Ramesh Kachchap, son of Late Sukra Kachchap v. Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Limited
2017-06-16
PRAMATH PATNAIK
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing office order dated 2/9.2.2011 whereby the appellate authority while modifying the original order of punishment reduced the punishment to “demotion to lower stage/Grade” and directed for recovery of Rs. 2,80,975/- and further directed to treat the period from dismissal from services till the date of joining as ‘Dies Non”. 2. The facts, in brief, is that the petitioner while posted as Chief Cashier at Tekadi Camp, Nagpur, he was served with a charge-sheet on the allegation that while he was posted at Anandwan Camp, Nagpur, discrepancies in cash-book and the Imprest amount of the Anandwan Camp including physical cash balance shortfall of Rs. 2,84,878/- was found, thereby he committed misconduct of theft, fraud and dishonesty in connection with the employer’s business or property. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his reply stating that the said allegation is not based upon evidence and material. Being dissatisfied with the reply, the disciplinary authority appointed enquiry officer, who upon inquiry submitted enquiry report. Basing on which, the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal from services vide order dated 30.09.2010. Against which, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was disposed of vide order dated 2/9.02.2011, which is impugned in this case. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that imputation of allegation forming part of alleged misconduct do not fall within the category of Para 26.01 and 26.05 of the Certified Standing Order and further the author of the charge-sheet is not delegated with the power to issue charge-sheet, which fact has not been taken into consideration by the enquiry officer or disciplinary authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the enquiry officer did not consider that piece of evidence wherein the witness has categorically stated about the manner in which cash affairs of the camp was being managed during the absence/leave of the petitioner i.e. Cashier. Further, the committee did not physically verify the cash at Anandwan Camp and in cross-examination, he admitted that he did not demand the key of the cash chest from the imprest holder. Hence, the enquiry report is perverse as the findings recorded therein are not based upon the materials available on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the appellate authority did not consider the points raised in appeal and passed a cryptic order.
Hence, the enquiry report is perverse as the findings recorded therein are not based upon the materials available on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the appellate authority did not consider the points raised in appeal and passed a cryptic order. It has been submitted that the word “Consider” has been great significance. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Chairman LIC & Ors v. A. Masilamani, as reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 and also the case of Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujrat & anr as reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 . 4. Reiterating the averments made in the counter affidavit, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is a case where the petitioner has not maintained the cash book in proper manner and has not shown the entries in the cash book, which fact has fully been proved in the enquiry. Moreover, in the case at hand, there is no procedural irregularity in conducting the departmental proceeding. In the enquiry, it also came on surface that when the petitioner went on leave, he did not hand over the cash and cash-books and other relevant documents to the In-Charge, which is a major misdemeanor as it is the duty of the cashier to hand over cash and other documents before proceeding on leave to his In-Charge. Hence, whatever discrepancies were there in the cash-book, the petitioner was solely responsible. In appeal preferred by the petitioner, the appellate authority took a lenient view taking into consideration his past service and modified the order from dismissal from services to “demotion to lower stage/Grade”. Hence, the impugned order warrants no interference by this Court. 5. After bestowing my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and on close scrutiny of the materials available on record, it appears that being a Cashier, it is the responsibility of the petitioner to maintain cash book and handle cash, which the petitioner failed to do so and lost his confidence as handling cash is based on confidence. Furthermore, on perusal of the record, it is quite evident that there has been no procedural irregularity from the initiation of disciplinary proceeding till its culmination as the petitioner has been found guilty of the charges by the enquiry officer.
Furthermore, on perusal of the record, it is quite evident that there has been no procedural irregularity from the initiation of disciplinary proceeding till its culmination as the petitioner has been found guilty of the charges by the enquiry officer. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and others Vs Raj Kishore Yadav and Another as reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 at paragraph 4 has held that: “4. ........ It is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquriy officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed..........”. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India and Another as reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 has held that High Court under Article 226 cannot disturb the facts and findings given by the disciplinary authority. 6. Now, the moot question which falls for determination by this Court is as to whether the impugned order of punishment can be interfered with by this Court on the ground of doctrine of proportionality or in other words on the question of quantum of punishment. It appears that order of dismissal from services passed by the disciplinary authority was appealed before the appellate authority, who considering the past service record of the petitioner commuted the punishment of dismissal from services to “demotion to lower stage/Grade”. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Others as reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held that the Court will not interfere with the order, unless the punishment order is one which shocks the conscience of the Court. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma as reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401 . 8. For the discussions made herein above, I do not find any reason to interfere on the ground of doctrine of proportionality also. 9.
Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma as reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401 . 8. For the discussions made herein above, I do not find any reason to interfere on the ground of doctrine of proportionality also. 9. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, I am of the opinion that the writ application does not warrant any interference by this Court and the same is dismissed, being devoid of any merit.