JUDGMENT : M.K. HANJURA, J. 1. Executive Engineer, Civil Investigation and Design Division, PDC, Sopore, has filed this application seeking the indulgence of this Court in condoning the delay of 167 days in filing the Civil 2nd appeal, chiefly on the grounds that in the Civil first appeal filed by him before the Court of the learned District Judge, Bandipora, along with an application for condonation of delay, calling in question the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 24.11.2012, the District Judge dismissed his application by an order dated 24.03.2015. The appellant filed a civil first appeal before this Court, which was dismissed in default on 14.08.2015. The appellant filed a re-admission motion and subsequently sought the withdrawal of the same, which was allowed. The appellant-applicant filed the application alongwith Civil first appeal before this Court with due diligence and, therefore, the time taken for prosecuting this appeal has to be excluded from the period of limitation as he had chosen a wrong remedy under the bona fide belief and on legal advice tendered by his counsel and in case the application for Condonation of delay is not allowed, the appellant department will suffer an irreparable loss. The application of the appellant is buttressed with an affidavit. In his objections, the respondent has vehemently resisted the application of the appellant, primarily, on the grounds that the application for Condonation of delay in preferring the Civil 2nd appeal is grossly misconceived on facts and law; it has been filed in a most casual manner. The appellant has engaged the respondent in a series of unwarranted litigations. The respondent filed a suit for accounts and release of payment before the Court of learned Sub Judge, Bandipora on 25.11.1999. A preliminary decree was passed in his favour on 19.09.2003, which was followed by the final judgment and decree dated 24.11.2012. It was based on reasons. The appellant/defendant assailed the said judgment in an appeal along with an application for Condonation of delay alleging negligence of the counsel. The Learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bandipora, dismissed the said application. Thereafter, the appellant filed a Civil first appeal against the impugned order of District Judge, before this Court, which came to be dismissed for want of prosecution on 14.08.2015. The Learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bandipora, dismissed the said application. Thereafter, the appellant filed a Civil first appeal against the impugned order of District Judge, before this Court, which came to be dismissed for want of prosecution on 14.08.2015. The appellant-applicant with a litigious mind filed an application for restoration of the appeal alongwith an application for Condonation of delay, which was subsequently withdrawn and later on he filed the instant application with the aim and object to drag and engage the respondent unnecessarily in a cycle of vexatious litigation. The appellant-applicant has not tendered any plausible explanation in his application nor has he shown any sufficient cause for the Condonation of delay. In the end, the respondent/plaintiff has prayed that the application be rejected and the appeal be dismissed with costs as the same shall further the ends of justice. 2. Heard and considered. 3. The learned Sub-Judge passed the judgment and decree in the suit of the plaintiff/respondent on 24.11.2012. The appellant-applicant filed an appeal along with the application for Condonation of delay on 16.12.2015, i.e. after an approximate period of more than three years from the date of the judgment and decree. The petitioner has dragged the respondent plaintiff for all these years in frivolous litigations and he has been deprived to harvest the fruits of a long drawn litigation. 4. It cannot be disputed that the Law of Limitation has to be applied with all its vigor and rigor as prescribed by the Statute. One cannot escape the consequences of section 5 of the J&K Limitation Act, 1995, which provides that for the extension of the period of limitation in a given case, the condition precedent is that the applicant or the appellant has to satisfy the Court that he/she has carved out a sufficient cause in seeking the indulgence of the Court for not preferring the Appeal or Application within the stipulated time. The appellant-applicant cannot escape the liability of satisfying the Court that the Appeal was filed with due diligence. The Courts cannot come to the aid and rescue of the applicants where the application for condonation of delay does not spell out sufficient cause and the approach of the applicant, in making such application, is casual and cryptic. 5. The appellant-applicant cannot escape the liability of satisfying the Court that the Appeal was filed with due diligence. The Courts cannot come to the aid and rescue of the applicants where the application for condonation of delay does not spell out sufficient cause and the approach of the applicant, in making such application, is casual and cryptic. 5. Testing the application of the Applicant on the touch stone of the law, governing the subject, it will be profitable to quote paragraph 7 of the law laid down in State of J&K and Others vs. Dr. Showkat Ali Mufti and Others, 2010 (4) JKJ 638 [HC] herein below, in verbatim: “7. In the case P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 , the Apex Court, at paragraph 6 ruled as under: “Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay ailed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.” 6. In another case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deliberating upon the question of condonation of a delay of 264 days on an application preferred by the Government, observed as under: “2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better bet set out in petitioner's own words: ................... ................... 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better bet set out in petitioner's own words: ................... ................... 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support of this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant, as indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common Interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.” 7. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above to the facts of the instant case, there has been a reckless delay of 167 days in filing the appeal and no explanation worth the name has come forward on that count. The applicant has not made even a murmur to explain this delay. He has taken shelter under the past by justifying that the proceedings before the Court of District Judge and the High Court were initiated by him under a reasonable belief and with due diligence, therefore, this period has to be excluded from counting the period of limitation. These proceedings appear to have been prosecuted by him in the most cavalier manner. Both these proceedings were initiated after a prolonged delay. These proceedings appear to have been prosecuted by him in the most cavalier manner. Both these proceedings were initiated after a prolonged delay. No doubt, a liberal approach has to be adopted in the matter of condonation of delay when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the applicant but in the instant case the applicant-appellant took his own time in filing the Appeal. The law laid down in AIR 2011 SC 1237 enunciates this principle and it lays down as follows: “........3. This appeal emanates from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court (High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) in Misc. Case No. 1569 or 2007 in W.A. No. 72020 of 2006. The appeal filed by the Union of India was dismissed by the High Court because of inordinate delay of 239 days. The Division Bench of the High Court, while dismissing the appeal, has observed as under: “We have gone, through the contents of the petition. The delay occurred because of the respondents took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. It is not that they were prevented by any reason which is beyond their control to take such a decision in time. Even otherwise, on merits of the case also it does not appear to have any tenable ground of appeal. In the circumstances, we do not see any merits in this petition.” 4. We have also gone through the Condonation of delay application which was filed in the High Court. In our considered view, the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay because no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay. ............. 6. The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.” 8. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.” 8. Resort can also be had to an elaborate and a lucid judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the relevant excerpts of which are as under: “.........21.2(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant nor to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. ............. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22.1(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harboring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. ............. 31. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice.” 9. The applicant-appellant appears to have drafted the application for condonation of delay recklessly without giving a proper account of the dates and details of the grounds agitated in it. The applicant-appellant appears to have drafted the application for condonation of delay recklessly without giving a proper account of the dates and details of the grounds agitated in it. Recourse has been had to the leisure and pleasure in moving the application and to cap it all, the applicant has not knocked the doors of the Court with clean hands. Fair play has become a casualty at the hands of the applicant for the simple reason that he has not justified the delay in filing the appeal in any manner whatsoever. 10. To substantiate this contention further, a cue can be had from the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in COD No. 237/2016 (LPA No. 06/2016), wherein it has been held as follows: “1. There is a delay of 310 days in filing the accompanying appeal. The COD application which is under consideration is vague and without any specific details explaining the day to day delay in filing the appeal. The only explanation that has been given is that after receipt of the judgment, the appellant examined the judgment which took “sometime” and thereafter, the judgment was sent to the State Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry for further action. It is further stated that the Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry examined the judgment and after examining the same, it was decided that an LPA should be filed and this also took “considerable time” and ultimately sanction for filing of the appeal was granted by the Law Department. 2. No reasons have been indicated as to why in the first instance examination of the judgment took time and why in the second instance, the Law Department took considerable time in deciding to file an appeal. 3. Sufficient cause for the delay clearly has not been shown by the applicants/appellants. Consequently, the COD application is dismissed. The accompanying appeal also stands dismissed.” 11. Viewed in the context of what has been said and done above, I am of the considered opinion that the applicant has failed to explain the delay of 167 days in filing the Appeal. Therefore, the application for Condonation of Delay, in filing the Appeal, is rejected, as a consequence of which, the civil 2nd Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time.