitted to perceive a bright moon in a sunny afternoon. It cannot be acquiesced to create an organic disorder in the system. It cannot be acceded to manure a fertile mind to usher in the nemesis of the concept of trial as such.” 18. Thus, in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case and the position which has emerged out from the legal precedents referred to supra, in my considered opinion, learned trial Court has seriously erred in rejecting the application filed by prosecution as well as petitioner to summon and examine material witness victim Ms. Sita. It is needless to observe here that the learned trial Court has not at all cared to see the overall impact of the impugned order on the result of the case rendering the impugned order all the more vulnerable. In totality, impugned order has resulted in miscarriage of justice and the learned trial Court in exercise of its discretion has clearly and unequivocally abused the process of the Court. 19. The upshot of above discussion is that instant petition is allowed, impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is quashed and set aside and the applications filed by the prosecution as well as the petitioner under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling/examining victim Ms. Sita are allowed. Learned trial Court is directed to record statement of Ms. Sita on the ensuing date of hearing or on any other date within a period of fortnight thereafter positively. Petitioner as well as prosecution is also directed to ensure presence of victim Ms. Sita before the learned trial Court on the ensuing date of hearing or any other date fixed in this behalf for recording her statement. 20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, while acceding to the prayer of respondent-accused, learned trial Court is directed to expedite trial and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. 21. Before parting, it is made clear that observations made in this order shall not be construed as an expression on merits of the case by learned trial Court and the learned trial Court is expected to decide the case dispassionately uninfluenced by the aforesaid observations, strictly in accordance with law.